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This study aims to define a “technological statecraft” concept to distinguish tech-based measures/sanctions from an array of economic measures ranging from restrictions of rare earth elements and natural gas supplies to asset freezes under the wider portfolio of economic statecraft. This concept is practically intended to reveal the USA’s “logic of choice” in its employment of technology as an efficient instrument to deal with China in the context of the great power rivalry.

This study follows David A. Baldwin’s statecraft definition and conceptualization methodology, which relies on “means” rather than “ends.” In addition to Baldwin and as an incremental contribution to his economic statecraft analysis, this study also combines national political economy with statecraft analysis with a particular focus on the utilization of technological measures against China during the Trump administration.

The US rationale for choosing technology, namely, emerging and foundational technologies, in its rivalry against China is caused at least by two factors: the nature of the external challenge and the characteristics of the US innovation model based largely on radical innovations. To deal with China, the USA practically distinguished the role of advanced technology and followed a grammer of technological statecraft as depicted in the promulgated legal texts during the Trump administration.

Despite a growing volume of literature on economic statecraft and technological competition, studies focusing on countries’ “logic of choice” with regard to why and under what conditions they choose financial, technological or commodity-based sanctions/measures/controls are lacking. Inspired from Baldwin’s account on the “logic of choice” from among alternative statecrafts (i.e. diplomacy, military, economic statecraft, and propaganda). This study will contribute to the literature with a clear lens to demonstrate the “logic of choice” from among a variety of economic statecraft measures in the case of the US technological statecraft toward China.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the origin of economics as a separate science.

A very comprehensive approach is presented for determining the origin of economics as a science. Three kinds of inter‐related issues are discussed: how to interpret and evaluate earlier, particularly ancient, writings, the specification of the requirements for declaring economics as a science and the definition, scope and methodology of economics.

Application of the most stringent requirements for declaring economics as a separate science to Kautilya's Arthashastra validated A.K. Sen's claim that it is the first book on economics.

According to Kautilya, economics is a separate science but not independent of other disciplines and particularly of ethics. Whereas, most of the current research ignores this inter‐dependence and consequently does not fully capture reality.

It implies that the inter‐dependence between economics and other disciplines should be encouraged and vigorously explored.

It validates Redman's assertion, “The history of economics as a science is, in my view, still waiting to be properly written”.

Sages and seers in ancient India specified dharma, artha, kama and moksha as the four ends of a moral and productive life and emphasised the attainment of a proper balance between the spiritual health and the material health. However, most of their intellectual energy was directed towards the attainment of moksha, the salvation from birth‐death‐rebirth cycle. Kautilya, on the other hand considered poverty as a living death and concentrated on devising economic policies to achieve salvation from poverty but without compromising with ethical values unless survival of the state was threatened. Kautilya's Arthashastra is unique in emphasising the imperative of economic growth and welfare of all. According to him, if there is no dharma, there is no society. He believed that ethical values pave the way to heaven as well as to prosperity on the earth, that is, have an intrinsic value as well as an instrumental value. He referred the reader to the Vedas and Philosophy for learning moral theory, which sheds light on the distinction between good and bad and moral and immoral actions. He extended the conceptual framework to deal with conflict of interest situations arising from the emerging capitalism. He dedicated his work to Om (symbol of spirituality, God) and Brihaspati and Sukra (political thinkers) implying, perhaps, that his goal was to integrate ethics and economics. It is argued that the level of integration between economics and ethics is significantly higher in Kautilya's Arthashastra than that in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations or for that matter in the writings of Plato and Aristotle.

The author sets out the development of the Northern Powerhouse initiative since it was launched by George Osborne in 2014. The chapter reflects on where the policy initiative and programmes are now in 2019 as we await Brexit. The new Conservative Boris Johnson premiership in 2019 has backed Northern Powerhouse Rail between Leeds and Manchester, and in advance of the major UK Spending Review after Brexit and the smaller towns have been promised investment funds. This chapter presents the wicked issues involved in seeking to address the North–South divide and re-balancing the UK at a time of increasing and deepening social and economic inequalities. The chapter calls for the strengthening of the Northern Powerhouse initiative due to its phenomenal brand. This requires greater collaboration between the public, private and voluntary sectors across the North of England to address the key strategic policy issues and yet there is no one organisation driving the Northern Powerhouse initiative. The author argues the Powerhouse may well be both underpowered and ungovernable and that Politicians and what she calls the Policy Qualgecrats, need more compelling Imagineers of the North, if we are to benefit and make more sense of this new pan-regional scale of governance and turn it into a real force for rebalancing the North as a whole.

Economic statecraft is a critical aspect of China’s foreign policy and has played a vital role in China’s relations with its Asian neighbors. The Chinese economic ties with Asia are significant not only because China is the second largest economy in today’s world but also because it has an important impact on regional economic co‐operation and international supply chains. Relentless growth in military buildup and more assertive foreign policy led many pundits to focus almost exclusively on political and military aspects of the Chinese grand strategy in Asia. The purpose of this study is to re‐examine this picture by studying China’s economic statecraft in the region.

This paper will address following research questions: How does the Chinese foreign economic policy serve its political aspirations in East Asia? Why has China increasingly relied on a combination of economic pressures and incentives to achieve its foreign policy objectives? How effective is China’s economic diplomacy as a strategic weapon? What are the limitations of such policy? What challenges does Beijing face in exercising its economic power in East Asia?

Beijing has a comprehensive, long-term grand strategy in Asia, and economic statecraft is a major component of it. Economic statecraft is a double-edged sword. It has given the People’s Republic of China more political influence but frictions and disputes between China and its trading partners are growing as well. Even with the slower growth of the Chinese economy, China will continue to be a game changer for the region. The economic diplomacy has long been part of the foreign policy toolkit used by the People’s Republic of China and will play more important role in the years to come.

Thus far, China’s expanding economic ties with many countries in the world have not generated significant spillover effects. Although China is the dominant economic partner for every country in East Asia, its “soft power” remains to be weak. With the slower growth of the Chinese economy, another looming issue is whether China is going to be able to make a shift away from a trade- and export-led growth model that brought its dramatic economic success. All these could lead China’s economic statecraft less potent. Meanwhile, it should be noted that Asian economies that once relied on the USA are reaching a turning point as China comes to the fore, a trend that may challenge the existing international order. Should this momentum continue, it could alter the balance of power between Washington and Beijing in the region.

For Beijing, economic statecraft concerns both the economic dimension of foreign policy and the strategic dimension of economic policy. Although there is a growing literature on China’s soft power and military capabilities, the study of the economic dimensions of China’s foreign policy remains underdeveloped. With rising confidence and sophistication, Beijing has deployed economic resources to achieve geopolitical aims.

Needless to say, China’s economic statecraft has already triggered heated debate in the United States, Asia and elsewhere in the international community. However, the study of the Chinese economic diplomacy has received relatively little scholarly attention in the English-speaking world. This paper will fill a gap in the analysis and literature.

As political interfaces, national borders are subject to extensive surveillance and policing within the interstate system. But what happens when the state's gatekeepers emerge from within the social body? How do such instances impact scholarly understandings of governance and surveillance? This chapter investigates these questions empirically, analyzing the Minuteman Project, a grassroots vigilante movement dedicated to directly policing the nation's borders. Situating the movement within the existing literature on “governmentality” and “community policing”, I analyze its history, ideology, practices and interactions with authorities, arguing that, despite their status as non-state actors, its members appropriate, enforce and extend many of the principles of governance and statecraft; whether, surveillance, policing, security or territoriality. Like community policing, the Minutemen highlight the pervasive and decentralized nature of government, social control and surveillance. In occupying and monitoring the border, the group serves as the state's “eyes and ears” without impinging upon its juridical or coercive capacities. However, in contrast to community policing, the Minutemen are not an instance of the state or police engaging or reaching down into the public, but represent a distinct segment of the public reaching up and aligning itself with the “arms” of the state.

The purpose of this paper is to cull out leadership lessons from one of India's oldest books on statecraft and economics – The Arthashastra by Kautilya – and present an Indian model of leadership which may be used by scholars and practitioners for leadership development in modern global context.

An analysis of Kautilya's teachings is done based on English translation of his original works by two eminent scholars. A model of leadership is derived on the basis of Kautilya's writings.

Kautilya presents a holistic perspective as he synthesizes the Eastern and Western approaches on leadership. His skill‐based and strategic approach gets support and direction from his value‐based, ethical considerations. Also, an in depth study of his writings shows that he was a precursor to a few leadership theories developed in the Western world in modern times.

Scholars have studied The Arthashastra as a treatise on economics, politics, diplomacy and statecraft. Lessons have also been drawn on a few aspects of management and leadership. There is no comprehensive commentary available on his views on leadership. In this paper, an attempt is made to develop a leadership model which integrates the Eastern and the Western approaches on leadership and can be used for leadership development in modern times.

In acknowledgment of the demands of studying state secrecy, this chapter asks how novel possibilities for knowing can be fashioned. It does so in relation to the place of secrecy within international diplomatic and security negotiations associated with humanitarian disarmament. A conversational account is given regarding how “cluster bombs” become subject to a major international ban in 2008. Tensions, uncertainties, and contradictions associated with knowing and conveying matters that cannot be wholly known or conveyed are worked through. With these moves, a form of writing is sought that sensitizes readers to how absences figure within debates about social problems and the study of those debates, as well as how ignorance born out of secrecy helps secure an understanding of the world. Uncertainties, no-go areas, and blind spots are looked to as analytical and practical resources.

This paper explores the relationship between social movement protest, economic sabotage, state capitalism, the “Green Scare,” and public forms of political repression. Through a quantitative analysis of direct action activism highlighting the Earth Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front, the discourse surrounding mechanisms of social change and their impact on state power and capitalist accumulation will be examined. The analyses examines the earth and animal liberation movements, utilizing a Marxist-anarchist lens to illustrate how these non-state actors provide powerful critiques of capital and the state. Specifically, the discussion examines how state-sanctioned violence against these movements represents a return to Foucauldian Monarchical power. A quantitative-qualitative history will be used to argue that the movements’ actions fail to qualify as “terrorism,” and to examine the performance of power between the radical left and the state. State repression demonstrates not only the capitalist allegiances between government and industry, but also a sense of capital’s desperation hoping to counter a movement that has produced demonstrable victories by the means of bankrupting and isolating corporations. The government is taking such unconstitutional measures as a “talk back” between the revolutionary potential of these movements’ ideology as well as the challenge they present to state capitalism.