Search results

1 – 10 of over 43000
To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 14 October 2020

Justin Ehrlich, Shankar Ghimire and Shane Sanders

Revenue sharing is ubiquitous among North American professional sports leagues. Under pool revenue sharing, above-average revenue teams of a league effectively transfer…

Abstract

Purpose

Revenue sharing is ubiquitous among North American professional sports leagues. Under pool revenue sharing, above-average revenue teams of a league effectively transfer revenues to below-average revenue teams. Herein, the authors find and prove that a league will vote into policy a pool revenue sharing arrangement if and only if mean team revenue is greater than presharing median revenue, where this condition is equivalent to the presence of positive nonparametric skewness in a league’s distribution of team revenues. This represents a median voter theorem for league revenue sharing.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors consider the case of revenue sharing for the National Football League (NFL), a league that pools and equally shares national revenues among member teams.

Findings

The authors find evidence of positive and significant nonparametric skewness in NFL team revenue distributions for the 2004–2016 seasons. This distribution is observed amid annual majority rule votes of League owners in favor of maintaining the incumbent pool revenue sharing model (as opposed to no team revenue sharing). Distribution of revenues – namely the existence of outlying large market NFL teams – appears to consistently explain the historical popularity of NFL revenue sharing.

Originality/value

The median voter theorem uncovered in the case of NFL applies to all professional sports leagues and can be used predictively as well as descriptively.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 6 July 2020

Justin Andrew Ehrlich and Joel M. Potter

Sports economists have consistently found that winning positively impacts team revenue fans prefer to allocate their entertainment dollars to winning teams. Previous…

Abstract

Purpose

Sports economists have consistently found that winning positively impacts team revenue fans prefer to allocate their entertainment dollars to winning teams. Previous research has also found that fans do not have a preference for how their team wins. However, this research ignores the significant variability in revenue that can exist between teams with similar attendance figures. The authors contribute to the literature by testing whether profit maximizing teams should pay different amounts for different types of production by estimating the marginal revenue product of a win due to offense, defense and pitching.

Design/methodology/approach

Using data from the 2010–2017 Major League Baseball seasons and an Ordinary Least Squares-Fixed Effects approach, the authors test whether a unit of offensive, defensive and pitching production generates differing amounts of team revenue both before and after revenue sharing. The authors then test if team Wins Above Replacement is a good approximation of actual wins while accounting for the previously observed nonlinear relationship between wins and revenue.

Findings

The authors found that marginal revenue product estimates in the postrevenue sharing model for mowar, pwar and dwar are nearly identical to each other. Further, after predicting prerevenue sharing, the authors find that fans have no preference for mowar, pwar or dwar play styles.

Originality/value

The findings illustrate that team decision-makers appear to be acting irrationally by paying more for offense than they do for defense. Thus, the findings suggest that team decision-makers should value defensive wins and pitching wins at the same rate as offensive wins on the free agent market.

Details

Managerial Finance, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0307-4358

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 21 October 2019

Zhenning Zhu, Lingcheng Kong, Jiaping Xie, Jing Li and Bing Cao

In the hybrid electricity market, renewable energy power generator faces the uncertainty of power market demand and the randomness of the renewable energy generation…

Abstract

Purpose

In the hybrid electricity market, renewable energy power generator faces the uncertainty of power market demand and the randomness of the renewable energy generation output. In order to improve the grid-connected quantity of green power, the purpose of this paper is to design the pricing mechanism for renewable energy power generator with revenue-sharing contract in a two-stage “multi-single” electricity supply chain which contains a single dominant power retailer and two kinds of power suppliers providing different power energy species.

Design/methodology/approach

Considering the dual uncertainties of renewable energy power output and power market demand, the authors design the full-cooperative contract decision-making model, wholesale price contract decision-making model and revenue-sharing contract decision-making model to compare and optimize grid-connected pricing in order to maximize profit of different parties in power supply chain. Then, this paper performs a numerical simulation, discusses the existence of the equilibrium analytical solutions to satisfy the supply chain coordination conditions and analyzes the optimal contract parameters’ variation characteristics and their interaction relationship.

Findings

The authors find that the expected profits of the parties in the hybrid power supply chain are concave about their decision variables in each decision-making mode. The revenue-sharing contract can realize the Pareto improvement for all parties’ interest of the supply chain, and promote the grid-connected quantity of green power effectively. The grid-connected price will reduce with the increase of revenue-sharing ratio, and this impact will be greater on the renewable energy power. The greater the competition intensity in power supply side, the smaller the revenue-sharing ratio from power purchaser. And for the same rangeability of competition intensity, the revenue-sharing ratio reduction of thermal power is less than that of the green power. The more the government subsidizing green power supplier, the smaller the retailer sharing revenue to it.

Practical implications

Facing with the dual uncertainties of green power output and market demand and the competition of thermal power in hybrid electricity market, this study can provide a path to solve the problem of renewable energy power grid-connecting. The results can help green power become competitive in hybrid power market under loose regulations. And this paper suggests that the government subsidy policy should be more tactical in order to implement a revenue-sharing contract of the power supply chain.

Originality/value

This paper studies the renewable energy electricity grid-connected pricing under the uncertainty of power supply and market demand, and compares different contract decision-making strategies in order to achieve the power supply chain coordination. The paper also analyzes the competition between thermal power and renewable energy power in hybrid electricity market.

Details

Industrial Management & Data Systems, vol. 119 no. 9
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0263-5577

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 20 June 2008

Zhong Yao, Stephen C.H. Leung and K.K. Lai

The purpose of this paper is to numerically analyze the coordinating mechanism of the revenuesharing contract in newsvendor products' supply chain. The contract considers…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to numerically analyze the coordinating mechanism of the revenuesharing contract in newsvendor products' supply chain. The contract considers stochastic and price‐dependent demand.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper presents an analytical model for supply chain contracts and then uses numerical methods with the Stackelberg game to identify the contracts' properties.

Findings

Comparing the revenuesharing contract with the price‐only contract, the paper finds that a revenuesharing contract does improve supply chain performance. However, the benefits earned by the revenuesharing contract differ among the supply chain partners under the impact of demand variability and price‐sensitivity factors. Specifically, the manufacturer will earn a greater share in channel profit in the revenuesharing contract than in case of a price‐only contract. Also, the incentive by revenuesharing contract could not lead to Pareto improvement. In other words, the retailer's profit in revenuesharing contract might be lower than that in price‐only contract.

Research limitations/implications

Management should note that there are additional administrative costs needed to monitor the revenuesharing contract. Incorporating these costs into models will yield more insight into the problems. Also, the retailer has more accurate market information due to the proximity to the customers that will lead to a different game mode.

Practical implications

Management such as airlines, hotel, video rental, etc. can adopt this kind of contracts to manage their retailers to obtain the higher channel performance. But they should be careful selecting the revenue sharing proportion. The research limitations also give some suggestion for practical reference.

Originality/value

Many studies have shown that the revenuesharing contract can obtain a higher channel performance. However, little attention has been noted that the fraction of shared revenue has a significant impact on the channel performance. To apply this form of incentive in practice, managements should consider the impact of the fraction of shared revenue in the revenuesharing contract on supply chain performance. This paper considers these issues.

Details

Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, vol. 13 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1359-8546

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 8 April 2019

Qiang Wei, Sheng Li, Xinyu Gou and Baofeng Huo

The rapid development of e-commerce has caused not only explosive growth of the express delivery industry, but also ever-greater operational pressures. Models from the…

Abstract

Purpose

The rapid development of e-commerce has caused not only explosive growth of the express delivery industry, but also ever-greater operational pressures. Models from the sharing economy may provide new ideas for operational improvement. The purpose of this paper is to consider an optimization method that reduces costs and increases efficiency. The proposed method enables a shared distribution system based on revenue-sharing and cooperative investment contracts.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors design a two-echelon supply chain (SC) of the shared distribution system with one shared distribution company and N express companies. In this SC, the express companies provide only inter-city transportation, and they outsource internal-city transportation to a shared distribution company. This distribution system differs from that of the traditional express delivery industry. The traditional system of delivery requires large numbers of empty trips (with no load to deliver), because the operating mode of urban distribution has been the franchise. To offer greater efficiency and performance, the authors introduce the sharing economy mode of express delivery. The authors examine the potential of a joint optimal decision-making strategy that involves revenue-sharing and cooperative investment contracts based on an order flow proportion (OFP) and a revenue-sharing factor (RSF). In this shared distribution system, the most important innovation is that all of the express companies jointly invest in and establish a shared distribution company based on OFP or RSF principles.

Findings

The profitability of an SC with revenue-sharing contracts based on an OFP system is much higher than that of a decentralized SC, and it is very close to the profitability of a centralized SC. In SCs with revenue-sharing contracts that are based on RSFs, there are many possible combinations of RSFs that can increase the overall profitability. The analyses indicate that the OFP system offers the best solution in designing revenue-sharing contracts based on RSFs.

Practical implications

This study indicates that revenue-sharing contracts based on both OFP and RSF principles can increase overall SC returns by 0.21 to 0.44 percent. In sum total, this improvement could mean a 0.84 to 1.76bn Yuan increase in revenues for the 400+ bn-Yuan express delivery industry.

Originality/value

The authors find that a combination of equity investment and SC coordination contracts makes the cooperation between SC members much more stable. Through this kind of shared distribution system, the scale of economy can further reduce the costs and increase the efficiency of the express delivery industry.

Details

Industrial Management & Data Systems, vol. 119 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0263-5577

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 1 February 2021

Ling Liang, Lin Tian, Jiaping Xie, Jianhong Xu and Weisi Zhang

The car-sharing market has entered the mature stage, and consumers' demand shows a diversified increasing trend. This paper considers two modes of operation and two…

Abstract

Purpose

The car-sharing market has entered the mature stage, and consumers' demand shows a diversified increasing trend. This paper considers two modes of operation and two pricing strategies, which are business-to-consumer and consumer-to-consumer modes, market pricing and platform pricing. Under these conditions, the platform's revenue-sharing ratio will be different. The purpose of this paper is to explore this research question, and seeks an optimal pricing mechanism that can achieve a win–win situation between platform and automobile manufacturer in the two market modes.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors design different profit functions for platform under the two contexts. Of course, the platform's function is constrained to the manufacturer's function. By introducing a revenue-sharing contract a Stackelberg game model dominated by the platform is established and the equilibrium solutions under the two pricing models are derived.

Findings

The study found that even if only market pricing is executed, the scale of the car-sharing market will continue to expand. As the car-sharing market becomes more saturated, platform pricing is better for the automobile manufacturer; in most cases, the platform prefers platform pricing, but when the number of private cars is relatively small, if the cost of car operation and maintenance for the automobile manufacturer is lower or the revenue-sharing ratio of private cars is high, then market pricing will be more favorable to the platform.

Practical implications

With the cross-border integration of car service platforms and the automobile manufacturing industry, the key to achieving win–win cooperation and sustainable development in the car-sharing market will converge on the question of how to design a suitable pricing mechanism and revenue-sharing method.

Originality/value

Authors have determined how a car-sharing platform achieves a win–win order pricing strategy with the manufacturer and private car owners, respectively. And authors combined the supply chain revenue-sharing contract with the car-sharing market to explore the application of the revenue-sharing contract in the sharing economy.

Details

Industrial Management & Data Systems, vol. 121 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0263-5577

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 31 December 2018

Qinqin Li, Yujie Xiao, Yuzhuo Qiu, Xiaoling Xu and Caichun Chai

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of carbon permit allocation rules (grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism) on incentive contracts provided…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of carbon permit allocation rules (grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism) on incentive contracts provided by the retailer to encourage the manufacturer to invest more in reducing carbon emissions.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors consider a two-echelon supply chain in which the retailer offers three contracts (wholesale price contract, cost-sharing contract and revenue-sharing contract) to the manufacturer. Based on the two carbon permit allocation rules, i.e. grandfathering mechanism and benchmarking mechanism, six scenarios are examined. The optimal price and carbon emission reduction decisions and members’ equilibrium profits under six scenarios are analyzed and compared.

Findings

The results suggest that the revenue-sharing contract can more effectively stimulate the manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions compared to the cost-sharing contract. The cost-sharing contract can help to achieve the highest environmental performance, whereas the implementation of revenue-sharing contract can attain the highest social welfare. The benchmarking mechanism is more effective for the government to prompt the manufacturer to produce low-carbon products than the grandfathering mechanism. Although a loose carbon policy can expand the total emissions, it can improve the social welfare.

Practical implications

These results can provide operational insights for the retailer in how to use incentive contract to encourage the manufacturer to curb carbon emissions and offer managerial insights for the government to make policy decisions on carbon permit allocation rules.

Originality/value

This paper contributes to the literature regarding to firm’s carbon emissions reduction decisions under cap-and-trade policy and highlights the importance of carbon permit allocation methods in curbing carbon emissions.

Details

Kybernetes, vol. 49 no. 4
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0368-492X

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 31 May 2019

Vinay Ramani, Sanjeev Swami and Debabrata Ghosh

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of collaboration between supply chain entities in a dyadic setting where the manufacturer invests in greening and…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of collaboration between supply chain entities in a dyadic setting where the manufacturer invests in greening and technology adoption effort leading to a price premium effect for the supply chain players.

Design/methodology/approach

The paper uses game theoretic approach to analyze the model of inter-firm interaction in a vertical channel setting consisting of a retailer and manufacturer. The paper studies strategic decisions of the channel members in a decentralized and centralized structure and extends this to decision making under contractual settings.

Findings

A two-part tariff completely coordinates the green supply chain, while a cost sharing and revenue sharing contract only achieve partial coordination. Nevertheless, a cost sharing, as well as a revenue sharing contract, increases the greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer while yielding the supply chain members a strictly larger profit. Furthermore, a revenue sharing contract in comparison to a cost sharing contract, leads to a larger greening and technological adoption effort by the manufacturer, lower wholesale and retail prices and a strictly larger profit for both the manufacturer and the retailer.

Originality/value

This paper contributes to the green supply chain pricing, technology and contract literature considering strategic interactions between a manufacturer and retailer in a supply chain under price premium effects of greening activities and technological advancements.

Details

Benchmarking: An International Journal, vol. ahead-of-print no. ahead-of-print
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1463-5771

Keywords

Content available
Article
Publication date: 16 October 2017

Bo Yan, Xiao-hua Wu, Bing Ye and Yong-wang Zhang

The Internet of Things (IoT) is used in the fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain, which can be coordinated through a revenue-sharing contract. The purpose of this…

Abstract

Purpose

The Internet of Things (IoT) is used in the fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain, which can be coordinated through a revenue-sharing contract. The purpose of this paper is to make the three-level supply chain coordinate in IoT by considering the influence of FAP on market demand and costs of controlling freshness on the road.

Design/methodology/approach

A three-level FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT is regarded as the research object. This study improves the revenue-sharing contract, determines the optimal solution when the supply chain achieves maximum profit in three types of decision-making situations, and develops the profit distribution model based on the improved revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain.

Findings

The improved revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the FAP supply chain that comprises a manufacturer, distributor, and retailer in IoT, as well as benefit all enterprises in the supply chain.

Practical implications

Resource utilization rate can be improved after coordinating the entire supply chain. Moreover, loss in the circulation process is reduced, and the circulation efficiency of FAPs is improved because of the application of IoT. The validity of the model is verified through a case analysis.

Originality/value

This study is different from other research in terms of the combination of supply chain coordination, FAPs, and radio frequency identification application in IoT.

Details

Industrial Management & Data Systems, vol. 117 no. 9
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0263-5577

Keywords

To view the access options for this content please click here
Article
Publication date: 13 March 2017

Ling Liang, Jiaping Xie, Luhao Liu and Yu Xia

The purpose of this paper is to discuss how wind farms attract wind turbine manufacturers to get involved in wind turbines’ maintenance service with revenue sharing

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to discuss how wind farms attract wind turbine manufacturers to get involved in wind turbines’ maintenance service with revenue sharing contract of bundled service under which the background of operation and maintenance (O&M) aftermarket of wind turbine exists. The authors also try to extend the results to the application of product plus service business mode on large-scale equipment O&M service. At present, Chinese wind power industry is suffering from production capacity redundancy. The profit levels for both wind farm and wind turbine manufacturers are relatively low. It is significant for Chinese wind power industry development to coordinate the supply chain of wind power in order to reduce O&M costs and increase revenues.

Design/methodology/approach

The present paper discusses product plus aftermarket service contract design on the background of closed-loop product service chain and uncertain equipment demand using revenue sharing contract model.

Findings

If centralized decision making is assumed, the authors find that the wind turbine order increases as the aftermarket service effort level and aftermarket service profit increase; aftermarket service effort level is positively correlative to the service efficiency. On the other hand, if decentralized decision making is assumed, the wind turbine order increases as share of the aftermarket service chain by manufacturer to wind farm increases and share of product supply chain by wind farm to manufacturer decreases. The optimal effort level of wind farm increases as the share of aftermarket service chain increases while the optimal effort level of the manufacturer is a concave function of share of aftermarket service chain if service quality linear correlates with effort level. Meanwhile, the authors find that the revenues of the product supply chain and aftermarket service chain have a concave relationship. This relationship is not affected by the format of relationship between service quality and effort level (linear or exponential).

Practical implications

The results could potentially be used to provide the wind turbine manufacturer with a greater profit space and satisfy wind farm’s equipment maintenance demand at the same time. It can also guide the practice of revenue sharing in the aftermarket service and manufacturing servitization.

Originality/value

In this model, the authors assumed that both the forward revenue sharing of power generation by wind farm to manufacturer and the backward revenue sharing of maintenance service by the manufacturer to wind farm exist in closed-loop product service chain. Then the authors discussed channel coordination of such cross-revenue sharing contract.

Details

Industrial Management & Data Systems, vol. 117 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0263-5577

Keywords

1 – 10 of over 43000