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We examine a setting in which a vertically integrated provider (VIP) initially has a duty to deal with an independent rival at unregulated upstream and downstream prices. The duty to deal is subsequently terminated which enables the VIP to acquire the independent rival (or the expertise necessary to produce the rival's product) and then serve as a two-product monopolist in the downstream market. We find that the refusal to deal decreases rivalry but increases economic efficiency and is therefore presumptively “pro-competitive.” The paramount policy question concerns whether a refusal to deal that eliminates a rival and monopolizes the downstream market while increasing static efficiency should be considered a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. This analysis also has implications for policies governing the unbundling of next-generation telecommunications networks.

The competition and regulatory economics literature has developed indicators that detect whether a vertically integrated provider (VIP) is engaging in market exclusion in the form of an anticompetitive price squeeze and non-price discrimination leading to sabotage of downstream competitors. Weisman integrates these indicators by developing a safe-harbor range within which a profit-maximizing VIP engages in neither form of market exclusion. Downstream retail competition that depends on the VIP’s inputs imposes upward pricing pressure on the downstream prices, with the amount of such pressure increasing as the downstream products become more homogeneous (closer substitutes). We analyze the implications of upward pricing pressure for antitrust evaluations of a duty to deal, regulatory policies mandating wholesale inputs for entrants, and vertical mergers. We find, for example, no basis to oppose a merger in which the VIP was previously required to supply inputs to rivals at unregulated prices.

This chapter examines the unique regulatory environment that trans-border air carriers work within. Using a U.S. perspective the concept of the bilateral air agreement is outlined and discussed. These agreements form the basis for how two countries decide to share their airspaces among their air carriers. The trend has been toward more liberal approaches. To explain this trend the concepts of the Freedoms of the Air and Open Skies are discussed. Other liberalization programs are also discussed; specifically, co-terminalization and cabotage. Finally, the air cargo transfer operations at Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport are used as an example to highlight a rare example of unilateral liberalization on the part of the United States.

This chapter examines the issues of the low-cost carriers (LCCs) in Japan and their impact on the domestic and international aviation markets. “Genuine” LCCs, such as Peach Aviation and Jetstar Japan, began their operations in 2012 to follow the new movement of low-cost and low-fare airlines, which are different from the “new emerging” airlines, such as Skymark and AIRDO that appeared in the late 1990s. We discuss the recent history of LCCs in Japan, the characteristics of each LCC, the competitiveness of the high-speed railway in the domestic market, the impact of open sky policies, and the contribution of inbound foreign visitors to the international passenger volume increase. As LCCs in Japan have recently begun operations, they can continue to play a significant role in the Japanese aviation market.

This chapter analyzes the technological growth of the modern Russian economy through the prism of evaluating its effectiveness from the position of costs and profits. It also determines the factors of this growth and develops recommendations for managing them in the interests of acceleration of rate and increase of effectiveness of technological growth of the modern Russian economy. While technological growth in Russia shows high effectiveness, the model of technological growth in Russia has its specifics, connected to the unconventional influence of a standard set of the factors on technological growth. The influence of the factor of the number of organizations that implement R&D is insignificant, and the influence of the number of personnel involved with R&D, volume of private expenditures for R&D, and the number of used leading production technologies is negative (reverse). We offer recommendations for increasing the effectiveness of technological growth of the modern Russian economy, which are connected to increase of the volume of state expenditures for R&D (recommended volume – USD 35.09, its growth as compared to 2018 constitutes 191.76%) and increase of the number of developed leading production technologies (recommended number of these technologies – 2350.05, its growth as compared to 2018 constitutes 62.34%).

We all understand the everlasting harmful effects of pollution. A larger proportion of this pollution gets generated from industrial units due to use of backward technologies along with intentional or unintentional economic policies that has allowed such industries to grow over the years. Many of these industries are poor, in many cases, they do not have the ability to install abatement technologies or use emission-free green technologies for their huge cost. In many cases, they do not do so intentionally just to enjoy higher profit and due to faulty planning. But, the pollution generated from such industries makes us all suffer, especially those who live in those industrial areas. They are more exposed to the emission directly. Again, growing consensus among people about pollution has increased the consumption of eco-friendly, less-polluting products which could have a wide-ranging impact on the production techniques and can force the producers to change their production techniques, In this chapter, by applying contingent valuation method (CVM), the authors have looked to capture how far people of two very renowned industrial belts in West Bengal, Howrah and Barrackpore, are willing to contribute to the reduction of such emission level by consuming eco-friendly products and paying the emitting producers to force them to adopt pollution-free technology. The authors have applied close-ended dichotomous choice (DC) bidding technique by using logit regression and have also applied open-ended bidding process by using ordinary least square (OLS) method. In both cases, the authors have found the mean willingness to pay (WTP) is quite high which shows that people are very much willing to move towards using eco-friendly goods and technologies.

The five countries in Central Asia, namely Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, are landlocked and therefore rely critically on aviation for passenger travel and express cargo logistics. However, despite substantial growth in the past decade, the aviation market in the region is still not realizing its full potential. This chapter reviews the development status of the international air travel market from Central Asia, with an aim of identifying the key barriers for industrial development and growth, and possible remedies to address these challenges. Overall, our study suggests that international market growth from the region is significantly influenced by historical patterns and political ties with Russia. Whereas markets linking selected countries such as Turkey and the UAE have experienced substantial growth, further liberalization is needed for the region to achieve better connectivity with major trade partners and aviation markets.

This chapter integrates two separate branches of the law and economics literature to demonstrate the two-sided risk of market exclusion by a vertically integrated firm (VIF) with upstream and downstream market power. The ratio of downstream (retail) to upstream (wholesale) price-cost margins is key. A margin ratio that is “too low” can result in a vertical price squeeze, whereas one that is “too high” can create incentives for the VIF to engage in non-price discrimination or sabotage. A price squeeze occurs when a rival is inefficiently foreclosed because the upstream (input) price is too high relative to the downstream (output) price. Sabotage arises when the VIF raises its rivals' costs which, in turn, raises their prices and diverts demand from the rivals to the VIF. Displacement ratios delineate the range of safe harbor margin ratios within which neither form of market exclusion arises. The admissible range of these margin ratios is decreasing in the degree of product substitutability and reduces to a single ratio in the limit as the competing products approach perfect substitutes. The policy challenge is to apply these pricing constraints judiciously to prevent market exclusion in accordance with a consumer-welfare standard, while recognizing the risk that these protections can be appropriated and used strategically in the errant pursuit of a competitor-welfare standard. These issues may take on greater prominence in light of the recent release of the DOJ/FTC draft vertical merger guidelines.

This study aims to examine whether the introduction of wine or regular strength beer (B) sales in Tennessee grocery stores significantly increased the number of alcoholic beverages (AB) consumed or excise taxes collected in the state.

This study uses both a time series and a model-based approach to assess if a significant change in alcoholic beverage excise tax collections occurred after the natural experiment. The study evaluates monthly tax collections from B, mixed drinks and AB between January 1968 and September 2018 published by the Tennessee Department of Revenue.

The findings suggest that neither alcoholic beverage consumption nor excise taxes collected increased substantially in Tennessee as a result of the introduction of wine and regular strength B in grocery stores. It is likely, however, that some changes inside the industry were significant.

This study assists policymakers and analysts in determining whether allowing the sale of wine and regular strength B in grocery stores will have a substantial impact on the total amount of AB consumed or excise taxes collected by the jurisdiction.

This paper is concerned with the current decision of the European Commission regarding Google’s comparison shopping service (Google Shopping). In 2017, the Commission has fined Google €2.42 billion for abusing its dominant position as a search engine by giving illegal advantage to Google Shopping. Consequently, Google has to stop its illegal conduct. In particular, the decision requires Google to treat rival comparison shopping services and its own service equally. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the decision from a perspective of two-sided markets. Google Shopping is an integrated service of Google Search and acts as an intermediary between companies, offerings products in the internet and people searching for products in the internet. This complies with the typical conditions of a two-sided market. From the perspective of sellers of goods and services in Europe, Google may be seen as a gatekeeper to the potential customers and thus as an essential facility. In the light of the current decision, this paper provides a possible regulation alternative. It is shown that Google Shopping represents a typical club good, so that welfare-optimising rules must be adhered to. In this context, it should be noted that in the current Google Shopping search results, artificial rivalry is created among sellers so as to ensure maximum willingness to pay for a top listing. The solution proposed in this paper entails a summary score list of all sellers of a particular product, for which a turnover-dependent contribution should be required, instead of a reduced score list, where positions are sold by auctions.

This paper uses methods of two-sided markets and public good theory.

It is shown that Google Shopping represents a typical club good, so that welfare-optimising rules must be adhered to. In this context, it should be noted that in the current Google Shopping search results, artificial rivalry is created among sellers so as to ensure maximum willingness to pay for a top listing. The solution proposed in this paper entails a summary score list of all sellers of a particular product, for which a turnover-dependent contribution should be required, instead of a reduced score list, where positions are sold by auctions.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, it is the very first paper about the decision of the European Union (06/2017) concerning Google Shopping.