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This study proposes a novel measure for management’s horizon (short-termism or myopia vs long-termism or hyperopia) derived from easily obtainable firm-level accounting and stock market performance data. The authors use the measure to explore the impact of managements’ horizon on firms’ investment efficiency.

The authors rely on two commonly used but uncorrelated measures of management performance: accounting performance (return on capital employed, ROCE) and stock market performance (average abnormal return, AAR). The authors combine these measures to develop a multidimensional framework for performance, which classifies firms into four groups: efficient (high accounting and high market performance), poor (low accounting and low market performance), myopic (high accounting and low market performance) and hyperopic (low accounting and high market performance). The authors validate this framework and deploy it to explore the relationship between horizon and firms’ investment efficiency.

In validation tests, the authors show that management myopia (hyperopia) explains firms’ decision to cut (grow) research and development investments. Further, as expected, myopic (hyperopic) firms are associated with significantly more (less) accrual and real earnings management. The empirical tests on the link between horizon and investment efficiency suggest that myopic managers cut new investments while their hyperopic counterparts grow the same. Ultimately, the authors find that myopia (hyperopia) exacerbates(mitigates) the over-investment of free cash flow problem.

The authors introduce a framework for assessing management’s horizon using easily obtainable measures of performance. The framework explains inconsistencies in prior empirical research using different measures of performance (accounting versus market). The authors demonstrate its utility by showing that the measure explains decisions around research and development investment, earnings management and firm investments.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of managerial decision horizon (MDH) on real estate investment trust (REIT) behavior and performance.

In this study, the authors expand the number of proxies and measure managerial horizon by CEO age, CEO tenure, cash compensation relative to total compensation, and the amount of vested equity-based compensation to total compensation. To avoid potential measurement error, the authors compute the average ranking score of the four individual measures to determine the overall MDH of a CEO. Cross-sectional time series regressions are then performed on the effects of CEO MDH on REIT policies and performance. The authors also examine if the effect of myopic MDH can be mitigated by good corporate governance. For robustness purpose, the authors also compare the effects of age-related MDH and compensation-related MDH.

The results show that REITs managed by CEOs with short MDHs have lower levels of asset growth and a lower standard deviation of return on assets. These REITs also have lower debt levels, lower dividend payouts, and hold more cash. The results suggest that short-horizon CEOs have incentives to lower investment risk, default risk, and liquidity risk at the firm level in order to protect personal benefits. CEOs with a short horizon also have a negative impact on REIT performance. The results also show that CEO compensation-related horizon problems are mitigated by corporate governance, but CEO age-related horizon problems are significant and persistent. The results suggest that age-related behavioral biases of the CEO are important determinants of corporate decisions.

The results of this study suggest that the managerial behavioral biases should be considered in understanding firm behavior.

This is the first study that examines the effects of MDH on REIT behavior and performance. The unique regulatory environment of REITs makes them less susceptible to agency problems of free cash flow and thus provides a clearer picture of the effect of MDH. Prior studies focus on the effect of managerial horizon on firm investment activity, this study expands the scope to examine the effects on investment and financial policies. In addition, this study adds to the literature by showing that the effect of age-related horizon problems may not be mitigated by good corporate governance.

In light of evidence of low levels of maintenance of public buildings, this paper aims to investigate trends and determinants of public building conditions in Norwegian local governments.

The authors consider data from surveys and public records in regression analyses.

On average, the condition of Norwegian local public facilities has improved slightly in the period 2004-2016. The survey data suggest substantial fluctuations in building conditions and a negative relationship between building conditions in 2004 and 2016. Local governments with poor building conditions in 2004 had higher investment in the following years. The authors find no systematic relationship between the conditions in 2004 and maintenance expenditures in subsequent years. They conclude that if maintenance levels are too low, the results suggest that investment levels are too high. Further, they find that both political and fiscal factors are important in explaining building conditions.

The authors provide insight into determinants and trends of building conditions in Norwegian local governments. The results hint at an unhealthy balance between maintenance spending and public investments.

The main objective of the paper is to examine the relationship between managerial attributes (e.g. managerial entrenchment, managerial myopia and managerial overconfidence) and firm risk-taking on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

The study’s sample comprises 150 companies listed on the TSE from 2011 to 2017. Risk-taking is calculated as the standard deviation (SD) of stock return. Explanatory factor analysis was performed to calculate the weight of each of the five variables managerial ownership, board independence, chief executive officer (CEO) tenure, board compensation and CEO duality as a proxy for managerial entrenchment. The study by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) was also used to calculate managerial myopia, and the study by Schrand and Zechman (2012) was used to calculate managerial overconfidence.

The results indicate that the effect of managerial entrenchment and managerial myopia on risk-taking of listed firms on the TSE is positive and significant, implying that an increase in CEO entrenchment is likely to give rise to risk-taking. The authors conjecture that this finding could be due to the investment projects impairing the firm performance in the long run. Furthermore, the effect of managerial overconfidence on listed firms' risk-taking on the TSE is significantly negative. Since overconfidence is one of the traits of narcissism and corporate managers tend to be encouraged and admired, it is implied that they tend to make efficient and low-risk investments that ultimately reduce the firm risk-taking.

Several theoretical studies show that managerial behavior is a determining factor in the economy. One of the reasons which justify the originality of this study is the context and institutional environment. Undoubtedly, managerial behavior (e.g. managerial entrenchment, managerial myopia and managerial overconfidence) is expected to have some significant variations in developing countries compared to prevailing in developed countries, particularly in the Iranian stock market the economic sanctions. Furthermore, due to the direct impact of individuals' psychological and behavioral characteristics on their decisions and the effect of companies' risk-taking on increasing and decreasing shareholders and companies' wealth, this research is essential. Given the function of designed behavioral criteria for assessing risk-taking behaviors, the relationship between managerial attributes and firms' risk-taking is still unclear and investigated in this study.

Green transition is a long-term direction of corporate development that can achieve sustainable corporate development. This study aims to investigate whether state ownership promotes corporate green transition by mitigating managerial myopia and the impact of environmental regulations, internal controls and ownership on this pathway.

Using data from 2,608 Chinese listed companies for 2010–2019, the authors investigate the relationship between state ownership, managerial myopia and corporate green transition by using fixed-effects and moderated mediation models.

State ownership can boost green transitions and alleviate managerial myopia. Managerial myopia mediates the relationship between state ownership and corporate green transition. Furthermore, environmental regulations, internal controls and ownership moderate the mediating effects of managerial myopia.

The authors construct a multidimensional green transition index to examine the influence of state ownership on corporate green transition behavior and reveal the underlying mechanism by which state ownership promotes green transition by “mitigating managerial myopia.” This study enriches the literature on state ownership, management myopia and green transition and provides important evidence for the promotion of mixed ownership reforms.

Exploiting an innovative measure of corporate culture based on machine learning and earnings conference calls, this study aims to investigate how corporate culture is influenced by hostile takeover threats. To sidestep endogeneity, this study uses a unique measure of takeover vulnerability principally based on the staggered implementation of state legislations, which are plausibly exogenous.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, this study also executes a variety of other empirical tests such as propensity score matching, entropy balancing and an instrumental variable analysis, to demonstrate that the results are robust. The final sample includes 27,663 firm-year observations from 4,092 distinct companies from 2001 to 2014.

This study documents that more takeover exposure weakens corporate culture considerably, consistent with the managerial myopia hypothesis. Threatened by the takeover risk, managers tend to behave myopically and are less likely to make long-term investments that promote strong corporate culture in the long run. Additional analysis focusing on a culture of innovation, which is especially vulnerable to managerial myopia, produces similar evidence.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to explore the effect of takeover susceptibility on corporate culture using a distinctive metric of corporate culture based on textual analysis.

We study the events that motivate CEOs to underinvest in R&D long-term projects (CEO myopia). Based on the existing literature in earnings management and agency theory, myopia is likely to become more problematic under five circumstances: when the CEO nears retirement (the CEO horizon problem), R&D projects have very long time horizons (the project horizon problem), the firm’s financial health is deteriorating (the cover-up problem), ownership structure is heavily weighted toward insider owners (minority owner oppression problem), and when the threat of hostile takeover increases (the entrenchment problem). We setup a dynamic simulation model in which rational CEOs maximize the total value of their bonus compensation over their tenure. Our findings related to the five circumstances are consistent with the extant literature. However, we found an unexpected stable, nonlinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between CEO tenure and R&D investment. We discuss the theoretical implications of our model and offer suggestions for future research.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate why poor people make decisions that at first sight appear irrational. The author stays within the realms of classical consumption theory, and investigates preference-based explanations. The author studies the case of rickshaw rental versus purchase. One-year rent is sufficient to buy a rickshaw in the plains of Nepal, while a rickshaw will last many years, so purchase appears very profitable. Still most cyclists rent the rickshaw.

Based on choices made by rickshaw cyclists between hypothetical financing schemes for rickshaws we investigate whether the explanation is a high time-preference rate or a high elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption, which in turn can be explained by preferences that are formed by consumption near a subsistence level.

The authors find that subsistence constraints are more important than high time-preference rates. In short, many rickshaw cyclists switch from profitable investment decisions to myopic choices if the weekly payments are too high.

In contrast to standard bidding-forms, the methodology does not allow for exact estimates of the implied time-preference rate or the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption.

Microcredit has no role if people are subsistence constraint, as they will need to save every day also to repay loans.

The findings indicate that myopic choices by poor people are not due to myopic preferences, but rather that the disutility of reducing consumption today is too high.

The authors believe bidding-forms are too complex for field experiments among people with no, or minimal, education. The simple hypothetical choices we have constructed appear to work.

Myopic loss aversion, or the combination of loss aversion and frequent portfolio evaluation, has been argued to possibly be one of the factors behind the equity premium puzzle. The purpose of this paper is to offer an alternative systematic test that looks at the relationship between inflation and equity premium to test for this theory.

Inflation and equity premium tends to be positively associated, both in standard rational-agents theoretical models and in simple empirical measures of correlation. Nonetheless, under the presence of nominal return evaluation, behavioral models such as myopic loss aversion do predict a negative causal relationship between those variables. This study aims to check this negative causal relationship. The identification strategy combines elements of two approaches: fixed effects regression on short-term returns and long-term least squares regression. As both methods have different strengths and weaknesses, and use different sources of data variation to compute their estimators, it is argued that the combination of these approaches provides a better identification strategy than each individual method.

This paper finds evidence for a negative relationship between inflation and equity premium in both methods, which supports myopic loss aversion theory. The magnitude of the coefficients is also relevant ranging from −0.23 to −0.80. However, it is also shown that these effects explain only a small part of equity premium observed variation, and are more prevalent in non-industrialized countries, which limits the scope of the theory.

The current method for testing myopic loss aversion theory is overly reliant on experimental evidence collected in the lab to estimate behavioral parameters and simulations. The authors complement these by providing an empirical study.

The present study aims to explore the impact of managerial attributes on cash holding and investment efficiency and the mediating role of cash holding for companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange.

Information about 178 companies in 2014–2021 was examined. In the present study, managerial overconfidence, managerial myopia and managerial ability were considered as the managerial attributes.

The present findings showed that managerial attributes (i.e. overconfidence, myopia and ability) have a significant effect on investment efficiency. In addition, cash holding has a significant positive effect on investment efficiency. Furthermore, cash holding plays a mediating role in the relationship between managerial attributes and investment efficiency.

There is a gap in the impact of managerial attributes on cash holding and investment efficiency and investigating the mediating role of cash holding. This gap creates an opportunity for studying these variables in depth. The present study contributes to the identification of factors influencing investment efficiency to advance future studies and support practical efforts. This study contributes to a better understanding of the effect of managerial attributes on investment decisions in the context of diverging opinions about manager-specific effects on company’s outcomes.