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This study examines whether the behavioral attributes, such as overconfidence, of chief executive officers (CEO) and chief operating officers (COO) affect firm's inventory leanness. If they do, how are they interacting with each other? Moreover, incorporating market competition into the analysis, this study explores how the competition moderates the relationship between managerial overconfidence and inventory leanness.

Using a large panel data of US manufacturing firms between 1998 and 2015, this study measures top managers' overconfident characteristics using stock option information. Then, a panel regression analysis is adopted to test the effects of managerial overconfidence on inventory leanness. Moreover, a moderation model is applied to investigate the interaction effects of market competition.

Firms with overconfident COOs (CEOs), other circumstances being equal, increase (decrease) the inventory leanness as the market becomes more competitive.

The study suggests that firms should understand top managers' behavioral characteristics to manage inventory efficiently. Collectively, CEOs (COOs) tend to increase (decrease) inventory levels due to their overconfidence as the market gets competitive. Firms should establish a systematic process to be reviewed by diverse stakeholders to deal with managerial overconfidence.

This study is an exploratory study that examines whether and how top management's behavioral attribute relates to a firm's operations performance. It underlines that CEO and COO's overconfident characteristics determine the inventory leanness when market competition is considered. Numerous studies on firm-level strategies emphasized the top managers' overconfidence as a key factor. However, behavioral characteristics at the top management level have rarely been studied in operations management fields. Based on the results, scholars could compare and understand the effects of CEO and COO overconfidence to provide insights into inventory management.

The purpose of this study is to understand the impact of the overconfidence of finance managers on the capital structure decisions of family-run businesses in the Indian scenario. Furthermore, this study aims to demonstrate that measurable managerial characteristics explain the capital structure decisions of managers.

The qualitative approach to research, which aims at understanding a given phenomenon among the experts, is followed. Semi-structured interviews are conducted with 21 overconfident finance managers of family-owned businesses. Content analysis is used to analyse the collected data regarding capital structure decisions into several themes to fully explore the issue in the Indian scenario.

In terms of preference for cash or debt, most of the responding overconfident finance managers of family-run businesses agreed that cash is the preferred source of financing over debt financing. This is due to the biased behaviour of overconfident managers, who consider lower availability of debt as a reason to prefer cash over debt financing. The present study reports that overconfident finance managers prefer short- to long-term debt financing. These managers raise certain practical issues, such as stringent debt terms and inflexible repayment schedules, that arise in relation to the long-term debt market. The study also finds that overconfident finance managers do not fully use tax savings. Respondents reported a lack of access to the debt market and a lack of expertise in capital structure decisions as factors in these capital structure decisions. In addition, the study explores various factors, such as the role of government, the Central Bank of India and industry practices, in relation to capital structure decisions. The study finds that the capital structure decisions of these overconfident finance managers are suboptimal because of the presence of overconfidence bias.

This study gathers information from respondents who are finance managers, not top-level managers, of family businesses; the decision not to interview the higher-ranking managers is a potential limitation of the present study. Another limitation is the small number of respondents in a specific firm size. Because of these factors, the generalisability of the findings of this study will obviously be restricted.

The present study has several practical implications. The first is the recognition of overconfidence bias as it affects the decision-making of finance managers. Executives, especially finance executives, will benefit from the recognition of overconfidence bias and will understand how the presence of such bias impacts corporate decision-making. Managers will understand that bias leads to faulty decision-making. The study will provide indirect feedback to policymakers and regulators in terms of understanding the role of macroeconomic variables in economic decisions. The qualitative approach followed in the present study may enhance the understanding of capital structure decisions from a psychological perspective. The majority of studies in the review of literature adopt quantitative approaches; so the qualitative approach adopted here represents a methodological innovation, and it may provide a deeper understanding of the matter.

The existing literature includes quantitative research aimed at understanding the impact of CEO overconfidence on various corporate policies such as capital budgeting, mergers and acquisitions, dividend policy and capital structure decisions. Quantitative research into the presence of overconfidence bias among executives and its impact on corporate policies returns mixed results. To fulfil the need for studies of overconfidence bias among executives with practical implications, this study explores the presence of overconfidence bias among finance managers in family-run businesses and investigates the impact of overconfidence on capital structure decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze whether and how managerial overconfidence affects stock price crash risk.

Based on a large sample of Chinese non-state-owned firms from 2000 to 2012, this study employs methods including multiple linear regression model, Heckman two-stage treatment effect procedure, firm fixed effects model and event study to clarify the causality relationship between managerial overconfidence and crash risk.

The authors find that firms with overconfident managers (chief executive officer or board chairs) are more likely to experience future stock price crashes than firms with non-overconfident managers. The effect of overconfidence on crash risk is more pronounced for firms with low transparency, suggesting that firm opacity facilitates overconfident managers’ bad news hoarding activities, which, in turn, increases stock price crash risk. The authors also show evidence that overconfident managers tend to disclose good news in a timely manner.

The authors add to the growing literature on stock price crash risk. Specifically, the authors find that the cognitive bias of board chair plays an important role in the bad news hoarding activities, thereby increasing the likelihood of stock price crash. This study also contributes to the literature that addresses the effects of managerial overconfidence on corporate finance issues.

Based on the perspective of cognitive psychology, this paper takes the M&A events of Chinese A-share listed enterprises from 2008 to 2015 as the research samples, and then empirically analyzes the influence of managerial overconfidence on M&A premium under the special circumstances in China and tests the moderating effect of debt capacity between managerial overconfidence and M&A premium.

This paper selects the M&A events of all A-share listed enterprises from 2008 to 2015 as the total samples. In view of the fact that the data in this paper are unbalanced panel data, so this paper uses the LR test, LR test and Hausman test to filter the mixed OLS model, fixed effect model and random effect model. Finally, using the random effect model for empirical testing reduces the endogeneity of the model.

The study shows that managerial overconfidence is positively correlated with M&A premium; at the same time, compared with the state-owned enterprises, the relationship between managerial overconfidence and M&A premium is more significant in private enterprises. Further study shows that debt capacity can strengthen the relationship between managerial overconfidence and M&A premium, to be specific, the larger the debt capacity is, the stronger the positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and M&A premium will be. Moreover, after considering the influence of agency cost and financing expense, and conducting endogenous test and robust test, this research’s conclusions remain the same.

This research also has some limitations. Some M&A announcements are incomplete, and the target has more information missing, resulting in a decrease in the number of samples, which may affect the accuracy of the conclusions. This paper does not address the research of the economic consequences of M&A, namely, the impact of managerial overconfidence and debt capacity on M&A performance. This is one of the future research directions for this paper.

The conclusions of this paper provide new theory evidence for Chinese enterprises' M&A decision-making.

First, enterprises should gradually improve corporate governance structure and governance mechanisms to guide more stakeholders to participate in corporate governance, and also they should strengthen the pre-evaluation, in-process control and post-supervision of managers' behavioral decisions to prevent irrational M&A caused by managerial overconfidence. Especially in private enterprises, this issue should be paid more attention. Second, enterprises should make full use of the debt governance function of creditors and improve the creditors' supervision mechanism for managers' decision-making behavior.

The innovation value and increment contribution of this paper may include the following aspects: the conclusions of this paper expand the research boundary of the relationship between managerial overconfidence and M&A premium, and enrich related literature about debt capacity and the influence of debt capacity on M&A decision-making, and also provide new theory evidence for Chinese enterprises' M&A decision-making. In a word, this research is a beneficial supplement and extension for existing research.

The characteristic of managers’ personality is a key factor in their decision-making. One of the most important personality characteristic of managers is overconfidence. Overconfident managers have false trust about their abilities and have a positive view of the firm’s future performance. Thus, the purpose of this study is to investigate the association between managerial overconfidence and internal control weaknesses (ICW) of the firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

Sample includes the 480 firm-year observations from companies listed on the TSE during the years 2013–2017, and the hypothesis is tested using multivariate regression model based on panel data analysis.

The authors found that managerial overconfidence increases the firms’ ICW. The findings are robust to alternative measure of managerial overconfidence, individual analysis of the research hypothesis for each year and endogeneity concern. Moreover, additional analysis reveals that the positive relationship between managerial overconfidence and ICW is less pronounced in larger firms.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study to analyze the association between managerial overconfidence and ICW in emerging capital markets and, therefore, can contribute to extend the current literature on managerial overconfidence and ICW in developing countries, especially Iran’s emerging capital market.

The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyze the effects of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity structure decisions in terms of liquidity risk and asset match in Chinese listed companies.

Combining data from CSMAR with some default data collected by hand, this paper selects age, tenure, education, education background and whether the board chair and CEO positions are consolidated in Chinese listed companies as proxies of managerial overconfidence. Thus, the authors acquired needed and credible empirical data.

It was found that, the younger the CEO, the shorter the tenure, the lower the education, having economics or management education and being chairman concurrently, CEOs have stronger managerial overconfidence. Thus, corporate debt maturity structure is more weakly correlated with debt ratio and asset structure.

The findings in this study suggest that managerial irrationality, especially overconfidence, does have an effect on the financing decisions of firms.

This is the first paper to analyze the effects of managerial overconfidence on debt maturity structure decisions in terms of liquidity risk and asset match. The findings inspire firm risk management policies from managerial overconfidence.

The primary purpose is to investigate the relationship between narcissism and managers' overconfidence in listed companies' risk-taking.

In this study, two criteria of signature and reward are used to measure manager's narcissism; manager's overconfidence, using multiple regression models and finally to measure companies' risk-taking by using companies' monthly returns. Multiple regression is employed to test the model using a sample of 890 firm-year participation on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2017 with panel data and model with fixed effects.

The findings indicate that the CEO's narcissism and the board of directors positively and significantly affect corporate risk-taking. Also, managers' overconfidence has a positive and significant relationship with corporate risk-taking.

The results of this study identified other factors affecting companies' risk-taking. This study also contributed to the development of the literature on narcissism, overconfidence and corporate risk-taking.

The main objective of the paper is to examine the relationship between managerial attributes (e.g. managerial entrenchment, managerial myopia and managerial overconfidence) and firm risk-taking on the Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).

The study’s sample comprises 150 companies listed on the TSE from 2011 to 2017. Risk-taking is calculated as the standard deviation (SD) of stock return. Explanatory factor analysis was performed to calculate the weight of each of the five variables managerial ownership, board independence, chief executive officer (CEO) tenure, board compensation and CEO duality as a proxy for managerial entrenchment. The study by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) was also used to calculate managerial myopia, and the study by Schrand and Zechman (2012) was used to calculate managerial overconfidence.

The results indicate that the effect of managerial entrenchment and managerial myopia on risk-taking of listed firms on the TSE is positive and significant, implying that an increase in CEO entrenchment is likely to give rise to risk-taking. The authors conjecture that this finding could be due to the investment projects impairing the firm performance in the long run. Furthermore, the effect of managerial overconfidence on listed firms' risk-taking on the TSE is significantly negative. Since overconfidence is one of the traits of narcissism and corporate managers tend to be encouraged and admired, it is implied that they tend to make efficient and low-risk investments that ultimately reduce the firm risk-taking.

Several theoretical studies show that managerial behavior is a determining factor in the economy. One of the reasons which justify the originality of this study is the context and institutional environment. Undoubtedly, managerial behavior (e.g. managerial entrenchment, managerial myopia and managerial overconfidence) is expected to have some significant variations in developing countries compared to prevailing in developed countries, particularly in the Iranian stock market the economic sanctions. Furthermore, due to the direct impact of individuals' psychological and behavioral characteristics on their decisions and the effect of companies' risk-taking on increasing and decreasing shareholders and companies' wealth, this research is essential. Given the function of designed behavioral criteria for assessing risk-taking behaviors, the relationship between managerial attributes and firms' risk-taking is still unclear and investigated in this study.

The authors study the relationship between CEO overconfidence and litigation risk by examining employee-level lawsuit data. The purpose of this paper is to better understand the executive characteristics that potentially affect the likelihood of employee litigations.

The authors employ a unique data set of employee lawsuits from the National Labor Relations Board – “Disposition of Unfair Labor Practice Charges” – which includes complaints, litigations and decisions. The data spans the years 2000–2014. The authors employ the option-based CEO overconfidence metric of Malmendier et al. (2011) as the primary explanatory variable.

The authors find that overconfident CEOs are less likely to be subjected to labor-related litigations. The authors document that firms with overconfident CEOs have fewer lawsuits opened by both labor unions and individuals. The authors then investigate the effect of employee litigations on firm performance to understand why overconfident CEOs are less prominent among lawsuits. The authors show that litigations lower corporate investment and value of capital expenditures for responsible firms, which may limit overconfident CEOs’ ability to invest. Therefore, the results may reveal the fact that overconfident CEOs may prefer to align with the interest of their employees to avoid reduced investment opportunities.

The paper makes three main contributions. First, it provides the first large-sample evidence on CEO overconfidence and labor relations. The authors employ data on firm-level labor litigation that contains both the case reason and case outcome. Second, this paper adds to the growing literature of CEO overconfidence and governance practices in the workplace. Finally, the study highlights the importance of employee treatment and explores the impact of labor lawsuits on firm value.

This study aims to explain the cognitive bias of overconfidence and portray the different ways in which overconfident top managers may affect firm outcomes. This paper outlines their opportunities and risks and how these managers are surrounded by contextual factors.

This study draws on a systematic overview of the current literature on senior executives' overconfidence and empirical studies investigating its impact on strategic outcomes.

This study identifies the opportunities and risks of overconfident top managers in firms and considers the contextual factors that influence firm outcomes. The results provide three important managerial implications for interactions with overly confident top managers.

These findings help us understand top managers' overconfidence. Organizations receive guidance on how to constrain inappropriately confident top managers who are detrimental to their businesses.

This study contributes to a better understanding of overconfidence among top managers, illustrates associated opportunities and risks and provides recommendations for controlling and dealing with top managers characterized by this cognitive bias.