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The rise of cryptocurrencies and other digital assets has triggered concerns about regulation and security. Governments and regulatory bodies are challenged to create frameworks that protect consumers, combat money laundering and address risks linked to digital assets. Conventional approaches to confiscation and anti-money laundering are deemed insufficient in this evolving landscape. The absence of a central authority and the use of encryption hinder the identification of asset owners and the tracking of illicit activities. Moreover, the international and cross-border nature of digital assets complicates matters, demanding global coordination. The purpose of this study is to highlight that the effective combat of money laundering, legislative action, innovative investigative techniques and public–private partnerships are crucial.

The focal point of this paper is Australia’s approach to law enforcement in the realm of digital assets. It underscores the pivotal role of robust confiscation mechanisms in disrupting criminal networks operating through digital means. The paper firmly asserts that staying ahead of the curve and maintaining an agile stance is paramount. Criminals are quick to embrace emerging technologies, necessitating proactive measures from policymakers and law enforcement agencies.

It is argued that an agile and comprehensive approach is vital in countering money laundering, as criminals adapt to new technologies. Policymakers and law enforcement agencies must remain proactively ahead of these developments to efficiently identify, trace and seize digital assets involved in illicit activities, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the global financial system.

This paper provides a distinctive perspective by examining Australia’s legal anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing framework, along with its law enforcement strategies within the realm of the digital asset landscape. While there is a plethora of literature on both asset confiscation and digital assets, there is a noticeable absence of exploration into their interplay, especially within the Australian context.

Purpose: This study examines the effect of uncertainties on the hospitality industry from different perspectives across the globe. The hospitality industry faces several contemporary issues and challenges that have the potential to impact its growth and development. This study aims to analyse the current problems and uncertainties in the hospitality sector.

Need for the Study: The hospitality industry plays a significant role in the global economy with various services, including accommodation, food and beverage, events, and tourism. However, the sector faces several contemporary issues and challenges that have the potential to impact its growth and development. This study provides an overview of the most significant problems and challenges facing the hospitality industry today.

Methodology: A systematic literature review was conducted to identify and synthesise relevant studies on the effect of uncertainties issues on the hospitality industry. A systematic search of the Web of Science and Scopus databases was conducted to determine relevant studies published between 2010 and 2021. Studies were screened and selected based on pre-defined inclusion and exclusion criteria. A thematic analysis was performed to categorise the uncertainties and issues in the hospitality industry.

Findings: The study identified several uncertainties and issues facing the hospitality industry, including the pandemic uncertainties, financial crisis, whether positive and negative impacts, terrorism attacks on hotels and tourist places, uncertainties in government policies, situational risks like uncertainties, ambiguity, cultural differences, changes in tourist preferences and changing habits of the tourist.

This study aims to convey the understanding of the ecosystem – how “hundi” works on the border trade between Myanmar and northern Thailand, which is an informal transfer system and is widely used as an alternative banking system. Even though the role of hundi is unable to declare the sources of money under the standard settlement of formal banking system, a failure to operate of its official mechanism are carrying using hundi, as a financial platform across the border between Thailand and Myanmar. This study surveys the best practice mechanism for the regional and international cooperation.

This paper draws on relevant literature, open-source reporting, and interviews with more than 30 interviewees on the border between Thailand and Myanmar. Interviewees includes border-trader, money changer, money transfer operators, business leaders, hundi operators, immigrant labors, government officials and commercial banking staffs.

This study provides a unique insight of hundi system, which work as the alternative mode of formal banking. It is an informal fund transfer payment platform used on the border between Thailand and Myanmar in the past five decades. It insists that hundi plays a significant role in both substitution and complementary on the trade and payment across the border of Myanmar–Thailand. Even though confronting with the barriers of financing of terrorism (anti money laundering AML/combating the financing of terrorism CFT) risk, the competition with the expanding and modernizing formal banking sector, and the introduction of Fintech and mobile money services. In the short term, these are unlikely to eliminate the hundi system completely, but may instead push hundi operators towards adopting these networks and technologies in their own operations.

This paper will be a useful source for academics, development professionals, policymakers, law enforcement agencies and business actors who are seeking to understand Myanmar’s informal payment system, hundi.

This is the latest work for border trade payment or trade financing role of hundi which has hidden under the informal market of the border for several decades. It has few research of hundi on border trade and payment, particularly after the military coup in 2021 which made hundi return to be on the spotlight and simultaneous mechanism of border trade and payment ecosystem of Myanmar. This paper will be a useful source for academics, development professionals, policymakers, law enforcement agencies and business actors who are eager to understand Myanmar’s informal payment system, hundi, especially during the hardship.

What kinds of support do interstate rivals provide to domestic actors in ongoing civil wars? And how do domestic actors utilize the support they receive? This chapter answers these questions by comparing Iranian and Saudi military and non-military (mediation, foreign aid and religious soft-power promotion) support to the Houthis and to the Government of Yemen (GoY) during the Saada wars (2004–2010) and the internationalized civil war (2015–2018). It also focuses on the processes through which the GoY and the Houthis have utilized this support for their own strategic purposes. This chapter applies a structured, focused comparison methodology and relies on data from a review of both primary and secondary sources complemented by 14 interviews. This chapter finds that there were less external interventions in the conflict in Saada than in the internationalized civil war. During the latter, a broader set of intervention strategies enabled further instrumentalization by domestic actors, which in turn contributed to the protracted nature of the conflict. This chapter contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry and third-party intervention. The framework of analysis is applicable to civil wars that experience intervention by rivals, such as Syria or Libya.

Financial crime presents a serious threat to the stability and integrity of the global financial system. To combat illicit financial activities, regulatory bodies worldwide have implemented various measures, including the requirement for financial institutions to assess the financial crime risks they are exposed to in the jurisdictions they operate in. These risks include inadequate anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism frameworks and other financial crime risks that have significant strategic implications for firms’ geographical footprints and customer risk classifications. This paper aims to make a contribution to the literature by undertaking a cross-country analysis of 158 countries to shed light on what drives perceived jurisdiction risk of the UK financial services firms.

Capturing firms’ perceptions of financial crime risk requires significant data collection efforts, including surveys and interviews with key personnel. This can be highly resource-intensive and may require access to sensitive information that firms may be reluctant to share. Furthermore, the dynamic nature of financial crime risks means that perceptions can change rapidly in response to changes in the regulatory and geopolitical landscape. As a result, capturing and monitoring firms’ perceptions of financial crime risks requires ongoing monitoring and analysis. Capturing firms’ perceptions of financial crime risks at a cross-jurisdictional level is a particularly complex and challenging task that requires careful consideration of a range of factors. As a result of data limitations, empirical investigation of the factors underlying the firms’ perceptions of jurisdiction risk is in its infancy. This paper uses regulatory financial crime data from the UK in a multivariate regression analysis, following a general-to-specific approach where any redundant variables were removed from the general model sequentially.

Results suggest that perceived jurisdiction risk is significantly and positively associated with evasion of tax and regulations, while it is significantly and negatively associated with political stability and regulatory stringency. These have important implications for home and host supervisors with respect to the factors that drive perceived jurisdiction risks and the evaluation of the nature of inherent financial crime risks within regulated firms. The findings confirm the critical role of the shadow economy, political stability and regulatory rigor in shaping jurisdiction risk perceptions. From a policy standpoint, the findings support the case for taking prompt policy action to identify, prioritize and implement specific and targeted measures with respect to the shadow economy, political stability and rigor of regulations to improve international firms’ perceptions of jurisdiction risk.

While there exists different measures of financial crime risk, it is notoriously challenging to capture firms’ perceptions of it, particularly at a cross-jurisdiction level. This is because financial crime risks can vary significantly across different jurisdictions due to differences in legal and regulatory frameworks, cultural norms and levels of economic development. This makes it difficult for firms to compare and evaluate the financial crime risks they face in different jurisdictions. Besides, firms’ perceptions of financial crime risks can be influenced by a range of subjective factors, including personal experiences, media coverage and hearsay. These perceptions may not always align with objective risk assessments, which are based on more systematic and empirical methods of risk measurement. This paper contributes to the existing literature by undertaking a cross-country analysis drawing on a unique set of UK regulatory financial crime data, which is based on a total of 1,900 annual financial crime data regulatory return (REP-CRIM) submissions to the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority.

Geopolitical risks associated with the return of great power politics and growing nationalism have generated new challenges for foreign investors across industries. Oil and gas companies are well acquainted with such risks and have developed strategies to manage them. This paper reviews five of these strategies: divorcing ownership control from operating control in designing collaborative ventures; proactively managing stakeholder relationships; ensuring transparency and communication; diversifying risks while proactively positioning for emerging opportunities; and deliberately planning for exit should such an eventuality arise. Firms outside of oil and gas can draw on these strategies as they navigate the emerging geopolitical context.

This paper reviews five strategies that oil and gas companies can use to manage geopolitical risk: divorcing ownership control from operating control in designing collaborative ventures; proactively managing stakeholder relationships; ensuring transparency and communication; diversifying risks while proactively positioning for emerging opportunities; and deliberately planning for exit should such an eventuality arise.

This study identifies several strategies that oil and gas companies have used to manage geopolitical risks. These tools will be increasingly important in the shifting global political landscape.

Drawing on the experiences of oil and gas companies, this study has identified several strategies that companies can use to shield themselves from the risks that are currently emanating from geopolitics. While these best practices originate in the experiences of oil and gas firms, the ability to deftly manage geopolitical risks is becoming an important prerequisite for companies across industries.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the onset of the conflict in Ukraine led to a sustained downturn in tourist arrivals (TA) in Russia. This paper aims to explore the influence of geopolitical risk (GPR) and other indices on TA over 1995–2023.

We employ a nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) model to analyze the effects, capturing both the positive and negative shocks of these variables on TA.

Our research demonstrates that the NARDL model is more effective in elucidating the complex dynamics between macroeconomic factors and TA. Both an increase and a decrease in GPR lead to an increase in TA. A 1% negative shock in GPR leads to an increase in TA by 1.68%, whereas a 1% positive shock in GPR also leads to an increase in TA by 0.5%. In other words, despite the increase in GPR, the number of tourists coming to Russia increases by 0.5% for every 1% increase in that risk. Several explanations could account for this phenomenon: (1) risk-tolerant tourists: some tourists might be less sensitive to GPR or they might find the associated risks acceptable; (2) economic incentives: increased risk might lead to a depreciation in the local currency and lower costs, making travel to Russia more affordable for international tourists; (3) niche tourism: some tourists might be attracted to destinations experiencing turmoil, either for the thrill or to gain firsthand experience of the situation; (4) lagged effects: there might be a time lag between the increase in risk and the actual impact on tourist behavior, meaning the effects might be observed differently over a longer period.

Our study, employing the NARDL model and utilizing a dataset spanning from 1995 to 2023, investigates the impact of GPR, gross domestic product (GDP), real effective exchange rate (REER) and economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on TA in Russia. This research is unique because the dataset was compiled by the authors. The results show a complex relationship between GPR and TA, indicating that factors influencing TA can be multifaceted and not always intuitive.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a model of relationships for conflict-ridden destinations that include variables concerning the dispute and their effect on key constructs that shape visitation decisions.

The theoretical model is examined for two conflict-ridden Eastern Mediterranean destinations, Israel and Turkey, which suffer from ongoing armed conflicts, using two samples of potential tourists residing in the USA (n = 1,581) and India (n = 1,383).

The relationships are stable for both destinations and cultural contexts. Animosity is a strong factor in tourists’ decisions, whereas perceived risk has a relatively insignificant impact. Knowledge of the conflict is also found to influence decisions about visiting conflict-ridden destinations.

The study investigates the role of variables related to the conflict as antecedents of animosity and perceived risk, thus contributing to the understanding concerning decisions to visit conflict-ridden destinations. The model is generalized for varied destinations and cultures.

该研究提出了一个针对有冲突目的地的关系模型, 其中包括与冲突有关的因素以及对旅游访问决策的关键概念的影响。

使用基于美国（n = 1,581 ）和印度（n = 1,383）的潜在游客样本, 本文的理论模型检验了两个东地中海目的地, 以色列和土耳其, 该目的地遭受了持续的武装冲突。

获得的关系在两个目的地和文化背景下都是稳定的。敌意是影响游客决策的重要因素, 然而风险感知的影响相对较小。研究还发现了对冲突的认知会影响有关访问目的地的决定。

该研究调查了与冲突相关的因素作为敌意和感知风险的前因变量, 从而有助于我们理解关于访问有冲突的目的地的决策, 该模型适用于不同的目的地和文化。

La investigación propone un modelo de relaciones para destinos en conflicto que incluye variables relacionadas con el conflicto y su efecto en conceptos clave para las decisiones de visita del turista.

Se examina el modelo teórico para dos destinos del Mediterráneo oriental, que sufren conflictos armados en curso, Israel y Turquía, utilizando dos muestras de turistas potenciales que residen en los Estados Unidos (n = 1.581) y la India (n = 1.383).

Las relaciones obtenidas son estables tanto para los destinos como para los distintos contextos culturales. La animosidad es un factor importante en las decisiones de los turistas, mientras que el riesgo percibido tiene un impacto relativamente insignificante. También se ha encontrado que el conocimiento del conflicto influye en las decisiones de visita al destino en conflicto.

El estudio investiga el papel de las variables relacionadas con el conflicto como antecedentes de la animosidad y el riesgo percibido, contribuyendo así a nuestra comprensión sobre las decisiones de visitar destinos en conflicto. El modelo es generalizable a distintos destinos y culturas.