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This research paper aims to examine the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics on earnings management.

Research samples are manufacturing firms listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange 2015–2021. CEO characteristics include narcissism, gender, age, tenure, experience, nationality and founding family status. Data analysis uses random-effect regression.

The result shows that higher narcissism CEOs have aggressive characteristics so they will be more likely to engage in accrual and real earnings management. Female CEOs, foreign CEOs and founding-family CEOs have higher monitoring and business ethics characteristics so they will be less likely to engage in accrual and real earnings management. CEOs with higher education levels have higher thinking complexity so they will be more likely to engage in accrual earnings management with higher regulator and auditor monitoring barriers than real earnings management. CEOs with financial and accounting experience are familiar with accounting standards and auditor monitoring barriers so they will be more likely to engage in accrual earnings management than real earnings management. On the other hand, there are no effects of CEO age and tenure on earnings management.

This research contributes to providing evidence of the effect of CEO characteristics on earnings management in a specific industry such as manufacturing firms and emerging markets such as Indonesia with the majority group firms being family firms.

The use of models for detecting earnings management in the academic literature, using accrual and real manipulation, is commonplace. The purpose of the current study is to compare the power of these models in a United Kingdom (UK) sample of 19,424 firm-year observations during the period 1991–2018. The authors include artificially-induced manipulation of revenues and expenses between zero and ten percent of total assets to random samples of 500 firm-year observations within the full sample. The authors use two alternative samples, one with no reversal of manipulation (sample 1) and one with reversal in the following year (sample 2).

The authors include artificially induced manipulation of revenues and expenses between zero and ten percent of total assets to random samples of 500 firm-year observations within the full sample.

The authors find that real earnings manipulation models have lower power than accrual earnings manipulation models, when manipulating discretionary expenses and revenues. Furthermore, the real earnings manipulation model to detect overproduction has high misspecification, resulting in artificially inflating the power of the model. The authors examine an alternative model to detect discretionary expense manipulation that generates higher power than the Roychowdhury (2006) model. Modified real manipulation models (Srivastava, 2019) are used as robustness and the authors find these to be more misspecified in some cases but less in others. The authors extend the analysis to a setting in which earnings management is known to occur, i.e. around benchmark-beating and find consistent evidence of accrual and some forms of real manipulation in this sample using all models examined.

This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence of misspecification of currently used models to detect real accounts manipulation.

Based on the findings, the authors recommend caution in interpreting any findings when using these models in future research.

The findings address the earnings management literature, guided by the agency theory.

This study aims to examine the non-linear relationship between corporate diversification and real and accrual earnings management, using a sample of 5,659 US firm-year observations for 1,221 firms covering the period from 2001 to 2012.

The authors use various techniques and regressions to test the hypotheses. Following prior research, several proxies have been used to measure diversification, accrual earnings management and real earnings management.

The study produces several important findings. First, the study provides evidence that diversified firms engage in real and accrual earnings management to manage their reported earnings upward. These results are consistent with recent research (Farooqi et al., 2014; Jirapon et al., 2008) that finds that diversified firms engage in earnings manipulation. Second, and most importantly, the study contributes to the literature by providing the first evidence on a non-linear relationship between corporate diversification and earnings management. Specifically, the study provides evidence that diversified firms engage in accrual (real) earnings management, but this engagement is associated with level of diversification in a non-linear U-shaped (inverted U-shaped) relationship.

Like all other studies, the current study has some limitations. The study was conducted only on the largest firms in the USA that have market capitalization of more than US$10m; hence, the findings may not be generalizable to small publicly traded firms. Further, the findings may not be generalizable to other markets, given the unique characteristics of US markets such as the presence of very sophisticated investors.

This study provides some important implications for US regulators to revise their regulations to prevent diversified firms from using earnings management to manipulate reported earnings.

This study is the first in the USA to examine the non-linear relationship between corporate diversification and earnings management. The study focuses on one of the most active, most attractive and largest capital markets throughout the world, that of the USA. Also, this study is one of the few studies that examine whether diversified firms use real activities manipulation to manage their reported earnings.

Most prior literature focuses on how managers’ immediate needs affect their current earnings management. The purpose of this paper is to expand this body of literature by investigating the managerial motivation in a multi-period setting. The authors believe that managers’ incentive to engage in earning management around current equity issues is not only determined by the companies’ immediate need, but that it is also determined by their longer-term financing need.

The authors examine all issuances of common stock, whether they are issued as seasoned equity offerings or whether as a reissuance of previously repurchased stock. They believe that the motivations for earnings management are similar for all these various stock-issuance events, which result in an increase in the number of outstanding common stock items.

The results of this paper reveal that those firms with less of a need for subsequent equity issuances are more likely to engage in “income- increasing” earnings management before their equity issuances. Conversely, equity issuers with more of a need for subsequent equity issuances would be more concerned about the potential impact of current earnings management on their future reported earnings and, therefore, would be less likely to manage earnings.

This paper contributes to the literature by extending the findings of the prior literature, showing that managerial discretion does not only affect the total magnitude of earnings management, but that it also impacts the timing of the earnings management activities. Insights gained from our research may contribute to the literature and enable a better understanding of firms’ financial reporting strategy from a longer-run view.

The aim of this study is to investigate whether debt maturity matters for the choice of earnings management strategy (i.e. accruals earnings management and real earnings management).

The sample involves 486 American listed firms extracted from fortune 1,000 over the period 2006–2014. Panel data regression models are employed to empirically test the impact of short-term debt and long-term debt on manager's choice of earnings management form. The generalized least square technique is applied to estimate the parameters of the regression models.

The results show that managers are more likely to manage earnings through real activities and reduce their use of accruals earnings management once short debt is increasing because the latter induces heavy lender's scrutiny. The managers move hence to real earnings management due to a lower possibility of being discovered. Moreover, the results reveal a simultaneous use of accruals earnings management and real earnings management for firms with high long-term debt. This finding highlights that long-term debt does not produce regular lender's enforcement allowing managers to use both earnings management techniques to reach earnings targets.

This research has two limitations. Like many other studies, the measure of discretionary accruals is subject to measurement errors. Moreover, the sample exclusively involves large firms extracted from Fortune 1,000. Therefore, the attained results may be not available for small and medium firms.

The findings have implications for both researchers and lenders. For researchers, the present work points out that the decision about the debt maturity structure is crucial for all managers because they establish their earnings management policy accordingly. For lenders, the findings imply that increasing scrutiny effectively constrains accounting manipulations but does not eliminate earnings management activities altogether. The managers move to another earnings management strategy (i.e. real earnings management). This evidence may support the lenders and the creditors in their decision-making processes.

This paper adds to the accounting literature by providing new and interesting evidence on the role of debt maturity on the trade-off between the earnings management tools. Prior studies provided mixed finding for the issue of earnings management in levered firms. The findings of this study should be viewed as a first step to understand the mixed results on this issue. While most papers focus on one earnings management form when they examine the earnings management in levered firms, the authors highlight the impact of debt on both accruals and real earnings management simultaneously.

This paper aims to examine the association between earnings management and the value relevance of earnings (the latter is operationalized by earnings response coefficient). Specifically, this study examines whether opportunistic earnings management has a negative impact on the value relevance of earnings for a sample of firms listed on the Egyptian Stock Exchange.

Different from prior work and due to data limitations in the Egyptian market, this paper first examines for the existence of earnings management based on the whole operating performances of the firms by testing whether firms with low/poor operating performance are more likely to choose income-increasing actions (strategies) than firms with high operating performance. After confirming that low operating performance firms manage earnings upward, the authors then assess whether this opportunistic earnings management by these low operating performance firms reduces the value relevance of earnings. This is performed by estimating a model of the relationship between stock returns and accounting earnings with a dummy variable that allows parameter shifts for earnings of low operating performance firms.

The results show that discretionary accruals are positive and significantly higher for firms with low operating performance than those for firms with high operating performance. These results indicate that low operating performance firms increase the earnings management practices by probably increasing their reported earnings opportunistically to mask their low performance. Furthermore, the results show that the earnings response coefficient is significantly smaller for earnings of low operating performance firms than that for earnings of high operating performance firms. These results suggest that earnings of firms with low operating performance (that are engaged in opportunistic earnings management strategies) have less value relevance than earnings of firms with high operating performance, i.e. the informativeness of managed earnings is lower than that of non-managed earnings.

Based on these results, it is plausible that the presence of opportunistic earnings management adversely affects the value relevance of accounting earnings.

Consistent with previous results from developed countries, this study shows that earnings management is a significant factor that affects value relevance of earnings in Egypt.

This study aims to investigate the occurrence of pre-merger earnings management for a sample of 197 stock- and cash-financed UK acquirers between 1990 and 2009. It also examines the earnings management behaviour around the change in the Corporate Governance Code in 2003 based on the Higgs recommendations.

Mean and median accrual- and real-based manipulation are examined in the period before the announcement of a merger and acquisition. These are compared across stock and cash acquirers as well as before and after the implementation of the Higgs recommendations. Logistic regressions are also run to examine accrual- and real-based manipulation across stock and cash acquirers after controlling for variables that may affect the acquisition type.

The study found some evidence of upward pre-merger accrual-based earnings management by stock-financed acquirers, which is in line with the findings of Botsari and Meeks (2008). Furthermore, no significant changes were found in the post-Higgs period, which indicates that the recommendations put forth by Higgs may not have been successful in mitigating earnings management. The evidence also shows that cash bidders engage in pre-merger real earnings manipulation through lower discretionary expenses, possibly to enhance cash availability for the bid.

The findings in this study confirm earnings management exists around mergers and acquisitions and provide some evidence that the recommendations set out in the Higgs Report do not appear to have mitigated earnings management activities. This is of interest to regulators as well as investors and academicians.

This provides the first analysis in the UK examining the use of real-based earnings management activities by UK acquirers. It also extends prior research around corporate governance changes that occurred in the UK.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management in US context and provide further insights on the effects of board of directors' characteristics on earnings management.

The paper uses a sample of three groups of US firms; where firms with relatively high negative, firms with relatively high positive, and those with low levels of discretionary accruals in the year 2004 are examined. Descriptive statistics, univariate analysis, multivariate analysis, board of directors' characteristics, and possible relationships between corporate governance variables and earnings management proxy provide the basis for discussion.

Firms with annually elected boards, small size boards, 100 percent independent nominating committees, and 100 percent independent compensation committees have more negative discretionary accruals. However, firms with 75‐90 percent independent board or firms with a board size of between nine and 12 have higher positive discretionary accruals.

Certain board characteristics may be the important factors associated with constraining the propensity of managers to engage in earnings management.

Results are limited by the accuracy of the models applied to isolate discretionary accruals. Additionally, the direction diverse of discretionary accruals may differ with selecting a time series of three or more years as a base for the analysis.

In contrast to prior literature, where board composition is defined as an insiders‐ or outsiders‐controlled board, this paper classifies board composition into seven discrete categories, using the same seven categories employed by Institutional Shareholder Services in evaluating and assigning corporate governance quotient scores to firms. The paper's major contributions to the existing literature are its findings that income‐increasing and income‐decreasing discretionary accruals have a different relationship with corporate governance practices and its expansion of the scope of corporate governance from board independence and audit committee independence to other corporate governance characteristics. This paper provides evidence that supports US regulators' initiatives that stronger corporate governance mechanisms provide greater monitoring of the financial accounting process and may be the important factors in improving the integrity of financial reporting.

The purpose of this paper is to add an important new dimension to the earnings management literature by establishing a link between idiosyncratic risk and the degree of accrual management.

Based on a comprehensive sample of 44,599 firm-year observations during the period spanning 1987-2009, the study offers robust empirical evidence of the importance of firm-specific idiosyncratic volatility as a determinant of earnings manipulation. The authors use standard measures of earnings management and idiosyncratic volatility. The authors test the hypotheses with robust econometrics techniques.

The authors document a strong positive relationship between idiosyncratic risk and accruals management. Further, the authors find a positive association between residual volatility and discretionary accruals whether accruals are income inflationary or income deflationary. The findings are robust to alternate idiosyncratic risk proxies and variables associated with earnings management.

Overall, the knowledge derived from this study provides additional tools to assess the degree of earnings management by firms, and hence the quality of the financial reporting. Thus the findings will enable standard setters, financial market regulators, analysts, and investors to make more informed legislative, regulatory, resource allocation, and investment decisions.

Managers of defined-benefit (DB) firms have considerable discretion in deriving pension costs and flexibility in cash contributions to pension plans. Pension accruals occur when cash contributions differ from pension costs. The manipulable nature of pension costs and cash contributions allows managers of DB firms to manipulate pension accruals to achieve their desired earnings. We study whether DB firms with earnings management attributes (referred to as suspect DB firms) used more discretionary pension accruals (DPA) than non-suspect DB firms, especially after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX).

The authors develop an aggregate measure of DPA to capture overall earnings management in pension accounting. They then employ a multivariate regression model to study whether the suspect DB firms engage in more DPA than non-suspect firms and to assess the impact of SOX on DPA for all DB firms and for suspect DB firms.

The authors find evidence that suspect firms inflate DPA to achieve their earnings goals and also that all DB firms and the suspect firms use more DPA in the post-SOX era compared to the pre-SOX period. In contrast, they observe no significant difference in real activities earnings management (REM) between suspect and non-suspect firms. In addition, neither the entire sample of DB firms nor the suspect firms display a significant change in REM after SOX.

The samples in the study are limited to firms with defined pension plans; thus, the findings cannot be generalized to all firms. In addition, as in other empirical studies relying on models to estimate earnings management proxies, this study inherits estimation errors from Jones and Roychowdhury's models. Consequently, the impact of these estimation errors cannot be ruled out.

The empirical findings of the study appear that instead of deterring DB firms from engaging in pension accruals earnings management, enacting the stringent anti-fraud SOX prompts these firms to rely more on accrual-based discretionary pension rather than switch to real activities manipulation to manage earnings.

While many prior studies focus on the impact of managing individual pension assumptions on earnings, the authors study overall earnings management in pension accounting by developing a model to derive an aggregate measure of pension earnings management.