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This study aims to define a “technological statecraft” concept to distinguish tech-based measures/sanctions from an array of economic measures ranging from restrictions of rare earth elements and natural gas supplies to asset freezes under the wider portfolio of economic statecraft. This concept is practically intended to reveal the USA’s “logic of choice” in its employment of technology as an efficient instrument to deal with China in the context of the great power rivalry.

This study follows David A. Baldwin’s statecraft definition and conceptualization methodology, which relies on “means” rather than “ends.” In addition to Baldwin and as an incremental contribution to his economic statecraft analysis, this study also combines national political economy with statecraft analysis with a particular focus on the utilization of technological measures against China during the Trump administration.

The US rationale for choosing technology, namely, emerging and foundational technologies, in its rivalry against China is caused at least by two factors: the nature of the external challenge and the characteristics of the US innovation model based largely on radical innovations. To deal with China, the USA practically distinguished the role of advanced technology and followed a grammer of technological statecraft as depicted in the promulgated legal texts during the Trump administration.

Despite a growing volume of literature on economic statecraft and technological competition, studies focusing on countries’ “logic of choice” with regard to why and under what conditions they choose financial, technological or commodity-based sanctions/measures/controls are lacking. Inspired from Baldwin’s account on the “logic of choice” from among alternative statecrafts (i.e. diplomacy, military, economic statecraft, and propaganda). This study will contribute to the literature with a clear lens to demonstrate the “logic of choice” from among a variety of economic statecraft measures in the case of the US technological statecraft toward China.

Economic statecraft is a critical aspect of China’s foreign policy and has played a vital role in China’s relations with its Asian neighbors. The Chinese economic ties with Asia are significant not only because China is the second largest economy in today’s world but also because it has an important impact on regional economic co‐operation and international supply chains. Relentless growth in military buildup and more assertive foreign policy led many pundits to focus almost exclusively on political and military aspects of the Chinese grand strategy in Asia. The purpose of this study is to re‐examine this picture by studying China’s economic statecraft in the region.

This paper will address following research questions: How does the Chinese foreign economic policy serve its political aspirations in East Asia? Why has China increasingly relied on a combination of economic pressures and incentives to achieve its foreign policy objectives? How effective is China’s economic diplomacy as a strategic weapon? What are the limitations of such policy? What challenges does Beijing face in exercising its economic power in East Asia?

Beijing has a comprehensive, long-term grand strategy in Asia, and economic statecraft is a major component of it. Economic statecraft is a double-edged sword. It has given the People’s Republic of China more political influence but frictions and disputes between China and its trading partners are growing as well. Even with the slower growth of the Chinese economy, China will continue to be a game changer for the region. The economic diplomacy has long been part of the foreign policy toolkit used by the People’s Republic of China and will play more important role in the years to come.

Thus far, China’s expanding economic ties with many countries in the world have not generated significant spillover effects. Although China is the dominant economic partner for every country in East Asia, its “soft power” remains to be weak. With the slower growth of the Chinese economy, another looming issue is whether China is going to be able to make a shift away from a trade- and export-led growth model that brought its dramatic economic success. All these could lead China’s economic statecraft less potent. Meanwhile, it should be noted that Asian economies that once relied on the USA are reaching a turning point as China comes to the fore, a trend that may challenge the existing international order. Should this momentum continue, it could alter the balance of power between Washington and Beijing in the region.

For Beijing, economic statecraft concerns both the economic dimension of foreign policy and the strategic dimension of economic policy. Although there is a growing literature on China’s soft power and military capabilities, the study of the economic dimensions of China’s foreign policy remains underdeveloped. With rising confidence and sophistication, Beijing has deployed economic resources to achieve geopolitical aims.

Needless to say, China’s economic statecraft has already triggered heated debate in the United States, Asia and elsewhere in the international community. However, the study of the Chinese economic diplomacy has received relatively little scholarly attention in the English-speaking world. This paper will fill a gap in the analysis and literature.

Online feminist activism has opened a different path for ordinary Iranians who are not necessarily versed in post-revolutionary discourses on feminism and political activism, nor are familiar with the names and past achievements of Iranian women’s activist pioneers since the birth of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Social media has helped to tease apart government statecraft that continually touts and reemphasizes Islamic values, at the same time providing a platform for a feminist consciousness that more recently has passionately supported individual rights, especially the right to privacy. This chapter delves into this move toward a more individualized form of dissent, surveying the generational, ideological, and technological divides that have emerged among Iranian women’s activists following popular uprisings that have been happening domestically since 2009.

Educational testing launched under “No Child Left Behind” (NCLB) brings unprecedented levels of surveillance to public education in the U.S. The testing regime is moving American pedagogy away from types of teaching which are either politically disfavored or not easily tested. The impact of NCLB will be strongest in lower-income schools which fare poorly on such tests; these schools can expect to see sanctions, shaming, and a concomitant departure of committed families and teachers. The reshaping of American education wrought by NCLB compels us to reimagine mass surveillance as not primarily a means of watching the world, but as expressions of power capable of effecting significant changes in institutions and behaviors.

The purpose of this paper is to study key economic strategies in Asia laid out by the Chinese Government since Xi Jinping became the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.

The paper is composed of six parts. The first part analyzes China’s Asian trade strategy with a focus on the free-trade agreement. The second part elaborates the Asian finance and currency strategy with the core being the regionalization of RMB. The third part introduces China’s newly proposed Belt and Road Initiative (B&R). The fourth part deals with the China–USA economic relationship with a view to China’s economic strategy in Asia. The fifth part explains China’s domestic economic policy which forms the basis of the Asian Economic Strategy.

A marked change has taken place in China’s economic strategy in Asia, namely, giving more consideration to how to offer more public goods to the region. This is natural as China’s economic power is developed to a certain level and it is highly related to China’s attempt to growing its economic influence in this region. China believes that the B&R Initiative and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are both public goods China has provided to Asia. China’s economic strategy in Asia demonstrates that China, as a rising power, though faced with domination of established power and the original regional economic rule system, still promotes the cooperation, integration, participation and development of this region. In general, China’s economic strategy in Asia offers an alternative for countries in this region so that Asian countries can better safeguard their rights amid China–America competition, and a new Asian economic order can be better built.

The paper contributes to the researched area of China’s economic strategy in Asia by comprehensively elaborating its trade, money, B&R Initiative and so on. This paper also shows the major challenges of China’s economic strategy in Asia and therefore is helpful to fully understand China’s economic statecraft.

This paper explores the relationship between social movement protest, economic sabotage, state capitalism, the “Green Scare,” and public forms of political repression. Through a quantitative analysis of direct action activism highlighting the Earth Liberation Front and Animal Liberation Front, the discourse surrounding mechanisms of social change and their impact on state power and capitalist accumulation will be examined. The analyses examines the earth and animal liberation movements, utilizing a Marxist-anarchist lens to illustrate how these non-state actors provide powerful critiques of capital and the state. Specifically, the discussion examines how state-sanctioned violence against these movements represents a return to Foucauldian Monarchical power. A quantitative-qualitative history will be used to argue that the movements’ actions fail to qualify as “terrorism,” and to examine the performance of power between the radical left and the state. State repression demonstrates not only the capitalist allegiances between government and industry, but also a sense of capital’s desperation hoping to counter a movement that has produced demonstrable victories by the means of bankrupting and isolating corporations. The government is taking such unconstitutional measures as a “talk back” between the revolutionary potential of these movements’ ideology as well as the challenge they present to state capitalism.

This chapter is a contribution to the intellectual history of the anxiety that full employment in the modern United States depended somehow on military spending. This discourse (conveniently abbreviated as “military Keynesianism”) is vaguely familiar, but its contours and transit still await a full study. The chapter shows the origins of the idea in the left-Keynesian milieu centered around Harvard’s Alvin Hansen in the late 1930s, with a particular focus on the diverse group that cowrote the 1938 stagnationist manifesto An Economic Program for American Democracy. After a discussion of how these young economists participated in the World War II mobilization, the chapter considers how questions of stagnation and military stimulus were marginalized during the years of the high Cold War, only to be revived by younger radicals. At the same time, it demonstrates the existence of a community of discourse that directly links the Old Left of the 1930s and 1940s with the New Left of the 1960s and 1970s, and cuts across the division between left-wing social critique and liberal statecraft.

Since China’s “opening-up” in the late 1970s, Singapore has played a major role in enhancing China’s engagement with the world, especially in economic terms. This traditional relationship is well manifested in the third government-to-government (G–G) project under the BRI, which is known as the Chongqing Connectivity Initiative (CCI). The purpose of this paper is to address the following question: despite Singapore’s initial reluctance to agree on a third G–G project with China, why did Singapore eventually decide to join the CCI?

This paper draws on archives of over 700 Chinese language media reports and over 400 English language media reports, as well as private interactions with scholars interested in Sino-Singapore relations and with both sides’ officials in charge of the CCI project.

The paper finds that it is the goal of connecting the region, along with the need to maintain Singapore’s relevance to China and the regional economy that led to Singapore’s participation in the third G–G project. This paper also uses this case to analyse the changes that are taking place in the bilateral economic relations.

Despite wide media coverage, op-ed commentaries and respective government statements, there are a limited number of academic studies on the rationale of the third G–G project and contemporary Sino-Singapore relations in the literature. The scholarship has not addressed the rationale for Singapore’s changing attitude towards CCI and the manner in which the CCI has improved cooperation (or upgraded cooperation to a broader and regional level).

The goal of this chapter is to reexamine the nature and structure of the military–industrial complex (MIC) through the works of John Kenneth Galbraith. MIC, or military power as he prefers, is a coalition of vested interests within the state and industry that promoted the military power in the name of “national security” for their interests. Galbraith’s theory of giant corporations helps us understand the role of military corporations in the MIC. Moreover, he is a critical scholar in examining this topic because he was a political insider in the Roosevelt, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations and a prominent public intellectual against the Vietnam War. Against this background, this chapter has three parts. After explaining the development of military Keynesianism with respect to the main economic thoughts, it examines the history of the MIC and its impact on economic priorities during and after the Cold War through Galbraith’s works. Finally, this chapter discusses MIC’s relevancy today and evaluates Galbraith’s prophecies.