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Directors help determine the strategic direction of a corporation and are responsible for ensuring the institution has a good system of internal control. Banking institutions without a strategic direction emphasizing sound lending practices that promote the long-run financial health and viability of the institution will be sued more frequently than peer institutions. Institutions that do not have a good system of internal control will also be sued more frequently. Hence, legal expense is a bank corporate governance measure. We compare the performance of bank legal expense and a widely cited corporate governance index in a regression framework to determine which better predicts bank performance. The regressions indicate legal expense is a much better predictor, hence a better measure of bank corporate governance. Regulators should require legal expense reporting and rank institutions by the ratio of legal expense to assets to help identify institutions with weak governance. Seven case studies illustrate the role of legal expense in corporate governance.

The year 1986 did not bode well for investment banker Dennis Levine. In a civil injunctive action the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or the Commission) alleged that Levine, through an insider dealing scheme, violated several anti‐fraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Without admitting or denying that he obtained over $12m in illicit profits from secretly trading in the securities of 54 companies, Levine settled the SEC action and was ordered to disgorge over $10m to the court.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the application of the fraud exception rule and try to analyze the different approaches in regard to the implication of fraud rule in letters of credit. Further, this paper tries to explore if there is an obstacle when applying such exception rule in common law and whether there is an overlap with interpreting the said rule. The same fact appears in civil law courts as well.

This paper is a comparative study which uses analytical approach and critical legal thinking.

The scope of the fraud defence, the US legal systems demonstrate that the scope of the fraud rule is extended and covers both fraud in documents and fraud in the underlying contract, while in contrast, in UK the rule’s scope is restricted to fraud in documents only. Such an approach is reasonable, as it is justified by applying the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits (UCP) rules strictly. That is to say, English courts apply the rules literally, even if it does not lead to fair judgements, while in contrast, American courts seek to enforce justice even if it goes beyond the rules. In any case, restricting the fraud exception to fraud in the documents is the proper approach. The reason for such restriction, on the one hand, is to maintain the integrity of letters of credit and, on the other hand, to affirm the autonomy principle.

Extending the scope of the fraud defence will require banks to go beyond the documents, which is not logical. Banks are neither expert in such transactions nor required to do so. Most importantly, banks are concerned with documents only; it is for the court to go beyond the documents. Although this approach could be criticized, it is important to ensure that the validity of the documentary credit instrument is not compromised. As established by academics, any argument need not engage the bank unless it is in respect of the presented documents. In short, “pay now, argue later” is paramount to distinguish parties’ litigations from banks vs parties’ litigations. In any case, it can be suggested that extending the fraud rule exception to include fraud in the underlying contract from Jordan perspective is not the proper one because it is necessary to maintain the integrity of letters of credit and to affirm the autonomy principle.

The risk of cheque fraud is serious for companies that maintain bank accounts with a high volume of chequing activity. Sophisticated criminals could create convincing replicas of a company's cheques, or steal blank cheques from the company and forge the necessary signatures. In some cases, employees entrusted with clearing accounts payables embezzle company funds by writing cheques to dummy payees and cashing the cheques with false identifications. By the time the fraud is discovered, the criminals and the money are usually long gone, and the bank and the company are left to argue over who should bear the loss.

In most financial institutions, chief risk officers (CROs) and their risk management (RM) staff fulfill a role in managing risk exposures, yet their lack of involvement in the governance has been cited as an influential factor that contributed to the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Various legislative and regulatory bodies have pressured financial firms to improve their risk governance structures to better weather potential future crises. Assuming that CROs and risk committees are given sufficient power to influence the corporate governance of financial institutions, can CROs and risk committees protect financial institutions from violating litigable securities law? Can they improve bank performance? The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The authors employ a principal component analysis to construct a single measure that captures various aspects of RM in a firm. The authors compare the risk governance characteristics of sued firms with their non-sued peers and consider one of the final outcomes of risky behavior: shareholder litigation. The authors compute ROA and buy-and-hold abnormal returns to capture operating and stock performance and examine whether risk governance improves bank performance by reducing litigation risk.

Proper risk governance reduces a firm’s litigation probability. The addition of the RM factor to models that have been previously proposed in the literature improves the accuracy of those models in identifying companies that are most susceptible to class action lawsuits. Better RM improves the financial and stock price performance of financial institutions.

The data collection is laborious as the information about CRO governance has to be hand-collected from the 10-K report. A broader sample employing, e.g., non-US banks may provide additional insights into the relationship between RM practices, shareholder litigation, and bank performance.

The study shows that a bank’s RM functions play a critical role in improving bank and operating performance and in reducing shareholder litigation. Banks should emphasize the RM function.

This is the first study to examine the mechanism behind the positive association between RM and bank performance. The study shows that better RM improves overall bank performance by decreasing litigation risk.

This paper aims to analyze the impact of the introduction of anti-money laundering (AML) regulations on bank stock valuations in the USA. Regulations can have a negative impact on financial returns as a result of increased operational costs, potentially driving down stock valuations and loss of profitability. However, regulations can also have a positive impact on valuations because of greater oversight and increased investor confidence. Findings are useful for assessing the market impact of future regulations.

Event studies and cross-sectional regression analysis are used to determine the impact on bank stock valuations together with specific characteristics of bank size and geographic headquarter location of the bank for identified AML regulations. Hypothesis related to the impact of the introduction of AML regulations are empirically tested based on the statistical significance of cumulative abnormal returns of markets.

AML regulations introduced in 1998 had a positive impact on bank stock valuations, while the USA PATRIOT Act legislation of 2001 had a negative impact. These findings suggest that recent AML regulation is a cost compliance burden for banks, where the costs of operations outweigh the benefits of improved processes. Larger banks see a more negative impact on their bank stock valuations compared to smaller banks, suggesting the market perceives greater cost and less profit for larger banks. Results also show that the location of bank’s headquarters does not significantly impact bank stock valuations.

This paper specifically focuses on the impact of AML regulations on the US banking sector, providing investors, academics and regulators additional insight on the market dynamics of regulations. Identifying whether the introduction of regulations has a significant impact on a bank’s performance will provide both banks and regulators clarity as to the net benefits associated with the current and future AML legislation.

This paper considers the issues facing banks who become engaged in litigation and the strategies and procedures available to obtain the most effective solutions. How these will be affected by the reforms in civil procedure proposed by Lord Woolf are also discussed.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of audit client importance on future bank risk and systemic risk in US-listed commercial banks.

The authors use archival research method.

The authors mainly find that client importance is negatively related with future bank-specific crash risk and distress risk, and also with sector-wide systemic crash risk and systemic distress risk in the future. The authors also report some evidence that these relations become more pronounced during the crisis period than during the non-crisis period. Moreover, the effect of client importance on systemic risk is found to strengthen in banks audited by Big-N auditors, by auditors without clients who restate earnings, and by auditors with more industry expertise.

These findings contribute to the auditing and systemic risk literature.

This study has implications for regulating the banking industry.

This study provides original evidence on how client importance affects bank-specific risk and systemic risk of the banking industry.

Since the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) there has been a plethora of BCCI related litigation. This article considers the latest developments in the BCCI saga while focusing on the current state of litigation in both the UK and the USA. It appears that creditors of BCCI will finally be receiving some of their money which was lost as a result of the closure of BCCI on 5th July, 1991. A compensation package requiring the approval of courts in England, the Cayman Islands and Luxembourg, the three jurisdictions where BCCI headquarters operated from has finally received the requisite approval (the High Court approved the compensation scheme on 19th December, 1994; a Cayman Islands' court gave its approval on 13th January, 1995; a Luxembourg court approved the package on 31st January, 1995). Under the scheme BCCI's majority shareholders, the Government and ruling family of Abu Dhabi, must pay $1.8bn towards a global settlement fund over a period of three years. The courts' decision states that Abu Dhabi will be subject to the same terms as other creditors and will not be absolved from any future legal action brought by creditors as a result of the present compensation agreement. The initial payment of $1.55bn is calculated to reimburse some 250,000 creditors with payments equal to 20 per cent of their losses by this summer, however, such estimates are subject to a separate agreement worth $425m between BCCI's liquidators and the National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia which will not be decided upon by Luxembourg courts until 14th March at the earliest; if this deal is delayed the first payment could drop to 15 per cent. It is anticipated that the final dividend that creditors can expect to receive will be between 20 and 40 per cent, however, this is far from guaranteed due to on‐going litigation and problems in assessing the total number of creditors' claims.