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The Principle of Legitimacy as formulated by Malinowski (1930) states that the father is indispensable for the full status of the child and that distinctions are always drawn which stigmatise those who are fatherless in a social sense. The universality of this rule has been a moot point since there is empirical refutation of it in Caribbean societies, which have consistently high illegitimacy rates (Hartley, 1980) and more recently, the concurrent rise of illegitimacy rates in the U.S. (U.S. Bureau of Census, 1982:66) and in many European countries since the 1950s (Eurostat, 1983) suggests that the Principle of Legitimacy is an anachronism. Whether it is limited in its application or obsolete cannot be determined, however, without first considering the validity of illegitimacy rates as a measure of fatherlessness. That is, can high or escalating illegitimacy rates be taken as evidence that the father's role is diminished and the mother‐father‐child triad supplanted? In Scandinavian countries, it is clearly the case that they cannot. Trost (1977; 1978) has pointed out that in Sweden, cohabitation is increasingly regarded as a viable alternative to marriage and that many children born illegitimate are fatherless only according to a strictly legal definition. Similarly, Carter (1977: 131) discussing historical data from Great Britain, has maintained that illegitimacy rates denote official categorisation and do not necessarily reflect the formation of incomplete families. He argues that whereas birth and death are defined biologically, illegitimacy and suicide are social definitions. The same problems hindering the utility of suicide data, he asserts, arise in the construction of illegitimacy rates and ratios and in an equally intractable form.

The purpose of this paper is to assess Marx's enduring significance in the center of his thought, the first volume of Capital. In Capital and related writings, Marx systematically works out his theory of value. Although Marx's value theory has been widely thought to be internally inconsistent, the “myth of inconsistency” in reclaiming Marx's “Capital” has been recently refuted by Kliman.

Based on Kliman's refutation, a logically coherent interpretation of Marx's theory is on hand. The paper therefore aims to bring out the philosophical character of Marx's critique of political economy, to which the terms and relations of value theory are essential. It is rooted in the abiding humanism he first discovered through his critical appropriation and transformation of Hegelian philosophy.

Following Raya Dunayevskaya in Marxism and Freedom, this paper interprets Marx to have founded a new critical science of society “that was at the same time a philosophy of history.” Hence Marx's use of ontological categories in Capital (“substance,” “essence,” “appearance”) is fully methodologically self‐conscious and deliberate. Categories derived from Hegel's Science of Logic (as Lenin rightly grasped) explain the “bewitched and distorted world” of capitalist social relations.

This paper shows that, thinking historically, Marx works out the “notion” of capital from the standpoint of its negation. As if seen through a camera obscura, capital is the domination of alienated, past, objectified, abstract, and dead labor over living labor power. In conclusion, emphasis is placed on the subjective as well as the objective condition necessary to the revolutionary transcendence of the law of value.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic part of the Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant stated the a priori necessity of the singularity of space that, “we can represent to ourselves only one space; and if we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same space … these parts cannot precede the one all‐embracing space … they can be thought only as in it”. If correct, Kant places a tight bound around the universe we consciously inhabit. Established arguments against Kant’s claims are reviewed and criticised based on the notion of dream spaces, before outlining the novel hypothesis that the widespread use of cyberspace and large scale multi‐user virtual realities illustrate public spaces beyond physical reality, and as such provide an empirical refutation of the a priori necessity of the singularity of space.

It is commonly recognized that the transition to democracy in Korea was associated with economic progress. However, not many scholars have given attention to the role of bureaucracy during the process of democratization, due to the fact that bureaucracy is usually thought of as belonging to politics, not democracy. As a refutation of this general view, first, this chapter argues that bureaucracy has been an important contributor to political modernization. Since the post-1945 period, the ‘ceiling’ strategy, which limits the total number of civil servants, was introduced into the personnel management method and system of checks and balances to limit undue political influence over staffing and to control bureaucratic expansion. Second, through this strategy as policy, the bureaucracy legitimately tried to avoid undemocratic political power by standardized process and allow coordination. The ceiling policy is originally the product of historical context during colonial and authoritarian period, but the bureaucracy utilizes it as the instrument to reduce corruption. The contribution of this chapter is provoking the new insights about democratization from bureaucrat’s perspective which is rarely highlighted.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to scientifically test the credibility (proof or refutation) of the existing argument for a technological leap in the COVID-19 pandemic and the post-pandemic period.

Design/Methodology/Approach: The conducted review of existing sources of research literature showed that they have formed an insufficient scientific background for a clear understanding of digital deprivation of services, social contradictions and conflict management as components of technological leap amid the COVID-19 pandemic and in the post-pandemic period. To fill the identified gap in the system of scientific knowledge, this work uses the method of comparative analysis of statistical data. Some countries of the world, the EU countries and the United States, which are characterized by the largest population and the largest contribution of investments to the digitalization of value chains and the development of innovations, were selected as objects for this study.

Findings: Research has shown that rapid digitalization is impacting all aspects of life, including not only how value is created and exchanged, but also how we interact, operate, purchase and receive services. In this process, data and its international flows are becoming increasingly important for development. The usual digital gap associated with connectivity, reflecting significant differences between and within countries in readiness to use the power of data, is exacerbated by what might be termed the data gap. Countries with limited opportunities to transform digital data into digital analytics and entrepreneurial opportunities, and to use them for economic and social development, are obviously at a disadvantage.

Originality/Value: Digital data have been proven to be one of the top strategic assets for creating both private and public value. Our ability to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 2015) depends a lot on how these data are applied. The idea of sustainable development arose, as it is known, for overcoming significant fluctuations in the positive transformation of society, and for the alignment in the pace and results of the transition of various countries to the post-industrial scenario of progress. There are many obstacles on the path of sustainable development, which hinder the transition to this vector of transformation. First, the gap in economic and social development between the countries of the ‘golden billion’ and many other countries has not been reduced. Second, the digital gap continues to deepen. But a new and extremely threatening danger on the path to the transition to sustainable development has become the global crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic that emerged in early 2020 and is still ongoing.

Determining the right course for the future is a difficult task, but its solution cannot be postponed. Data are multidimensional, and their use has an impact not only on trade and economic development but also on human rights, peace and security. In addition, measures should be taken to reduce the risk of misuse and unauthorized use of digital data by states, non-states or the private sectors to avoid the possibility of global social conflict.

International business (IB) research is traditionally heavily reliant on economics. In this chapter, we review selected debates in the philosophy of science of economics and consider their relevance for economics-based IB research, given important characteristics of IB such as phenomenon-orientedness, concern with data and facts and limited use of formal mathematical models and unrealistic assumptions in the analysis. We argue that, like in the case of mainstream economics, Lakatos’ concept of scientific research programmes (SRPs) is more useful for understanding the philosophy of science of economics-based IB than Popper’s falsificationism. Following this, we discuss characteristics of two possible IB SRPs, internalization theory and Dunning’s Ownership-Location-Internalization paradigm. Finally, we discuss the approach to modelling in IB, finding it to reflect a relative commitment to scientific realism.

All of us seek truth via objective inquiry into various human and nonhuman phenomena that nature presents to us on a daily basis. We are empirical (or nonempirical) decision makers who hold that uncertainty is our discipline, and that understanding how to act under conditions of incomplete information is the highest and most urgent human pursuit (Karl Popper, as cited in Taleb, 2010, p. 57). We verify (prove something as right) or falsify (prove something as wrong), and this asymmetry of knowledge enables us to distinguish between science and nonscience. According to Karl Popper (1971), we should be an “open society,” one that relies on skepticism as a modus operandi, refusing and resisting definitive (dogmatic) truths. An open society, maintained Popper, is one in which no permanent truth is held to exist; this would allow counter-ideas to emerge. Hence, any idea of Utopia is necessarily closed since it chokes its own refutations. A good model for society that cannot be left open for falsification is totalitarian and epistemologically arrogant. The difference between an open and a closed society is that between an open and a closed mind (Taleb, 2004, p. 129). Popper accused Plato of closing our minds. Popper's idea was that science has problems of fallibility or falsifiability. In this chapter, we deal with fallibility and falsifiability of human thinking, reasoning, and inferencing as argued by various scholars, as well as the falsifiability of our knowledge and cherished cultures and traditions. Critical thinking helps us cope with both vulnerabilities. In general, we argue for supporting the theory of “open mind and open society” in order to pursue objective truth.

Human agents are constantly using “symbols,” according to G. H. Mead, or “signs,” as C. S. Peirce called them, to engage in what Mikhail Bakhtin has called “dialogues” with each other or with the environment. Such vehicles of communication are not freestanding ones but are drawn from specific and demarcated discursive formations. So drawn, these vehicles are then put to use, as Kenneth Burke has shown in his dramatistic perspective on human social life, as agencies used by human agents to construct acts, in defined situations or scenes – that is social situations and physical locations – to display given attitudes, in order to fulfill one purpose or another. Every human move that an individual makes has these Burkean features. Such moves are used to engage in either convivial dramas or confrontational ones.

Moral agents have moral choice. This chapter argues that moral choice denies historical inevitability when moral choice is informed by both moral imagination and historical imagination. I explore this by way of one specific historical example which should be used, as the philosopher Bernard Mayo argued, as a moral exemplar. In pursuing my arguments I utilise work by Sir Isaiah Berlin, amongst others. I do though take issue with Berlin, whom I argue has confused not the nature but the role of historical imagination, claiming dominance for it where it cannot dominate. I conclude with historical inevitability being refuted by moral choice, informed by both moral imagination and historical imagination.I argue that the refutation of historical inevitability has implications for Australian businesses in their current dealings with the People’s Republic of China. Australia escaped the Global Financial Crisis because of Chinese purchases of Australian commodities. But Australian business in trading with China is trading with an unjust regime. Hoffman and McNulty (2009) argue that regarding a regime such as China we can ‘learn from our past’. Regarding the past I argue that Australian business executives dealing with China would benefit by studying the historical example of Churchill’s May 1940 decision and should use that as a moral exemplar. Earlier generations of Australian managers contemptuously dismissed Chinese workers. The current generation of Australian managers, who fail to morally acknowledge China’s workers and citizens, risks being equally contemptuous, dismissive and racist.

This study aims to present radical abolition studies, which encourages us to (re)member that the abolition of institutions and systems is incomplete without the abolition of their attendant epistemes of domination. The authors draw on the etymology of the word radical to encourage abolitionist praxis to grab systemic harm at its epistemological roots. Within radical abolition studies, this study presents Black abolition theory, which aims to make explicit a theorization of Blackness and works to abolish the episteme of anti-Blackness.

This paper offers Black abolition theory within radical abolition studies to reground abolition in its Black theoretical roots and to interrogate the concept of anti-Blackness and other epistemes of domination in abolitionist study and practice. Using a close reading of W.E.B. Du Bois’ Black Reconstruction, and subsequent books and articles in abolition studies and educational studies that reference it, the authors highlight Du Bois’ original conceptualization of abolitionism as an ultimate refutation of a racial-social order and anti-Blackness. The authors then put Michael Dumas and kihana ross’ theory of BlackCrit into conversation with abolitionist and educational theory to push forward Black abolition theory.

Radical abolition studies and its attendant strand of Black abolition theory presented in this paper encourages scholars and practitioners to go beyond the dismantling of current instantiations of systemic harm for Black and other minoritized people – such as the school as it currently operates – and encourages the questioning and dismantling of the epistemes of domination sitting at the foundation of these systems of harm.

Black abolition theory contextualizes abolition in education by rooting abolitionist educational praxis in Black lineages. More generally, radical abolition studies encourages further research, study and collaboration in partnership with others who have historically participated in the fight against being labeled as subhuman to upend all epistemes of domination.