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This study investigates the ex-dividend day stock prices of the firms listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) where the tax rate is higher on dividends than on capital gains. The results help to explain what impact taxes have on the ex-day stock prices behavior in an emerging market.

To examine the tax effect on the ex-day stock prices behavior, this study considers after-tax dividends and computes the raw price ratio, market-adjusted price ratio, raw price drop, market-adjusted price drop. The market-adjusted ex-dividend day abnormal returns and relative trading volume are also examined to determine the direction of investor trading around the ex-day.

The main hypotheses examine whether the mean (median) differs from its theoretical value by using a t-test and nonparametric sign-rank test. The findings suggest that the drop of stock prices on the ex-day on the DSE is not due to taxes or transaction costs but to valuation assumptions made by investors in determining the equilibrium stock price.

Findings of this study will be useful for investors and traders in their valuation assumption to trade around the ex-dividend day.

Market participant’s preference of dividends, and exempted tax and its ultimate contribution to the equity value explain the ex-day stock prices behavior in the Dhaka Stock Exchange.

We examine the ability of co-founders of a firm to create an artificial (or “homemade”) dividend as in Miller and Modigliani (1961). We employ traditional discounted valuation in showing that the act of creating an artificial dividend may decrease the value of the firm because it can divert funds from investment to the consumption of perquisites. Only where there is complete trust in the party to which the shares are sold can a co-founder costlessly create an artificial dividend. It seems likely that a dividend policy, idiosyncratic to the firm’s founders, would be established at the founding of the firm.

This study examines whether dividend payout, an internal corporate governance mechanism, is a substitute for or an outcome of product market competition, an external corporate governance mechanism. The sample includes firms in six of the world’s most prominent economies. We find that firms in more competitive industries pay less in the way of dividends to their shareholders, which is consistent with the notion that dividends and competition are substitutes. We also determine that the above negative relationship is weaker in countries with stronger regulation protecting minority shareholders against corporate self-dealing. Furthermore, the relationship has attenuated following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that increased regulation and enhanced governance standards. Collectively, our findings provide consistent evidence across countries that the two corporate governance mechanisms examined in the study are substitutes, and greater regulation weakens the substitution effect. Our empirical findings are robust to alternative measures of dividend payout, industry definition, and shareholder protection.

The Canadian mutual fund setting is unique in that two governance mechanisms – corporate and trust – coexist. This study empirically examines the impact of each mechanism on fund fees and performance. We find that corporate class funds charge higher fees but deliver superior fee-adjusted returns than trust funds. We then analyze the impact of various board characteristics on fees and performance for corporate class funds. We find that a board with smaller size, CEO duality, and a higher percentage of independent directors is more likely to charge lower fees. In addition, smaller boards are strongly associated with higher fee-adjusted performance. Our study supports agency theory over stewardship theory and provides valuable guidelines for Canadian investors and regulatory agencies.

The first alternative is to enrich shareholding by management. The basic theory of this research is the agency theory. This study aims to examine the institutional ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, and risk that are interconnected directly or indirectly. The research sample was a non-financial company from 2010 to 2014. Four variables will be tested using Two-stage Least Square (2SLS) in the SPSS application. The result of this study represents the overall interdependency relationship among institutional ownership, dividend policy, debt policy, and risk. The research outcome signifies an interdependency relation for endogenous variables, even if some exogenous variables have no significant relation. In addition, the effects of substitution between institutional ownership and dividend policy, debt policy and dividend policy, and institutional ownership and risk. Meanwhile, institutional ownership and dividend policy, risk and dividend policy, and risk and debt policy have no substitution effect.

This chapter investigates the relationship between financial measures and dividend payout policy choices of firms. We examine why firms choose to pay dividends continuously, intermittently, or not pay them. Specifically, the findings provide evidence that firms with relatively larger debts tend to pay dividends less frequently than firms with smaller debts.

The results also suggest that good financial performers are more likely to pay dividends more regularly. Additionally, the results of this study indicate that highly leveraged firms tend to make less frequent payouts than lowly leveraged firms.

Overall, this research adds to our understanding of firms’ dividend payout policy choices. First, evidence on the relationship between the various types of financial measures and firms’ choice of dividend payout frequencies should be useful to investors. Second, the findings of this study provide financial statement users with useful information about the firm’s dividend payout patterns. Third, in general, it also adds to the accounting and finance literature on dividends.

This chapter examines the effect of creditors’ monitoring role on the profitability of firm acquisitions. We use the shares retained by the lead arranger of a syndicated loan as a proxy for monitoring level. We find that acquirer announcement returns are positively related to the shares retained by the lead arranger. The effect of the lead arranger’s shares on the acquirer’s return becomes pronounced in cash acquisition deals, and when there exist financial covenants. Our results suggest that lead arrangers are important not only for monitoring loans but also for successful acquisitions by borrowers. An important policy implication of the main findings of this chapter on bank monitoring is that policy makers should design financial covenants to improve the efficiency of monitoring activities by lead arranging banks in syndicated bank loan deals.

This study investigates the impact of insider-ownership of publicly traded firms on their performance, cost of debt (COD) and cost of equity. We use a sample of 104 non-finance listed companies of Pakistan for the period from 2006 to 2016. Our study is conducted in Pakistan as a developing country in which insider-ownership is dominant, and a weak external corporate governance mechanism increases the payoffs from insider-ownership. We use feasible generalized least square (FGLS) regression methods to examine these hypotheses. Based on agency theory, we find that insider-ownership enhances firm performance. Furthermore, our results show that insider-ownership reduced the COD and equity. Higher ownership decreases the opportunistic behavior of insiders. It also reduces the creditor’s perception of the likelihood of default on loan payments and reduces agency issues among shareholders. The insider will invest in positive NPV projects which will help maximize shareholders’ wealth and minimize the COD. Similarly, the relationship between insider-ownership and cost of equity is significant but negative. Supporting the convergence of interest increase in ownership helps in aligning the goals of managers and stakeholders whereby the insider will focus on value creation by minimizing equity cost.

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationships between chief executive officers (CEOs) with military service and firm dividend and cash holding decisions.

The authors use a sample of Standard and Poor's (S&P) 1500 firms in the USA over a sample period from 1999 to 2017 and a panel data approach, as well as instrumental variable (IV)analysis. The models control for firm characteristics as well as industry and year-fixed effects.

The results show CEOs with military service are associated with higher total payout and less cash. Higher dividends appear to drive the total payout result. When cash holdings are split into pure cash and short-term investments, the reduction in cash holdings is driven by a reduction in pure cash. The findings are more pronounced for powerful CEOs and CEOs with low labor mobility. Military CEOs are also associated with less risk, measured by stock return volatility and return on assets (ROA) volatility.

Overall, the results are consistent with military CEOs implementing conservative policies that reduce firm risk, curtailing the demand for precautionary cash and reducing the necessity to forego dividend payouts.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of female directors on the dividend policies of 96 ASEAN-5 listed commercial banks between 2015 and 2020.

This paper developed an econometric model to assess the impact of female directors on the banks’ dividend policies. This paper regressed the payout variable on the female director, legal (institutional environment) variables and several control variables. This paper also considered the interaction between the female and legal variables to assess the moderating impact of the institutional environment.

This paper found that female directors positively affected dividend policy and that banks with female directors tended to pay dividends to balance stakeholders’ interests, especially for the minority. This paper also found that the influence of female directors was weaker in countries with strong institutional environments because greater legal protection for shareholders reinforced or replaced corporate governance mechanisms.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to investigate gender diversity and its impact on dividend policy using data from ASEAN-5 countries.