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An individual should be indifferent between a rebate subsidy of rate sr and a matching subsidy of rate sm=sr/(1-sr), and the total amount received by the charity should be the same regardless of subsidy type. Recent laboratory and field experiments contradict these straightforward predictions of standard economic theory: subjects consistently make decisions that result in larger amounts going to the charity under a matching subsidy than under an equivalent rebate subsidy. This paper tests whether this result is due to rebate-aversion – a preference by donors for a match over a rebate subsidy. Consistent with theory, we find no significant preference for one or the other subsidy scheme. However, we do find that, as in previous studies, participants selecting the matching subsidy made decisions that resulted in approximately twice the donations of participants selecting the rebate subsidy donated.

This paper aims to analyze the potentials of dynamic, commitment and revenue-sharing contracts; that a nonrebate offering manufacturer can use to safeguard his profit while his competitor offers customer rebates in a supply chain consisting of two manufacturers and a common retailer.

We consider a two-period supply chain model to explore optimal decisions under eight possible scenarios based on the contract and rebate offering decisions. Because the manufacturers are selling substitutable products, therefore, a customer rebate on one of the products negatively impacts the selling quantity of other. Optimal price, rebate, and quantities are examined and compared to explore the strategic choice for both the rebate offering and non-rebate offering manufacturer. Comparative evaluation is conducted to pinpoint how the parameters such as contract parameters and its nature affect the members.

The results demonstrate that all these contracts instigate the rebate offering manufacturer to provide a higher rebate, but do not ensure a higher profit. If the revenue sharing contract is offered to the common retailer, the effectiveness of the rebate program might reduce significantly, and the rebate offering manufacturer might receives lower profits. A non-rebate offering manufacturer might use a commitment contract to ensure higher profits for all the members and make sure the common retailer continues the product.

The effect of customer rebate vs. supply chain contract under competition has not yet been explored comprehensively. Therefore, the study contributes to the literature regarding interplay among pricing decision, contract choice and rebate promotion in a two-period setting. The conceptual and managerial insights contribute to a better understanding of strategic decision-making for both competing manufacturers under consumer rebates.

This paper aims to compare the rebate computation in Islamic sale-based financing contracts as proposed by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) in its guidelines on ibrāʾ (rebate) – with the rebate computation in conventional finance that is applicable to conventional loans, thus examining if there is a significant difference between the two approaches.

The paper employs the qualitative analysis method, involving review and discussion of relevant literature. Subsequently, a quantitative analysis is utilized to compare both rebate computations: the one proposed by BNM for Islamic sale-based financing contracts and the conventional finance computation that is utilized in conventional loans.

BNM's rebate computation for debts resulting from sale-based financing contracts does not differ from the conventional finance rebate computation applied to conventional loans; such similarity may raise the usury concerns that the conventional finance rebate computation raises.

The paper focuses only on the fixed profit rate rebate computation proposed by BNM guidelines.

The results highlight the need for seeking another rebate computation to be applied in Islamic financial institutions in the case of mandatory bilateral rebate for sale-based financing contracts – a computation that differs from the practice utilized in conventional loans in order to avoid any usury implications associated with conventional finance computation.

The paper examines the rebate practice proposed by BNM for sale-based financing contracts. Forcing a predetermined rebate computation in sale-based financing contracts could be plausible as BNM requires; however, the suggested computation might be questionable because it resembles conventional finance computation.

Mail‐in rebates are an oft used, but poorly understood mechanism to promote the purchase of a product. In particular, prior research suggests that a significant percentage of consumers who purchase a product intending to redeem an accompanying rebate, fail to do so – a phenomenon known as “slippage.” To date, however, there has been very little research designed to understand why this takes place. The authors here aim to propose that the presence of a rebate provides a consumer with the means to justify a preferred course of action. Specifically, when considering the purchase of a desired product that carries a rebate, consumers tend to generate scenarios of successful rebate redemption and fail to adequately account for things that can go wrong in the redemption process. As a result, they systematically overestimate their likelihood of rebate redemption.

The authors conduct three laboratory experiments to test the proposed framework.

Study 1 shows that consumers overestimate their redemption likelihood because they tend to generate scenarios of successful rebate redemption and fail to adequately account for things that can go wrong in the redemption process. In studies 2 and 3, it is found that this effect is moderated by the valence and strength of one's motivation to purchase the promoted product.

The authors propose a new psychological account to explain consumer responses to rebate offers, and in particular study the role of motivation and elaboration. The results suggest that managers could use rebates in situations where customers need a reason to purchase, and that rebates for hedonic products are best delivered at the point‐of‐purchase.

This study aims to examine the scholars’ views on the legality of bilateral rebate in Islamic financial transactions. It also aims to evaluate the contemporary application of bilateral rebate in Islamic banking operation as an alternative to the conventional mechanism in handling the events of early settlement of debt, early termination of debt facility and early withdrawal of term deposit.

The study used deductive and inductive methods to analyze the juristic literature of all the major schools of law on the legality of both bilateral and unilateral rebate in a financial transaction.

The study found bilateral rebate (ibra’ mutabadal), instead of unilateral rebate, to be the best and fairest Islamic mechanism to overcome injustice in several events that may impact the bank’s liquidity such as that of early settlement of debt facility and early withdrawal of term deposit in the sense that the interest (maslahah) of both transacting parties is equally secured.

This study has its limitation, as it only covers the applicability of bilateral rebate in Islamic banking operation. It does not include the applicability of bilateral rebate in other segments of Islamic finance such as Islamic capital markets and Islamic insurance (Takaful business).

This paper has practical implication for Islamic banking industry particularly with regard to its liquidity management in the event of early settlement of a debt facility, early termination of an Islamic facility and early withdrawal of Islamic term deposit. It may also assume policy implication in the event that the regulator adopts the legality of bilateral rebate in its Islamic banking policy and guidelines.

This paper offers an Islamic alternative to the conventional mechanism in handling the event of early settlement of a debt facility, early termination of an Islamic facility and early withdrawal of Islamic term deposit. Under conventional banking, there are certain fees and charges imposed on customers in the above events like early settlement charge and early withdrawal charge. Unlike its conventional counterpart, Islamic banks cannot opt for the conventional method that seems unjust to the customers as the charge is imposed without Sharīʿah basis. In this case, bilateral rebate serves as a fair mechanism to manage the bank’s liquidity in the aforementioned events.

The confirmation of receipt of orders by consumers means that the online retailer actually receives the payments on many retail platforms (e.g. Taobao). In order to recoup funds as soon as possible, the retailer will take steps (e.g. improving the level of delivery and adopting a rebate policy) to encourage consumers to confirm receipt earlier. It is significant for the retailer to identify an appropriate strategy and determine the optimal product price. To address the above issues, this paper examines and compares the pricing strategies and profits under different strategies to show some managerial insights for the retailer's decision-making.

In this paper, the authors discuss four models, i.e. adopting common delivery and offering consumers no rebates, adopting common delivery and offering rebates, adopting fast delivery and offering no rebates and adopting fast delivery and offering rebates, which the retailer may consider. Under different models, consumer utility and firm's profit structure are disparate. After comparing the retailer's profits under four models, the optimal strategy, profit and product price are obtained.

Some interesting results are as follows. When the cost of fast delivery is not very high, improving the level of delivery would bring more profit to the retailer and create a positive impact on consumers. Interestingly, our results also show that offering proper rebates to stimulate consumers to confirm receipt early only serves to improve the profit only when the motivation of consumers to confirm the receipt is very low. Moreover, the authors find that a higher level of delivery services can promote the implementation of the rebate policy to improve the retailer's earnings.

This paper is the first study on the transaction mode of retail platforms and the problem of confirming receipt by a model-based method.

In this paper the authors seek to develop a measure that can identify those customers who might best be described as rebate prone, and to link rebate proneness to behavioral usage of rebate offers, intentions to use rebate offers in the future, attitudes towards using rebates as a way to try new products, and finally, the tendency to complete the rebate transaction.

In study 1, college students enrolled in marketing classes at two large state universities were asked to complete a brief online survey regarding their attitudes towards rebates as a promotional tool as well as shopping behaviors and attitudes towards shopping. Study 2 replicated study 1 using a mall intercept approach.

Confirmatory factor analyses of the measure of rebate proneness demonstrated substantial psychometric validity and yielded acceptable levels of internal consistency. In both studies, rebate proneness was significantly and positively related to behavioral, intentional and attitudinal approaches to rebate usage. Rebate prone shoppers viewed rebates as a substantive incentive for trying new products.

These results are preliminary yet provide an important foundation to explore a measurable propensity towards product and brand specific rebate usage.

The promising theoretical framework of consumptive delay provides a managerial opportunity to segment consumers on the basis of measurable psychological and behavioral tendencies. Rebate usage is but one of a number of strategies that can create and or maintain brand loyalty. The ability to identify and provide incentives to incent rebate prone shoppers has widespread implications including the enhancement of the lifetime value of the customer.

This paper aims to propose an Islamic compliant approach that deals with the prepayment rebate on debts resulting from cost-plus sales and their accompanied sale-based financing contracts. The proposed approach uses the time value of money concept without charging excessive fees from the debtor in the early settlement of debts.

The paper uses a qualitative analysis via analyzing and reviewing relevant literature. A quantitative analysis is subsequently used with a proposed computation that addresses prepayment rebate accompanied by debts resulting from cost-plus sales.

The proposed approach results in a rebate amount for the debtor greater than those rebate amounts resulting from either conventional finance techniques or current Islamic finance practices.

The application of the descending rebate proposed computation in this paper is restricted to cost-plus sale and their accompanied sale-based financing contracts only. The computation does not address any agreement or deal that may involve a rebate without a selling transaction.

The paper criticizes the prevailing practices for computing rebates in the case of debt prepayment, whether those nominated by conventional finance or others currently employed by most Islamic financial institutions. The paper also introduces a new rebate computation aimed to comply with Islamic finance's real context.

This paper replicates and refines the finding that subsidies for charitable contributions of a rebate type are less effective than matching subsidies. A survey based field experiment with health charities was conducted among a national sample representative of the Dutch population on key demographic characteristics. The greater effectiveness of matching subsidies found in laboratory experiments is replicated. Also some evidence is provided on why matches are more effective than rebates. Matches attract a larger pool of donors, in part because donors expect more people to make donations and “join in.” Matches also increase the amount contributed among the higher educated, higher income households and larger donors. Subsidies of either type do not decrease subsequent giving in a campaign for tsunami relief. The experiment could not test whether the greater effectiveness of a matching subsidy is due to a change in the donor’s attention to the benefits of a donation to the cause. This explanation should be tested in future research. The findings imply that a given budget available to subsidize charitable contributions can be used more effectively if the subsidy is framed in the form of a match than in the form of a rebate. Nonprofit organizations can use this insight in the design of fundraising campaigns. For governments the finding suggests that the effectiveness of current subsidies for charitable contributions can be enhanced by matching them rather than providing a deduction in the income tax, which works as a rebate.

This chapter investigates the relationship between heterogeneous social preferences and charitable giving under alternative prices of giving and types of subsidies. Using 10 allocation decisions, we categorize participants’ social preferences as self-interested, inequity averse, or social surplus maximizing. In subsequent charitable giving treatments, analysis of within-person decision-making gives support for several predictions consistent with social preference types: social surplus maximizers are most likely to give to a charity that increases production; inequity averters give more to charity than do other groups; all preference types give more when the price of giving declines; and social surplus maximizers are more responsive to the price of giving than are inequity averters.