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Baumol’s impact on the development of managerial theories of the firm is investigated here through the material found in Galbraith’s archives. In 1957, Galbraith published a paper claiming that the impact of macroeconomic policies varies with market structures (competitive versus oligopolistic). That publication prompted Baumol (1958b) to send Galbraith a manuscript dealing extensively with a crucial question of managerial theories of the firm, namely, the trade-off between sales and profits. I argue that Baumol’s critiques and Galbraith’s answers largely explain the way Baumol (1958a, 1959) framed his alternative model of the behavior of corporations. He reasoned in terms of maximization of sales with a profit constraint as their main objective. In return, Business Behavior, Value and Growth fostered the development of Marris’ (1964) and Galbraith’s (1967) theories of the corporation. While Tullock (1978) provides a narrative in which the sales maximization hypothesis has two main branches – Baumol for the one and Galbraith–Marris for the other – the paper demonstrates that these branches are intimately connected.

The theory of financial management suggests that the objective of the firm is to maximise shareholder wealth. The valuation of the firm is its net operational cash flows discounted at the stock market's average required rate of return. A firm's risk class determines the rate of return required by investors. The operating objective for management is to maximise the difference between operational receipts and operational expenditures plus investment, whilst minimising risk. However, the separation of ownership by shareholders and control by professional managers enables directors to pursue objectives other than maximisation of shareholder wealth. Directors might attempt to maximise sales revenue, maximise growth in assets or employees, maximise value added or even their own well‐being. They may choose to pursue multiple objectives as described in corporate planning systems. Multiple objectives may include social goals as well as goals relating to marketing, production, personnel and finance. It has been suggested that levels of directors' remuneration might be associated with the extent to which directors achieve corporate objectives. Several research projects have tried to identify the major determinants of directors' remuneration. Some of these are summarised below.

The study develops a mathematical model of the firm to derive theoretical foundations for the balanced scorecard concept (BSC). The model is based on several parts which are integrated into a company model. This model includes the demand function, the production function and the objective function of the firm which are depicted by traditional microeconomic concepts. Demand is presented as a function of price and customer relationship management (CRM) costs. Production is assumed to depend on labor, capital, and development and learning (D&L) costs. Simple dynamics is included both in the demand and production function. The strategy of the firm is depicted by the objective function based on profit and net sales. The output variables of the model are classified as the four perspectives of BSC. The effects of the objectives (strategies) on the importance (shadow prices) of the constraints are analysed. It is shown that a change in the objectives may alter the order of their importance. Thus, a change in the strategy should be accompanied with a change in the focus of BSC. Furthermore, non‐financial and financial performance ratios may change in opposite directions, when the strategy is shifted towards revenue maximization. Thus, inconsistencies with the interpretation of cause and effects may emerge, when the strategy is shifted. Numerical examples are presented to demonstrate the results.

The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple microeconomic model of the firm to give theoretical foundations for the balanced scorecard concept (BSC).

The model consists of demand, production, and objective functions integrated into a resource allocation model. Costs, sales volume, and sales revenue grow at constant rates. Strategy is depicted by a weighted objective function of profit and net sales. Output variables are classified according to the four perspectives of BSC.

The effects of the parameters, especially growth and strategy, on the importance of the perspectives and on performance measures, are shown.

Many results are based on assumptions of a constant growth; and of constant demand and production functions. Empirical research is welcome to give evidence on demand and production elasticities, the shifts of strategy, their effects on performance measurement; and tension between profit and revenue maximization.

BSC should be elastic to respond to shifts of strategy towards revenue maximization. When a shift is happened, the focus in BSC should be transferred towards customer relationship management and development and learning; and the time‐series of performance measures should be interpreted cautiously. Even for a constant strategy, the time‐series of non‐financial and financial measures may give a contradicting signal.

This research paper introduces a new growth model of the firm useful in the theoretical analysis of BSC. It can be applied to assess the importance of the four perspectives of BSC, trade‐offs between them, and relationships between non‐financial and financial measures.

The continuing growth in the size and importance of very large joint‐stock companies in the modern economy has prompted a search for new theories of the firm which are more relevant in explaining the behaviour of giant enterprises. For whilst the traditional profit‐maximising theory of the firm derived from neo‐classical economics may be an appropriate generalised approximation of the behaviour of firms operating in competitive markets, the need for broader theories to explain the behaviour of large manager‐controlled, oligopolistic companies has been recognised.

The objective of this research was to assess whether the open‐to‐buy (OTB) system allows retail buyers to attain sales and profit objectives and thus obtain the bonuses available for budget attainment. The research used data from both Australia and New Zealand together with specific information from a major department store. Concludes with a recommendation that the traditional OTB system is in need of a major review and outlines specific recommendations.

Empirical analysis does not yet converge on a unique set of factors which determine CEO compensation within the electric utility industry. There is some evidence, for example, that compensation and firm size are positively related, and that compensation and accounting profitability are either unrelated or negatively related (Carroll & Ciscel, 1982; Hirschey & Pappas, 1981). On the surface, these findings argue against the need for incentive programs within the utility industry since regulation itself assures adequate firm profitability.

Executive compensation equations are estimated separately for three groups of firms, under the contention that the determinants of executive remuneration may depend upon the form of and degree of regulation in an industry. Empirical evidence obtained for three separate years lends support to that notion.

This paper proposes a hegemonic power hypothesis to examine the determinants of CEO compensation by drawing on insights from the field of international relations. It then reports results of an empirical test of this hypothesis. The results indicate a limited support for the hegemonic power hypothesis, indicating the importance of a cross‐disciplinary perspective in studying the determinants of CEO compensation.

Prior research has investigated determinants of CEO compensation. However, that research has been primarily limited to large firms. This study investigates the impact of CEO influence over the board of directors on CEO pay for both large and small firms. Additionally, other determinants of CEO pay for both large and small firms are examined. Results suggest that CEO influence over the board significantly affects CEO pay for large firms. However, we do not find the same evidence for small firms. Firm size is the prinmary factor of CEO pay for small firms. Evidence in this study suggests that CEO pay of large firms is mostly a function of CEO influence over the board, firm size and firm performance.