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Motivated by recent financial liberalization policies in emerging markets, this study investigates whether bank competition and regulatory capital affect bank risk taking in an international banking context.

Bank competition is regressed, using GLS regression, on various measures of bank risk, to reflect regulatory, accounting and market-based risk-taking. The authors use a sample of publicly traded banks operating in Africa during 2004–2019.

Results show that higher level of bank competition increases bank risk taking and results in greater financial fragility in the absence of banking capital regulations. Furthermore, larger capital adequacy ratios control the risk-taking incentives of managers and guard banks against the risk of default. Further tests confirm the significance of market-based risk measures over accounting and regulatory measures.

Findings are relevant to bank managers and regulators in their sustained effort of finding an optimal balance between bank competition and financial stability. Increased competition should be balanced with capital regulations to curtail bank excessive risky behavior and derive the social benefits of greater competition in the market while sustaining overall economic growth.

This study provides novel evidence in an international context. First, it uses regulatory, accounting and market-based measures of bank risk taking to reflect regulators', management and market participants' emphasis. Another original contribution is the investigation of bank competition across African economies characterized by financial liberalization, stringent banking system and interesting socio-economic challenges.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the effect of induced capital regulatory pressure on banks’ charter value and risk-taking, and the influence of bank’s charter value on its risk-taking under such a capital regulatory pressure.

The authors use two different estimations to check the robustness of the results. First, they apply a two-stage least squares mode to estimate the impact of capital requirements and bank charter value on bank risk-taking, with the influence of capital regulatory and market-force variables on bank charter value. Second, to reduce the problem of unobserved heterogeneity, the authors use dynamic panel data techniques as a check for robustness.

The empirical results show that higher capital requirements pressure brings about a lower charter value for banks, which in turn increases their risk-taking. The issue of banks’ risk-taking is also affected by their size: large banks seem to be more stable than their smaller counterparts.

The authors’ findings suggest that regulatory pressure has had the desired impact on insolvency risk for Chinese banks due to the expected penalty triggered by a breach of capital requirements.

It is the first paper that investigates the impact of capital regulatory pressure on risk-taking of the Chinese banking system, which sheds light on concerns about regulatory monitoring of bank risk and capital regulatory framework.

This paper measures the impact of capital regulation on Chinese bank charter value and risk-taking and offers some support for the implementation of Basel III in China.

The authors have constructed different measures of regulatory pressure to investigate the influence of new capital regulatory regime on banks’ behavior. Most importantly, the exogenous changes of banks’ capital ratio induced by capital regulatory pressure during the past decade that provides a unique opportunity to directly analyze the impact of capital regulatory pressure on bank charter value and risk-taking.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of funding liquidity risk and liquidity risk on the bank risk-taking.

This study employs a system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique and a sample of 57 banks operating in BRICS countries over the period from 2006 to 2015.

The results reveal that liquidity risk has a significant and negative effect on the bank risk-taking, indicating that a decrease in liquidity risk contributes to higher bank risk-taking. The study also reveals that funding liquidity risk has the substantial impact on bank risk-taking, suggesting lower funding liquidity risk results in higher bank risk-taking. These results are consistent with prior assumptions.

The implications of this study highlight the fact that liquidity risk is a risk factor which drives the potential bank default, of which banks tend to take more risks when higher funding liquidity exists.

This study offers a number of valuable implications for the policy makers as well as practitioners. The policy makers should take into account better liquidity risk management framework aimed at preventing banks from taking excessive risks. Bank executives must pay more attention on how banks could hold more liquid securities and cash. Less risk-taking reduces higher borrowing costs undermining earnings through imposing taxes on corporate.

This work uncovered that liquidity risk per se is an important and previously unidentified risk factor, specifically its effects on bank risk-taking and contributes to the view in support of holding more liquid securities than the past.

This paper aims to examine risk-taking in Islamic banks by exploring moral hazard and owner/manager agency problems simultaneously.

The authors propose to estimate a model of bank risk-taking that includes both franchise value and ownership structure as explanatory factors of bank risk.

The results show that franchise value is an important determinant of Islamic bank risk-taking. Banks with high franchise values are less likely to take risks than banks with low franchise value. In contrast, outside block holders have, at best, limited influences on bank risk-taking.

This paper conducts the first empirical examination of the relationship between managerial risk preferences and Islamic banks ownership. The authors examine simultaneously the effect of franchise value and owner/manager problem on Islamic bank risk taking behavior. They consider separately the impact on total risk, systematic risk and bank specific risk.

This study aims to examine the impact of activity restrictions in shaping the risk-taking behaviour of banks through the channel of competition in different economic conditions.

The authors use a dynamic panel regression method, particularly a two-step system generalised method of moments to address the risk-taking persistence of banks and endogeneity of activity restrictions and competition with banks’ risk-taking using financial freedom and property rights as instrumental variables. Activity restrictions are computed by constructing an index based on the survey results of Barth et al. (2001, 2006, 2008 and 2013a). Competition is measured by the Panzar–Rosse H-statistic and risk-taking behaviour are measured by non-performing loan ratio and lnZ-score. In the investigation process, the authors control bank characteristics – size, efficiency, ownership and loan composition and macroeconomic factors – gross domestic product growth and inflation, and use 2,527 bank-year observations from 180 commercial banks of Association of the Southeast Asian Nations-five countries over the 1990–2014 period.

This study finds that activity restrictions exacerbate the risk-taking behaviour of the banks leading to changes in the channel of competition because of the “risk-shifting effect” of competition. The finding is robust by considering the financial crisis and alternative specifications.

This study contributes to bank literature and policy formulation regarding the effect of activity restrictions on the risk-taking behaviour of banks, which is an issue of concern amongst bank regulators, policymakers and academics, especially in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis.

Understanding how the competition plays a role in the relationship between activity restrictions and the risk-taking of banks in different economic situations.

This study provides new insight into the bank literature by investigating the moderating role of competition on activity restrictions and the risk-taking behaviour of banks in a different economic environment.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission in the Chinese banking industry. This study also investigates the role of various other factors in the risk-taking channel.

This study used panel data from 2000 to 2012, and a dynamic panel model (Difference GMM) was applied.

The empirical findings of this paper suggest that loose monetary policy rates increase bank risk-taking. Unlike previous studies, the results of this paper suggest that the bank-specific factors (size, liquidity and capitalization) do not significantly affect the risk-taking channel. However, the market structure does have a stabilizing effect on monetary policy transmission and the risk-taking channel. Higher market power weakens the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission.

Of significance to the policymakers' point of view is that loose monetary policy induces banks to take excessive risks. However, such effects can be mitigated by encouraging a proper level of market power in banking markets.

This study investigated the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission for the Chinese banking industry. Due to the unique features of the People's Bank of China (PBC, Central Bank of China) policy, this study also contributes to the literature by comparing price-based and quantity-based monetary policy tools and their effectiveness in financial stability and monetary policy transmission. Furthermore, the role of market structure is also investigated in the risk-taking channel.

The relevance of economic freedom in influencing bank risk taking has not been adequately addressed in the literature. In this connection, employing bank-level data for 2000-2012, the purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of economic freedom on risk taking by MENA banks.

Given the cross-sectional time-series nature of the data, the author employs panel data techniques to explore this issue. In addition, the author examines the robustness of the results using instrumental variable techniques.

The findings appear to suggest that economic freedom exerts a significant and non-negligible impact on bank risk taking. Among the sub-components of economic freedom, it is observed that higher levels of both business and monetary freedom increase variability of profits and, thereby, raise the risk appetite of banks. Risk taking by banks appears to be reliably lower after the crisis than in the period prior to it, although there was a substantial increase in bank risk taking during the crisis.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is one of the earliest studies to explore the interlinkage between economic freedom and bank risk taking for MENA banks.

This paper aims to investigate the impact of regulation and market competition on the risk-taking Behaviour of financial institutions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

The empirical framework is based on panel fixed effects/random effects specification. For robustness purpose, this study also uses the generalized method of moments estimation technique. This study tests the hypothesis that regulatory capital requirements have a significant effect on financial stability of Islamic and conventional banks (CBs) in the MENA region. This study also investigates the moderating effect of market power and concentration on the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk.

The estimation results support the view that capital adequacy ratio (CAR) has no significant impact on credit risk of Islamic banks (IBs), whereas market competition does play a significant role in shaping the risk behavior of these institutions. This study report opposite results for CBs – an increase in the minimum capital requirements is followed by an increase in a bank’s risk level, which has a negative impact on their financial stability. Furthermore, the results support the notion of a non-linear relationship between banking concentration and bank risk. The findings inform the regulatory authorities concerned with improving the financial stability of banking sector in the MENA region to set their policy differently depending on the level of concentration in the banking market.

This study contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of regulatory reforms (in this case, capital requirements) and market competition for bank performance and risk-taking. In regard to IBs, capital requirements are less effective in requiring IBs to adjust their risk level according to the Basel III methodology. This study finds that IBs’ risk behavior is strongly associated with market competition, and therefore, the interest rates. Moreover, banks operating in markets with high banking concentration (but not necessarily, low competition), will decrease their credit risk level in response to an increase in the minimum capital requirements. As a result, these banks will be more stable compared to their conventional peers. Thus, regulators and policymakers in the MENA region should restrict the risk-taking behavior of IBs through stringent capital requirements and more intense banking supervision.

The practical implications of these findings are that the regulatory authorities concerned with improving banking sector stability in the MENA region should proceed differently, depending on the level of banking market concentration. The findings inform regulators and policymakers to set capital requirements at levels that would restrict banks from taking more risk to increase their returns. They are also important for bank managers who should avoid risky strategies in response to increased regulatory pressure (e.g. increase in the minimum required capital level of 8%), as they may lead to an increase in the level of non-performing loans, and therefore, a greater probability of bank default. A future extension of this study will focus on testing the effect of bank risk-taking and market competition on the capitalization levels of banks in the MENA countries. More specifically, this study will investigates if banks raise their capitalization levels during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The analysis of previous research indicates that there is no unambiguous answer to the question of whether IBs perform differently than CBs under different competitive conditions. To fill this gap, this study examines the influence of capital regulation and market competition (both individually and interactively) on bank risk-taking behavior using a large sample of banking institutions in 18 MENA countries over 14 years (2005–2018). For the first time in this line of research, this study shows that the level of market power is positively associated with the level of a bank’ insolvency risk. In others words, IBs operating in highly competitive markets are more inclined to take a higher risk than their conventional peers. Regarding the IBs credit risk behavior, this study finds that market power has a limited impact on the relationship between CAR and risk level. This means that IBs are still applying in their operations the theoretical models based on the prohibition of interest.

U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) have experienced dynamic changes over a period of 2000–2010. We find that the size distribution of sample banks becomes highly positively skewed with a small number of big banks becoming super-sized, and these big banks tend to take extra risk by holding derivative positions for trading purposes. The ten largest risk-taking banks hold about 70% of total assets of all the sample banks in 2010. We investigate whether the risk-taking activities of the BHCs translate into higher risk-adjusted return performance. In extensive panel regression analyses, we find that the risk-taking strategies of large banks by holding derivative positions for trading purpose do not show the clear evidence of enhancing risk-adjusted performance. We find that negative impacts of extra risk-taking on the risk-adjusted performance become bigger with the size of banks.

Purpose – This paper examines the interaction of efficiency and bank risk taking in the Ghanaian banking industry.

Design/methodology/approach – We relate risk taking to price competitiveness, foreign ownership and cost efficiency and other control variables. Cost-inefficiency scores from a stochastic frontier model are used, and a Lerner price index is employed to proxy for market power.

Findings – Our results suggest that market power affects risk taking when conditioned on foreign ownership, but foreign bank risk-taking behaviour is not statistically different from local banks. Cost inefficiency diminishes bank soundness. We also find that industry concentration discourages greater risk taking.

Originality/value – Our study extends the views on risk taking and competition among banks in Ghana, which throws more light from an emerging economy perspective.