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This introductory essay historicizes the evolution of China’s geopolitical strategy from the Maoist era (1949–1976) to the present. It examines the Chinese strategic thinking in four spatial settings: Eurasia, maritime Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent and the wider Indo-Pacific region. The Chinese strategic concerns are comparable across these regions, but the ability to pursue security interests is contingent on many circumstantial factors. This study refers to some snapshots of the ongoing regional disputes to discuss the continuities and breakpoints in China’s strategic outreach in a multipolar world.

This study draws on the scholarly literature and policy papers to examine the interrelated forces that shape China’s rise to regional dominance: how Beijing has co-opted a series of global and regional crises for its rise to domination; how China, the USA and neighbouring countries have adjusted and adapted to a new changing international order; and how major powers in littoral and maritime Asia respond to an increasingly assertive Chinese state.

This study documents the combination of smart, soft and sharp power that China has deployed, since the global financial crisis of 2008, to enforce its dominance against the USA across the Pacific Rim and Eurasia. It argues that General Secretary of the Chinese Communist PartyXi Jinping initially launched the Belt and Road Initiative to respond to former US President Barak Obama’s policy of rebalancing Asia, and he has expanded these expansionary projects to counter US President Donald Trump’s “America First” doctrine, thereby asserting Chinese influence abroad and tightening control against discontented populations at home.

Many Western policy analysts are wondering whether a rising China will be a “status quo” state or a revisionist state that attempts to challenge the existing world order. The lack of clarification from Beijing has prompted Washington to shift from a longstanding strategy of diplomatic engagement to that of geostrategic containment to balance against China.

The strategic goals of China in the early 21st century pertain to security reassurance, access to energy resources and national image building. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, China has become immensely confident of its own socio-economic accomplishments and scornful of what it perceives as an American conspiracy to undermine its rise to power. Following in the footsteps of the USA in the post-Second World War era, Japan in the 1980s and Taiwan in the 1990s, Beijing has used international commercial activities and business contracts to achieve specific political, strategic and diplomatic objectives.

International tourists traveling the eastern Adriatic are sometimes perplexed when some guides describe a Venetian bell tower, a Byzantine church, or Roman ruins as solely Croatian or Slovenian cultural heritage. If the same guides would then reveal that Marco Polo should be spelled Marko Polo for his Croatian origins, their perplexities would probably grow stronger. Most of the time, the same tourists are unaware that the Austrian Navy kept the codes and the tradition of the Serenissima Republic of Venice. Actually, until the Empire split in 1867, it was named Österreich-Venizianische Marine (Austro-Venetian Navy). Interestingly, according to the legend, the Austrian Admiral von Tegheltoff (German speaking subject of the Empire, born in the Alpine town of Maribor-Marburg, currently in Slovenia) after the famous victory in the battle of Lissa in 1866 hailed “Viva San Marco!” The Austrian victory against the fleet of the Kingdom of Italy was surprising and it has become a legendary one both in a good and bad sense. Accordingly, it has been later romanticized in different ways and strategically imbued with moral values by diverse actors. For instance, the journal of Admiral Wilhelm von Tegheltoff reports the famous sentence: “Iron men with wooden ships defeated wooden men with iron ships.” So, Tegheltoff stressed the virtues of the imperial subjects vis-à-vis the lack of moral strength of the opponents. As a matter of fact, the kingdom of Italy's fleet was stronger in numbers and technologically more advanced, but less organized and riddled with conflicts among the admirals. Quite differently, hundred years later, one of the most prominent journalists and writers from the Italian region of Veneto, Guido Piovene, said that: “the battle of Lissa has been the last great victory of the Venetian fleet.” The reason for such statement is that the mariners boarded in the Austro-Venetian fleet were all from former Venetian lands, such as Veneto, Istria and Dalmatia. Therefore, from this standpoint, the battle of Lissa is a matter of an “Italian” dispute between different maritime traditions, namely the Adriatic one of Venice and the antagonist Genoese or Neapolitan. Conversely, in Croatia and Slovenia, there is usually a different version of the story. The battle of Lissa is seen as a victory of a Croatian-Slavic navy over the Italians. Particularly, the battle of Vis (Lissa) is usually referred to as part of Croatian national history and it is a crucial step to legitimize the Croatian identity on the Adriatic Sea, because many of the sailors were ethnically Croats.

U.S. military facilities abroad are key sites around which foreign citizens and U.S. officers negotiate questions of sovereignty with a particular intensity. Between 1999 and 2009, Manta, Ecuador, was home to one of the most strategic U.S. Air Force “forward operating locations” (or FOLs) in the Western hemisphere. While rejected by most Ecuadorian legal scholars, anti-FOL activists, and the current Ecuadorian administration as a violation of national sovereignty, the facility was widely embraced by residents of the city itself, who actively rejected this characterization of “violation” by arguing that the FOL was, on the contrary, a strategic means of bolstering their “municipal sovereignty.” Drawing on 14 months of ethnographic research on and around the FOL in 2006–2007, this chapter tracks the efforts of Manta residents, U.S. military personnel, and anti-base activists to both circumscribe and expand the various registers in which they articulated their understandings of “sovereignty.”