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The anti-money laundering (AML) frameworks of many countries were generally influenced by the international best practices of money laundering that were first established in 1988 through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS). The general belief is that these international best practices are applicable in all jurisdictions, although most countries are still affected by money laundering. The international best practices are universal measures that were developed as a yardstick to control and curb money laundering globally. Nonetheless, international best practices for money laundering are not tailor-made for specific jurisdictions and/or countries. Therefore, it remains the duty of respective jurisdictions and/or countries to develop their own context-sensitive AML measures in accordance with international best practices. An overview of the AML international best practices that were developed and adopted by several countries are analysed in this paper. These include customer due diligence measures established by the BCBS, the financial action task force (FATF) standards, as well as the ongoing monitoring and the risk-sensitive approach that were implemented to curb money laundering globally.

The article analyses the AML international best practices that were developed and adopted by several countries. These include customer due diligence measures established by the BCBS, the FATF standards, as well as the ongoing monitoring and the risk-sensitive approach that were implemented to curb money laundering globally.

It is hoped that policymakers and other relevant persons will use the recommendations provided in the paper to enhance the curbing of money laundering in financial institutions globally.

The paper does not provide empirical research.

The study is useful to all policymakers, lawyers, law students and regulatory bodies globally.

The study seeks to curb money laundering in the economy and society globally.

The study is original research on the use of AML/counter financing of terrorism international best practices to curb money laundering activities globally.

The purpose of this study is to examine the South African banks’ customer due diligence (CDD) practices in the fintech era to mitigate money laundering (ML) risks and ensure financial stability. Financial technologies have brought substantial transformations to the financial services sector. However, such technologies have exposed the sector to emerging risks that threaten the integrity and stability of the financial system globally. Before any bank–customer relationship is established, proper customer background checks must be conducted. These background checks enable financial institutions to validate information provided and ensure customers are properly risk profiled. Failure to risk profile customers could result in financial institutions being used as conduits for ML. Undoubtedly, CDD procedures are pivotal to overall anti-money laundering efforts and curbing financing terrorism in a regulatory framework.

A qualitative research approach was adopted to address the research questions of the study. Given the confidentiality associated with the financial services sector, data triangulation was used in blending mainly secondary and primary data sources. Secondary data sources used in the study were published reports available in the public domain that were corroborated with subject matter experts’ interviews.

Based on the findings of this study, it is concluded that in South Africa, technological solutions have been incorporated into CDD functions, which is now risk-based (enhanced due diligence). Also, legally, South Africa has incorporated the biometrics, integration with Department of Home Affairs and Companies and Intellectual Property Commission databases, customer consent to third-party sources with the Financial Intelligence Centre Act and the Protection of Personal Information Act.

The shift towards digital banking in South Africa results in increased data and dynamic risk profiling. This study advocates a policy shift requiring a risk-based approach to mitigating emerging ML risks (in particular digital laundering), especially in the wake of South Africa’s recent greylisting by the Financial Action Task Force.

In the aftermath of the 2021 Financial Action Task Force Mutual Evaluation Report, legislators, supervisory bodies, law enforcement and the like are focusing on preventing South Africa from being greylisted. This paper performs an analysis of the 2021 South African Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Mutual Evaluation, specifically Recommendation 8 and Immediate Outcome 10. The purpose of this paper is to address the concerns raised and assist those tasked with implementing remediation measures.

Secondary sources such as legislation, case law, textbooks and peer-reviewed publications are used in addressing the concerns. A major focus is placed on the evaluation itself, with an analysis of Recommendation 8 and Immediate Outcome 10.

Despite the non-compliance rating and a low level of effectiveness received regarding non-profit organisations, authorities might not place a large focus on remediating this, as more pertinent issues arise in the report. The lack of focus in this area adds to the likelihood of grey listing by FATF. However, with co-operation from the relevant stakeholders, these low ratings can be improved.

Since the Mutual Evaluation’s release in October 2021 there have not been any papers addressing the highlighted issues in the non-profit sector in South Africa, to the best of the authors’ knowledge. This paper will be the first of its kind and will be of use to authorities as regards mitigating the concerns raised by FATF.

This study aims to identify European positioning on the use of remote customer onboarding solutions in combating financial crime.

This study is a desktop research that examines European Banking Authority (EBA) policy statements relating to the use of innovative solutions in combating financial crime.

Technological advancements in biometric data and software tools provide a unique opportunity to address potential paper customer onboarding process deficiencies. Electronic remote customer onboarding solutions equip credit, financial institutions and investment firms with an alternative FTE cost-saving solution, in their pursuit of revenue generation. Whilst the EBA and Financial Action Task Force have provided approval for the utilisation of innovative solutions and AML technologies in combatting financial crime. Hesitancy remains on the ability of credit and financial institutions to use technological solutions as a “magic solution” in preventing the materialisation of money laundering/terrorist financing related risks. Analysis of policy suggests a gravitation towards the increased use of the aforementioned technologies in the interim.

Capitalisation of European banking authority.

Illegal wildlife trade (IWT) is a transnational organized crime that generates billions in criminal proceeds each year. Yet, it is not regarded by many countries as a serious crime. There is also no general consensus on its recognition as a predicate offence for money laundering. In this regard, banks are misused in different ways to facilitate financial flows linked to IWT. This paper aims to illustrate the importance of the banking sector in combating money laundering relating to IWT. It also aims to demonstrate the need for a general recognition of IWT as a predicate offence for money laundering.

This study investigates the implementation of money laundering controls by banks in the illegal-wildlife-trade context. As background to this investigation, it provides an overview of IWT, which is followed by an exploration of some of the general characteristics of the banking sector, before discussing the relevant Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations.

This study finds that the banking sector is well-placed to combat money laundering relating to the IWT and is, by virtue of its international nature and strong focus on compliance, able to be effective in preventing the use of the proceeds of IWT as well as in identifying broader trafficking networks. Moreover, the banking sector is well-equipped to develop appropriate platforms to facilitate the swift, easy and effective sharing of financial intelligence between banks at the local, regional and especially international level.

This study draws on publicly available information on financial flows relating to IWT. Little data and research are available on the financial flows and consequently the money laundering techniques used in cases suspected of IWT.

There has been little scholarly research on the relationship between money laundering and the IWT as well as the financial flows of IWT in general. This study highlights some of the money laundering techniques used in relation to IWT by drawing on the works of various international organizations, including the FATF.

This paper aims to critically examine the digital transformation of anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) in light of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) San Jose principles, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) principles for artificial intelligence (AI) and the proposed European Union (EU) Artificial Intelligence Act. The authors argue that AI tools can revolutionize AML/CFT and asset recovery, but there is a need to strike a balance between optimizing AML efficiency and safeguarding fundamental rights.

This paper draws on reports, legislation, legal scholarships and other open-source data on the digital transformation of AML/CFT, particularly the deployment of AI in this context.

A new regulatory framework with robust safeguards is necessary to mitigate the risks associated with the use of new technologies in the AML context.

This study is one of the first to examine the use of AI in the AML/CFT context in light of the FATF San Jose principles, the OECD AI principles and the proposed EU AI Act.

This paper explores the historical aspects of customer due diligence and related anti-money laundering measures in South Africa. Customer due diligence measures are usually employed to ensure that financial institutions know their customers well by assessing them against the possible risks they might pose such as fraud, money laundering, Ponzi schemes and terrorist financing. Accordingly, customer due diligence measures enable banks and other financial institutions to assess their customers before they conclude any transactions with them. Customer due diligence measures that are utilised in South Africa include identification and verification of customer identity, keeping records of transactions concluded between customers and financial institutions, ongoing monitoring of customer account activities, reporting unusual and suspicious transactions and risk assessment programmes. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (FICA) as amended by the Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act 1 of 2017 (Amendment Act) is the primary statute that provides for the adoption and use of customer due diligence measures to detect and combat money laundering in South Africa. Prior to the enactment of the FICA, several other statutes were enacted in a bid to prohibit money laundering in South Africa. Against this background, the article provides a historical overview analysis of these statutes to, inter alia, explore their adequacy and examine whether they consistently complied with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations on the regulation of money laundering.

The paper provides an overview analysis of the historical aspects of the regulation and use of customer due diligence to combat money laundering in South Africa. In this regard, a qualitative research method as well as the doctrinal research method are used.

It is hoped that policymakers and other relevant persons will adopt the recommendations provided in the paper to enhance the curbing of money laundering in South Africa.

The paper does not provide empirical research.

The paper is useful to all policymakers, lawyers, law students and regulatory bodies, especially, in South Africa.

The paper advocates for the use of customer due diligence measures to curb money laundering in the South African financial markets and financial institutions.

The paper is original research on the South African anti-money laundering regime and the use of customer due diligence measures to curb money laundering in South Africa.

The aim of the present study is to shed light on the role of legal practitioners, namely, lawyers and notaries, in the fight against money laundering: Are they considered as facilitators or obstacles against money laundering? How does the global and the EU legal framework deal with the legal professionals?

The research follows a deductive approach attempting to respond to questions such as: How do the lawyers’ and notaries’ societies react in front of the anti-money laundering measures that concern them and why? What are the discrepancies between the lawyers’ professional secrecy and the obligations that EU anti-money laundering legislation assigns them?

This study disclosures the response of the European union and international legal and regulatory framework as well as the reflexes of the international and European legal professionals’ associations to this danger. It also demonstrates the reaction of lawyers against European union anti-money laundering legislation, to the point that it limits not only the confidentiality principle but also the position of the European judicial systems to the contradiction between this principle and the lawyers’ obligation to report their suspicions to the authorities.

To fulfil the study goals, it was necessary to overcome some obstacles, like the limitation of existing sources. Indeed, transnational empirical research considering the professionals who facilitate money laundering is narrow. Besides, policymakers and academics only recently expressed more interest in money laundering and its facilitators.

This paper fulfils an identified need to study the legal professionals’ role not only in money laundering practices but also in anti-money laundering policies.

In 2019, FIU-the Netherlands celebrated its 25th anniversary. This study takes the occasion to reflect on the role of the FIU in financial surveillance and to describe its core practices of collecting, analysing and disseminating financial intelligence.

Because FIU practices are often secret and its transaction data classified as state secrets, the FIU’s daily operational activities remain obscure. Drawing on interviews, public reports and an online training course, this study encircles secrecy and offers a fine-grained analysis of the FIU's core activities.

The article finds that the FIU plays a pivotal role in financial surveillance because it can operate at various intersections. An FIU operates at the intersection of finance and security, in between the public and private sector and at the national and international domain. This pivotal role makes the FIU indispensable in the surveillance of payment systems and spending behavior.

The article poses that the desirability and effectiveness of financial surveillance has to date not received sufficient consideration, while it affects (the privacy of) anyone with a bank account. The article asks: is it ethically justifiable that transaction information is declared suspect, investigated, and shared nationally and internationally, without the individual or entity concerned officially being notified and legally named a suspect?

This case-study is not only relevant for the study of finance/security, AML/CFT and financial surveillance, but also to policy makers and the broader public who merit an understanding of how their financial behaviour is being surveilled.

This study aims to examine the role of Australian casinos in facilitating money laundering and Chinese capital flight.

The reports and transcripts of evidence from government inquiries into money laundering in Australian casinos are integrated with analyses of Asian transnational crime.

Money laundering in Australian casinos is linked to transnational crime and Chinese capital flight. A central finding is that junket operators play a key role in facilitating money laundering. The casinos are particularly exposed to criminal influences in the Chinese very important person gambling market, since they have used junket operators and underground banks, many of whom are closely linked to major Chinese criminal groups from Hong Kong and Macau.

Very little information is available on money laundering in Australian casinos and this research has relied on the government inquiries that have been conducted over the past two years on the subject.

The author’s focus on money laundering in Australian casinos in the context of Asia-Pacific transnational crime is important for Federal and state government regulators grappling with the rapidly changing money laundering issues. The government inquiries recognised that the money laundering was related to transnational crime, but did not have the time and resources to explore the topic. The paper provides state government casino regulators and financial crime regulators with a broader international perspective to anticipate future money laundering and crime pressures facing Australia’s casinos.

Money laundering in Australian casinos has had devastating social implications on the community. My research helps to focus attention on the problems of transnational crime and money laundering.

Little research has examined the linkages between casinos and transnational crime. This study has found that Australian casinos were used to launder the proceeds of illegal drug trafficking and to facilitate Chinese capital flight. While casinos have been forced by damming government inquiries to tighten anti-money laundering controls, it is likely that there will be pressure to relax these controls in the future because of competitive pressure from other casinos in the Asia-Pacific region.