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The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the cultural values which underpin the practice and acceptance of nepotism and cronyism in societies and organizations worldwide. We argue that there are advantages inherent in harnessing the resources of the social networks involved in nepotism and cronyism, but there are also major problems arising from the inequality and unfairness of these practices. A theoretical consideration of cultural values combined with illustrative cases is used to discuss nepotism and cronyism in different cultures. We suggest that nepotism and cronyism exist in all cultures but perception and discussion of these phenomena as well as the perceived gravity of their effects can vary according to the cultural values of egalitarianism and universalism, together with the economic development of the societies in which they occur.

Political corruption takes many forms across different countries and regions. The types of corruption that occur in American politics are drastically different from the clientelism, nepotism, and corrupt electoral practices that are seen in the developing world. This chapter will analyze three distinct cases of political corruption in Southeast Asian politics: clientelism in Cambodia, nepotism in Thailand, and the 2021 coup d'état in Myanmar. All three cases highlight the unique challenges facing developing democracies and reveal that, while political corruption affects all countries to a degree, distinct regional and cultural differences produce different forms of corruption in Southeast Asia than in the United States.

Purpose — This chapter investigates how dishonesty may be legitimized in organizations through customary practices of gift giving, patronage, and non-meritocratic employment practices.Design/methodology/approach — A survey of managers was undertaken in four sub-Saharan African countries: Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.Findings — Gift giving was perceived to be widespread in organizations in all four countries and yet the vast majority of managers we surveyed, rejected the proposition that the practice of gift giving causes dishonesty in organizations. There were cross-country variations as to whether the expectations of the society on individuals “glorify and endorse” dishonesty as they may feel pressured to accumulate and (re)distribute wealth among their wider social groups. Non-meritocratic employment practices were unanimously perceived to engender incompetent workforce, lack of accountability and transparency without necessarily improving trust, and loyalty in organizations.Research limitations — This study used quantitative methods to gauge managers’ perceptions of the relationship between customary practices and dishonest behavior in only four African countries. Further qualitative research is required to gain a deeper insight into how customary practices may inform dishonest behavior in organizations.Implications for managers — Managers should be clear about the distinction between customary practices and dishonest behavior in order to facilitate the development of appropriate organizational strategies to minimize their negative impacts.Originality/value — This paper explores the relationship between dishonesty and customary practices of gift giving, patronage and nepotism in African organizations from the managers’ point of view, an approach that had not been undertaken previously.

Lab studies on culture and corruption have led to some puzzling, contradictory results. This chapter begins with a discussion of nonexperimental work in this area and evaluates the experimental findings in the context of earlier research. We sketch out the channels through which culture interacts with corruption (i.e., through institutions and social norms) and argue that discrepancies in experimental results may be due to differences in design (including repetition or unobserved variation in beliefs) or due to differences in the response to punishment across societies. In addition to exploring design-based reasons for previous contradictory findings, avenues for future research include: behavioral responses to different types of externalities; replicating results in different countries; and utilizing the lab to formulate effective anticorruption measures.

The chapter discusses the introduction of standardized tests as they move education system from equity of access to quality of instruction and learning. The aim of the chapter is to analyze the role of international education projects like PISA, TIMSS, and PIRLS in shaping national education policies and in helping them to tackle such issues as limited access to education, corruption, illegal practices, quality manipulations in academia, and achievement gaps. The main method used is cross-national comparative analysis. The theoretical scope of the chapter covers major scholarly works on international testing, achievement gaps, and corruption in education. The research finds that the arrows of influence operate in both directions, implying that while setting global standards, international projects base their judgments on identified local challenges in education systems of individual countries. Besides, internationalization of standards has spillover effects on curbing corruption and illegal actions that often cause widening of achievement gaps. The findings of the research could be used in designing education policies both on national and international levels to make education systems more transparent and comparable to international standards. The chapter sets forth a novel idea that the international projects like PISA, TIMSS, and PIRLS could serve not only as means of setting and checking quality standards in education, but as mediators in closing achievement gaps and even curbing corruption. This novelty presents a value to the local education policymakers, and more importantly, to the public.

This paper investigates, theoretically and empirically, differences between blacks and whites in the United States concerning the intergenerational transmission of occupational skills and the effects on sons’ earnings. The father–son skill correlation is measured by the correlation coefficient (or cosine of the angle) between the father’s skill vector and the son’s skill vector. The skill vector comprises an individual’s occupational characteristics from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). According to data from the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79), white sons earn higher wages in occupations that require skills similar to those of their fathers, whereas black sons in such circumstances incur a wage loss. A large portion of the racial wage gap is explained by the father–son skill correlation. However, a significant unexplained racial wage gap remains at the lower tail of the wage distribution.

In its most basic usage, “corruption” means a change from functional or good to dysfunctional or bad. This definition is far too broad to be of use to scholars or policymakers, who need a more precise, shared definition so that they can communicate meaningfully with one another. Scholars and policymakers have developed scores of definitions, which this chapter briefly explains. Within this galaxy of definitions, scholars and policymakers have tended to favor one definition, which this chapter calls the “general definition.” The general definition describes organizational corruption as: the abuse or misuse of power or trust for self-interested purposes rather than the purposes for which power or trust was given. This chapter discusses and illustrates the general definition. The chapter concludes by pointing out that the general definition is only one definition. In many places, the public is deeply concerned with phenomena such as undue influence, which should also be taken into consideration as a form of corruption even though it falls outside of the general definition.

In this chapter, I proposed the use of structured behavioral analysis (SBA) as a methodological approach to address critical questions in organizational behavior research in sub-Saharan Africa.

The chapter is a conceptual paper that reviews the extant literature on research tools aimed at coding and analyzing behavior, with a particular focus on employee behavior in African organizations.

SBA requires the researcher to act as both an organizational scholar and an anthropologist. As an organizational scholar, the researcher will identify predetermined behaviors that he/she intends to study. Thus, the observation and analysis will be geared toward such behaviors. As an anthropologist, the organizational researcher will observe behaviors that are displayed by employees and managers and use them as the basis for explanation and theory building.

SBA can be used to study behaviors that often occur in African organizations, such as nepotism, corruption, the role of tribal status, and the impact of family generosity, the forced solidarity tax, and obligations on employee behavior.

Findings from SBA could help design interventions to address the detrimental effects of negative behaviors while reinforcing positive behaviors in African organizations.

As a research methodology, SBA is relatively new in the African context although some versions of the method are used in industrial/organizational psychology and ergonomics.

In Bangladesh, the fertilizer market is the main source of corruption in the agriculture sector. Market imperfection allows the input dealers to extract extra benefit from the market through selling fertilizer at higher than government declared price, and the benefit is positively correlated with market restriction. Bribery or unauthorized payment in the fertilizer market negatively affects farm profit. Empirical evidence shows that restricted fertilizer markets encourage corruption, as bribe-paying farmers can acquire their required fertilizer and thus operate at a higher efficiency level than their counterparts who do not pay bribes. Alternatively, in markets where sufficient supply is available and farmers face liquidity constraints, corruption further restricts farmers to collecting their optimal input bundle and ultimately reduces efficiency. Nepotism and negligence of duty are the two most common form of corruption in the extension service. Along with identifying several key causes of corruption, this article suggests some interventions to combat corruption.