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In the context of sustainable development goal 5 of the United Nations 2030 Agenda: “Achieve gender equality and women’s empowerment”, where gender equality is not only a matter of justice but also essential to achieve sustainable development, this paper aims to examine the gender pay gap in executive director compensation and the influence of female board representation and participation in nomination and remuneration committee (NRC) on this gap in Spanish listed firms over the period 2012–2022.

The analysis is conducted using a data set created by the authors, which includes executive director compensation data for 164 unique firms. This data set comprises 128 distinct observations for a given firm and year for women, and 2,333 observations for men. The authors estimate ordinary least squares models, clustering standard errors by executive. The authors use Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to decompose gender differences in compensation into differences in the characteristics of men and women and differences in the return on the same characteristics.

The authors find evidence of pay penalty for female executive directors compared to male counterparts. After controlling for firm, board and executive characteristics, the authors find that women earn 27% less than comparable men. The penalty is lower in companies with a higher share of women on the compensation committee, suggesting that women’s participation plays a role in setting a more equal remuneration policy. The gender gap in executive compensation narrows over time due to a substantial reduction of the differences between men and women in both characteristics and the return on these characteristics.

This study is one of the few analysing the gender gap in executive director compensation and its evolution in Spain. It specifically explores how gender diversity on both the board and the NRC impacts this gap. The analysis is focused on the most recent period characterized by important efforts to promote gender diversity.

This paper examines the effect of restrictions on executive pay and high CEOs’ compensation on bank performance following the “2008 UK bank rescue policy”.

Using the difference-in-difference estimation technique we assess the relationship between executive compensation and financial performance of rescued banks relative to non-rescued banks over the period 1999–2019.

Our main finding indicates that the relationship between executive compensation and financial performance declines in rescued banks relative to non-rescued banks. Further, we document that performance continues to deteriorate in rescued banks relative to non-rescued banks. Our results are robust to different estimation techniques.

This study contributes to the literature that examines the efficacy of government bailouts during the 2008 crisis. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is among the first to examine the long-term implications of bank rescue and pay restrictions on executive compensation and performance post–rescue.

This study aims to contribute to the ongoing assessment of executive compensation by investigating the nexus between managerial entrenchment factors, adopting a multifaceted perspective encompassing both economic and non-economic dimensions.

This research employs pooled cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and Least Squares with Dummy Variables (LSDV) models with fixed effects to examine the determinants of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation.

This research identifies firm size, performance (via ROA and Tobin’s Q), and CEO characteristics (age, tenure, stock ownership, MBA degree) as significant determinants of executive compensation at the 0.05 level. In contrast, the prestige of educational institutions, doctoral degrees, and the MBA’s relevance to short-term performance, along with CEO tenure, do not significantly affect pay. Additionally, the study highlights the significance of industry type (manufacturing vs technology) in shaping compensation, emphasizing the role of firm metrics and CEO credentials in designing executive pay packages.

This research introduces an innovative approach to controlling unobserved heterogeneity and adjusting for the dynamic nature of CEO compensation attributes across diverse CEO characteristics. By integrating both pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) models, the study addresses the challenges posed by time-invariant variables and unobservable heterogeneity. Such issues have historically skewed the accuracy of traditional OLS models in identifying the comprehensive array of factors—both economic and non-economic—that influence CEO compensation. This novel methodological framework significantly advances the examination of unobservable variables that may vary not only across the firms selected for analysis but also over time periods, thereby offering a more detailed understanding of the determinants of CEO pay.

This study aims to analyse the motivations and underlying assumptions of decision makers driving the adoption of sustainability-oriented targets in executive compensation (SCTs) to better understand SCTs’ impact on sustainability performance.

Through a qualitative approach, 15 in-depth interviews are conducted in a two-tier governance setting. Participants include management and supervisory board members, compensation consultants and other stakeholders involved in proxy voting.

SCT implementation is primarily determined by meeting shareholders’ expectations rather than those of other stakeholders. Decision makers react in a differentiated way to increased expectations by implementing either primarily symbolic or substantive measures and encounter different implementation challenges like insufficient data quality and a lack of experience within supervisory boards, both of which potentially contribute to decoupling.

The study offers valuable insights for companies in designing SCTs and emphasises the significance of addressing decoupling to effectively enhance sustainability performance through SCTs and provides a foundation for future studies aimed at analysing this phenomenon.

Using a neo-institutional theory lens, this study marks one of the first interview-based investigations to distinguish between symbolic and substantial SCTs. It delves deeply into the role of decoupling and the associated challenges, offering fresh perspectives within the under-researched framework of a two-tier corporate governance structure. Moreover, this study aims to meticulously capture the real-world design practices and implementation processes of SCTs through experts, an aspect that was emphasised as a limitation in previous studies.

This paper studies the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck as well as the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay in which good luck is rewarded but bad luck is not penalized symmetrically. We further explore the impact of the regulatory changes on executive compensation taking effect in the 2000s on CEO pay for luck and asymmetry.

In this study, we examine the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and CEO pay for luck and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO compensation. The sample consists of DJIA component companies over a 71-year period from 1950 to 2020. CEO pay-performance sensitivity is measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity.

We find that an increase in CEO pay-performance sensitivity as measured by both delta and Jensen-Murphy pay-performance sensitivity leads to an increase in the degree of CEO pay for luck but tends to reduce the level of CEO pay for luck asymmetry. In addition, we find that the major pay-related regulatory changes in recent years have mitigated the degree of CEO pay for luck and pay asymmetry, in which CEO pay structure and the associated CEO pay-performance sensitivity are major mechanisms through which the regulatory changes take effect.

Our findings provide empirical evidence supporting the argument that both optimal contracting and rent extraction should be considered as important determinants of CEO compensation.

When a firm designs the pay packages for its CEO to align CEO wealth to firm performance, CEO pay-performance sensitivity is expected to improve. However, the improved CEO PPS can also lead to an increased CEO pay for non-performance (Luck), which is an undesired outcome from the shareholder view. Therefore, a firm should thoroughly consider various advantages and disadvantages when compensating its top executives. Third, pay-related regulations have indeed achieved some intended outcomes such as the diminished pay for luck and asymmetry, but they also exacerbated the positive relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and the asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. It seems that executive pay-related regulations cannot achieve perfect outcomes without side effects. Continuous reforms and regulations on corporate governance should be a dynamic process under various changing situations.

This study contributes to the literature on executive pay for luck and asymmetry in several ways. First, our study is among the few studies empirically testing the relationship between CEO pay-performance sensitivity and pay for luck and asymmetry. We find that CEO pay-performance sensitivity tends to increase the degree of CEO pay for luck but reduce the level of asymmetric benchmarking of CEO pay. These findings partly support the rent extraction theory grounded on the managerial power hypothesis and partly support the optimal contracting theory. Our findings confirm that the optimal contracting theory and the rent extraction theory are both important for explaining the practices and historical trends of CEO compensation.

The authors examine the role of stock liquidity in CEO equity compensation design. For a sample of publicly traded firms from 2007 to 2020, the authors find that greater stock liquidity is associated with a higher proportion of stock awards relative to the proportion of options in CEO equity compensation. The results of this study suggest that stock price informativeness on the grant date has a differential effect on the preference for the type of equity compensation awarded to CEOs. The empirical results are supported by multivariate analyses using alternative measures of stock liquidity and a two-stage least squares (2SLS) specification that alleviates endogeneity concerns. Furthermore, the authors document that the firm-specific increase in the proportion of stock awards compared to the proportion of stock options is associated with a firm-specific increase in stock liquidity. Collectively, the analyses suggest that stock liquidity as a measure of stock price informativeness contributes to the choice of CEO equity compensation design.

Remuneration policies may differ from country to country, and their effect on bank stability could be due to the legal framework. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how the legal system impacts the relationship between CEO compensation and bank stability across countries.

To test the study hypotheses, the authors use panel data of 74 banks operating in ten OECD countries during the period 2009–2016 and apply the generalized moments method regression model to better remediate the endogeneity problem.

The findings confirm that a country’s banking regulations significantly affect its bank stability. Common law countries have less bank stability than civil law countries. This result can be interpreted by the fact that, in common-law countries, banks’ CEO are strongly protected by the law, so they allocate a large part of bank assets to risky loans to improve their variable remuneration.

The research can help policymakers understand bank stability in one country. Any legal reform would require prior knowledge of how risk-taking may arise in executive compensation.

The contribution is to explain the controversial effect of executive compensation on bank stability in the framework of legal theory. The authors argue that regulators should monitor compensation structures and that the country’s legal origin of law shapes the CEO compensation structure and is a determinant of bank stability. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies exploring this field. So, this study tries to shed more light on the dark side of CEOs’ behavior when undertaking risky projects to maximize their remuneration.

Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.

Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.

The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.

This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.

Organizational scholars studying compensation often place an emphasis on certain employee groups (e.g., executives). Missing from this discussion is research on the compensation systems for low-wage jobs. In this review, the authors argue that workers in low-wage jobs represent a unique employment group in their understanding of rent allocation in organizations. The authors address the design of compensation strategies in organizations that lead to different outcomes for workers in low-wage jobs versus other workers. Drawing on and integrating human resource management (HRM), inequality, and worker literatures with compensation literature, the authors describe and explain compensation systems for low-wage work. The authors start by examining workers in low-wage work to identify aspects of these workers’ jobs and lives that can influence their health, performance, and other organizationally relevant outcomes. Next, the authors explore the compensation systems common for this type of work, building on the compensation literature, by identifying the low-wage work compensation designs, proposing the likely explanations for why organizations craft these designs, and describing the worker and organizational outcomes of these designs. The authors conclude with suggestions for future research in this growing field and explore how organizations may benefit by rethinking their approach to compensation for low-wage work. In sum, the authors hope that this review will be a foundational work for those interested in investigating organizational compensation issues at the intersection of inequality and worker and organizational outcomes.

This study aims to explore the relationship between foreignness and CEO pay.

This study combines cross-sectional and time series observations analyzed with panel data methodology in a sample of 59 firms listed in the Spanish IBEX-35 index between 2006 and 2020.

International ownership influences CEO underpayment and foreign sales influence CEO overpayment.

CEO pay is susceptible to being influenced by foreign non-American variables. An appropriate understanding of these factors can contribute to discussing policies that balance the level of CEO payment in large public firms.

Research on internationalization and CEO pay is scarce. A handful of studies confirm the link between Americanization and executive compensation in Europe. However, the authors still do not know if the level of CEO pay is influenced by non-American exposure. To do this, the authors test the effect of firm – ownership, sales, board – and individual – CEO – exposure to international, non-US environments on the level of over/underpayment of CEOs in a sample of Spanish firms.

Explorar la relación entre la extranjería y la remuneración de los CEO.

Combinamos observaciones transversales y de series temporales analizadas con metodología de datos de panel en una muestra de 59 empresas del índice IBEX-35 español entre 2006 y 2020.

La propiedad internacional influye en la remuneración insuficiente de los CEO y las ventas en el extranjero influyen en la remuneración excesiva de los CEO.

La investigación sobre la internacionalización y la remuneración de los CEO es escasa. Un puñado de estudios confirman el vínculo entre la americanización y la remuneración de los ejecutivos en Europa. Sin embargo, todavía no sabemos si el nivel de remuneración de los CEO está influenciado por la exposición no estadounidense. Para ello, probamos el efecto de la exposición de la empresa (propiedad, ventas, consejo) y del individuo (CEO) a entornos internacionales, no estadounidenses, sobre el nivel de sobre/insuficiente remuneración de los CEO en una muestra de empresas españolas.

La remuneración de los CEO es susceptible de verse influenciada por variables extranjeras no estadounidenses. Una comprensión adecuada de estos factores puede contribuir a discutir políticas que equilibren el nivel de remuneración de los CEO en las grandes empresas públicas.

Explorar a relação entre estrangeirismo e remuneração de CEO.

Combinamos observações transversais e de séries temporais analisadas com metodologia de dados em painel em uma amostra de 59 empresas listadas no índice espanhol IBEX-35 entre 2006 e 2020.

A propriedade internacional influencia o sub pagamento de CEO e as vendas no exterior influenciam o super pagamento de CEO.

Pesquisas sobre internacionalização e remuneração de CEO são escassas. Alguns estudos confirmam a ligação entre americanização e remuneração de executivos na Europa. No entanto, ainda não sabemos se o nível de remuneração de CEO é influenciado pela exposição não americana. Para fazer isso, testamos o efeito da exposição da empresa - propriedade, vendas, conselho - e individual - CEO - a ambientes internacionais, não americanos, no nível de super/sub pagamento de CEOs em uma amostra de empresas espanholas.

A remuneração de CEO é suscetível a ser influenciada por variáveis estrangeiras não americanas. Uma compreensão adequada desses fatores pode contribuir para discutir políticas que equilibram o nível de remuneração de CEO em grandes empresas públicas.