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Introduction: Why companies pay dividends and the determinants of dividend policy are considered an unresolved dividend puzzle. To reach a consensus over the puzzle, researchers must investigate the factors affecting dividend policy by incorporating all the determinants into a single research effort.

Purpose: We examine the dividend policy determinants of Sri Lankan firms, explicitly focusing on the banking, finance, and insurance (BFI) sectors.

Methodology: This study uses the quantitative approach applying the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) system to examine the dividend policy determinants by obtaining secondary data from 51 listed BFI organisations in Sri Lanka.

Findings: The analysis disclosed that the variables of changes in revenues, firm size, liquidity, corporate tax, business risk, and profitability have a positive relationship with dividend yield, whereas investment opportunities, leverage, change in revenues, corporate tax, and firm size impact positively on the propensity to pay dividends in BFI organisations in Sri Lanka. Our findings opine that managers in the BFI industries should prioritise changing their dividend policies by paying close attention to factors, such as dividend yield, changes in revenue, firm size, liquidity, corporate tax ratio, business risk, and profitability because the dividend policy is critical to retaining current investors and luring new ones.

The practice of real earnings management (REM) or earnings manipulation through the company’s real activities is increasingly widespread. Companies that want to achieve profit targets have switched from accrual-based to REM, especially in the firm family owner, who is an active manager. Our study aims to determine whether family ownership in a company will be a factor in the existence of greater REM practices. The authors collected 2,613 observational data from non-financial companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2013–2018 using a purposive sampling method and then analyzed using panel random effect (RE) regression. The results show that family ownership significantly negatively affects abnormal operating cash flow which means that family firms are more likely to reduce operating cash flow to report higher income than non-family firms. Thus, it can be concluded that family firms in Indonesia are more likely to be involved in REM than non-family firms.

We study the potential effects of pension underfunding on corporate investment, financial constraints and improved employee bonding using 10 Pacific-Basin countries (including the United States, Australia, and eight Asian countries) at heterogeneous economic development stages and different regulatory environments. We document that corporate pensions are significantly underfunded in most countries of our sample in the period of 2001–2017, when interest rates were ultralow in most countries. In addition, firms from countries with stronger employee protection and more generous retirement benefits tend to show higher levels of underfunding in their defined benefit (DB) pension plans. To the extent of pension underfunding imposing constraints on corporate investment, we find that firms in these countries can face more constraints on investment when their pension is underfunded.

This chapter presents both main arguments of dividend policy theories and their empirical evidence. According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), dividend decisions are not relevant to firm value in a perfect capital market. Nevertheless, there are several market frictions in the real world (e.g., information asymmetry, agency problems, transaction costs, firm maturity, catering incentives and taxes). Therefore, academics use them to develop theories which help them explain corporate dividend decisions. Particularly, signaling theory considers dividend payments as a signal about firms' future prospects since outside investors face information disadvantage. “Bird-in-hand” theory argues that investors prefer dividends to capital gains since the former have lower risk than the latter. Agency theory is developed from the conflict of interest between corporate managers and shareholders. Corporate managers have high incentives to restrict dividend payments. Furthermore, transaction cost theory and pecking order theory posit that firms prefer internal to external funds. This drives firms to hold more cash and pay less dividends. Life cycle theory explains dividend policy by firm maturity. Mature firms have fewer investment opportunities, and thus, they tend to pay more dividends. Catering theory states that dividend decisions are based on investors' demand. Firms pay more dividends since investors prefer dividends and assign higher value to dividend payers. Tax clientele theory argues that firms that have corporate dividend policy rely on the comparative income tax rates for dividends and capital gains. Under the tax discriminations against dividends, firms tend to restrict their dividends in order to increase their stock prices.

This chapter analyzes how the macro-environment determines corporate dividend decisions. First, political factors including political uncertainty, economic policy uncertainty, political corruption, and democracy may have two opposite effects on dividend decisions. For example, firms learn democratic practices to improve their corporate governance, but dividend policy may be the outcome of strong corporate governance or the substitute for poor corporate governance. Second, firms in countries of high national income, low inflation, and highly developed stock markets tend to pay more dividends. A monetary restriction (expansion) reduces (increases) dividend payments, as economic shocks like financial crises and the COVID-19 may negatively affect corporate dividend policy through higher external financial constraint, economic uncertainty, and agency costs. On the other hand, they may positively influence corporate dividend policy through agency costs of debt, shareholders' bird-in-hand motive, substitution of weak corporate governance, and signaling motive. Third, social factors including national culture, religion, and language affect dividend decisions since they govern both managers' and shareholders' views and behaviors. Fourth, firms tend to reduce their dividends when they face stronger pressure to reduce pollution, produce environment-friendly products, or follow a green policy. Finally, firms have high levels of dividends when shareholders are strongly protected by laws. However, firms tend to pay more dividends in countries of weak creditor rights since dividend payments are a substitute for poor legal protection of creditors. Furthermore, corporate dividend policy changes when tax laws change the comparative tax rates on dividends and capital gains.

Introduction: According to the existing research, one of the key determinants of a company’s survival and market development is its ability to get bank loans or other external sources of finance for business expansion.

Purpose: The study aims to explore the factors affecting access to finance and their effects on the development of medium- and small-sized businesses. These factors include business size and age, profitability, the length of a company’s association with a commercial bank, and banking sector characteristics.

Need for the study: It is particularly crucial for small- and medium-sized businesses since they often have trouble getting funding from banks because they don’t supply the banks with the information they need to assess their loan application prospects, however, when a company’s economic and financial situation improves, banks get access to more information about the firms, and financing is thus more readily available.

Methodology: This research is based on qualitative methods, focus on an elaborative study of the existing literature, and provide suggestions based on the same.

Findings: The findings show that small- and medium-sized businesses, like those in other European nations, have less access to finance than large businesses. It revealed that the company’s size, liquidity, profitability, and banking industry state significantly influence the availability of bank loans.

Introduction: Commercial banks play a vital role in the global economy, facilitating economic growth and providing essential financial services. As key intermediaries between savers and borrowers, these institutions operate in a dynamic and complex environment characterised by various risk factors that can significantly impact their profitability and overall stability. Understanding the interconnected relationships between credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, and profitability is crucial for effective risk management strategies and the development of appropriate regulatory frameworks.

Purpose: Commercial banks play a critical role in the global economy by facilitating economic growth and providing financial services. This study examines the interconnected relationships between credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, and profitability in commercial banking.

Methodology: The sample consists of licenced scheduled commercial banks on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) from 2015 to 2022. Using the Smart PLS-SEM 3.0 path analysis technique, the study evaluates the combined influence of these risk factors on profitability and provides evidence-based recommendations for risk management strategies.

Findings: The findings can assist banks in enhancing their risk management practices, and regulators in developing appropriate regulatory frameworks. By understanding the key risk factors and their impact on profitability, banks and regulators can mitigate risks, enhance transparency, and promote stability within the banking sector.

Significance/value: The value of this study lies in its focus on the interconnectedness of risk factors, profitability, and the potential implications for decision-making, risk management strategies, regulatory frameworks, and the overall stability of the commercial banking sector.

As a financial policy, dividend policy significantly affects firm value. This chapter analyzes how stock prices react to dividend decisions. First, a dividend payment is an extraction of value; therefore, stock price theoretically drops by the dividend amount on the ex-dividend day. In practice, the price drop and the dividend magnitude are not equal because of tax clientele, short-term trading, and market microstructure. Investors are indifferent in trading stocks before and after stocks go ex-dividend if they obtain equal marginal benefits from the two trading times. The difference in tax rates on dividends and capital gains leads to the gap between the price drop and the dividend amount. Moreover, if transaction costs are considerable, investors have high incentives to short-sell stocks until they cannot obtain more profits. The final outcome of this short-term trading is the difference between the price drop and the dividend amount. Furthermore, market microstructure factors such as limit orders, bid-ask spread, and price discreteness also create this gap. Second, dividend announcements convey valuable information to outsiders. When firms announce increases (decreases) in dividends, their stock prices tend to increase (decrease). Third, dividend policy is negatively related to stock price volatility. This negative relationship is explained by duration effect, rate of return effect, arbitrage realization effect, and information effect. Empirical evidence for this relationship is found in many countries. Finally, dividend smoothing is also considered as a signal about firms' future earnings. Consequently, firms with stable dividends have higher market value. In other words, dividend stability has a positive effect on stock prices.

This chapter analyzes how the industry environment determines corporate dividend decisions. First, common participants in the product market are competitors, suppliers, and customers. These micro-stakeholders create competitive pressures on firms and thus affect their current and future performance. Competitors influence dividend decisions through three mechanisms, namely predation threat, corporate governance, and imitation. Predation threat reduces firms' incentives to pay dividends when facing high rivalry. Competition helps firms improve corporate governance. However, strong corporate governance may increase or decrease dividend payments since dividend policy may be the outcome of strong corporate governance or the substitute for weak corporate governance, respectively. Besides, firms tend to imitate their industry peers in dividend policy. Second, as a financial policy, dividend policy is also affected by participants in the financial market like investors, creditors, and auditors. These financial stakeholders' behaviors are important to stock prices. Due to the agency problem, creditors have high incentives to restrict firm's dividend payments in order to protect their benefits. On the other hand, creditors are effective external monitors who help firms improve their corporate governance. Outside investors affect corporate dividend policy through their valuation. Firms pay more dividends if investors prefer dividends to capital gains. Auditors play the role of a third-party monitor, and thus, they help firms reduce managers' expropriation of shareholders and improve the quality of accounting information. Furthermore, we also investigate dividend policy of regulated industries in both financial sector (banking, insurance, and real estate) and utilities sector (energy, telecommunications, and transportation).

This chapter investigates the cost of public debt for firms using a comprehensive sample consisting of 17,368 industrial bond issues from 1970 to 2011. The empirical evidence shows that yield spreads for seasoned bond issues are significantly lower than those for initial bond issues. This seasoning effect is robust across different sample periods, subsamples, and model specifications. On average, the yield spreads for seasoned bond issues are around 50 bps lower than those for initial bond issues. This difference cannot be explained by other bond and firm characteristics. The seasoning effect is more pronounced for firms with higher levels of uncertainty, lower information disclosure quality, and longer time intervals between the first and subsequent issues. Our empirical findings provide supportive evidence for the extant theories that aim to rationalize the information role in determining the cost of capital.