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This paper aims to consider the effects of a merger on technology adoption and welfare in the presence of passive cross ownership. Merger increases investments in process technology and may increase welfare. The results are important for antitrust policies and suggest that the antitrust authorities may not need to be too concerned about mergers in industries with cross ownership.

Game-theoretic analysis.

Merger increases investments in process technology and may increase welfare.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is original.

To elaborate on the model terms for the effective integration in Russia's special economic zones in the long term.

The statistical method, comparative method and a formalised model of game theory are used in this research.

The research is aimed at determining the model conditions for effective integration in Russia's special economic zones. The proprietary methodology envisages the following stages: establishment of the case experience of the development of Russia's special economic zones and determination of requirements that are set to residents (players) for entrance; comparison of the functioning of players of one of the studied integration structures under the conditions of individual development and the conditions of business integration; description of advantages; development of the practical implications to improve the business strategies of residents (players). The analysis is performed based on the materials of the development of Industrial Production SEZ ‘Alabuga’ (Republic of Tatarstan) and its residents, as well as the evaluation of the system of regulation of the parameters of joining special economic zones of different types. The assessed residents of Industrial Production SEZ ‘Alabuga’ (Republic of Tatarstan) are Trakya Glass Rus and Automotive Glass Alliance Rus (in 2021, the name was changed to Shishejam Automotive Rus), which started functioning within the association in 2017.

The originality and scientific value of this research are due to the description of the specific features and perspective directions of integration in Russia's special economic zones.

Baumol’s impact on the development of managerial theories of the firm is investigated here through the material found in Galbraith’s archives. In 1957, Galbraith published a paper claiming that the impact of macroeconomic policies varies with market structures (competitive versus oligopolistic). That publication prompted Baumol (1958b) to send Galbraith a manuscript dealing extensively with a crucial question of managerial theories of the firm, namely, the trade-off between sales and profits. I argue that Baumol’s critiques and Galbraith’s answers largely explain the way Baumol (1958a, 1959) framed his alternative model of the behavior of corporations. He reasoned in terms of maximization of sales with a profit constraint as their main objective. In return, Business Behavior, Value and Growth fostered the development of Marris’ (1964) and Galbraith’s (1967) theories of the corporation. While Tullock (1978) provides a narrative in which the sales maximization hypothesis has two main branches – Baumol for the one and Galbraith–Marris for the other – the paper demonstrates that these branches are intimately connected.

The purpose of this work is to present the modelling of the conditions of provision of growth of public–private partnership using digital technologies based on the game approach.

The methods of a systemic approach, linear programming and linear correlation, as well as statistical method, are used.

We performed the modelling of the conditions of provision of growth of public–private partnership using digital technologies based on the game approach. We also determined the level of development of public–private partnerships at the level of developed (United States, United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark) and developing countries (Bulgaria, Venezuela and South Africa) and analysed the level of implementing digital technologies within the studied countries. We note a high level of public–private partnership in developed countries and a low level of this indicator in developing countries (except for Bulgaria, which has the positive dynamics of improvement). We also determine the main competitive advantages of implementing digital technologies, which have an impact on the improvement of the state of public–private partnerships at the level of the studied countries. Using the linear method of programming (game approach), we formulate the models of development of this type of interaction, within which the positive experience of developed countries is taken into account.

The originality and value of this research consist in the study of the specifics of the use of the game approach in the modelling of public–private partnership, which is based on the use of digital technologies.

This English translation of Heinrich von Stackelberg’s Marktform und Gleichgewicht will be welcomed by economists working in the field of industrial organisation and beyond. It has been overdue for more than 80 years. This translation will allow matters to be set straight concerning a number of fundamental theoretical issues connected to Stackelberg’s work as well as allow to clarify a number of misunderstandings that go back to the first reviews of Stackelberg’s 1934 classic on competition theory.

To reveal the impact of the development of technology parks and innovative networks on the national digital economies.

The following methods are utilised: the complex method, statistical analysis, comparative method, correlation analysis and linear programming (method of the game approach category).

We reveal the impact of the development of technology parks and innovative networks on the national digital economies. Analysis of the formation of the digital economy includes the assessment of its components (Rank Knowledge, Rank Technology, Rank Future readiness) in the context of the development of the analysed developed countries (Belgium, France, Iceland, Spain and Hong Kong). It is discovered that Hong Kong and Iceland have high indicators of digital technologies implementation. We prove that these results are connected to investments in this sphere made by integration structures, including the sphere of business, sciences and government agents (in the case of Hong Kong). We perform an analysis of the clustering of the given countries and describe the main forms of integration that ensure the innovative development of the economy. Based on the study of analytical and statistical materials, we determine the perspective model of the impact of these integration mechanisms on the state of innovative development of the digital economy, which could be applied to developing countries.

The originality and value of this research are due to the development of a model of the impact of implementing the integration mechanisms on the state of innovative development of the digital economy, which could be used in the case of developing countries.

The purpose of this research is to substantiate the processes of implementing the electronic forms of business integration under the conditions of digital transformation by market players.

The methods used in this research include cooperative game theory, systemic analysis and statistical analysis.

This research presents the substantiation of the processes of implementing the electronic forms of business integration under the conditions of digital transformation by market players. The proprietary methodology of evaluation of the set problems includes three procedures: analysis of the electronic forms of business integration that are used in the digital economy in the world, which envisages their systematisation; evaluation of the effectiveness of implementing the processes of business integration with the use of such forms and their forecast estimation under the condition of individual development of the market environment's players, as well as determination of advantages; and development of the practical implications for managing the electronic forms of business integration for the national companies of developing countries (with forecasting based on the cooperative game theory). The modern electronic forms of business integration include electronic cash (e-cash), electronic data interchange, electronic banking (e-banking), electronic marketing (e-marketing), electronic insurance (e-insurance) and electronic trade (e-trade). Analysis of the effectiveness of implementing the processes of business integration with the use of the electronic forms is performed based on electronic trade, which is used under the conditions of the functioning of digital trade platforms (Internet stores). Such digital trade platforms, as the forms of business strategies, are Amazon and eBay Inc. These two American companies were selected because the United States has the leading position in this sphere. The comparative analysis showed the advantages of participation of players in partnership with the use of electronic trade within two digital platforms, connected to cost saving on advertising and organisation of trade. The practical implications of implementing the electronic forms of business integration for the national companies of developing countries are also presented; they are formed based on the practice of implementing the advantages revealed in the activities of the digital trade platforms Amazon and eBay Inc.

The originality and value of this research are due to the further development of provisions on the specifics of the process of implementing the electronic forms of business integration under the conditions of digital transformation by market players.

Magnet effect entails a hypothesis in market microstructure entailing a systemic likelihood of prices being sucked toward the theoretical threshold. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the existence of magnet effect in Bursa Malaysia via overnight returns.

This study investigates the existence of magnet effect via overnight returns in Bursa Malaysia by utilizing historical daily price data from 1994 to 2017 by probabilistic regression approaches. The authors divide the study period into three distinct regimes based on regulatory limit mechanisms.

Based on demarcated regimes, the authors find evidence of magnet effect in Bursa Malaysia throughout all regimes, with a heightened magnitude detected between 2002 and 2013. Moreover, upper limit scenarios exhibit a greater propensity for magnet effect. The authors end the paper with implications of the findings for portfolio managers, intraday traders, and policymakers.

The research is the first of its kind in attempting to measure the magnet effect in Malaysia via overnight jumps.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an alternative way of calculating the deadweight loss triangle in oligopolistic markets which takes inefficient use of inputs into account. The author shows that the result of the approach coincides with the one that exists in the economics literature. However, the author explicitly accounts for the inefficient use of inputs.

The market supply curve that is extensively used for competitive markets has been reconsidered for the imperfectly competitive markets. The necessary condition for the efficient use of resources is investigated and a price level is derived at which the market output of oligopoly is produced efficiently. The degree of inefficient use of inputs is reported via the definitions of Input Inefficiency Measure (IIM) and the Ratio of Inefficient usage of Inputs to Total Deadweight Loss (RITD).

The author discovers that the area under the supply curve of the competitive market corresponds precisely to the minimum total costs of producing any given market output. To make this important finding operational in imperfectly competitive markets, the IIM reports the degree of distorted input allocation among firms with differentiated cost structures in producing a given equilibrium imperfectly competitive market output. In measuring the monopoly power, it is known that CRn or HHI market concentration indexes, which are calculated based on the market shares of firms regarding the demand side of the market, are widely used. The measures, which take into account of the distortions in input usage, and hence, the supply side may be considered as an additional index. For example, if the market demand were shared equally by two firms (no dominant firm with respect to the demand side), it is known that the leadership would still arise when the costs of firms differed as in the dominant firm model in favor of the lower cost producing firm.

The author recommends some more theoretical research extensions of the approach suggested here to other oligopolistic markets like the Cournot-Nash, the Stackelberg and other models. In all cases, there is a need for additional work to find some measurable variables in practice in order to estimate the input inefficiency given by the two measures and differentiate it from the inefficiency of units of outputs that are not produced.

It may be interesting to decompose the various estimates of welfare losses due to monopoly power as a percentage of GNP that were discussed in the literature into two inefficiency components: units of outputs that are not produced and units of inputs that are misallocated among firms.

The government officials might be interested in assessing the degree of loss of input usage by firms in addition to output loss in oligopolistic markets summarized by the two inefficiency indexes. Law economists may be inspired in discussing the issue of input inefficiency in the context of on antitrust policy.

The author emphasized that the area under the market supply curve minimized the aggregate cost of producing a given total market output in competitive markets. Having recognized the importance of this finding, the author tried to apply it to imperfectly competitive markets and especially to the calculation of deadweight loss in such markets. The author showed that the total social cost could be calculated by including the input inefficiency which can be defined as the extra cost to society arising from not using the most appropriate economic resource allocation among firms in addition to the usual deadweight loss triangle. Moreover, the author had to introduce some more new terms like the market supply curve allocation, the adjusted competitive price, efficiency gain and so on, as they were necessary along the course of the analysis.

Many governments around the world have strategically privatized their ports. The privatized ports try to maximize profits by setting higher charges for port services and attracting transship cargos. This paper shows that such privatization of ports can be complemented by adjusting the number of ports. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is to derive the optimal number of ports in cases in which ports serve transship and domestic cargos.

This paper constructs a theoretical model in which ports compete with each other for transship and domestic cargos. In the first stage, the government determines the number of ports. In the second stage, the ports compete with each other in quantity to maximize profits. The authors have derived the optimal number of ports that maximizes national welfare.

The optimal number of ports is expressed as a function of the slope of the demand curve, the slope of the supply curve, and the share of domestic demand relative to total demand for port services. It is shown that the optimal number of ports tends to increase as the share of domestic cargo increases. The optimal number of ports, n*, is given as n*=1/(1−θ), where θ denotes the share of domestic demand in total demand for port services, when the unit cost of port services is constant.

The analysis in the present paper is confined to the case of unilateral intervention by the government of the domestic country. Analyzing interaction among governments via competition policy would offer valuable policy implications.

The results of the current research offer important implications for Korean port policy in the context of maritime industrial changes, in particular, China’s New Silk Road initiative. In particular, the findings of this study suggest that Korea’s investment in ports should be concentrated on ports with competitive advantages.

Relatively scant attention has been paid to the possibility, or need, of strategic privatization being complemented by governmental competition policy. Filling this knowledge gap, the authors have shown that the government can mitigate the negative effects of privatization on domestic consumer surplus by introducing competition in the supply of port services.