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Following the United Kingdom's (UK) withdrawal from the European Union (EU), there is uncertainty in the financial services industry on equivalence of regulatory regimes. This also affects the insurance industry. As of now, it is not clear if the UK’s supervisory regime (“Solvency UK”) will be classified as equivalent to the European Solvency II supervisory regime. After no equivalence decision was taken during the Brexit transition period and there are efforts by the UK in the form of the UK Solvency II Review and the Financial Services and Markets Bill to adapt Solvency II more to the characteristics of the national insurance market, the uncertainties are intensified. Although Solvency II non-equivalence would have a significant impact on insurance groups operating in both the UK and the EU, there has been no detailed analysis of whether these initiatives could have an impact on a future Solvency II equivalence decision. The purpose of this paper is to address and close this research gap with a literature review and a subsequent equivalence mapping and discussion.

Based on the literature review methodology, this paper draws on academic sources as well as publications from governments and regulators, articles from consultancies and subject matter experts and uses this literature to provide an overview of the current state of research on equivalence in the wider financial services industry, but specifically on Solvency II equivalence, the UK Solvency II Review and the Financial Services and Markets Bill. Based on this literature review, the paper also forms the basis for an innovative and forward-looking Solvency II equivalence mapping and discussion.

Several articles state that differences between Solvency II and Solvency UK could harm a future Solvency II equivalence decision. The UK Solvency II Review and the Financial Services and Markets Bill are two initiatives that support the objective of aligning the Solvency II supervisory regime more closely with the circumstances of the UK insurance market. Although both initiatives contribute to the fact that Solvency UK differs in parts from Solvency II, based on the literature review and the subsequent equivalence mapping and discussion, there are currently no reforms that should harm future Solvency II equivalence decisions.

This paper provides a previously non-existent overview of equivalence in the wider financial services industry, but specifically on Solvency II equivalence, the UK Solvency II Review and the Financial Services and Markets Bill, and brings them together in an innovative equivalence discussion. It thus presents the current state of knowledge on Solvency II after Brexit and develops it further around a mapping against the equivalence criteria. As non-equivalence could have significant implications for insurance groups operating in both the UK and the EU, this paper is a useful and practical study that provides a previously non-existent equivalence mapping and discussion based on current initiatives and publications. It thus closes the research gap identified and reduces uncertainties in the insurance industry and can be used as a blueprint for detailed and forward-looking equivalence mappings and discussions for the wider financial services industry.

This chapter investigates the impact of the euro crisis on Asia’s short-term economic outlook. This chapter tries to answer this question by examining both the trade and financial channels of crisis transmission. More specifically, it looks at the effect of euro crisis on Asian exports and growth, contagion from EU financial markets to Asian financial markets, and influence of EU bank lending on credit growth in Asia. The chapter also touches upon Asia’s policy space to assess how well the region is positioned to weather another major external shock. This chapter finds that the impact of euro crisis on developing Asia points to a sizable but manageable short-term impact. Furthermore, our analysis points to a significant effect on the region’s financial systems, especially its banking sector. This chapter informs policymakers of the impact of the euro crisis and advice to continue to keep a close eye on eurozone developments and their ramifications for their economies.

Norway is a small nation state on the northernmost coastline of Western Europe, integrated in the Western world economy. For centuries Norway's integration in the world economy had been based on exports of raw materials such as fish and timber, as well as shipping services. In the early 20th century, furnace-based metals (made possible by cheap hydropower) were added to this export basket. Just as the world economy entered an increasingly unstable phase in 1970s, another natural resource was discovered in Norway: petroleum – that is, oil and natural gas from the North Sea. This chapter analyses the challenges and possibilities inherent in the Norwegian strategy of developing an oil economy in a world economic situation influenced by new and stronger forms of international integration through the four decades between 1970 and 2010.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the long‐term impact of the current financial and economic crisis on competition in the European Union (EU) banking sector.

The article first discusses the long term role of competition in the banking sector, commenting on policy developments prior to the crisis. Then the impact of the crisis is discussed focusing on two main areas of policy state: aids and bank regulation and supervision. The article culminates with the conclusions.

The main findings about state aids are that the efforts of the Commission to ensure that aided companies would not use the government support to distort competition seem to be working. However, given that the full impact on competition of these aids may take years to be felt, the Commission should be prepared to take action where necessary to ensure that competition will be protected. The provision of state aids could not have been avoided due to the grave systemic risks associated with bank failures. In respect of regulation and supervision, the article concluded that there is a lot of work to be done in this area to ensure that mistakes that led to the crisis will not be repeated but also that there is need for the Commission to ensure that the reforms to the regulatory and supervisory architecture do not occur at the expense of competition.

The article contains proposals about policy adjustments, thus contributing to the ongoing debate about the role of competition policy in the efforts to address the impact of the crisis.

The economic and financial crisis, especially the sovereign debt crisis, discovered many deficiencies and weaknesses in the banking sector in the European Union (EU). The need for special surveillance and supervision of cross-border banking cooperation and termination of the toxic link between sovereign debt and banking sector have accelerated the process of forming and establishing a Banking Union (BU). An integrated financial framework has been established in which the European Central Bank (ECB) through the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has a key role and the responsibility for the overall supervision of the banking sector of the euro zone. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and schemes of the Single Deposit Guarantee Mechanism (SDGM) are under the national supervisory authorities while the European Banking Authority (EBA) is responsible for developing the Single Rules. From the new architecture is expected the preservation of the single market and a common currency, breaking “toxic connections” between sovereign debt and banks, mitigation and removal of financial instability and economic growth. The research shows that the BU together with the ECB in a certain sense, also contributes to the normalization of credit and financial conditions in the single mark. Estimates through SSM, conducted by the ECB and the EBA, during, 2014 and 2015 on 107 banks in 21 countries indicate progress toward solvency and resilience of the banking system of the euro area. Despite some initial success the entire project BU seems to have missed on opportunities, resulted in late reactions, and was too complex to be feasible. The political will of national governments to give up sovereignty over its banking sector and transfer competencies to the supranational institutions is a key factor in the success or failure of a BU. It seems so but past experience indicates that there is no political willingness to solve problems. Mainly most of the government avoids cleaning a hidden “skeleton in closets” due to lack of means for recapitalization while some are trying for loans from the ECB to help their banks. The ECB plays a key oversight role at the EU level and has too much power, which can cause risks caused by conflicting goals. The ECB is losing the role of the final refuge of liquidity, which is the main disadvantage of a BU. The SSM is susceptible to criticism due to difficulty in operation because of slow incorporation of European legislation into national law. Slow implementation carries risks of fragmentation of the market, regardless of the responsibility of the ECB. The financial capacity of the temporary agreement with the SRM is insufficient in solving the crisis of more banks while procedural application is complex and time-consuming. Planned backstop with a centralized resource is a resolution that is insufficient for solving the failure of big systemic banks, which are too big to bail. The heterogeneity of the existing Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) and the banking systems of the member states of the euro zone caused controversy in terms of setting of common insurance schemes. The procedures for the recovery and resolution of critical banks are problematic.

The purpose of this paper is to answer a specific research question: How have EU and US regulators translated the idea of central clearing into law?

A meticulous legal research is carried out. First, the pre‐crisis regulatory regime for credit default swap (CDS) is reviewed, from a securities law angle as well as from a comparative Euro‐American perspective. Next, the regulatory processes leading to the adoption of the central clearing regulations are discussed. Thereafter, a material comparative analysis is made of the provisions related to central clearing in the EU and US regulatory initiatives. Finally, the paper is concluded with an evaluation of both legislations in the light of all previous analyses.

The research first shows that central clearing regulations rely on a series of presumptions, both concerning the gravity of counterparty risk threats and the necessity of central clearing. Additionally, the EU and US clearing regulations are similar with regard to the broad innovations they introduce, i.e. the mandatory central clearing of a variety of over‐the‐counter derivatives and counterparty risk management requirements for central clearing institutions and for non‐cleared swaps. However, the specific content of the provisions often differs. Furthermore, both legislations are limited to enouncing broad principles. This is also the case for the crucial provisions related to counterparty risk management. Therefore, these provisions in se do not guarantee the proper regulation of counterparty risk management practices. Consequently, much is to be expected from the implementing measures adopted by regulatory institutions.

The paper provides an overview of those provisions in the European and US regulations that specifically concern central clearing for CDS. It is one of the first papers which does this in a very well‐structured and clearly written manner. Also it is one of the first to provide a clear comparison between the provisions in the EU and the US regulations.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the outcome of European Union (EU) deregulation and competition policies on the competitive conditions of the main EU banking markets.

After a review of deregulation and competitition policies in the EU banking industry, the degree of competition in the largest five EU banking markets using is tessted both structural (concentration ratios and Herfindahl‐Hirshman indices) and non‐structural (H‐statistics and Lerner index) approaches.

Results indicate that EU banking markets are becoming progressively more concentrated and that there is no evidence of an increase in competitive pressure. Country differences are also apparent thereby indicating that despite the sustained regulatory interventions, significant barriers to the integration of EU retail banking markets remain. In line with recent literature, the analysis also seems to provide further evidence that concentration is not necessarily a good proxy for competition.

Increased market concentration and its effects on competition are of relevance in a period of renewed EU regulatory efforts to remove the remaining barriers to the integration of financial markets. The evaluation of competitive conditions and market power in EU banking are therefore of interest to policy‐makers and regulators.

The paper seeks to highlight the differences among EU countries in a series of institutional factors (e.g. enforcement, securities regulation, investor protection and ownership concentration) in order to test whether these differences are associated with the European variability in earnings management practices and, as a result, in the quality of financial information.

The approach is to use cluster analysis and regression analysis.

The results of the study confirm the main hypothesis in that earnings management practices are significantly lower in those EU countries with an institutional framework more favourable to a high quality of financial reporting (i.e. in those countries with a higher level of enforcement of the rules, stricter securities regulation, lower ownership concentration and a higher degree of investor protection).

The study presents the limitations typical from cross‐country studies. Moreover, the results should be interpreted cautiously as earnings management is difficult to measure. Future research should explore further the theoretical relations among institutional factors and earnings management practices by taking into consideration potential endogeneity issues.

The results of the study suggest that a single EU financial market should be based not only on a harmonization of financial reporting standards (such as the International Reporting Financing Standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Board) but also on a harmonization of enforcement rules, investor protection mechanisms, and securities regulation.

The main contribution is to justify from an empirical point of view the necessity of the recent EU convergence regulatory initiatives in the areas of shareholder protection, enforcement and securities regulation to facilitate the construction of the pan‐European stock market.

This paper aims to discuss key concerns surrounding the recent implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID II). It focuses on the UK regime. The insights derived are envisaged to be helpful guides for participants and regulators in financial markets.

This paper used the legal-economics perspective. It relied on primary data from statutes and regulations and secondary data from the public domain to analyze the phenomenon. The analytical framework comprised the following sections: Introduction, MiFID I review, MiFID II scope, MiFID II key concerns and concluding remarks.

Only half of the EU Member States including the UK managed to transpose MiFID II within the 3rd January 2018 effective date. At this early stage of implementation, various teething problems were encountered. These pertained to costs and charges reporting, firm governance, product governance, transaction reporting, best execution and research. Owing to the sheer scale and complexity of MIFID II, most entities barely coped with their reporting obligations. Noting the situation, the Financial Conduct Authority assured firms taking all sufficient steps that they would be treated fairly.

The paper was not sufficiently empirical. However, the study benefited reasonably from triangulation of data and perspectives to provide good insights on the implementation effects of the complex and voluminous EU rules for governing financial markets with global implications.

Investors could gain from the enhanced transparency and best execution rules. Investment banks could gain from the emerging resilient, integrated and efficient financial markets. Regulators with better access to more and higher quality reporting could intervene more effectively when required.

This paper assembled and critically analyzed currently available research insights in these areas so as to provide useful guidance to those needing to work and comply with MiFID II rules and academics teaching financial services law.

Published in June 2020, the European Union (EU) Taxonomy Regulation is an important tool for the reorientation of capital flows toward sustainability, establishing a classification system that enables investors to identify green economic activities. Confronted by the reporting demands of this regulation, companies are caught in a sustainability economic revolution. This study seeks primarily to understand firms’ responses to the EU taxonomy, and whether they recognize value creation opportunities by aligning market and nonmarket strategies with the taxonomy goals. For that, we conducted expert interviews and adopted a conceptual framework based on institutional theory, dynamic capabilities view and nonmarket strategy research. Our findings indicate that most firms respond reactively, while firms with sustainability-driven business models tend to respond in an anticipatory way, and firms with high greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and low taxonomy eligibility in a defensive way. We also find evidence for mimetic isomorphism related to the influence of consulting and auditing services. Further, high levels of uncertainty, ambiguity and lack of clarity has a great impact on firms’ responses and motives. Finally, this study highlights the EU taxonomy considering a paradigmatic shift toward sustainability, which is not recognized by most firms. To this end, we find that most companies have not identified opportunities arising from nonmarket integration and, rather, see the taxonomy only as an extra regulation to be compliant with. Hence, we argue that it is crucial that firms contextualize the taxonomy within its larger institutional paradigmatic shift to capture the importance of going beyond mere compliance.