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With the growing concern of various sectors of society regarding environmental issues and the promotion of sustainable development, green technology innovation is generally considered to be conducive to the long-term development of enterprises. However, because of the existence of agency problems, managers may have shortsighted behaviors. Then how will managers' shortsighted behaviors affect enterprises' green technology innovation?

This paper uses machine learning-based text analysis methods to construct a manager myopia index based on the data from A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2015 to 2020. We examine the impact of manager myopia on green technology innovation in companies.

Our study finds that manager myopia significantly inhibits green technology innovation in companies. However, when multiple large shareholders coexist and the proportion of institutional investors' holdings is high, it can alleviate the inhibitory effect of manager myopia on green innovation. Heterogeneity tests show that the impact of manager myopia on green technology innovation is relatively significant in non-state-owned and manufacturing companies, as well as in the electricity industry. Robustness tests demonstrate that our conclusions remain valid after using propensity score matching to eliminate endogeneity problems.

From the perspective of corporate governance, this paper incorporates managers' shortsightedness, multiple large shareholders and institutional investors' shareholding ratios into the same logical framework, analyzes their internal mechanisms, helps improve corporate governance, enhances green innovation capabilities and has strong implications for the implementation of national innovation-driven development strategies and the achievement of “carbon peak” and “carbon neutrality” targets.

This study investigates the relationship between management's psychological characteristics (managers' narcissism, overconfidence and managers' myopia) and earnings management in the pre-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and post-ISIS eras.

A multivariate regression model was used to test the hypotheses. The research hypotheses were tested using a sample of all companies listed on the Iraqi Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2020.

Findings indicate a positive and significant relationship between managers' narcissism, overconfidence and myopia with accrual and real earnings management. According to the results, the ISIS weakens the relationship between managers' narcissism, managers' overconfidence and managers' myopia with accrual and real earnings management.

Because no study has addressed this issue in Iraq so far, the results of this research can provide helpful information for its users and improve the knowledge and science in this area.

This study aims to investigate the impacts of the psychological behaviors of managers, including entrenchment, myopia, narcissism and overconfidence, on money laundering at Iranian companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange.

The present study is descriptive-correlational in terms of methodology and applied research in terms of objectives. The statistical population consisted of all companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2013–2019. A total of 150 companies were selected as samples via screening. Logistic regression was used to analyze the data and test the hypotheses in EViews v10.

The findings revealed that management entrenchment, managerial myopia, managerial narcissism and managerial overconfidence have significant impacts on money laundering.

This study pioneer investigating the impacts of psychological behaviors among managers on money laundering in Iran. As an economic crime, money laundering poses an adverse impact on economic growth in countries. The continuous monitoring of manager performance and the deployment of performance measurement systems could prevent the negative impacts of manager behavior on money laundering.

The present study attempts to assess the relationship between management characteristics (managerial entrenchment, CEO narcissism and overconfidence, managers' myopia, real and accrual-based earnings management) and financial statement readability of listed firms on the Tehran Stock Exchange. In other words, this paper seeks to answer the question that “whether management characteristics have a favorable effect on financial statement readability or not.”

Multivariate regression model is used to meet the purpose of this study and research hypotheses are also examined using a sample of 1,050 listed observations on the Tehran Stock Exchange during 2012–2017 and by employing multiple regression patterns based on panel data technique and fixed effects model. Moreover, exploratory factor analysis of six variables (tenure, board independence, CEO duality, CEO ownership, board compensation and CEO change) is used for calculating managerial entrenchment and the FGO index is used for measuring readability.

The obtained results show that there is a negative and significant relationship between managerial entrenchment and accrual-based earnings management and a positive and significant relationship between real earnings management, managers' myopia, managers' narcissism and overconfidence and financial statement readability.

Since the present study is the first paper to investigate such a topic in the emerging markets, it provides useful information about intrinsic and acquisitive characteristics of management for accounting information users, analysts and legal institutions that contribute greatly to financial statement readability. Besides, the results of this study aid the development of science and knowledge in this field and fill the existing gap in the literature.

The present study investigates the impact of managerial psychological characteristics on the supply chain management efficiency (SCME) of companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange.

To this aim, information about 215 companies was analyzed during 2014–2021. The sales per inventory ratio was used to calculate SCME. In the present study, the focus is on characteristics such as managerial entrenchment, managerial myopia, managerial overconfidence (MOC) and managerial narcissism, all considered as managerial attributes.

The present findings showed that managerial myopia/managerial entrenchment (MOC/managerial narcissism) have a negative (positive) effect on SCME. Hypothesis testing based on robustness checks confirmed these results. Moreover, the findings are presented separately for companies with high business strategy (first quarter) and low business strategy (third quarter). The results show that at low levels of differentiation strategy, managerial entrenchment does not have a significant effect on SCME while other managerial attributes have a significant effect on both high and low business strategy.

The present study contributes to the identification of managerial psychological characteristics influencing SCME to advance future studies and support practical efforts. The present findings can prove the significance of this research and fill the existing gap in research.

This paper aims to explore the effects of director network on open innovation. As an informal institutional arrangement, the director network is an important source for the enterprise to obtain external information, which provide resource basis for open innovation. Chief Executive Officer (CEO) as the top of management team could make short-sighted decisions for personal interests; this paper also investigates the moderating role of CEO short-sightedness between director network and open innovation.

This paper takes 4,102 Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as the research sample. By introducing network centrality and structural hole to measure director network and using data mining to extract key words related to CEO short-sightedness from annual reports, this paper constructs several multiple linear regression models to analyze the impact of director network on open innovation and the moderating role of CEO short-sightedness.

The analysis finds that director network can facilitate corporate open innovation. Enterprises can acquire more external resources in high centrality and structural hole of director network and promote ability for corporate open innovation. The relationship between director network and open innovation is negatively moderated by CEO short-sightedness. When the level of corporate governance and analyst attention is high, the negative effect of CEO short-sightedness on the innovation effect of directors’ networks is suppressed.

This is the first empirical paper to investigate the promotion effect of director network on open innovation as well as the negative moderating role of CEO short-sightedness. The findings bring new perspectives to the open innovation and enlightenments for practical activities from social relationship aspect.

Exploiting a novel measure of hostile takeover exposure primarily based on the staggered adoption of state legislations, we explore a crucial, albeit largely overlooked, aspect of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In particular, we investigate CSR inequality, which is the inequality across different CSR categories. Higher inequality suggests a less balanced, more lopsided, CSR policy.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, we perform several robustness checks including propensity score matching, entropy balancing and an instrumental-variable analysis.

Our results show that more takeover exposure exacerbates CSR inequality. Specifically, a rise in takeover vulnerability by one standard deviation results in an increase in CSR inequality by 4.53–5.40%. The findings support the managerial myopia hypothesis, where myopic managers promote some CSR activities that are useful to them in the short run more than others, leading to higher CSR inequality.

Our study is the first to exploit a unique measure of takeover vulnerability to investigate the impact of takeover threats on CSR inequality, which is an important aspect of CSR that is largely overlooked in the literature. We aptly fill this void in the literature.

This study proposes a novel measure for management’s horizon (short-termism or myopia vs long-termism or hyperopia) derived from easily obtainable firm-level accounting and stock market performance data. The authors use the measure to explore the impact of managements’ horizon on firms’ investment efficiency.

The authors rely on two commonly used but uncorrelated measures of management performance: accounting performance (return on capital employed, ROCE) and stock market performance (average abnormal return, AAR). The authors combine these measures to develop a multidimensional framework for performance, which classifies firms into four groups: efficient (high accounting and high market performance), poor (low accounting and low market performance), myopic (high accounting and low market performance) and hyperopic (low accounting and high market performance). The authors validate this framework and deploy it to explore the relationship between horizon and firms’ investment efficiency.

In validation tests, the authors show that management myopia (hyperopia) explains firms’ decision to cut (grow) research and development investments. Further, as expected, myopic (hyperopic) firms are associated with significantly more (less) accrual and real earnings management. The empirical tests on the link between horizon and investment efficiency suggest that myopic managers cut new investments while their hyperopic counterparts grow the same. Ultimately, the authors find that myopia (hyperopia) exacerbates(mitigates) the over-investment of free cash flow problem.

The authors introduce a framework for assessing management’s horizon using easily obtainable measures of performance. The framework explains inconsistencies in prior empirical research using different measures of performance (accounting versus market). The authors demonstrate its utility by showing that the measure explains decisions around research and development investment, earnings management and firm investments.

We study the events that motivate CEOs to underinvest in R&D long-term projects (CEO myopia). Based on the existing literature in earnings management and agency theory, myopia is likely to become more problematic under five circumstances: when the CEO nears retirement (the CEO horizon problem), R&D projects have very long time horizons (the project horizon problem), the firm’s financial health is deteriorating (the cover-up problem), ownership structure is heavily weighted toward insider owners (minority owner oppression problem), and when the threat of hostile takeover increases (the entrenchment problem). We setup a dynamic simulation model in which rational CEOs maximize the total value of their bonus compensation over their tenure. Our findings related to the five circumstances are consistent with the extant literature. However, we found an unexpected stable, nonlinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between CEO tenure and R&D investment. We discuss the theoretical implications of our model and offer suggestions for future research.

Exploiting two novel measures of takeover vulnerability and asset redeployability, this paper aims to investigate the effect of the takeover market on redeployable assets. Redeployable assets are those with alternative uses. Asset redeployability is a crucial concept in the literature on investment irreversibility.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, the authors execute several robustness checks: propensity score matching, entropy balancing, instrumental-variable analysis and generalized method of moment dynamic panel data analysis.

The authors’ results reveal that more takeover threats reduce asset redeployability significantly, corroborating the managerial myopia hypothesis. Hostile takeover threats reduce managers’ job security and thus induce them to myopically focus on the current utilization of assets in the short run, rather than how they may be deployed in the long run, resulting in less asset redeployability.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the effect of takeover threats on asset redeployability. Because the authors’ measure of takeover vulnerability is principally based on the staggered passage of state legislations, which are plausibly exogenous, the authors’ results likely reflect causality, rather than merely an association.