Search results

This study investigates the relation between lawsuit attributes that support an inference of fraud and the probability and the size of securities lawsuit settlement. A sample of 607 securities lawsuits between 1996 and 2006 is used in the analysis of the probability of settlement and a subsample of 261 lawsuit settlements is used in the analysis of the size of settlement. The empirical results indicate a positive association between the probability of a settlement and accounting irregularity, SEC enforcement action and stock offer. Accounting irregularity and SEC enforcement action are also documented to be positively related to the size of the settlement. The results imply that a stock offer supports a strong inference of fraud and the presence of accounting irregularity and SEC enforcement action in a lawsuit filing strengthens the fraud allegation and increases the likelihood of a settlement. The findings also suggest that the stronger the inference of fraud, the greater the size of the settlement. The results of this study add to our understanding of the determinants of securities lawsuit settlement. Studies using securities litigation as a proxy for fraud can use the results of this study to distinguish between fraud-related and nonfraud-related lawsuits.

This chapter analyses efforts exerted and utilities obtained in a double lawsuit. This is a usual situation when insurance companies are involved in damage compensation. A victim files the first lawsuit against its insurance company for coverage. If the victim loses, there are no further lawsuits. If the victim wins, the insurance company files the second lawsuit against the perpetrator to recover its expenses.

The situation is described as a two-period game, which is solved with backward induction. The model is based on the Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001) litigation success function that expresses influence of the counterparts’ efforts on the outcome of a lawsuit.

The chapter analyses the optimal resource allocations in each lawsuit as functions of effort unit costs, the value of each lawsuit and the contest intensities in the lawsuits. It is shown that a one-period game where the victim, the insurance company and the perpetrator choose their efforts simultaneously and independently gives the same solution as the two-period game.

In 2008 in the United States 15 million lawsuits were filed. Several of these were linked in the sense that subsequent lawsuits depend on the outcomes of earlier lawsuits.

Lawsuits are commonly analysed separately. The chapter analyses in a novel manner the implications of two linked lawsuits referred to as a double lawsuit.

This study aims to use institutional and upper echelons theories to comprehensively investigate the intricate interplay between TMT legal expertise and firms' adaptive strategies in legal contexts, notably within emerging economies. It explores how upper echelons experiences shape opportunistic compliance strategies, impacting value and risk perceptions. Drawing on upper echelons theory, the research probes how TMT legal expertise molds firms’ involvement in significant lawsuits, accounting for influential roles. It scrutinizes TMT’s impact on legal strategies, positing that managerial discretion emerges from environmental factors, organizational attributes and executive traits. The study underscores TMT’s internal incentives and external factors’ interplay, molding strategic legal engagement.

To validate this framework, statistical analysis is performed on data from 2,584 Chinese-listed firms. The data set spans 2010–2015, with 5,713 material lawsuits. Chosen due to reliable institutional-level incentives data from the China Market Index Database, years 2016–2019 are excluded for methodological disparities. Moreover, 2007–2009 is omitted to mitigate the potential financial crisis impact. This study’s 11,272 observations ensure robust empirical exploration, offering insights into the interplay of TMT legal expertise, institutional factors and firms’ legal strategies.

The study reveals that firms led by executives with legal expertise are more prone to engage in significant lawsuits, indicating strategic use of legal skills. TMT age moderates this, with older teams less likely to engage. TMT tenure’s effect remains unclear due to tenure-risk preference complexity. Institutional factors matter; less legally mature regions reduce managers’ legal risk intention. Results confirm hypotheses and highlight executive human capital’s impact on firms’ legal strategies.

This study acknowledges contributions while highlighting limitations, including the need for detailed distinctions in lawsuit roles and exploration of heterogeneous TMT power dynamics. Further research is proposed for nuanced power dynamics and comprehensive TMT legal background data. The study advances upper echelons theory by introducing TMT legal expertise as a factor influencing strategic lawsuit behavior. It challenges institutional theory by showing the adaptable legal context, beyond fixed constraints. Moderating factors – group risk attitude and external knowledge – deepen understanding of upper echelons’ impact. Enhanced data collection is encouraged to address limitations and refine findings.

This study’s implications extend to managerial practices. Firms should acknowledge the dynamic legal system, using TMT legal expertise for strategic legal challenges. Executives should pragmatically approach regulations. While legal professionals enhance compliance, caution is needed in selecting TMT members with legal expertise due to the risk of misusing it for unnecessary litigation, potentially misaligned with financial performance goals.

This study combines institutional and upper echelons theories to explore TMT legal expertise’s impact on firms’ adaptive strategies in emerging economies. It challenges the idea of a universally constraining legal environment and highlights how TMT legal expertise enhances firms’ management of complex legal risks. The research introduces TMT legal expertise as an influencing factor in strategic lawsuits, revealing nuanced relationships between legal contexts and strategic decisions. The findings enrich upper echelons theory, challenge conventional institutional views and identify moderating factors that deepen the understanding of upper echelons’ influence in legal landscapes.

Considering the importance of environmental lawsuits in the capital market specifically and society more generally, the authors examine whether environmental lawsuits are related to the cost of bank loans for the first time.

This study uses a US sample of 7,684 loans from 1,409 individual borrowing firms over the 1995–2015 period. The hypothesis is tested using lagged data from the year before the start of a bank loan, and firm fixed effects panel regression analysis is applied to control for correlated omitted variable bias. To further address endogeneity concerns, the authors use a difference in differences analysis that exploits the Deepwater Horizon oil spill on April 20, 2010, to establish causality. Finally, the authors use the entropy balancing method as an additional endogeneity check.

The authors find a positive relationship between environmental lawsuits and firms' bank loan costs. The results are economically significant. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in environmental lawsuits is related to a 2.07 basis point increase in bank loan costs. The results are robust to various endogeneity checks. Cross-sectional analyses indicate that a poor information environment, weak corporate governance, and low corporate social responsibility (CSR) levels strengthen the positive relationship between environmental lawsuits and bank loan costs. Finally, additional analyses show that environmental lawsuits are significantly negatively related to the loan amount and maturity contract provisions.

The authors provide new empirical evidence that increasing understanding of the economic consequences of environmental lawsuits on bank loan costs.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of the number of lawsuits on firm performance and in-house legal department size. More importantly, this paper also aims to explore the interaction effect of in-house legal department size on the aforementioned lawsuit-performance relationship.

The empirical analyses are performed by using secondary data. Structural equation modeling is employed in order to examine multiple structural relationships between the number of lawsuits, size of in-house legal department, and firm performance.

Three key findings were generated: number of lawsuits has a significant detrimental effect on firm performance; number of lawsuits is positively associated with size of in-house legal departments; and size of in-house legal departments negatively moderates the relationship between number of lawsuits and firm performance.

The results corroborate the harmfulness of lawsuits. On the one hand, a large number of lawsuits damage the firm’s financial performance directly; on the other hand, more lawsuits lead to enlarged in-house legal departments which further aggravate the negative effects of lawsuits on firm performance. These results suggest that firms should spend more effort in properly managing legal departments.

This paper contributes to the literature by empirically examining the economic impacts of lawsuits on firm performance. Moreover, it also explored the notion that having a large size of in-house legal department does not mitigate, but aggravates the harmfulness of lawsuits on firm performance.

The purpose of this paper is to study lawsuits involving the police using newspaper accounts from three large cities in the USA.

A content analysis was conducted using 634 newspaper articles from the New York Times, Chicago Sun‐Times, and the Los Angeles Times from 1993‐2003.

Research findings reveal how prevalent racial and gender discrimination issues are in lawsuits involving the police; some of the differences in lawsuits filed by police employees compared to those filed by citizens; the extent of disciplinary action taken against police officers named in lawsuits, and any organizational changes (i.e. department policies, procedures, or training) made as a result of lawsuits filed against police agencies.

The findings from this study are based solely on what the newspapers chose to report. It may be the case that newspapers only report on extraordinary lawsuits involving the police, or lawsuits that result in moderate to large jury awards or settlements.

Since there is currently no national data collection effort focused on lawsuits filed against the police, researchers are left to use the data sources available to them (in this case, newspaper articles).

This paper presents the first study of lawsuits involving the police using newspaper accounts. Previous studies have used survey data, court records, and interviews.

This article aims to examine the influence of chief executive officer (CEO) internal political beliefs on labor relations. Prior research has paid little attention to channels through which the internal personal value system of managers enhances or deteriorates firm value. The authors provide evidence consistent with CEOs adopting labor policies impacting incumbent management–labor relationships based upon their political ideologies.

The research design tests the impact of CEO political ideology on labor relation using an individual CEO’s personal information and firm affiliation, employee lawsuit information, financial contributions to candidates and committees, and firm financial information. The authors compiled a sample of 4,354 unique CEOs from 2,558 US firms that are covered by ExecuComp and used 18,404 firm-year observations for the study’s analysis. A Heckman two-stage estimation process is used to address a potential sample selection bias and match the requirements of exclusion and relevance criteria.

Findings indicate that firms led by Republican-leaning CEOs are more likely to be sued by their employees, especially for violating union rights. Moreover, the findings of the study uncovered that Republican-leaning CEOs have fewer cases dismissed or withdrawn compared to Democrat-leaning CEOs and are also less likely to settle court cases prior to trial. Results indicate that Republican-leaning CEOs are associated with more substantial decreases in firm value compared to Democrat-leaning CEOs when facing labor allegations. The authors further show that firm value is lower for all firms facing litigation, with the magnitude of the decrease being more pronounced for firms with Republican CEOs.

Firm affiliations are identified using ExecuComp, employee lawsuit information from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), financial contributions to candidates and committees from the Federal Election Committee (FEC) website, and financial information from Compustat. To the extent that these websites are inaccurate, such as financial contributions being underreported, the findings reported here may understate the relationships reported in this article.

The authors capture CEO political ideology using political contributions. There may be other means, such as physical space and personal effort, by which one could also estimate the party and intensity of CEO political ideology. This information is unavailable.

While presidential politics has four-year cycles, managerial finance is a daily activity. While political affiliation is most clearly measurable through monetary contributions, one can see implications of manager political leaning through their relationship with labor throughout the election cycle.

The analyses of this study indicate that labor unions are more likely to sponsor lawsuits and stronger allegations in firms with Republican CEOs and show that withdrawal, settlement or dismissal rates are lower when firms are managed by Republican managers, resulting in higher subsequent legal costs and potentially damaged employee morale. Also, this paper investigates whether lawsuits have a greater negative consequence on firm value when the firm is run by a Republican CEO. The authors find that lawsuits significantly lower Tobin's Q for Republican-led firms compared to companies with Democratic and apolitical CEOs. The authors further show that firm value is lower for all firms facing litigation, with the magnitude of the decrease being more pronounced for firms with Republican CEOs.

The authors study the relationship between CEO overconfidence and litigation risk by examining employee-level lawsuit data. The purpose of this paper is to better understand the executive characteristics that potentially affect the likelihood of employee litigations.

The authors employ a unique data set of employee lawsuits from the National Labor Relations Board – “Disposition of Unfair Labor Practice Charges” – which includes complaints, litigations and decisions. The data spans the years 2000–2014. The authors employ the option-based CEO overconfidence metric of Malmendier et al. (2011) as the primary explanatory variable.

The authors find that overconfident CEOs are less likely to be subjected to labor-related litigations. The authors document that firms with overconfident CEOs have fewer lawsuits opened by both labor unions and individuals. The authors then investigate the effect of employee litigations on firm performance to understand why overconfident CEOs are less prominent among lawsuits. The authors show that litigations lower corporate investment and value of capital expenditures for responsible firms, which may limit overconfident CEOs’ ability to invest. Therefore, the results may reveal the fact that overconfident CEOs may prefer to align with the interest of their employees to avoid reduced investment opportunities.

The paper makes three main contributions. First, it provides the first large-sample evidence on CEO overconfidence and labor relations. The authors employ data on firm-level labor litigation that contains both the case reason and case outcome. Second, this paper adds to the growing literature of CEO overconfidence and governance practices in the workplace. Finally, the study highlights the importance of employee treatment and explores the impact of labor lawsuits on firm value.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of class action litigation on firms' cost of equity capital.

The paper uses three different models to estimate the cost of equity capital. To separate the impact of lawsuit filings on the cost of equity capital from that of the revelation event, a sample of lawsuits with a long lag between the disclosure events and filing dates was analyzed. Also, a comparison group study was conducted to illustrate the distinct impact of a lawsuit filing on the defendant firm's cost of equity capital. Finally, a multivariate analysis was used to examine the factors that affect the magnitude of such impact.

The paper finds that filing of a class action lawsuit results in a significant increase in the defendant firm's cost of equity capital incremental to the effect of the disclosure event. Additionally, increases in the cost of equity capital after the lawsuit filings are higher when the lawsuits involve generally accepted accounting principle (GAAP) violation and have high merit, and when the defendant firms are small and have high leverage.

Findings in this paper suggest that the filing of a lawsuit brings new information to the market and is likely to increase the defendant firm's cost of equity capital by increasing the perceived risk in corporate governance, information asymmetry and operation.

This paper reveals securities class actions increase the defendant firms' cost of equity capital.

The purpose of this paper is to study the relation between compensation clawbacks and lawsuits and analyze how these two corporate disciplinary forces interact. This paper hypothesizes that by allowing firms to recoup compensation from managers who breach their fiduciary duty, clawbacks provide a form of discipline that potentially reduces the likelihood of managerial wrongdoing, which, in turn, lowers the risk of corporate lawsuits.

This paper identifies whether or not a company in the S&P 1500 had a clawback policy between 2007 and 2014 by searching the company filings and press releases. The authors also construct different proxies for litigation risk and lawsuit outcomes using the Audit Analytics Database. They then perform a variety of empirical tests to examine the association between clawbacks and litigation risk and the association between clawbacks and litigation outcomes.

This paper finds that firms with higher litigation risk are more likely to adopt a clawback policy. In addition, after the adoption of clawback provisions, litigation risk significantly declines, suggesting that clawback policies are effective in reducing the likelihood of corporate lawsuits. Furthermore, firms with clawback policies are approximately 50 per cent more likely to have lawsuits against them dismissed or settled for lower amounts (approximately 12 per cent lower).

The findings of this paper provide insights to the efficacy of a current change in compensation regulation, the mandatory clawback adoption requirement by the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010.

This paper contributes to the literature on both clawbacks and litigation, as it is the first to analyze the relation between the two.