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The economic and financial crisis, especially the sovereign debt crisis, discovered many deficiencies and weaknesses in the banking sector in the European Union (EU). The need for special surveillance and supervision of cross-border banking cooperation and termination of the toxic link between sovereign debt and banking sector have accelerated the process of forming and establishing a Banking Union (BU). An integrated financial framework has been established in which the European Central Bank (ECB) through the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) has a key role and the responsibility for the overall supervision of the banking sector of the euro zone. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and schemes of the Single Deposit Guarantee Mechanism (SDGM) are under the national supervisory authorities while the European Banking Authority (EBA) is responsible for developing the Single Rules. From the new architecture is expected the preservation of the single market and a common currency, breaking “toxic connections” between sovereign debt and banks, mitigation and removal of financial instability and economic growth. The research shows that the BU together with the ECB in a certain sense, also contributes to the normalization of credit and financial conditions in the single mark. Estimates through SSM, conducted by the ECB and the EBA, during, 2014 and 2015 on 107 banks in 21 countries indicate progress toward solvency and resilience of the banking system of the euro area. Despite some initial success the entire project BU seems to have missed on opportunities, resulted in late reactions, and was too complex to be feasible. The political will of national governments to give up sovereignty over its banking sector and transfer competencies to the supranational institutions is a key factor in the success or failure of a BU. It seems so but past experience indicates that there is no political willingness to solve problems. Mainly most of the government avoids cleaning a hidden “skeleton in closets” due to lack of means for recapitalization while some are trying for loans from the ECB to help their banks. The ECB plays a key oversight role at the EU level and has too much power, which can cause risks caused by conflicting goals. The ECB is losing the role of the final refuge of liquidity, which is the main disadvantage of a BU. The SSM is susceptible to criticism due to difficulty in operation because of slow incorporation of European legislation into national law. Slow implementation carries risks of fragmentation of the market, regardless of the responsibility of the ECB. The financial capacity of the temporary agreement with the SRM is insufficient in solving the crisis of more banks while procedural application is complex and time-consuming. Planned backstop with a centralized resource is a resolution that is insufficient for solving the failure of big systemic banks, which are too big to bail. The heterogeneity of the existing Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGS) and the banking systems of the member states of the euro zone caused controversy in terms of setting of common insurance schemes. The procedures for the recovery and resolution of critical banks are problematic.

This study aims to analyze the impact of cooperation between banking supervisory entities on maintaining financial stability, using Single Supervisory Mechanism evolution and performance as instance. Then banking supervisory cooperation and financial stability in Egypt are reviewed.

The qualitative method is used to study and analyze the practices that contributed to financial instability and raised the need for supervisory cooperation. Descriptive qualitative method is used to study the interrelations between supervisory authorities on various levels and its impact on financial stability.

Findings show that maintaining financial stability through strong, consistent complete or semi unified supervisory framework faces challenges. Providing cooperation between different supervisory authorities, effective information sharing, gained experience in the long run contributes to financial stability.

The originality of this research paper arises from the fact that it encompasses the academic aspect through interpreting the developments that occurred to the cooperation in banking supervision in relation to the financial instability times in the Eurozone that led to the establishment of Single Supervisory mechanism, and the challenges it faced. The supervisory cooperation in Egypt is studied as well at international, regional levels and its role in contributing to financial stability. To the best of the authors' knowledge this is the first study that studies the banking supervisory cooperation between Egyptian supervisory authorities and other international and regional authorities.

The purpose of this paper by the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee (ESFRC) is to provide an account of the financial crisis in Europe during the period 2010-2013 and an analysis of how the relevant authorities reacted to the crisis.

These actions included measures taken by central banks, governments or fiscal authorities, and by regulatory or supervisory bodies. In a previous study covering the regulatory developments during the financial crisis up until 2009, issues such as the implementation of Basel III rules in Europe and the (mostly ad hoc and unilateral) resolution mechanisms set in most European countries to fight the crisis were covered. This study focuses on developments since 2010 with a focus on the concerns and actions that emerged with the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. In particular, the transition from the European Financial Stability Facility to the European Stability Mechanism is assessed. The focus after 2012 has progressively turned to the challenges of the European banking union.

These issues are jointly covered, along with some updates on the views of the ESFRC on recent advances in other areas, such as solvency regulation. All in all, the authors find that the weaknesses of the global financial system remain to be addressed, and they believe that the banking union is one of the main tools and opportunities for an improved and efficient crisis management in Europe.

The paper aims at contributing to the study of financial regulation after the banking crisis. The experience of the euro zone in this context is assessed in this article from a wide range of perspectives.

This study aims to identify European positioning on the use of remote customer onboarding solutions in combating financial crime.

This study is a desktop research that examines European Banking Authority (EBA) policy statements relating to the use of innovative solutions in combating financial crime.

Technological advancements in biometric data and software tools provide a unique opportunity to address potential paper customer onboarding process deficiencies. Electronic remote customer onboarding solutions equip credit, financial institutions and investment firms with an alternative FTE cost-saving solution, in their pursuit of revenue generation. Whilst the EBA and Financial Action Task Force have provided approval for the utilisation of innovative solutions and AML technologies in combatting financial crime. Hesitancy remains on the ability of credit and financial institutions to use technological solutions as a “magic solution” in preventing the materialisation of money laundering/terrorist financing related risks. Analysis of policy suggests a gravitation towards the increased use of the aforementioned technologies in the interim.

Capitalisation of European banking authority.

Product intervention power is introduced under the markets in financial instruments regulation (MiFIR) and packaged retail and insurance-based investment products (PRIIPs) Regulation for all EU Member States and gives National Competent Authorities (NCAs), European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and European Banking Authority (EBA) powers to monitor financial products (and services) under their supervision and to “temporarily” prohibit or restrict the marketing, distribution, or sale of certain financial instruments, or to intervene in relation to certain financial activities or practice. This extends the supervisory measures defined in MiFID II to any PRIIPs (including insurance-based investment products “IBI products”) that would not otherwise fall under the scope of MiFID II. Product intervention power is given to the NCAs, and in order to use power, it requires to take the specifics of the individual case into account and a series of conditions, criteria, and factors to fulfill. Moreover, ESMA and the EBA have a type of control function and ability to override national regulators on product. The aim of product intervention powers is to ensure strengthening of investor protection, but given the potential significant impact of this power, calls into question of possibility to delay innovation and slow down product developments on the capital market.

This paper provided an overview of supervisory measures on product intervention, that is, scope of the product intervention power, criteria, factors, and risks which have to be taken into consideration when using this regulator’s tool.

This chapter analyzes the rules and institutions that have characterized the European Monetary Union (EMU) during its prolonged crisis, stressing the limits of the strategy pursued by the European authorities. It also examines the issues of current account imbalances, economic growth and the problem of debt, and their interconnections. The main purpose of this chapter is to indicate feasible economic solutions and political arrangements in order to complete the institutional system of the EMU. This requires appropriate reforms of its institutional architecture. But such reforms demand changes in the treaties in order to make the Eurosystem more consistent and endowed of democratic legitimacy, so to have appropriate tools, resources and policies that can contribute to the stability, cohesion and development of the Eurozone.

The purpose of this paper is to report and review the legislative and regulatory responses to the global financial crisis (GFC) from within the United Kingdom (UK).

The paper observes aspects of the effect of the GFC within the UK, using economic statistics and institutional case studies. It summarises the laws that the European Union (EU) and the UK have produced in the wake of the crisis and recommends approaches to be taken from this point.

The regulators are putting in place a comprehensive, integrated framework, much of which is sensible in its content. However, this structure will be insufficient to re-establish the effective operation of the financial sector, unless firms comply with the rules and a “relationship culture” is developed.

It is not yet clear how the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) will perform and coordinate.

The paper presents a comprehensive review of relevant EU and UK legislation, thereby bringing readers up to date with the situation in the UK.

This paper aims to examine the relationship between regulation, market discipline and banking distress.

To address the empirical question put forward above, a multivariate logit model is applied to an international sample of 586 banks from 21 European countries in the period between 2000 and 2012. To give robustness to the results, different variables have been used to test the role played by market discipline and regulation as well as an alternative methodology known as duration/survival analysis.

It can be found that market discipline is a good indicator in signalling banking distress, that is, market discipline has penalized more banks with a higher likelihood of being in distress. Nonetheless, as broadly acknowledged, market discipline was not sufficient per se to avoid banking distress in Europe. With regard to regulation, this paper evidences that the adoption of other regulatory measures beyond the simple transposition of changes occurred in the EU Directives such as borrower-based measures and limits on pre-emptive exposures’ concentration, have contributed toward reducing the probability of distress of EU banks, showing that the introduction of this kind of measures was necessary and relevant. In addition, in this paper, it can be found that the NPL ratio, size, capital (including the well-known regulatory capital ratio, as well as the novel leverage ratio which discards the risk weights present in the former one) and liquidity are good indicators of banking distress which lead us to conclude that the new regulatory framework known as Basel III is on the right path to mitigate the probability that a new banking crisis similar to the last one takes place again.

The first limitation regards the period of time chosen, that is, from 2000 to 2012, empirically neglecting, to some extent the important regulatory changes occurred after the aforementioned period. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the Data and Methodology section, the period ends in 2012 because it is difficult to flag a reasonable number of banks’ bailouts afterwards, to properly run the type of model used in this paper. The second limitation is the fact that the possible changes in the risk management and risk assessment by institutions and in the behaviour of investors, acknowledge as weak and inappropriate before the on-set of the global financial crisis, albeit very relevant, are not in the scope of this paper.

Despite the welcomed changes performed by regulators so far, some aspects are not complete yet and new areas deserve more empirical work and attention by the regulators and supervisors. Some of them stem directly from the results obtained from this paper such as the enhancement and a close monitoring of the current Pillar 3 framework the increase of the adoption of more targeted tools, in a more preemptive way, to counter the build-up of risks and the implementation of the leverage ratio.

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the identification of leading indicators signalling emerging risks to the banking system has become a major priority to central banks and supervisory authorities. As a consequence, several studies have formulated the aim of analysing predictive characteristics of a set of macroeconomic variables, such as GDP Growth, Credit-to-GDP, Inflation, M2-to-GDP, among others. Other studies take a different perspective and complement the analysis with bank-specific risk indicators. Nonetheless the aforementioned studies do not consider the relationship between regulation and market discipline and banking distress. This is the gap the authors wanted to fill, and this assessment is the main contribution of this paper.

The purpose is to analyse how the policy approach to the immediate problems in the European financial sector has long-term effects on implicit protection of banks' creditors and, thereby, on risk-taking incentives.

The near term issues in European banking are discussed within a framework for long-term reform along the lines proposed for a European banking union.

The author advocates conducting a thorough stress test with potential consequences for unsecured creditors of banks proven to be insolvent. Losses may have to be imposed on these creditors, following the example of recent cases in Cyprus and in The Netherlands.

There is widespread consensus among international policy makers that the European banking system is seriously undercapitalized. Unlike the USA, Europe failed to recapitalize its biggest banks following the financial crisis of 2007-2009. It is now urgent to start recognizing losses on balance sheets to avoid a proliferation of Japanese-style zombie banks in Europe.