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With the growing concern of various sectors of society regarding environmental issues and the promotion of sustainable development, green technology innovation is generally considered to be conducive to the long-term development of enterprises. However, because of the existence of agency problems, managers may have shortsighted behaviors. Then how will managers' shortsighted behaviors affect enterprises' green technology innovation?

This paper uses machine learning-based text analysis methods to construct a manager myopia index based on the data from A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2015 to 2020. We examine the impact of manager myopia on green technology innovation in companies.

Our study finds that manager myopia significantly inhibits green technology innovation in companies. However, when multiple large shareholders coexist and the proportion of institutional investors' holdings is high, it can alleviate the inhibitory effect of manager myopia on green innovation. Heterogeneity tests show that the impact of manager myopia on green technology innovation is relatively significant in non-state-owned and manufacturing companies, as well as in the electricity industry. Robustness tests demonstrate that our conclusions remain valid after using propensity score matching to eliminate endogeneity problems.

From the perspective of corporate governance, this paper incorporates managers' shortsightedness, multiple large shareholders and institutional investors' shareholding ratios into the same logical framework, analyzes their internal mechanisms, helps improve corporate governance, enhances green innovation capabilities and has strong implications for the implementation of national innovation-driven development strategies and the achievement of “carbon peak” and “carbon neutrality” targets.

Green transition is a long-term direction of corporate development that can achieve sustainable corporate development. This study aims to investigate whether state ownership promotes corporate green transition by mitigating managerial myopia and the impact of environmental regulations, internal controls and ownership on this pathway.

Using data from 2,608 Chinese listed companies for 2010–2019, the authors investigate the relationship between state ownership, managerial myopia and corporate green transition by using fixed-effects and moderated mediation models.

State ownership can boost green transitions and alleviate managerial myopia. Managerial myopia mediates the relationship between state ownership and corporate green transition. Furthermore, environmental regulations, internal controls and ownership moderate the mediating effects of managerial myopia.

The authors construct a multidimensional green transition index to examine the influence of state ownership on corporate green transition behavior and reveal the underlying mechanism by which state ownership promotes green transition by “mitigating managerial myopia.” This study enriches the literature on state ownership, management myopia and green transition and provides important evidence for the promotion of mixed ownership reforms.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of temporal myopia (focussing on the short-term) and spatial myopia (focussing on the current market) on firm strategy. Specifically the paper investigates the effects of temporal and spatial myopia on the persistence and conformity of firm strategy. Additionally, the paper tests how environmental munificence moderates these effects. A secondary purpose of this paper is to develop a replicable method of measurement of temporal and spatial myopia.

The authors conducted a manual content analysis of letters to shareholders for 100 firms over three years to measure spatial and temporal myopia. After collecting strategy variables and control variables from Compustat, the authors utilize a random-effects panel methodology.

The results indicate that strategy is influenced by both temporal and spatial myopia. Specifically, temporal myopia creates a focus on the firm's current strategy, leading to a persistent strategy over time and spatial myopia focusses firm decision makers on better known technologies and competitors, leading to conformity to industry strategic profiles. Additionally, the paper tests how environmental munificence influences these relationships. In total, the paper finds that the differing types of managerial myopia have distinct influences on firm outcomes.

This paper makes two important contributions to the literature on managerial myopia. First, the paper investigates the differential effects of both spatial and temporal myopia on firm strategy, topics that have been relatively overlooked in empirical investigations of decision making. Second, the paper develops replicable measures for both temporal and spatial myopia, which have been previously suggested to limit the ability to empirically test the implications of managerial myopia (Laverty, 1996).

Exploiting a novel measure of hostile takeover exposure primarily based on the staggered adoption of state legislations, we explore a crucial, albeit largely overlooked, aspect of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In particular, we investigate CSR inequality, which is the inequality across different CSR categories. Higher inequality suggests a less balanced, more lopsided, CSR policy.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, we perform several robustness checks including propensity score matching, entropy balancing and an instrumental-variable analysis.

Our results show that more takeover exposure exacerbates CSR inequality. Specifically, a rise in takeover vulnerability by one standard deviation results in an increase in CSR inequality by 4.53–5.40%. The findings support the managerial myopia hypothesis, where myopic managers promote some CSR activities that are useful to them in the short run more than others, leading to higher CSR inequality.

Our study is the first to exploit a unique measure of takeover vulnerability to investigate the impact of takeover threats on CSR inequality, which is an important aspect of CSR that is largely overlooked in the literature. We aptly fill this void in the literature.

This study proposes a novel measure for management’s horizon (short-termism or myopia vs long-termism or hyperopia) derived from easily obtainable firm-level accounting and stock market performance data. The authors use the measure to explore the impact of managements’ horizon on firms’ investment efficiency.

The authors rely on two commonly used but uncorrelated measures of management performance: accounting performance (return on capital employed, ROCE) and stock market performance (average abnormal return, AAR). The authors combine these measures to develop a multidimensional framework for performance, which classifies firms into four groups: efficient (high accounting and high market performance), poor (low accounting and low market performance), myopic (high accounting and low market performance) and hyperopic (low accounting and high market performance). The authors validate this framework and deploy it to explore the relationship between horizon and firms’ investment efficiency.

In validation tests, the authors show that management myopia (hyperopia) explains firms’ decision to cut (grow) research and development investments. Further, as expected, myopic (hyperopic) firms are associated with significantly more (less) accrual and real earnings management. The empirical tests on the link between horizon and investment efficiency suggest that myopic managers cut new investments while their hyperopic counterparts grow the same. Ultimately, the authors find that myopia (hyperopia) exacerbates(mitigates) the over-investment of free cash flow problem.

The authors introduce a framework for assessing management’s horizon using easily obtainable measures of performance. The framework explains inconsistencies in prior empirical research using different measures of performance (accounting versus market). The authors demonstrate its utility by showing that the measure explains decisions around research and development investment, earnings management and firm investments.

We study the events that motivate CEOs to underinvest in R&D long-term projects (CEO myopia). Based on the existing literature in earnings management and agency theory, myopia is likely to become more problematic under five circumstances: when the CEO nears retirement (the CEO horizon problem), R&D projects have very long time horizons (the project horizon problem), the firm’s financial health is deteriorating (the cover-up problem), ownership structure is heavily weighted toward insider owners (minority owner oppression problem), and when the threat of hostile takeover increases (the entrenchment problem). We setup a dynamic simulation model in which rational CEOs maximize the total value of their bonus compensation over their tenure. Our findings related to the five circumstances are consistent with the extant literature. However, we found an unexpected stable, nonlinear (inverted U-shaped) relationship between CEO tenure and R&D investment. We discuss the theoretical implications of our model and offer suggestions for future research.

This study investigates the relationship between management's psychological characteristics (managers' narcissism, overconfidence and managers' myopia) and earnings management in the pre-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and post-ISIS eras.

A multivariate regression model was used to test the hypotheses. The research hypotheses were tested using a sample of all companies listed on the Iraqi Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2020.

Findings indicate a positive and significant relationship between managers' narcissism, overconfidence and myopia with accrual and real earnings management. According to the results, the ISIS weakens the relationship between managers' narcissism, managers' overconfidence and managers' myopia with accrual and real earnings management.

Because no study has addressed this issue in Iraq so far, the results of this research can provide helpful information for its users and improve the knowledge and science in this area.

The purpose of this paper is to explore how a number of processes joined to create the microlevel strategies and procedures that resulted in the most lethal and tragic forest fire in Portugal's history, recalled as the EN236-1 road tragedy in the fire of Pedrógão Grande.

Using an inductive theory development approach, the authors consider how the urgency and scale of perceived danger coupled with failures of system-wide communication led fire teams to improvise repeatedly.

The paper shows how structure collapse led teams to use only local information prompting acts of improvisational myopia, in the particular shape of corrosive myopia, and how a form of incidental improvisation led to catastrophic results.

The research offers insights into the dangers of improvisation arising from corrosive myopia, identifying ways to minimize them with the development of improvisation practices that allow for the creation of new patterns of action. The implications for managing surprise through improvisation extend to risk contexts beyond wildfires.

The paper stands out for showing the impact of improvisational myopia, especially in its corrosive form, which stands in stark contrast to the central role of attention to the local context highlighted in previous research on improvisation. At the same time, by exploring the effects of incidental improvisation, it also departs from the agentic conception of improvisation widely discussed in the improvisation literature.

Exploiting an innovative measure of corporate culture based on machine learning and earnings conference calls, this study aims to investigate how corporate culture is influenced by hostile takeover threats. To sidestep endogeneity, this study uses a unique measure of takeover vulnerability principally based on the staggered implementation of state legislations, which are plausibly exogenous.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, this study also executes a variety of other empirical tests such as propensity score matching, entropy balancing and an instrumental variable analysis, to demonstrate that the results are robust. The final sample includes 27,663 firm-year observations from 4,092 distinct companies from 2001 to 2014.

This study documents that more takeover exposure weakens corporate culture considerably, consistent with the managerial myopia hypothesis. Threatened by the takeover risk, managers tend to behave myopically and are less likely to make long-term investments that promote strong corporate culture in the long run. Additional analysis focusing on a culture of innovation, which is especially vulnerable to managerial myopia, produces similar evidence.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to explore the effect of takeover susceptibility on corporate culture using a distinctive metric of corporate culture based on textual analysis.

Exploiting two novel measures of takeover vulnerability and asset redeployability, this paper aims to investigate the effect of the takeover market on redeployable assets. Redeployable assets are those with alternative uses. Asset redeployability is a crucial concept in the literature on investment irreversibility.

In addition to the standard regression analysis, the authors execute several robustness checks: propensity score matching, entropy balancing, instrumental-variable analysis and generalized method of moment dynamic panel data analysis.

The authors’ results reveal that more takeover threats reduce asset redeployability significantly, corroborating the managerial myopia hypothesis. Hostile takeover threats reduce managers’ job security and thus induce them to myopically focus on the current utilization of assets in the short run, rather than how they may be deployed in the long run, resulting in less asset redeployability.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to investigate the effect of takeover threats on asset redeployability. Because the authors’ measure of takeover vulnerability is principally based on the staggered passage of state legislations, which are plausibly exogenous, the authors’ results likely reflect causality, rather than merely an association.