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Early termination of public–private partnerships (PPPs) in China is caused by various risk factors, resulting in significant losses. This study aimed to clarify the key factors and identify the causal relationships among these factors.

Social network analysis (SNA) was used to analyze 37 risk factors that were summarized from 97 early terminated PPP cases and to identify the relationships among these key risk factors. Interpretive structural modeling (ISM) was conducted to explore the causal relationships. Data were collected from case documents, questionnaires and interviews.

A total of 17 key risk factors were identified and distributed in a hierarchical structure with six tiers. Among these key risk factors, the root causes affecting the early termination of PPP projects were government oversight in decision-making, local government transition, policy and law changes and force majeure. The direct cause was insufficient returns. Furthermore, local government and private sector defaults were essential mediating factors. Local government transition and the low willingness of the private sector were highlighted as potential key risks.

The cases and experts were all from China, and outcomes in other countries or cultures may differ from those of this study. Therefore, further studies are required.

This research provides knowledge regarding the key risk factors leading to the early termination of PPP projects and guidance on avoiding these factors and blocking the factors' transmission in the project lifecycle.

This study contributes to the knowledge of risk management by emphasizing the importance of local government transition, the low willingness of the private sector and project cooperation and operation, whose significance is ignored in the existing literature. The proposed ISM clarifies the role of risk factors in causing early termination and explains their transmission patterns.

This paper shows a new methodology for evaluating the value and sensitivity of autocall knock-in type equity-linked securities. While the existing evaluation methods, Monte Carlo simulation and finite difference method, have limitations in underestimating the knock-in effect, which is one of the important characteristics of this type, this paper presents a precise joint probability formula for multiple autocall chances and knock-in events. Based on this, the calculation results obtained by utilizing numerical and Monte Carlo integration are presented and compared with those of existing models. The results of the proposed model show notable improvements in terms of accuracy and calculation time.

The purpose of this paper is to understand women’s experiences, acceptability and outcomes of using the medical termination of pregnancy (MTP). The study is conducted at nine reproductive health and family planning clinics at university hospitals as well as regional and provincial hospitals located in Bangkok and the locations within Thailand.

This is a descriptive research recruiting healthy women with pregnancy up to 63 days since the last menstrual period (LMP) who opted for MTP during 2012–2014.

A total of 443 women who were referred from the reproductive health networks voluntarily participated in the study. Overall, 92.6 percent of participants had a complete abortion. No serious adverse events were found for cases using misoprostol at home or at clinic. More than 98.3 percent of the women felt satisfied or very satisfied with the method. More than 80 percent of participants thought that the side-effects of the method were as expected or less than expected. More than 95 percent of the women recommended having MTP available in Thailand.

The introduction of MTP that uses a mifepristone and misoprostol regimen (Medabon®) in pregnancies up to 63 days, since LMP demonstrates that misoprostol can be safely used by women at home or at clinic. The administration of misoprostol at home reduces the number of hospital visits, which saves time and costs for traveling from home to the facility. In addition, women have more privacy and control over their bodies by self-administering misoprostol. The MTP’s introductory results also show that MTP service provision is well integrated into reproductive health and family planning services. It is useful for stakeholders who would be involved in design and planning of health system services before the MTP is made broadly available throughout the country.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a public–private partnership (PPP) framework for newcomers from developing countries with the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

For this purpose, through the meta-analysis review of literature and applied qualitative content analysis to the international PPP best practices, the authors identified key relevant PPP processes, terminologies and vocabulary that can assist new entrants in establishing their PPP infrastructure.

The outcome was a generic best practice framework for PPP implementation that consisted of five phases which further consisted of groups of functions and sub-groups of functions. These phases are establish the PPP framework, PPP implementation, contract design, bid management and PPP contract management.

This framework is expected to benefit the upper management of local government departments and the federal ministries to understand the full process for local PPPs and to help them make informed decision for what to develop as PPPs and how to develop them.

This systematic approach to the development of PPPs in the UAE is expected to increase the number of PPP tenders, as there will be more awareness on what PPPs stand for, how they balance risks, improve efficiency and effectiveness of projects, improve facilities and services, etc.

This framework is the first to lay the foundations for a standardised PPP practice in the UAE for practitioners.

“Back-to-back” contracts are widely used in the engineering and construction industry and are recently spreading into the telecommunication industry. In back-to-back contracts, the principals require the main contractors to assume majority of the liability in delivering a project and in turn, the main contractors try to allocate most of that liability to their subcontractors. The successful delivery of the projects hinges on how the contracts are drafted and risks are allocated between the parties involved. The purpose of this paper is to undertake a comparative analysis of “back-to-back” subcontracts in the telecommunication and construction industries.

By examining contracting practices and texts from contract documents for the telecommunication and construction industries, this paper reveals how certain aspects of “back-to-back” contracts lose their meaning when seen out of context. Using comparative research method, this paper discusses reasons why the adoption of “back-to-back” contracts should be a matter of degree, based on the business strategy and relevance to the intended transactions rather than on the typical model of “back-to-back” contracts.

Good contracting practices should be such as to enable parties negotiate the contract terms to ensure clarity and common understanding before commencing the project. Construction universally adopts back-to-back even for minor straightforward works, an approach supported by readily available industry model contracts as well as the traditional tender process (design before construction). In telecoms, back-to-back is mainly desired where the subcontractor has a major part of the scope, whereas minor subcontractor scope is considered “leverage commodity” where suppliers are engaged using in-house contract templates, often in a frame contract arrangement, to satisfy corporate strategies for supplier management and pricing.

This paper provides value by presenting an insightful review of the nature of back-to-back contracting practices in the telecommunication and construction industries. The paper outlines advantages, disadvantages and opportunities for improving “back-to-back” contracting practices in the telecommunication and construction industries.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the determinants of the early termination of infrastructure projects implemented under public–private partnerships (PPP), concessions or privately managed divested assets.

Cross-section and duration model estimations were applied to a sample of 2,655 infrastructure projects implemented in Latin America and the Caribbean for the period 1993–2017. Estimation techniques consist of a logistic model and cox proportional hazards model (CPHM) applied to alternative specifications, including diverse causal factors.

Evidence is found that early termination of infrastructure projects is determined by intrinsic and extrinsic factors. Among the intrinsic factors, the main characteristics of projects that increase the likelihood of failure are the size or scale of the project, the sector in which the project is developed (transport and water and sanitation) and being investments in divested assets. Extrinsic factors that showed a negative impact on the risk of early termination are good regulatory quality and domestic macroeconomic stability. Likewise, external real and financial shocks also contribute importantly to explain the likelihood of early termination of infrastructure projects.

The results reveal that particular care must be put in design and supervision of large-scale projects, either in transport or water and sanitation. As well, risks associated with external shocks must be explicitly acknowledged in project design, with appropriate remedies and safeguards. The prevalence of relatively high rates of early termination in projects in divested assets in contrast with PPP suggests the importance of introducing simpler way out mechanisms for concessionaires. Finally, the results show the key importance of institutional factors like regulatory quality in determining project failure on economic performance of infrastructure projects.

In contrast to the previous literature, the analysis shows the decisive role played by financial external factors and institutional factors of Latin American and Caribbean countries in early termination of private participation in infrastructure projects. As well, the finding of a higher likelihood of failure in projects that involve investments in divested assets versus concession or PPP suggests the need of investigate further the tradeoffs regarding the balance that must exist among guarantees offered to investors in infrastructure projects and the need to keep contractual decisions in line with market signals.

Seek to compare the consequences of single‐source versus multiple‐source lending for a borrower who has loans that can be prematurely terminated.

The considered model framework is an option‐theoretic firm value model similar to Merton (1974) but where lenders have the additional right to prematurely terminate the loans. The single lender is a monopolist, while multiple lenders are represented by a continuum without individual impact on the aggregate termination decision.

The model explains that, if the borrower is in financial distress but has positive net present value projects, a single lender has a higher incentive to save the firm and therefore terminates fewer loans than multiple lenders. In the opposite case where the firm is not under financial distress, it is the other way round and multiple lenders terminate fewer loans than a single lender. As a result, equity holders are better off by having a loan from a single‐source under financial distress but multiple‐source lending is advantageous in the absence of financial distress.

To focus on the origin for arising differences from single‐source and multiple‐source lending, consideration is given to the simple case with perfect information and without monitoring and renegotiation. These market imperfections can be incorporated into the model in a straightforward way.

While other models in the literature require market imperfections to explain the relevance of the bank relationship, this paper indicates that even in the absence of market imperfections the lending relationship is fundamental as long as lenders have the right for early terminations.

The few studies on the effects of a sponsorship termination do not consider the effects of different exit options on consumers’ attitudes toward the exiting sponsor. To fill this gap, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of the extent of the exit (gradual vs entire) as well as the timing of the announcement (early vs late) on consumers’ attitudes. Moreover, this research considers the mediating role of the perceived abandonment of the sponsored party.

This research uses an experimental study (n=204). Data were collected among supporters of a German second division soccer team.

The results emphasize that the extent of the exit as well as the timing of the announcement influences consumers’ attitudes. They develop negative attitudes toward the withdrawing sponsor, especially when the sponsor exits entirely instead of gradually and announces the decision late instead of early. Furthermore, the results reveal that the perceived abandonment of the sponsored party mediates the effect of the extent of exit on attitudes.

The results help to formulate several exit options for the withdrawing sponsor that will help to minimize the possible negative effects on their brand. Specifically, the author recommends a gradual exit as well as an early announcement of the decision to prevent negative effects on the sponsor brand.

This study expands the research on the effects of a sponsorship termination on consumers’ attitudes toward the sponsor brand. Specifically, it is the first study that considers several aspects regarding the sponsor management of a sponsorship termination as important determinants of consumers’ attitudes.

The Howard Shuttering Contractors case throws considerable light on the importance which the tribunals attach to warnings before dismissing an employee. In this case the tribunal took great pains to interpret the intention of the parties to the different site agreements, and it came to the conclusion that the agreed procedure was not followed. One other matter, which must be particularly noted by employers, is that where a final warning is required, this final warning must be “a warning”, and not the actual dismissal. So that where, for example, three warnings are to be given, the third must be a “warning”. It is after the employee has misconducted himself thereafter that the employer may dismiss.

Terminations of overfunded pension plans may strengthen a financially‐weak firm. When manager's interests are aligned with shareholder's, either through high levels of stock ownership, or through labor and takeover market discipline at low levels of ownership, termination strengthens the firm and the stock price should react positively. In contrast, managers at middle levels of ownership hold enough stock to be entrenched, but not enough to be aligned with shareholder interests. Terminations may then be for reasons other than strengthening a financially‐weak firm and may not generate a positive stock price reaction. We find that the financial incentives for terminations differ significantly between terminators and nonterminators at high and low levels of managerial ownership, but not at intermediate levels. Our stock return analysis indicates that terminations by high and low ownership firms are consistent with shareholder welfare. Concern has been expressed that terminations of defined benefit pension plans transfer wealth from plan participants to plan sponsors. Plan terminations can have a value‐maximizing motive when the reversions are used as a source of financing, thereby helping firms avoid bankruptcy and liquidation. The empirical evidence (e.g., Alderson and VanDerhei (1992), VanDerhei (1987), and Hsieh, Ferris, and Chen (1990)) showing favorable stock price reactions to terminations by financially‐weak firms are consistent with the value‐maximizing justification for plan terminations. Prior studies (e.g., Agrawal and Mandelker (1987), Kim and Sorensen (1986), Sicherman and Pettway (1987), Hill and Snell (1989), Benston (1985), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Carter and Stover (1991) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991)) have also documented that management's ownership interest in the firm has an important effect on the incentive to maximize firm value. This paper examines the effect of managerial ownership on financial termination. Specifically, we address whether or not financial motivation to terminate plans exists at all levels of managerial ownership. Our results suggest that the terminating firms, when compared to the nonterminating firms, are financially weak at high and low levels of managerial ownership. In contrast, there is no significant difference in financial weakness between the terminators and the nonterminators at the middle ownership levels. Also, stockholders reactions to terminations are higher at high and low levels of managerial ownership.