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To gauge the extent to which the global financial system is anti‐money laundering (AML)/countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) prepared by analysing and comparing the AML/CFT systems of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) members with countries belonging to regional AML organisations.

Mutual evaluation data of 16 FATF members and 21 non‐FATF countries is analysed and compared using Kruskal‐Wallis and paired‐t tests to determine similarities and differences across the two groups of countries.

AML/CFT systems of FATF members and non‐FATF countries are poor. The lack of compliance with global AML/CFT standards leaves so many holes in these countries' regulatory, financial, and legal systems that money laundering with or without any relationship to the financing of terrorism, would be relatively easy to achieve.

In using an analytical approach it has been necessary to put numerical values on compliance levels used by the FATF. Given that these are very broad, substituting a single value for each compliance level will provide only a crude measure of compliance for comparisons to be made. The results should therefore be used as a guide to the ranking and compliance of countries rather than some exact measurement of compliance.

There will need to be follow‐up visits to this round of mutual evaluations to evaluate country responses to their poor assessments.

Publication of mutual evaluations by the FATF and a number of regional bodies has enabled a comparison of AML/CFT systems from countries around the world. Lack of data has not enabled this to be done before.

This paper aims to examine the extent to which the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40+9 Recommendations have been implemented by developing countries from the Asia‐Pacific region and the issues pertaining to these countries.

The paper uses the compliance ratings from published reports of assessments/mutual evaluations for these countries between 2004 and 2010 and makes comparisons with the ratings for FATF countries for that period.

These developing countries have demonstrated positive developments in addressing anti‐money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) requirements and having their level of compliance evaluated through the rigorous process of assessment/mutual evaluation. Nonetheless, the general level of compliance is quite limited, not least when compared with FATF countries. This may be due to complexities of the FATF 40+9 Recommendations, challenges in prioritizing AML/CFT development amidst other national priorities and general limited capacity in these countries. An appreciation of the challenges faced by these countries is essential in the formulation and implementation of AML/CFT measures for these countries.

This paper considers implementation of international standards for AML/CFT from the perspective of developing countries, which is an important contribution given the needs and peculiarities of these countries.

This study aims to examine the effect of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) compliance on the degree of financial inclusion (FI) across 174 economies during the period from 2011 to 2021, including developed and developing countries.

This paper uses panel dynamic threshold regression to examine whether there is a threshold effect that exists in FATF compliance.

The findings show that FATF regulations enhance financial inclusiveness all over the world, but at the same time, FATF regulations regarding AML/CFT implications impose a high cost on financial institutions above the threshold of FATF compliance.

This study’s findings indicate that nations should undertake deliberate struggle to reduce the prevalence of money laundering (ML) and terrorism financing by putting in place effective FATF regulatory frameworks to support FI.

This study’s findings indicate that nations should undertake deliberate struggle to reduce the prevalence of ML and terrorism financing by putting in place effective FATF regulatory frameworks to support FI. Regulators must, however, guarantee that the process is cost-effective and efficient.

The legal profession is vulnerable to abuse for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing. According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), that vulnerability justified updated global recommendations that urge countries to require lawyers, notaries and other independent legal professionals – including sole practitioners, partners and employed professionals within law firms – to identify, assess and manage the money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with their services and to ensure that they have appropriate mechanisms in place to provide risk assessment information to competent authorities. Those recommendations proved contentious, with concerns raised by both legal academics and legal professional bodies about the implications of certain aspects of the requirements for the principle of lawyer–client confidentiality. Despite those concerns, many countries have introduced or amended regulatory regimes to extend their application to the legal sector to comply with the FATF’s standards. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate surrounding the extension of AML/CTF obligations to the legal profession.

This paper considers three jurisdictions – the UK, Israel and Australia – at different stages in their journey towards compliance with the FATF’s anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorist financing (CTF) standards for the legal profession. While the UK has a long-established and well-embedded AML regulatory framework for legal professionals, Australia remains non-compliant with the FATF standards. Israel occupies a position between these two ends of the spectrum: following criticism of the omission of lawyers from its AML/CTF regime, Israel implemented due diligence rules for the profession. In 2018, Israel was found to be partially compliant with the relevant FATF recommendations.

It argues that although there are challenges involved, there are also important benefits. Therefore, Australia should act to implement its proposed changes sooner rather than later. Its persistent failure to appropriately address globally recognised areas of vulnerability leaves Australia open to integrity abuse. In addition, if the government delays addressing this issue until pressure from the FATF (such as deadlines for compliance and, if necessary, a finding of non-compliance) forces it to comply, this may tarnish Australia’s reputation, threaten its access to international financial markets and adversely affect the legitimacy and effectiveness of its AML/CTF regime.

Originality in this context refers to the distinctiveness and uniqueness of a paper’s content and approach. In this case, the originality lies in the fact that there is no other existing paper that addresses the topic of three common-law jurisdictions at various stages of their progression towards aligning with the FATF AML/CTF standards, specifically within the context of the legal profession. Furthermore, the timeliness of this paper is underscored by the fact that multiple jurisdictions are currently deliberating their positions on the focus of this paper. This adds to its originality and relevance, as it addresses a gap in the literature while also contributing to the ongoing discourse surrounding compliance with FATF’s standards.

This study aims to focus on the legal status of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) regulatory spread in spite of its limited membership in international law. This is conducted by examining the regime of the FATF with the normative regime of public international law and trying to identify common grounds and conflicts between the two.

This study adopted an exploratory approach involving a thorough examination and analysis of accredited text, command papers and reports, archival materials, national obligations, websites as well as other documentary evidence.

This research gives an empirical determinant of compliance behaviour in response to FATF regulatory standards and the interplay of international law.

The findings here are not exhaustive and could be approached from other perspectives. Researchers are therefore encouraged to engage by testing the findings further, as this is only a blueprint for further research.

This study provides implications for the need to open up the current membership of the FATF, as it appears discriminatory in nature and could inhibit effective compliance with its regulatory standards.

FATF regulatory standards do not just revolve around its members and rule-takers but also affect unintended and vulnerable people who were never in contemplation when these regulations were debated without a global consensus.

The main aim of this study is to advocate for a rethink of FATF’s regulatory strategy by ensuring that its operations are more inclusive, where jurisdictions can participate as members, creating a sense of belonging and commitment in the fight against money laundering.

The purpose of this study is to determine whether income tax evasion also constitutes money laundering if Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations are strictly applied, including cases where an offender evades tax on lawful income.

Apply FATF conditions for money laundering to the tax evasion facts in United States v. Walter Anderson. In this case, the USA alleges that Anderson attempted to evade $200m of taxes on lawful income.

Anderson’s tax evasion actions met all the FATF’s conditions for money laundering. FATF Recommendations imply that tax evasion, even on lawful income, is a form of money laundering. Tax evasion produces criminal tax savings and simultaneously launders those criminal proceeds.

The FATF effectively classified all tax evasion as money laundering when it designated tax evasion among predicate offenses thereto. The FATF stopped short of explicitly stating this result. The FATF should seriously consider taking the next step: formally recognize tax evasion as one form of money laundering, and thus codify a single crime that covers both offenses. A single-crime approach may be unfamiliar to prosecutors, but it could enable a more effective multiagency approach to fighting financial crime. It could simplify prosecution, eliminate overlapping statutes and reduce concerns over double jeopardy.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first tax case analysis to indicate that tax evasion completely incorporates money laundering within the FATF framework.

This study aims to explore the perception of the compliance officers of the Pakistani financial sector towards the placement of Pakistan on the grey list by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).

To achieve this objective, the study adopted a qualitative methodology and conducted semi-structured interviews with different financial institutes and their regulators.

The study found that role of the FATF is lopsided and politically motivated towards Pakistan. Although Pakistan has loopholes like many other countries, its treatment in the FATF is irregular. Therefore, the decision of the greylisting is not purely based on technical compliance, but political preferences are the determinative aspect.

This study provides a holistic overview of the FATF greylisting mechanism and how Pakistan is treated. This might provide both the FATF and Pakistan to revisit their policies.

In the aftermath of the 2021 Financial Action Task Force Mutual Evaluation Report, legislators, supervisory bodies, law enforcement and the like are focusing on preventing South Africa from being greylisted. This paper performs an analysis of the 2021 South African Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Mutual Evaluation, specifically Recommendation 8 and Immediate Outcome 10. The purpose of this paper is to address the concerns raised and assist those tasked with implementing remediation measures.

Secondary sources such as legislation, case law, textbooks and peer-reviewed publications are used in addressing the concerns. A major focus is placed on the evaluation itself, with an analysis of Recommendation 8 and Immediate Outcome 10.

Despite the non-compliance rating and a low level of effectiveness received regarding non-profit organisations, authorities might not place a large focus on remediating this, as more pertinent issues arise in the report. The lack of focus in this area adds to the likelihood of grey listing by FATF. However, with co-operation from the relevant stakeholders, these low ratings can be improved.

Since the Mutual Evaluation’s release in October 2021 there have not been any papers addressing the highlighted issues in the non-profit sector in South Africa, to the best of the authors’ knowledge. This paper will be the first of its kind and will be of use to authorities as regards mitigating the concerns raised by FATF.

To critically examine two significant developments for the regulation and supervision of virtual assets and virtual assets services providers: the amendment of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation No 15 in October 2018 and the adoption of an Interpretative Note in June 2019. We argue that new FATF standards constitute an appropriate response to money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with virtual assets, but that they must be followed by firm, consistent and effective implementation at the national level.

This paper draws on reports, legislation, legal scholarship and other open source data in order to examine the new FATF standards on virtual assets.

The amendment of the FATF Recommendation No 15 in October 2018 and the adoption of an Interpretative Note in June 2019 have been necessary and opportune to forge a global approach to mitigate money laundering risks associated with crypto-assets. The new FATF standards on crypto-asset activities need to be implemented firmly, effectively and consistency to reduce the risk of jurisdiction-shopping by money launderers and terrorism financiers.

This is one of the first studies examining two important and recent FATF initiatives, the amendment of the FATF Recommendation No 15 in October 2018 and the adoption of an Interpretative Note in June 2019.

This study aims to define how countries can implement a risk-based approach (RBA) for non-profit organisations (NPOs) by measuring how well certain countries have complied with the Financial Action Task Force’s (FATF) “Recommendation 8, criterion 1” (recommendation [8.1]).

This study combines a comparative analysis methodology with a descriptive analytical approach to compare three member countries of FATF and FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs). It uses secondary data sources, namely, FATF guidelines on the subject and FATF reports on mutual evaluation reports.

This study examines the variations in compliance with the FATF recommendation (8.1) among three countries recently assessed by the FATF: the UK, Bahrain and the Russian Federation. Although the UK has completely fulfilled these recommendations, Bahrain and Russia have largely fulfilled them. These variations in compliance are mainly attributed to the uneven level of preparedness in the countries’ commitment to the legislative requirements before the process of mutual evaluation.

This paper offers insight into the progress of legislation and mechanisms (technical compliance) in the three countries with respect to recommendation (8.1). This paper also discusses the evolution of implementing and adopting the RBA among NPOs. This paper concludes with suggestions to other countries in developing a plan that meets the FATF recommendations by considering key factors such as comprehensive assessment of threats to NPOs, periodic reassessment and sharing of success stories.