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The purpose of this summary is to provide excerpts of selected Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Regulatory Notices and Disciplinary Actions issued in July, August, and September 2010.

The paper provides excerpts from FINRA Regulatory Notices and Disciplinary Actions.

Regulatory Notice 10‐32: Effective August 2, 2010, the Board composition and governance structure of FINRA Dispute Resolution, Inc. (a subsidiary of FINRA) will more closely parallel the composition and governance structure of the FINRA, Inc. Board of Governors (FINRA Board). 10‐34: The SEC approved amendments to FINRA Rule 8312, which governs the release of information 10‐36: Effective September 7, 2010, amendments to FINRA Rule 2360 (Options) extend the cut‐off time for the submission of certain contrary exercise advices (CEAs) by one hour to 7.30 pm Eastern Time (ET). 10‐42: Effective February 11, 2011, and May 9, 2011, are new FINRA rules that extend certain Regulation NMS protections to quoting and trading of over‐the‐counter (OTC) Equity Securities. 10‐43: On September 10, 2010, the SEC approved amendments to FINRA Rule 6121 (Trading Halts Due to Extraordinary Market Volatility) to expand the trading‐pause pilot, originally adopted on June 10, 2010, to include all stocks in the Russell 1000 Index and specified ETPs.

These are direct excerpts designed to provide a useful digest for the reader and an indication of regulatory trends. The FINRA staff is aware of this summary but has neither reviewed nor edited it. For further detail as well as other useful information, the reader should visit www.finra.org

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the limitations and potential bias in securitized residential mortgage data and examine the importance of such data issues for typical studies of residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) market and the financial crisis.

We use trustee data on mortgage characteristics provided by BlackBox Logic – the BBx data – to study the extent to which undisclosed mortgage characteristics distort the available data and impact risk analysis of RMBS collateral pools.

We illustrate that substantial amounts of loan characteristic data in crucial fields like occupancy, property type, loan purpose and FICO are missing from the trustee data. The frequency of missing values is staggering, ranging from just under 9 per cent for property type to 29 per cent for FICO, up to almost 85 per cent for originator name, all variables used in recent studies. The omissions are correlated to some degree with the securitization sponsor and even more dramatically with the identity of the deal trustee.

Analysis of RMBS collateral should be built not on the entirety of mortgage databases, but on stratified samples and should otherwise control for important sponsor and trustee fixed effects.

The revisions for Regulation AB which require loan-level disclosure should be adopted to standardize mortgage disclosure.

This is the first paper that examines selection bias in loan characteristics relied upon for a wide variety of mortgage market research that has substantially affected policy decisions in the post-crisis era.

The purpose of this paper is to study the correlational and effect relationship between Halal standards and the performance of Halal-certified Palestinian Food Companies.

Quantitative method was used, using a questionnaire survey of 40 Halal-certified Palestinian organizations out of a total of 47 certified organizations, the analysis was done using the partial least squares structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) and the literature review was conducted using a well-known systematic literature review methodology.

Halal implementation and certification had a positive impact on performance (operational, financial and marketing). The depth/intensity of implementation fully mediates operational performance and partially mediates marketing and financial performance.

As the sample size is small, it is recommended to conduct the study using a larger sample size, once the number of Palestinian Halal-certified organizations increases. A longitudinal or panel study is recommended to capture data that are more accurate and avoid objectivity and bias issues using a cross-sectional research design method. Finally, the study recommends to conduct additional research in the field of Halal awareness for customers to gage their intention and welling to buy Halal products within the Middle East region.

The importance of this study exists in the lack of previous Halal-related studies in the Palestinian context and the previously described gap in the literature. Nevertheless, the quality management drivers and impact are limited in the Palestinian context compared with other contexts; the results of the previously published studies revealed mixed results such as the drivers of quality management are based on the type of business. Finally, this research gives small insights and directions toward conducting additional studies concerning customer awareness about Halal products.

Purpose – Emissions trading is often heralded as an efficient approach to environmental regulation. In the mid-90s Communities for a Better Environment (CBE), a Los Angeles-based advocacy organization, raised concerns that emissions trading in the South Coast Air Basin, the most polluted region in Southern California, would result in environmental injustice. The organizations concerns received mixed responses from regulators. Historical analysis is used to assess the clash between emissions trading and environmental justice (EJ).

Methodology/approach – Emissions trading and EJ arose side by side between the 1960s and the 1990s, yet they disagree on how to clean the air. Historical analysis of legal documents, presidential addresses, letters, working papers, reports, and the like offers a better understanding of the development of emissions trading and EJ, and their intersection in environmental policy.

Findings – Emissions trading was grafted onto Clean Air Act policies not inherently designed for their incorporation. As a result, emissions trading came into direct philosophical opposition with EJ as political pressures calling for both economically efficient antiregulatory-ism and environmental equity forced their intersection. Formally, regional and national government accepted EJ as part of law. However, in principle, emissions trading undermined this acceptance. As a result, CBE could not easily win or explicitly lose its battle against emissions trading.

Originality/value of paper – Previous work on the relationship between emissions trading and EJ tend to focus on legal analysis and normative implications of emissions trading. Putting emissions trading and environment justice into historical perspective helps to illuminate larger questions about EJ activism and policy. Also, as California, the United States, and Europe turn to emissions trading to combat not only air pollution but also climate change, important lessons can be learned from the histories and collision of emissions trading and EJ.

The proliferation of information in electronic format does not guarantee its accessibility. The fact that many Web sites are not accessible to large segments of the disabled community has created a “digital divide”. The accessibility barriers are systemic. In recent years, there has been a growing body of significant laws and standards concerning Web accessibility that impact people with disabilities. Ways of breaking down these barriers to a fuller accessibility implementation do exist, including education to raise awareness of Web accessibility, nationwide policy and guidelines for accessibility, and Web‐based applications and tools to facilitate Web accessibility, to name a few.

Provides an institutional insight into competition policy making in the European Union (EU). Focuses primarily on the core EU institution, namely the European Commission, and specifically the Directorate General for Competition (DGIV) which has assumed the stature of an autonomous agency and manages the first truly supranational EU policy. As its authority has grown the EU competition rules have impacted on the activities of all businesses operating within the single market. In short, the Commission operates as the world’s leading regional anti‐trust enforcement agency and as such it may serve as the ideal prototype for a larger international accord as pressure mounts for the establishment of some form of global competition rules. Accounts for the origins of policy and the evolution of DGIV, analyses the EU institutional setting, provides an assessment of policy and accentuates the inevitability of competition policy reform in the late 1990s.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the basis of the complaints against banks which sold private label securities to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac before the financial crisis. The examination shows that all but one of the cases was settled out of court. Nomura and RBS went to court, but the case against them was based on dubious evidence and on strict liability which only enabled the judge to set aside relevant evidence. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s evidence against senior executives of Fannie and Freddie shows that they deliberately purchased PLSs based on subprime loans to meet the government’s housing targets.

The research was based on publicly available documents, including details of the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s (FHFA) complaints against the banks in question, the settlement agreements published by the DoJ, FHFA and SEC. Furthermore, it includes documentary evidence from the Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee and Senate Committees, the full transcript of the trial, opinions of the judge for the trial and the judgement.

The findings are that many have concluded that settlements out of court fail to satisfy the demand for justice. They have been criticised as a trade-off between the prosecutor and the bank, with a view that the imposition of large fines is to pay back taxpayers’ money spent on rescuing the banks, rather than punishing those responsible. Such fines do little, if anything, to change the behaviour of banks. As a result, the Department of Justice issued a memorandum on 9 September to focus on individual accountability for corporate wrongdoing. It remains to be seen how many cases against senior executives will result from the change in direction.

The implications of the research are that it is important even in the aftermath of such a serious if not devastating financial crisis to ensure that the laws are properly applied and can stand up to any challenge that it has been stretched to obtain the results the administration of the day wants to see. In addition, care must be taken over both the imposition of large fines and the use to which the monies should be put. All the parties involved in bringing about the crisis should be held to account. The major cases against the banks have almost all been “resolved”. A change in direction has now taken place.

The practical implications of holding individuals to account should now be tackled. It requires a careful examination of the laws and regulations already in place to ensure that it is clear within a bank as to who is responsible for what. It will only be possible to hold senior individuals to account if the laws are clear and if all the evidence is not hidden. It may also require a review of the contracts under which senior executives are employed, because to remove a person from his post and then find that he still has a large pension pot and bonuses due may not result in justice either. A delicate balancing act is required because banks require highly competent and motivated individuals to run them.

If a very large fine is imposed on a bank, the shareholders and customers pay. The shareholders will mostly own the shares through their pensions and their savings in mutual funds.

There have been few studies of all the cases against the banks brought by the DoJ and FHFA and still fewer have recognized the fact that government housing policy was the source of the extent of the subprime mortgages.

This study aims to develop a measurement model of the halal supply chain resilience (HSCRES) index, which represents the capability of the supply chain (SC) to handle disruption caused by halal risks. A case study is conducted to apply the HSCRES index in the halal chicken SC in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, to test the proposed methodology.

A literature synthesis was conducted to establish the main capability and vulnerability factors and their relevant indicators. The indicators were validated using the confirmatory factor analysis approach. Then, applying an analytical hierarchy process involving ten experts – practitioners and academicians – the weight of each indicator was obtained. A survey of 20 employees of slaughterhouses, 35 sellers and 100 consumers was conducted to obtain the value of each indicator. Finally, the HSCRES index was calculated by comparing the total weighted capability value to vulnerability.

The results revealed that the resilience of halal chicken SC in Yogyakarta is at a good level, with an index of 3.459, and “halal team” is the most significant indicator. The findings also revealed several capabilities that need improvement, including dedicated halal facilities, employees’ halal competence and halal regulation. However, the lack of a halal certification board, lack of management commitment and packaging contamination were found as vulnerability indicators that need to be reduced.

The case of this study is limited to the halal chicken SC in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. As a consequence, the obtained results are limited to a specific context. The application of this method to different areas and objects enables the establishment of different capability and vulnerability indicators.

The halal resilience measurement model offers a comprehensive understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the HSC. The findings can help stakeholders improve preparedness for halal risks, deal with halal risks better and recover more quickly. Measuring the HSCRES index can be particularly useful for policymakers in developing evidence-based strategies to increase HSCRES.

The current study is the first to define and classify the contributing halal resilience attributes and also to calculate the halal resilience index.

The purpose of the paper is to summarize and discuss selected investor‐protection and other related enhancements to federal securities regulation contained in the Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

The paper discusses the following investor protections and related enhancements: enhanced whistleblower incentives and protections; expanded SEC investor‐protection administrative functions including the establishment of an Office of the Investor Advocate, the appointment of an Ombudsman, and the establishment on a permanent basis of an Investor Advisory Committee; expanded enforcement authority against aiders and abettors of securities violations; evaluation of the existing standards of care employed by broker‐dealers and investment advisers; a narrowing of exemptions from registration under the Securities Act, including by directing the SEC to enact rules to disqualify “bad actors” from relying on Rule 506 of Regulation D and adjusting the definition of “accredited investor” for purposes of the SEC's rules under the Securities Act; an exemption for certain small companies from the auditor attestation requirements of Sarbanes‐Oxley; provisions to increase the oversight and accountability of credit rating agencies; and steps to bolster the regulatory oversight of the municipal securities market, including by creating a new class of regulated intermediaries – “municipal advisors”

The Dodd‐Frank Act leaves many critical issues to be fleshed out through further SEC rulemaking and in the implementation phase, including: procedures regarding whistleblower information submitted to the SEC; the actual role of the Office of the Investor Advocate; whether the SEC will adopt a broker‐dealer fiduciary‐duty standard of care; additional texture on rules disqualifying bad actors from relying on Rule 506 of Regulation D; adjustments to net worth requirements related to accredited investor status; rules on disclosure of credit ratings in registration statements; and qualification standards for municipal advisors.

Public companies and other persons affected by the Dodd‐Frank Act should: keep abreast of key developments in the rulemaking phase; possibly participate in the rulemaking process: develop realistic strategies to respond to the proposed rules; develop compliance action plans; and review whistleblower‐related compliance policies and procedures.

The paper provides expert guidance from experienced securities and financial services lawyers.