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This paper aims to consider the problem of determining the equilibriums on oligopoly market in case of Stackelberg leader (leaders) and reflexive behavior of market agents.

This paper includes economic and mathematical modeling, optimization methods and game theory.

This paper explains models of reflexive games on oligopoly market, taking into account the diversity of agents’ reasoning about strategies of environing and equilibrium mechanisms for coincidence or opposition of agents’ reflexive reasoning on the same rank of reflection.

This paper considers the oligopoly market with linear function of demand and costs of agents, the rational behavior of agents and the reflexive reasoning on the same rank of reflection. The set of agents’ reasoning about the environing strategies is considered as a set of market states for which the problem of agent’s optimal action choosing solves with the complete awareness.

Identification of reflexive behavior of environing allows agents to increase their market shares and profit.

Oligopoly markets play a leading role in the world oil trade and reflexive behavior affects the market equilibrium.

In the paper, the mechanisms of equilibrium in reflexive games on the linear duopoly market for arbitrary rank reflection are developed.

Uses a conjectural variation approach to derive a general result concerning the equivalence of tariffs and quotas. Shows that, as long as the quota is binding, the equivalence of tariffs and quotas depends exclusively on the domestic firm′s conjectural variations. Specifically, the domestic prices of the goods under the quota are higher than, identical to, or lower than those under the tariff if the domestic firm′s conjectural variation under the quota is larger than, equal to, or smaller than that under the tariff. This conclusion holds for both price‐setting and quantity‐setting duopoly with heterogeneous goods as well as quantity‐setting duopoly with homogeneous goods.

The main objective of this paper is to propose a model that allows the detection of the competitive pattern of the Spanish loans market between 1992 and 1996.

In order to achieve this objective, the paper estimates, following the New Empirical Industrial Organization paradigm, a conjectural variation model for the strategic marketing dimension of price. The model proposed allows the measurement of strategic group‐level rivalry while simultaneously considering demand, costs, and profit specifications for each bank.

The findings evidence a high degree of competition between the firms within the same strategic group. Further, the demand for loans of a firm has a positive (negative) relationship with the rivals' price (own price), with the own branch network (rivals' branch network), and with the economic activity in the regions where firm operates.

The major limitation of this research could become from the necessity to operate with detailed information that the authors try to overcome using proxies of several non‐available variables.

The model proposed herein represents a contribution to previous works and also provides more information about banking competition in the sense that it estimates price competition between firms within three strategic groups.

During the last two decades there have been significant policy changes in the banking system, primarily in the emerging market economies. These changes have impacted the competitive structure of banking. In India, since 1991, gradual reform measures have been initiated to improve efficiency, productivity, competition and stability of the banking sector. There is a requirement for a formal approach to examine level of competition in Indian banking sector after the liberalization. This paper aims to address this issue.

The article applied the conjectural variation method using 2‐stage least square for assessing the degree of competition in the Indian banking system.

The paper finds that competitive condition in the Indian banking sector has been improving 1996. However, big banks with market share more than 1 per cent have been exercising some degree of price mark‐up over their marginal cost.

Due to the paucity of data competition at the regional level is not analysed which is a limitation of the article.

Analysis of competition allows the policy formulators to design proper liberalization measures to ensure greater competition in the banking sector so as to prevent any cartel formation.

Since the Indian banking sector is monopolistically competitive, the article advocates for more liberalization measures to improve competition in the Indian banking sector.

To assess competition the article has covered 53 banks involving more than 90 per cent banking sector assets of the country. Through Lerner Index the article has found that big banks are able to charge a price which is about 30 per cent more than their marginal cost. The conjectural variation method is a monopolistic market structure prevailing in the Indian banking sector.

Low productivity and the prevalence of marketing and demand constraints are all interrelated problems for banana growers in East Africa. The purpose of this paper is to examine how different marketing policies can alter the incomes of banana‐growing households in the Ntungamo district of Uganda.

A partial equilibrium model and a trader profit‐maximisation model are used to analyse changes in banana market equilibrium conditions, marketing costs and market competitiveness.

The results indicate that increasing supply relative to demand reduces grower returns. It appears that reducing market power and lowering middlemen marketing costs may lead to higher grower returns. Policies facilitating lower marketing costs for traders are proposed in conjunction with strategies that promote banana processing.

Drawing on both primary and secondary data, this paper examines how increasing demand and reducing marketing costs impacts on banana‐grower returns. Furthermore, sources of price movements in the Ugandan banana industry are assessed.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical model of price transmission from the farm to the retail sector, allowing not only for an interaction between oligopoly power, oligopsony power and non‐constant returns to scale in industry technology, but also allowing for the market power conduct parameters to vary in response to an industry‐wide exogenous shock. Also, the degree of price transmission under imperfect competition relative to that under perfect competition is evaluated.

Conjectural variations are used to parameterize both seller and buyer market power conduct of the industry and then the equilibrium displacement approach is applied to solve a system of six structural equations which describe the demand for and supply of industry retail output and farm and marketing inputs.

First, it is found that given empirical values of retail output demand elasticity, of farm and marketing inputs supply elasticities, of market power conducts, and of the returns to scale measure, the degree of price transmission under imperfect competition is greater than that under perfect competition. Second, it is found that the relative degree of price transmission under imperfect competition could be greater or smaller under the assumption of a varying market power conduct than one under the alternative assumption of a constant market power conduct, depending on whether market conduct is falling or rising, respectively.

The paper makes two original contributions to the literature. First, it allows for an interaction between oligopoly power, oligopsony power and industry technology. Second, it allows both oligopoly and oligopsony power parameters to vary in response to industry‐wide exogenous shocks.

In recent years, economics has turned its serious attention to the explaining of conflicts and a peaceful resolution of conflicts. Some interesting and powerful microeconomic models have been developed, yet it seems there are gaps that motivate the current research. As our discussion shows below, the existing models are robust in explaining an equilibrium defence spending of a nation in a general equilibrium setting. Yet, there is little that we know about the regional distribution of defence spending that is likely to give rise to serious rent-seeking activities, politicking and consequent economic consequences in terms of regional disparity and inequality. In this work, we posit that defence spending is like a local public good that impacts on a regional, or local, economy. To be more specific, our model suggests that defence spending offers public infrastructure to a regional economy that, in turn, impinges on the costs of production of local firms, which thereby influence the competitive positioning of the regional economy in the national, or global, market. The goal of the work is to explore how the politics of allocation of defence spending can create an equilibrium regional inequality within a nation, which may in turn drive internal conflicts. Since an allocation of defence spending impacts on regional inequality, regional inequality becomes endogenous in our model. We establish an equilibrium inequality in our model that depends on the optimal allocation of defence spending across regions, which is driven by the electoral motive of an incumbent government.

Sets out a version of a standard conjectural‐variations oligopoly model, and investigates the properties of that model with respect to the effects of entry. Shows within this context that entry unambiguously reduces incumbents′ margins and output, while raising industry output. Also shows that higher degrees of collusion in an industry may induce entry at increased levels of output.