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The purpose of this paper is to argue that small‐scale, low‐value but high‐volume fraud should be pursued as seriously as high‐value, organised crime‐related fraud.

The paper discusses the consequences of profiling offenders and offences involving fraud against the European Community budget. It also looks at ten years of the body tasked with investigating such fraud and suggests that it has become bogged down with too many responsibilities and too few resources. It ends by describing the requirements for a successful investigative environment.

The political nature of the fight against fraud means that measures based solely on economic criteria are a mistake; measures against political and social harm need to be developed to assist in prioritization.

Public education is required to change the image of those who commit fraud against the Community budget. A different institutional set‐up is also advisable.

The paper applies the lessons learned from targeting frequent offenders in the UK who are being ignored because each individual offence is not worth pursuing but, once the offences in total are recognised, much harm could be prevented.

In today’s society, information and communications technology (ICT) is the force that drives prosperity and provides a higher standard of living. All other e‐services and infrastructures tend to play a major role in our daily life and global economy. The growing dependence on such systems, however, has increased their vulnerability to cyber attacks. Any failure to these systems typically would lead to a huge impact, not only on businesses, but also human life, that depends on such interconnected systems. The growing potential for telecommunications network infrastructures problems stems from their nature of openness. A successful attempt for a network attack to a particular organization’s network could have devastating effects on the security of the organisation. In this paper we propose an innovative way to counteract distributed protocols attacks such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks using intelligent fuzzy agents.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the various characteristics of mobile money transactions and the threats they present to anti-money laundering (AML) and counter terrorist financing regimes.

A thorough literature review was conducted on mobile money transactions and the associated money-laundering and terrorist financing threats. Four key themes were identified in relations to the three stages of money laundering and effective law enforcement.

The findings indicate that as money laundering and terrorist financing transactions continue to gravitate towards the weaknesses in the financial system, mobile money provides yet another avenue for criminals to exploit. Risk factors associated with anonymity, elusiveness, rapidity and lack of oversights were all integral considerations in building an effective AML regime. The use of cash is considered a higher threat than mobile money prior to implementation of systems and controls.

This rapidly changing environment of how individuals manage their money during transactions is set to further explode globally, which poses new problems for regulators and governments alike. Unless there is a unified concentration to heighten global awareness, the imposing threat of mobile money is set to increase at a rapid rate if appropriate actions are not taken.

The findings from this study can be used to gain greater insights on mobile money transactions and raise further awareness of the ever-increasing threat to global financial integrity.

This paper aims to compete and detect suspicious transactions that can lead to detecting money laundering cases.

This paper presents a plan-based framework for anti-money laundering systems (PBAMLS). Such a framework is novel and consists of two phases, in addition to several supporting modules. The first phase, the monitoring phase, utilizes an automata approach as a formalism to detect probable money laundering. The detection process is based on a money laundering deterministic finite automaton that has been obtained from the corresponding regular expressions which specify different money laundering processes. The second phase is STRIPS-based planning phase that aims at strengthening the belief in the probable problems discovered in the first (monitoring) phase. In addition, PBAMLS contains several supporting modules for data collection and mediation, link analysis and risk scoring. To assess the applicability of PBAMLS, it has been tested using different cases studies.

This framework provides a clear shift of anti-money laundering systems (AML) from depending heuristic and human expertise to making use of a rigorous formalism to accomplish concrete decisions. It minimizes the possibilities of false positive alarms and increases the certainty in decision-making.

This framework enhances the detection of money laundering cases. It also minimizes the number of false-positive alarms that waste the investigators’ efforts and time; it decreases the efforts presented by the investigators.

This work proposes PBAMLS as a novel plan-based framework for AML systems.

An amateur boxer; A professional soldier turned indestructible zombie; A fast-driving heister; A combat pilot on another world; A taco truck driver with a heart of gold; A Smurf; Michelle Rodriguez, American actress, has played them all. As Leticia ‘Letty’ Ortiz, Rodriguez' most famous role offers both a sensitive portrayal of a tenacious woman living out a tough existence who exhibits as much courage, strength, moral standing and fibre as her male counterparts, whilst also revealing a softer, emotional side and one that focuses on family and ideals of accepting Motherhood. This is what makes Rodriguez such a fascinating contradiction. Whilst much praise is heaped on other actresses for their roles in action films, this chapter will offer, through both an overview of her action-hero career and in-depth look at Rodriguez's work in the Fast and Furious films, an insight into the importance of this actress to the growing canon of action hero(ine) characters and film stars.

Analyses how money made from entrepreneurial crime is disbursed through Canada’s legitimate economy; this is one of the first quantitative studies of money laundering using a survey of police cases, and the exclusive source of primary data was the Royal Canadian Mounted Police proceeds of crime files. Finds that drug trafficking is the largest single source of these proceeds, that banks and real estate are the main destinations of the revenues, and that methods used involved hiding their true ownership and source by using nominees and establishing legitimate companies, avoiding suspicion by using “smurfs”, and avoiding reporting requirements by structuring transactions. Describes the design of the research and gives a typology of money laundering operations.

The purpose of this paper is to measure the size of the money laundering and terrorism financing problem, identify threats and trends, the techniques employed and the amount of funds involved to determine whether the information obtained about money laundering and terrorism financing in real‐world environments can be transferred to virtual environments such as Second Life and World of Warcraft.

Analysis of 184 Typologies obtained from a number of anti‐money laundering and counter‐terrorism financing (AML/CTF) bodies to: determine whether trends and/or patterns can be identified in the different phases of money laundering or terrorism financing, namely, the placement, layering and integration phases; and to establish whether trends and/or behaviours are ubiquitous to a particular money laundering or terrorism financing Type.

Money launderers and terrorism financers appeared to have slightly different preferences for the placement, layering and integration techniques. The more techniques that are used, the more cash can be successfully laundered or concealed. Although terrorism financers use similar channels to money launderers, they do not utilise as many of the placement, layering and integration techniques. Rather, they prefer to use a few techniques which maintain high levels of anonymity and appear innocuous. The sums of monies involved in money laundering and terrorism financing vary significantly. For example, the average maximum sum involved in money laundering cases was AUD 68.5M, as compared to AUD 4.8 for terrorism financing cases.

This paper provides some insight into the relationship between predicate offence, the predominant techniques utilised in carrying out that offence and the sums of money involved.

This study aims to understand how forensic accountants can analyse bank transactions suspected of being involved with money laundering crimes in Brazil through social network analysis (SNA).

The methodological approach taken in this study was exploratory. This study cleaned and debugged bank statements from criminal investigations in Brazil using computational algorithms. Then graphs were designed and matched with money laundering regulations.

The findings indicated that graph techniques contribute to a range of beneficial information to help identify typical banking transactions (pooling accounts, strawmen, smurfing) used to conceal or disguise the movement of illicit resources, enhancing visual aspects of financial analysis.

Research found limitations in the data sets with reduced identification of originators and beneficiaries, considered low compared to other investigations in Brazil. Furthermore, to preserve restrict information and keep data confidential, data sets used in research were not made available.

Law enforcement agencies and financial intelligence units can apply graph-based technique cited in this research to strengthen anti-money laundering activities. The results, grounded in analytical approaches, may offer a source of data to regulators and academia for future research.

This study created data sets using real-life bank statements from two investigations of competence by the Brazilian Federal Justice, including real-data perspectives in academic research. This study uses SNA, which is a popular approach in several areas of knowledge.

The aim of this paper is to examine some of the recent changes to the old anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing law, which is now known as the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of Unlawful Activities Act 2001. The paper will highlight the newly consolidated money laundering offences and the newly created offences including structuring of transactions or “smurfing”. Also, the transgression of cross-border movement of cash and negotiable instruments and tipping off about a money laundering disclosure will be assessed.

The paper uses a doctrinal legal research and secondary data, with the new AML/CFT legislation as the primary source. For comparative analysis, legislations in the UK, Australia and New Zealand are also examined. Secondary sources include case law, articles in academic journals, books and online databases.

The review of the AML/CFT law is timely and indicates the Malaysian government’s efforts to adhere to international standards set by the financial action task force. However, it is imperative that the Malaysian government addresses the remaining instrumental and normative deficiencies in the AML/CFT law to ensure that the recent legal changes are sufficiently comprehensive to prevent and regulate money laundering and terrorist financing within Malaysia.

This paper is a useful source of information for legal practitioners, academicians, law enforcement, policymakers, legislators, researchers and students.

It is now generally recognised that, when investigating acquisitive crime, investigators must focus not just on obtaining evidence of the commission of the underlying crime itself, but also on what happened to the criminal proceeds. While there has been significant culture change in the UK so that investigators now focus to a greater degree on the proceeds of crime, this is usually from the perspective of tracing what remains of the proceeds so that the confiscation legislation may be applied. Even then such a focus is patchy and inconsistent and much work remains to be done to ensure that the confiscation legislation is applied in a rigorous manner.