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The purpose of this paper is to investigate how institutional mechanisms operate within both formal and informal channels of cross-border remittance.

Face-to-face interviews were conducted with Myanmar migrants mostly working in Thailand. Thematic coding was used to analyze field notes and identify themes in channel member perceptions and institutional environmental process.

Informal money transfer channels have achieved higher levels of legitimacy when compared to formal channels. Channel legitimacy is a more important attribute than efficiency. Lack of financial infrastructure, such as bank branches and ATM machines particularly in rural or outlying areas of Myanmar, the requirements for formal documentation and language and communication are the major institutional constraints that encourage the development and use of multiple channels in Myanmar. Formal money transfer channels develop with stronger regulative institutional processes, whereas informal money transfer channels develop with stronger cultural-cognitive and normative institutional processes.

Using convenience sample of remitters mainly from one area of Thailand and other channel members from Yangon, the financial capital of Myanmar, may limit the applicability of the findings, which calls for future research.

Banks and money transfer offices need to improve legitimacy perception within migrant communities by building stronger networks with local banks and international banks. They could provide Myanmar speaking front-line service personnel and include brochures in the Myanmar language to improve the communication process. The findings and recommendations from this study are also applicable to informal channels and formal financial institutions in other ASEAN countries that are preparing to make investments in Myanmar. Moreover, Myanmar banks should also consider opening branches to cater for Myanmar workers in ASEAN, especially in Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia.

This paper applies institutional theory within channels, investigates the context of a financial channel rather than a product channel, addresses the importance of institutional environmental mechanisms and constraints in influencing channel behavior and is embedded in the situational context of Myanmar, a newly opened South-East Asian economy where little prior research has been conducted.

This paper aims to offer a general overview of money transfers in Italy and Europe focussing specifically on the migrant community. This is of particular interest because it is in that community where money transfers are most prevalent. This shows the money transfer system as a tool that could guarantee the financial inclusion of migrants but at the same time being used in a distorted and unlawful manner.

After a brief introduction focussed on working principles and legal frameworks, the paper will go deeper in evaluating money transfer data. This data, which comes from various legal authorities, will show the extent to which different migrant communities who reside in Italy are able to carry out illicit activity using money transfers. It will also highlight the existence of legislative inconsistencies through a case by case approach.

This paper shows the reason why people find it relatively easy to use money transfers to launder money or in a broader sense, take part in other illicit financial operations such as financing terrorism.

This study will examine recent Italian criminal cases concerning the unlawful use of money transfers. This paper is the original study of the author and has not been submitted elsewhere for publication.

This study examines how the introduction of mobile money transfers, while making it efficient and convenient to access funds, has affected rural households’ savings behavior and the banking sector.

This study utilizes Fiji’s most recent agricultural census data to model the agricultural household’s saving decision. The study estimates an probit model to examine rural households' savings behavior. Furthermore, it utilizes time series secondary data to examine how funds transfer has been channeled to rural households in Fiji.

Firstly, the results demonstrate that with the mobile money transfer platform launch, the banking sector has lost substantial money previously used to pass through its system, thus losing service fees and interest income. Furthermore, the findings demonstrate that those using mobile wallet platforms to receive money are more likely not to have a savings account with the bank. Noting the cultural systems and social settings of the native households and the ease of payments via the mobile platform, they tend to spend more on consumption rather than saving, thus making these households more vulnerable during shocks such as natural disasters.

While mobile money transfer is hailed as a revolution, no research has yet picked up the downside to it, that of undermining the very effort by policymakers to get low-income rural households to save. Secondly, this study also highlights how mobile money transfer deprives the banking system of a significant transfer fee income and a source of funds to pool and lend to earn interest income. Furthermore, this study brings to the forefront a dichotomy about how a rural indigenous community sees the welfare and prosperity of their community much differently than what economics textbooks portray.

The aim of this paper is to estimate the costs of implementing the anti‐money laundering regulations in Sweden.

The banks are the central institutions in this respect and the paper shows that the costs of the banks in Sweden amount to 400 million SEK yearly. The paper is based upon interviews with a sample of banks and bank statistics.

There are big deficiencies in the Swedish legal regulations. For example, banks have no right to freeze the money in suspicious transactions. There are also deficiencies in the legal regulation systems that make it possible for unserious companies to transfer money on behalf of criminals by using the normal retail banking system. The resources of the supervising authorities are insufficient. The results of the regulations are meagre seen in relation to the costs of the banks for the implementation of the regulations. One argument against this assertion about inefficiency is that the regulations have preventive effects. There is nothing in this project that gives evidence for any noteworthy preventive effects of the regulations upon the original criminality or terrorism. Why should accept a system that costs substantial sums of money and has other negative effects just because it might have some uncertain positive effects? It seems to be a better strategy to develop a system whose effects are measurable.

Very little research about the costs of the anti‐money laundering regulations has been done so far and this paper is entering a new field of research.

Based on an overview of the anti-money laundering initiatives in the sport sector and recent efforts of money launderers focused toward finding alternative channels for money laundering operations, the purpose of this paper is to present the modus operandi of money laundering in the football sector especially.

Specifics of money laundering through the football sector have been analyzed using deductive and inductive methods. This paper provides a review of the existing anti-money laundering initiatives in the sport sector to highlight the specific features of sport that increase money-laundering risks in the football sector. Certain risks have been analyzed and linked to risk areas and money laundering methods as a way of demonstrating established modus operandi.

Analyzed vulnerabilities that arise from the structure, financial characteristics and culture of the football sector represent an increased risk of money laundering in a condition where potential money launderers achieve status of investors, football agents or owners of football clubs and players. Taking some of these roles allows money launderers to enter into transactions related to the acquisition of ownership over football clubs or player transfers. Such types of transactions are particularly exposed to abuse for the purposes of the money laundering process due to their unique features.

Through a wide range of clarified risks and money laundering methods applicable to the football sector, this paper offers a comprehensive review of the existing money laundering threats in the football sector and proposals of prevention.

This paper aims to help build awareness with financial institutions about the money laundering risks posed by individuals who have been unknowingly recruited as Money Mules and the measures that financial institutions can adopt to detect illicit funds which are being received into the bank accounts of low risk or medium risk customers who are unknowingly recruited as “Money Mules”.

The research took the form of a desk study, which analysed various documents and reports such as a 2019 report on Money Mules by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL); a 2019 and 2020 report on Money Mules by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Better Business Bureau (BBB); the Financial Action Task Force Guidance on the Risk Based Approach to Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (High Level Principles and Procedures) 2007; the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations 2012; the United Kingdom’s Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017; the United States Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Examination Manual 2014; Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2018; The UK Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (as amended); the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group JMLSG, Prevention of money laundering/combating terrorist financing: Guidance for the UK financial sector Part I June 2017 (Amended December 2017); the United States Codified Bank Secrecy Act Regulations (31 CFR); the Nigerian Money Laundering Prohibition Act 2011 (as amended); and the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group JMLSG, Prevention of money laundering/combating terrorist financing: Guidance for the UK financial sector Part II: Sectoral Guidance June 2017 (Amended December 2017).

This paper determined that financial institutions may be able to prevent proceeds of crime from being laundered by individuals who have been unknowingly recruited as Money Mules if they focus monitoring resources on the emotionally vulnerable customers like newcomers to the country, unemployed people who may have lost their jobs because of a pandemic like COVID-19, students and those in economic hardship; pay very close attention to the country of origin where the funds emanate from; pay very close attention to the country where the funds are being transferred to; and pay close attention to frequent large cash deposits followed by wire transfers.

While most articles focus on the money laundering risk(s) associated with Money Mules and the measures that individuals can use to ensure that their bank accounts are not used by criminals to launder illicit funds, this paper focuses on the different mechanisms that banks can use to detect illicit funds which are being received into the bank accounts of low risk or medium risk customers who are unknowingly recruited as “Money Mules”. This paper recommends a proportional approach that balances anti-money laundering measures, financial inclusion and human rights. The mechanisms/measures which have been extensively discussed in this paper will help banks to identify, assess and understand their money laundering and terrorist financing risks as it relates to Money Mules and take commensurate measures to mitigate them.

Prior to the events of 11th September, 2001, international cooperation in the field of global financial crime prevention was already well established. Prompted by separate initiatives led by the United Nations Organisation and the Basel Committee in the late 1980s, the creation in 1989 of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) by the G7 countries set in place an international body to coordinate anti‐money laundering measures across 26 countries and jurisdictions. Subsequently, and prompted by the creation of the FATF, other regional interstate organisations in western and eastern Europe, across the Americas and the Caribbean, and also in Asia, have drafted similar anti‐money laundering standards for their respective countries. In turn, these interstate regulatory initiatives have been complemented by parallel business‐led ‘voluntary’ initiatives, such as the example of the Wolfsberg Anti‐Money Laundering Principles designed to promote greater transparency across the banking sector.

This paper aims to assess the role of secrecy jurisdictions in providing supply-side stimulants for illicit financial flows from developing countries and how the tax havens structures shape the role of actors. Specifically focussing on decades of trade liberalisation and markets, and of increasingly rapid movement of people, capital and information across regions and around the globe, the paper draws on the political economy theory of globalisation to illuminate the connections between capital flight, money laundering and global offshore financial centres (OFCs).

The paper uses publicly available evidence to shed light on the role played by tax havens in facilitating money laundering, capital flight and corruption. The issues are illustrated with the aid of case studies.

The evidence shows that, in pursuit of organisational and personal interest, the tax havens create enabling structures that support illicit activities of the political and economic elites from developing countries. The paper further argues that the supply-side of corruption severely limits the possibilities of preventing corruption in developing countries.

The paper uses publicly available evidence to illuminate the role played by OFCs in facilitating elite corruption and money laundering practices.

It is impossible to quantify the volume of money laundered, but it has been estimated that money laundering may account for as much as 5% of the world economy.

The paper, therefore, suggests that unless this supply-side of corruption is tackled there is little prospect for an end to aid dependency and the creation of economically stable and democratic states in developing countries.

The paper examines predatory practices of the international financial industry in tax havens and OFCs in facilitating money laundering, corruption and capital flight and the challenges posed for the economic development of developing countries.

The purpose of this paper is to examine Myanmar’s “hundi” system, an informal value transfer system used widely by local Myanmar citizens and offshore migrant workers to remit money domestically and internationally. Due to historically stringent banking and foreign exchange controls and a lack of domestic and internationally linked financial services, the system grew to become the dominant medium for remittances in Myanmar. It also remains unregulated despite authorities acknowledging its use in criminal and terrorist activity. However, with an expanding and modernising financial sector, there is now increasing competition and challenges facing Myanmar’s hundi system.

This paper draws on available literature and open source reporting, as well as interviews with former Myanmar Police Force officials.

This study provides a unique insight into Myanmar’s hundi system, its history and the challenges it faces. The once dominant system remains a known anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) risk and is having to compete with an expanding and modernising formal banking sector and the introduction of fintech and mobile money services. In the short term, these are unlikely to eliminate the hundi system completely, but may instead push hundi operators towards adopting these networks and technologies in their own operations.

Myanmar remains a very under-researched area and there has been a limited focus on its informal hundi remittance system and related AML/CFT issues. This paper will be a useful source for academics, development professionals, policymakers, law enforcement agencies and private sector actors seeking to understand Myanmar’s informal remittance system.

In this article the author proposes to traverse various views on money in order to contend that while antiquated notions of its materiality continue to bedevil English legal structures, the law will fail to keep up with current commercial practices, and, equally seriously, fail to detect, prevent or punish coming criminal practices as well. The thrust of the argument is that how money is perceived, and what is conceived of as constituting it, together determine how laws deal with the cultural and commercial need for consensus on what might function as a medium of exchange and a store of value. As a consequence, if the perception of money is locked into its historically contingent aspects, legal structures will become increasingly marginalised by the superior resources and sophistication of contemporary organised crime.