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This paper compares the performance of the big four UK banks and four Australian banks between 2004‐2009. The banks are chosen according to the total assets as listed in The Banker magazine 2009. The purpose is to analyse why UK banks were more vulnerable to the financial crisis of 2007‐2009 than Australian banks. The consequence of this study is what improvements can be made in relation to liquidity, leverage, loan to deposit, asset quality and capital ratios.

The author adopts an empirical approach and gathers data from the annual reports of the big four UK banks and Australian banks and the database “Factiva” and the Financial Times. The data contains liquidity, debt, capital, asset quality and profitability ratios during 2004‐2009.

The author's data show UK banks had on average higher cash ratios, higher leverage ratios, higher loan to deposit ratios, higher capital ratios, lower asset quality, lower ROA but higher ROE than the Australian banks.

The results support the findings in the Financial Development Index 2011 of the World Economic Forum. UK banks should ameliorate its ranking on financial stability by improving the quality of loans and capital.

The analysis is of use to regulators who are contemplating the need for reforms aimed at improving financial ratios of banks. Basel III Accord has introduced some recommendations but has its limitations.

This paper's value lies in providing analysis of the top four UK and Australian banks' performances during 2004‐2009. There is room for improvement in providing a more stable financial environment in the UK.

This paper aims to investigate the effect of UK building society demutualisation on levels of efficiency at the largest five commercial banks in the UK.

This research utilises data envelopment analysis (DEA) within a rarely adopted windows framework to analyse efficiency. The study also incorporates a novel risk proxy in the profit‐orientated approach to determine DEA input/output which proves a useful innovation to the methodology.

The overall aggregate results suggest that converting building societies outperformed their bank counterparts in all areas of efficiency and that scale efficiency dominates pure technical efficiency. Interestingly, the results also indicate that the level at which institutions continue to find economies of scale had increased when compared to previous research.

The period of building society demutualisation offers an empirical opportunity to examine deregulation upon market participants. It is felt that this study offers academics, regulators and participants within the financial services environment an insight into the efficiency impact of deregulation.

With the creation of the Single European market in 1992, there will be intensification of competitive pressure on small firms in the UK and on UK banks as their main providers of finance. Evidence is presented of possible mismatching of the services actually provided by UK banks and those desired by small firms, and of the unwillingness of UK small firms to switch banks, particularly if it involves crossing the Scots/English border. It is argued that the competitiveness of UK small firms after 1992 depends on either an autonomous change in the services provided by UK banks or the switching of accounts to non‐domestic banks who may move into the domestic market.

The purpose of this paper is to test and extend a conceptual model of risk assessment in bank lending to SMEs using five German and five UK bank case studies. Derived from research in Germany and the UK, the model postulates that factors in the external, operating and internal environments of individual banks can influence credit-risk assessment decisions.

The empirical data for this paper was collected during face-to-face interviews with five UK lending bankers in June 2006 and five German bankers in February 2007. The timing is important, as these were unaffected by credit-crunch considerations. The sample banks were similar in size and operating in the retail environment in their respective countries. The interviewees comprised lending officers and managers in loan departments. All interviews were conducted using a questionnaire format designed to elicit a commentary on the loan process in a reasonably unstructured way.

Notable differences emerged from these findings compared to the scene painted by existing research. The findings argue that changes in the law and banking regulations have reshaped both German and UK banking institutions. German bank employees are facing ever-increasing pressure as their employers strive to become efficient, streamlined banks with a high orientation towards their shareholders in a highly competitive market. This has a consequence for the emphasis placed on local and community factors. These findings further argue that German banks have moved their value orientations towards the British banking model to simulate the high returns achieved by British banks. German banking culture and state values are deeply embedded into the societal structure (Llewellyn, 2002; Lane and Quack, 2001). The deregulation of German banks has manifested in an adjustment of institutional behaviour, steering towards a shareholder orientation. However, even whilst German banks readjust their strategies, they continue to struggle to “shake off” their original roots and a cultural identity of stakeholder orientation.

This study provides a historical context for the recent developments in public sector reporting and accountability in the financial banking sector in both the United Kingdom and Germany. The paper provided an insight into the determination and interpretation of European regulations.

This paper examines the determinants of bank income smoothing using loan loss provisions in the United Kingdom or Great Britain from 1999 to 2017.

The study used ordinary least square (OLS) regression and applying the HAC robust standard error correction test.

The findings showed that UK banks use loan loss provision for income smoothing purposes. Income smoothing is greater in times of high economic policy uncertainty. The extent of bank income smoothing is reduced by foreign bank presence, UK GAAP adoption, IFRS9 adoption, and high levels of voice and accountability. Also, there is reduced income smoothing using loan loss provisions during a financial crisis and in periods of economic prosperity.

The implication is that economic conditions, institutional governance and accounting disclosure rules can influence the extent of bank income smoothing in the United Kingdom. The findings of the study contribute to several studies that explore the determinants of bank income smoothing.

No study has extensively examined the determinants of bank income smoothing in Great Britain or the United Kingdom. The present study fills this gap in the literature.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the importance of business lending as a source of bank profits in the UK banking system. The paper also examines whether the profitability of business lending is mostly driven by heterogeneous characteristics of individual banks or whether it is affected by systematic characteristics such as bank size and ownership structure.

The study uses bank level data from BankScope for a total sample of 83 UK banks and building societies. The period under consideration extends from 2005 to 2009. Econometric estimation is by panel fixed effects.

Our empirical results show that business lending is a statistically significant determinant of bank profits. However, this average effect masks important systematic differences among banks. In particular, we find strong size effects: the profitability of business lending is considerable for small banks but negligible for large banks. In contrast, we could not detect any ownership effects for domestic and foreign banks. These findings persist when the occurrence of the financial crisis is accounted for.

Interestingly, our study relates these findings to the process of financialisation. Yet, the extent of the latter and its impact on various groups of banks (i.e. large, small, domestic and foreign banks) have not been examined. Further research in this area would make an important contribution to the literature.

Our findings suggest that business lending is not a driving factor of profitability for large banks. One possible policy implication – which may be of interest especially to regulators and policy makers – is that capital injections into the larger banks per se are unlikely to lead to an expansion of credit to business.

There is very little research in the literature on the questions addressed in this paper, especially for the UK banking system. Moreover, the process of financialisation, which motivates the enquiry of this paper, is a growing area of research. Thus, the contribution of this paper is twofold.

The purpose of this paper is to show the different attitudes to bank ownership and regulation, residential lending and eviction in the UK and France, with their effects in the credit crunch and how these factors are connected. UK non‐interventionism stems from a history of private banking, where competition produced plentiful finance but high risks for borrowers, where eviction is certain and fairly quick, but not necessarily disastrous for borrowers within a flexible system. The French history of post‐war interventionism for reconstruction and cautious banking has had successes and failures, culminating in large‐scale special loans to lower‐income borrowers, improving lending liquidity and stability. The French lower lending levels, intervention and caution can be partly explained by the disastrous effects of French debt and eviction processes on borrowers, but with overlay of delay and social protection.

The paper uses a historical institutionalist approach, calling on historical materials, statistics (where available) and the law and procedure of banking, mortgages, eviction and insolvency. Quantitative comparison of mortgage evictions is difficult, but procedures illuminate this.

National approaches to banking are path dependent and this effect is underestimated, particularly concerning attitudes to public intervention and eviction. Awareness of these connected effects could improve comparative research to assist lending to lower income groups, particularly concerning special French loans.

This can improve open‐mindedness, and promote ideas to house young people rather than simply calling for heavy regulation in the UK, or criticising French interventionism.

Comparative evictions related to the history of banking intervention are considerably understudied. The paper addresses the issues.

The present state of the financial services industry suggests the need for banks to appeal to consumers’ emotions with the aim of improving their reputation; this study aims to explore how UK banks are using emotional appeals in their advertisements and how this shapes consumers’ attitudes towards their brands.

Qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis in a two-stage study – Study 1 analysed the content of 1,274 UK bank advertisements to understand how the banks convey emotional appeals, whereas Study 2 elicited consumers’ perceptions of these advertising appeals and how they influenced their attitudes through semi-structured interview with 33 UK retail bank customers in London and Luton.

UK banks are using emotional appeals in their marketing communication strategies. The qualitative findings highlight the bi-dimensional nature of feelings towards the advertisements and how this relates to the brand. There is a lacklustre attitude towards the brands; there was no sense of pride in associating with any bank, even with though there are possibilities of switching; and consumers feel there is no better offer elsewhere as all banks are the same.

Bank brands should present distinct values about their services to the target audience, endeavour to build relationships with existing customers and reward loyalty. Importantly, financial brands need to engage in and highlight charitable activities and any corporate social responsibility as this can help to improve consumers’ attitudes as they often consider bank brands greedy and selfish.

Qualitative research methodology was adopted to better understand consumers’ attitudes towards UK retail bank brands.

The Independent Banking Commission (Vickers) Report is not only one of the most significant developments in the banking regulatory and supervisory context in the UK in recent times but is also one that would considerably impact banking and capital markets functions and trends in this decade. The purposes of this paper are two‐fold: to analyse the interim Vickers Report within the larger paradigm of the prudential banking regulatory approach in the UK, particularly in the context of the debate of bailing out banks that are too‐big‐to‐fail; and to critically examine the recommendation of the Report in the context of the failure of Northern Rock in 2007. The central focus of the paper is to analyse the probable impact and shortcomings of the key recommendation of the Vickers Report, i.e. requirement to hold an additional capital buffer in order to separately ring‐fence retail functions and retail deposits of universal banks and financial institutions operating in the UK.

The method used is a combination of legal examination and case‐study based analysis. This paper sees the failure of Northern Rock as essentially a consequence of supervisory lapses by the FSA and raises relevant critical questions as to the efficacy of the recommendation of the Vickers Report in the context of such supervisory lapses and failures. While relying primarily on official publications in the public domain, journal articles, academic writings, and, newspaper articles, this paper explores the related regulatory and financial implications of the Vickers Report recommendation in the backdrop of the banking crisis in the UK.

The paper concludes that the key recommendation of the Vickers Report, to ring‐fence retail functions universal banks operating in the UK, goes only mid‐way in securing the twin objectives of stability and safety that the Report has set out to achieve.

The present Report is an interim one and the final version of the Report is expected in September. Further, various oversight reports and recommendations by the FSA and other bodies are expected as a follow‐up to the final Report. The key recommendation of the requirement for universal banks operating in the UK to hold additional capital for ring‐fencing their retail functions and deposits is not expected to undergo any substantial modification or revision in the final Report.

This paper is of immense significance to bankers, supervisors, lawyers, auditors, consultants, researchers, jurists, and, those engaged in or with various issues and sectors in financial and banking regulation.

Documents US banks' expansion overseas and stresses that London has, internationally, been an important centre for them in their operations. States also that by early 1979 US banks were the largest bank group in the UK and that by the early 1970s US bank lending to UK manufacturing industry was almost half that of the London clearing banks. Proposes that among large corporate customers US and other foreign banks became preferred as second source banks, with the clearing banks still preferred as the first source. Highlights the vigour with which the US banks will continue to pursue the UK corporate sector – though this will be hard to judge. Says that clearing banks are not under immediate pressure from US/foreign banks but that the threat has galvanized them into attempting to rectify their market position. Concludes that the revival of US domestic loan demand has given the US banks an opportunity to reassess whether their original investment in London could now be reduced and the available funds more profitably employed in the US.