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The purpose of this paper is to explain how a multi-market firm develops the motivation to forbear from competition.

A two-way fixed effects model with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors investigates the research question with panel data collected from the US scheduled passenger airline industry.

The results demonstrate that although the interaction of multi-market contact with strategic similarity impairs a firm’s forbearance from competition, the same interaction promotes it as firm performance deteriorates, supporting the hypotheses.

Performance explains not only how forbearance emerges out of coincidental multi-market contact but also reconciles the mixed evidence for the impact of the two-way interaction between multi-market contact and strategic similarity on forbearance.

Antitrust authorities should pay more attention to low performing firms than to high performing firms in their investigations. Also, managers of multi-market firms should identify multi-market rivals with low performance as targets for the initiation of forbearance.

This study revises the mutual forbearance theory to align it with the accumulating empirical evidence that otherwise refutes its assumption and thereby improves theory’s descriptive and predictive power.

Selection and training of expatriates emphasizes the importance of respecting and adapting to local cultural norms. However, even when motivated to modify their behavior, expatriates tend to act in ways which transgress host country cultural norms. While such transgressions can harm working relationships between expatriate manager and host country nationals (HCNs), this is not an inevitable outcome. The purpose of this paper is to apply the social psychological construct of forbearance to create a model which considers how transgression severity, responsibility attributions made by the HCN, empathy, and expatriate manager reputation influence HCN forbearance in the face of culturally inappropriate leadership behaviors.

This is a conceptual paper, which proposes forbearance as a process which can reduce dysfunctional outcomes on working relationships resulting from culturally inappropriate behaviors by expatriate managers.

The author argues that differences between expatriate and host country implicit leadership theories influence HCN attributions for culturally inappropriate leadership behaviors. These attributions, together with expatriate reputation, HCN empathy, and the severity of the cultural transgression, will determine the extent to which HCNs are likely to exercise forbearance.

The paper suggests several important lines of research into the initial establishment of an effective working relationship between expatriate and HCN. Suggestions for further elaboration and testing of the model are also provided.

The model points to important processes (e.g. establishing incoming expatriate’s reputation, managing attributions, and facilitating empathy) which have the potential to reduce difficulties early in the assignment.

Much research into expatriate adjustment focuses on the expatriate. This paper adopts the perspective of the HCN, providing a framework for better understanding perceptual and attributional processes influencing the relationship.

This study develops a multi-period structural model to value bank subordinated debt (subdebt) under different regulatory policies. The model provides a complete framework for analyzing how various factors, such as credit and interest rate risks, bank characteristics, and regulatory policies, affect subdebt prices and yield spreads. It finds that the implementation of Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) will raise subdebt prices and lower subdebt spreads, while capital forbearance will have the opposite effects. Also, subdebt spreads are less sensitive to bank risk when PCA is imposed than when capital forbearance occurs. The results of the paper suggest that enhancing market discipline through giving subdebt investors more rights to force timely reorganization of weak banks will reduce the subdebt spreads required by investors.

The new Basel Accord (known as Basel II) attempts to introduce more risk-sensitive capital requirements. We propose a multiperiod deposit insurance pricing model that incorporates specific regulatory capital requirements and the possibility of capital forbearance and moral hazard. We estimate the cost of deposit insurance under alternative regulation regimes based on the building block approach of the 1988 Basel Accord (known as Basel I) and internal model-based (IMB) capital regulation. In contrast to the building block of Basel I, Basel II's IMB capital regulation links more closely the capital requirement to a bank's actual risk. We develop a multiperiod pricing model while incorporating the effects of capital forbearance and moral hazard. The fairly-priced premium rates are computed by assuming that a bank's asset value follows a GARCH process. In contrast to previous studies based on the building block capital standard, we find that forbearance and the potential moral hazard behavior will not increase the cost of deposit insurance in the scheme of Basel II's IMB capital regulation.

This paper describes how firm characteristics evolve in different industries. In particular, it reports on relationships between industry performance and competitor diversity in the American economy from 1981 to 1997. Industry performance is measured using a prospective measure of performance (Tobin's q) and a measure of performance that reflects historical competence (accounting profitability). Competitor diversity is characterized by differences in size, operating margin, asset composition, and asset utilization. The results indicate significant diversity among competitors in both high- and low-performance industries. The study suggests that low industry performance may be associated with processes of transition in competitor characteristics.

This chapter examines three kinds of relational bonds (trust-based commitments, forbearance-based commitments, and apprehension-based commitments) on which parties rely in the processes employed in negotiating, committing, and executing their cooperative inter-organizational relationships (CIORs). It also considers three different societal contexts with strong, moderately strong, and weak exogenous governance safeguards in which these relational bonds are employed. The authors propose a process theory of relational bonds that fit different contexts. Specifically, our central proposition is that parties to CIORs are more likely to achieve their goals when they rely on relational bonds that fit their societal contexts in which they engage in economic exchanges.

The paper's aim is to build a model that predicts the optimum tactics for capitalizing on inventions within the context of competitive interaction among large firms. For patenting, the paper seeks to show how invention value and firm rivalry drive the tactics of competing, deterring competitors, retreating from markets, and cooperating. It also aims to explore the effects of the contingencies of patent bulking, technology complexity, spheres of influence, resource similarity, and complementary‐resource tacitness.

The work is conceptual.

The base model shows that patenting can be used to protect markets where there is high invention‐value and high rivalry. When both invention‐value and rivalry are low, the best tactic is to cooperate. When value is high and rivalry low, patenting can be used as a signaling and deterring mechanism, but when value is low and rivalry is high the best option is to let patents lapse and retreat from markets. The moderating effects of patent bulking, technology complexity, spheres of influence, resource similarity, and complementary‐resource tacitness affect rivalry and the amount of patenting that will be done.

The paper provides propositions for empirical testing that are predictive of firm performance, rivalry, and patent bulking. Despite the authors' attention to key contingencies, it is impossible to be completely comprehensive in addressing all contingencies.

The framework provides tactics for competing and, consequently, maximizing income and minimizing costs.

The work synthesizes extant thinking on patents and multipoint competition. While the base model should be valuable for managers, the overall work should be valuable for academics.

Using a two bank, two-period game-theoretic model, this chapter shows that contingent purchase and assumption policy under which the choice of acquirer for a failed bank is contingent on the surviving banks’ risk-taking behavior is generally most effective in reducing moral hazard problems, particularly for countries with low levels of competition and high regulatory barriers. Moreover, we find that to minimize the probability of future bank failures, the choice of acquiring bank should be based not only on the short-term goal of resolving the insolvencies of financial institutions, but also on the long-term effects of ex ante risk-taking incentives.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how firms with multimarket contacts in both product and geographic markets make foreign direct investments (FDI) location choices and to advance the understanding about how managers with cognitive limits cope with opportunities to take the advantage of mutual forbearance in two types of markets.

Drawing upon the literatures on multimarket contact and decision making, the authors develop original hypotheses on how multimarket contacts in two types of markets influence firms’ choice of destination for foreign investments. The authors test the hypotheses using longitudinal archival data on foreign market entries of Japanese auto parts makers.

The authors find that when choosing FDI locations, firms reduce the cognitive burdens of coping with multimarket contacts in the two types of markets by focussing exclusively on what is perceived as relevant to the decision at hand. The authors also find that this propensity is particularly significant for large firms, whereas small firms use different decision rules and avoid entering markets with the greater degree of multimarket contact with prior entrants, whether in product or national market.

Although heuristics simplify competitive environments and reduce managers’ cognitive burdens, such a cost-saving orientation could increase the risk associated with international entry that may end in severe counterattacks from prior entrants, wasteful foreign investments, and substantial entry failures.

This study contributes to the literature by adopting multimarket contact theory to foreign market entry, jointly analyzing two types of multimarket contacts, testing three alternative hypotheses about how boundedly rational managers cope with multimarket contacts in two markets, and demonstrating that managers focus on multimarket contacts only in one type of markets when making entry decisions.

The academic literature has examined why bank runs happen based on the work of 2022 Nobel Prize-winning economists Diamond and Dybvig. They have found the source of banking/financial crisis in terms of mismatch between liabilities (deposits being short term and savers wanting to short-term access to their money) and assets (long term and illiquid). The Lakshmi Vilas Bank (LVB) crisis intensified when it came under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). This situation provides the opportunity to study whether the elements embodied in the theoretical models like Diamond and Dybvig hold true for LVB crisis. This study aims to examine the reasons for the demise of LVB in India using DuPont financial model, peer group analysis and time series structural break in crucial financial parameters.

The study examines the reason for insolvency of LVB using financial ratios, financial models (DuPont), financial distress model (Z-score) and asset-liability management. The study also adopts univariate structural break models using quarterly financial data covering the key financial measures used in the RBI’s PCA framework.

LVB crisis is like Diamond–Dybvig model, in the sense, savers requiring short-term access to their money (liquidity for their deposits) on the information of high non-performing assets, which further deteriorates the illiquid nature of loan portfolio (assets) of banks. The study finds its profit margin (net interest margin and non-interest margin) and managerial efficiency had started deteriorating since 2018. The study finds that LVB’s main weakness lies in its limited credit appraisal ability, its monitoring and weak internal controls. Lending to sensitive sectors (like real estate, capital markets and commodities) and exposure to large business groups also contributed to its weakness. The study also finds huge, elevated asset-liability mismatch, especially in the short-term maturity buckets. Using univariate econometric time series model, the study also confirms financial weakness being evident much earlier than the time when resolution was undertaken by the RBI through PCA.

The study has implications for analysing and monitoring financial distress of banks. The study also has implications for devising banking regulation and supervision.

The study brings in a perspective of the banking regulations using the application of PCA framework on a listed private sector bank. The authors combine an accounting ratio model and combine risk measures that could identify the incipient risks in a bank. The authors believe this will help in refinement of banking regulations and better monitoring mechanisms.