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Universally, university is considered as the apex body which is ethically obliged to present a substantial society. In doing so, universities often innovate dynamic business models and theories. Ideally, the countries whose universities contribute for better and sustainable business growth are the advanced one. However, universities themselves should be the business organisation – an argument is yet to receive attention. Although literature lacks in the area of education business especially university provision, the sector behaves as business entity after the inception of private sector. Therefore, this paper aims to explore the paradigm transformation of university sector and its impact on the society.

Given the differentiated nature of research questions, multiple techniques are used to collect the data. However, this research adopts the norms of qualitative methods. Both secondary and primary data are used. While secondary data are collected by University Grants Commission (UGC), primary data are collected through interviews.

Findings show that the development of university sector started following monopoly model. More than half a century, the same model was continued. Thereafter, duopoly model was introduced which carried until the inception of private sector. The growth of private sector followed oligopoly model which was further extended to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). These days, society compares university with “diploma mill”, as production of knowledge and civic society is longer than the part of the core business of university. Consequently, compromising with research is to be judged as a threat to overall development that includes business and social development.

A few studies have been published in the area of private university. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, none covers the oligopoly-ism and SME-ism behaviour of university and its impact on the concept of university and on the society. Therefore, this project aims to understand the norms of university business and its substantial contribution on the social change.

This paper aims to consider the problem of determining the equilibriums on oligopoly market in case of Stackelberg leader (leaders) and reflexive behavior of market agents.

This paper includes economic and mathematical modeling, optimization methods and game theory.

This paper explains models of reflexive games on oligopoly market, taking into account the diversity of agents’ reasoning about strategies of environing and equilibrium mechanisms for coincidence or opposition of agents’ reflexive reasoning on the same rank of reflection.

This paper considers the oligopoly market with linear function of demand and costs of agents, the rational behavior of agents and the reflexive reasoning on the same rank of reflection. The set of agents’ reasoning about the environing strategies is considered as a set of market states for which the problem of agent’s optimal action choosing solves with the complete awareness.

Identification of reflexive behavior of environing allows agents to increase their market shares and profit.

Oligopoly markets play a leading role in the world oil trade and reflexive behavior affects the market equilibrium.

In the paper, the mechanisms of equilibrium in reflexive games on the linear duopoly market for arbitrary rank reflection are developed.

The purpose of this study is to analyze comparatively the properties of open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in a dynamic oligopoly model with price dynamics and reflexive behavior of market agents.

To consider dynamic competitive markets, the authors focus on a differential game theory in oligopolistic structures, using analytical models to illustrate how advertising effort, good differentiation and price stickiness interact simultaneously in the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibria. The comparative assessment of these equilibria obtains some significant results.

An optimization model that enriches the continuous time is presented. Under the open-loop and the closed-loop, Nash equilibrium showed an increase in the total output, advertising in price stickiness and promotional efficiency, while there was a decrease in product differentiation and advertising promotional efficiency. However, the open-loop equilibrium levels are larger than the closed-loop equilibrium. Under the closed-loop information, the long-run equilibrium was faster than the opened-loop in a dynamic oligopoly. The graphical illustration was used to present the behavior of the model parameters.

This study helps managers to choose an appropriate price and advertising adjustment to maximize profit. The obtained results may help firms to make the smart decision and may provide managers the valuable tool for making decisions in the competitive market environments.

This is a first attempt to analyze a dynamic oligopoly in the differentiated market environment. It considers a joint action of the output and advertising in shaping the closed-loop and the open-loop equilibria with N competitors in a dynamic competitive setting.

Complaints about lower agricultural farm-gate price and higher consumer price have emerged in China in recent years. The large gap between dairy farm-gate price and consumer price gives rise to worries that China's dairy industry is characterized by strong degree of oligopoly. The purpose of this paper is to take the dairy processing industry as an epitome of China's food industry, and use a new approach to investigate whether it is oligopolistic and/or oligopsonistic.

Based on a new proposed Primal-Dual Solow Residual model, the authors first test the hypothesis that there are significant oligopoly and oligopsony powers in China's dairy sector, and the latter is stronger. The authors then turn to measure these two kinds of market power using regressions of the model.

The estimation results show that firms in the sector have both strong oligopoly and oligopsony power, but the latter is stronger than the former. Meanwhile, with the continuous reinforcement of competition in China's dairy sector, market power in both the upstream and downstream has decreased slightly.

This paper is the first to simultaneously test oligopoly and oligopsony power in China's dairy sector. The empirical results explicitly imply that more attention should be paid to the raw milk purchase market.

As the pharmaceutical industry is one of the key sectors of the health-care system, the identification of its structure is of particular importance. This paper aims to determine the structure of the pharmaceutical industry in Iran to provide appropriate solutions for pricing and regulation by policymakers. Iran is a growing pharmaceutical market with over $4bn in sales, so the supply side needs to be examined to meet the domestic consumption.

This research is a descriptive and retrospective analytical study which examines the Iranian pharmaceutical industry through library studies and using pharmaceutical data of the country’s Food and Drug Administration during 1992-2016. Due to data availability in firm level, the concentration ratio of N leading firms and the Herfindahl–Hirschman index are used to measure the concentration of the pharmaceutical market in 2014 and 2016.

The results show that pharmaceutical manufacturing, importing companies and distributing companies play roles in monopolistic competition market, loose oligopoly market and oligopoly market, respectively. For all companies, the magnitudes of Herfindahl–Hirschman indices indicate non-competitive settings. As a result, these companies set their own prices, and market demand affects their sales. In addition, demand for medicines is shaped in the form of supply-induced demand.

This research was accomplished with no computational limitation. However, it was confined to only one country, one industry and the mentioned period of study.

The pharmaceutical manufacturers have no influence on medicine prices, and government pricing regulations lessen the market power of such market agents. However, the easy entry to and exit from market stimulate producers to participate in manufacturing activities. The pharmaceutical importers may expand their imports in response to entry new actors; however, the new entrants weaken the coordination on pricing decisions.

As pharmaceutical distributers act in an oligopoly market, they can collude, reduce competition and lower the welfare of pharmaceutical consumers. In such conditions, high investment requirements and economies of scale may discourage the entry of new firms.

Although there are various studies on market structure in non-pharmaceutical industries, this study is a new effort to measure concentration in the Iranian pharmaceutical market and to determine its structure.

The purpose of this paper is to estimate oligopsony power in the upstream factor market and oligopoly power in the downstream product market. On this basis, the paper intends to examine the effects of both oligopsony and oligopoly power as well as ownership on technical efficiency which were rarely discussed in previous studies.

First, based on the stochastic frontier production function, the paper constructs a new model that is capable to estimate oligopsony power for each observation. Second, the paper employs the popular dual stochastic frontier cost function to estimate marginal cost as well as oligopoly power. Then, the system GMM method with different sets of instrumental variables is applied to test the effects of the two-sided market power and ownership on technical efficiency.

Using unbalanced panel data at the firm level, the paper demonstrates that oligopsony power is significantly variant across different sectors. The most notable point is that oligopsony power in China’s soya and peanut oil industries is negative, while that in pork and beef industries is much stronger than those in other industries. In addition, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are found to be less technically efficient in most of the selected industries, while SOEs with higher oligopsony power tend to be more technically efficient than non-state-owned enterprises(NSOEs), which is consistent with the quiet life hypothesis.

This paper sheds light mainly on three aspects. First, it proposes a new model to estimate oligopsony power for each single firm. Second, it tests the effect of oligopsony power on technical efficiency. Third, it distinguishes the differential effect of oligopsony power on technical efficiency between SOEs and NSOEs.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of market power and returns to scale in the determination of farm-value share.

This paper utilizes the equilibrium displacement model to investigate the role of market power and returns to scale in the determination of farm-value share. Contrary to the current literature, the paper incorporates oligopoly power, oligopsony power and non-constant return to scale into one generalized model, which systematically enables us investigate the impacts of market power on the determination and changes of farm-value share.

The results imply that market power as well as non-constant returns to scale is central to the understanding of farm-value share. These, in turn, indicate that ignoring the impacts of market power and degree of return to scale may overestimate or underestimate the impacts of exogenous shocks on changes in farm-value share.

Thus, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no literature has examined the co-existence of oligopsony power, oligopoly power as well as non-constant return to scale in farm-value share determination. This paper therefore tries to fill this gap.

In his work Dr Rugina mentions several times his affinity and indebtedness to the German economist, Walter Eucken (1891–1950). He does so most outspokenly in the following quotation:

Goes back to thinking on the price theory of oligopoly in 1960. In particular, is concerned with Stackelberg’s oligopoly theory. Presents a careful description of the development of Stackelberg’s analysis. Takes into account his mathematical appendix. Confronts the theory with game theory and concludes that in a dynamic game a Nash‐Cournot equilibrium will emerge.