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Research suggests that context matters for MNEs’ international business strategy. MNEs’ strategies vary when different intertwined contexts interact with each other. While International Business scholars understand well the influence of the institutional environments on firms’ international strategies and operations, some contextual differences are less understood as is the case involving African countries and firms. In this study we investigate how different institutional contexts and legitimacy challenges combine to impact ownership strategic choices of African firms in their cross-border acquisitions (CBAs). Specifically, we study the influence of the host country institutional development and two institutional dimension distances: administrative distance and knowledge distance. Methodologically, we use a sample of 314 CBAs made by acquirers from 24 African countries in 71 host countries worldwide to test a number of theoretically driven hypotheses. This study contributes to our understanding of how foreign investors from less institutionally developed countries that are more likely to face higher legitimacy barriers use ownership strategies to achieve legitimacy abroad.

This paper aims to consider the effects of a merger on technology adoption and welfare in the presence of passive cross ownership. Merger increases investments in process technology and may increase welfare. The results are important for antitrust policies and suggest that the antitrust authorities may not need to be too concerned about mergers in industries with cross ownership.

Game-theoretic analysis.

Merger increases investments in process technology and may increase welfare.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is original.

To examine how shareholding affects optimal profits, R&D innovation, NEV market scale and social welfare in two supply chain models with partial and cross ownership patterns.

The gradual retreat of government subsidies has directly weakened the financial support available to the stakeholders of new energy vehicles (NEVs). In this context, upstream and downstream enterprises of NEV are constantly seeking new business models of cooperation to achieve possible win-wins. NEV supply chain shareholding is an emerging new practice for such explorations. However, its performance in the NEV supply chain is seldom investigated. In this paper, we employ a Stackelberg game model to investigate how partial and cross-ownership affect the optimal decisions in a NEV supply chain.

Results showed that: (1) Compared with the unilateral shareholding model, the battery supplier will benefit from cross-ownership in the supply chain, while the NEV manufacturer will not necessarily benefit from it. At the same time, cross-ownership will bring the greatest incentive for battery R&D (2) Supply chain downstream competition will not necessarily lead to the improvement of the total consumption of NEVs or the level of battery design. Pareto improvement can be brought only when one of the manufacturers holds less than a certain equity threshold. In addition, downstream competition will also not necessarily bring more benefits to the battery supplier.

At present, NEV supply chain management has attracted widespread attention from scholars from all walks of life. Previous studies have been carried out that covers topics such as pricing strategies and optimal profits and the role of NEV in the sustainable development of the automotive industry supply chain, or disparate impacts of government subsidies and carbon emission regulation on supply chain members. However, as far as the authors know, compared with the new emerging NEV corporate practice, the shareholding phenomenon between upstream and downstream in the supply chain of NEV has not been studied in the existing studies.

A key characteristic for a family firm, preservation of socioemotional wealth, may appear to be at conflict with the concept of organizational diversity. The authors investigate how organizational diversity, captured through heterogeneity in ownership structure, diversity in the senior management team, interfaces with the concept of the socioemotional wealth of family businesses in an emerging economy, when these firms pursue inorganic growth strategies.

Drawing on the concepts of socioemotional wealth, behavioral agency theory and bifurcation bias, the authors develop perspectives on how ownership structure, family influence in executive management and institutional shareholding influence a family firm's internationalization strategies captured through propensity to pursue cross-border M&A – an activity that may threaten the preservation of socioemotional wealth. The authors also explore the role of business group affiliation, another organizational diversity construct, and contingent parameters like past financial performance and export intensity in this study. The authors take pooled data over 15 years, involving 346 large firms from India, which are family-controlled, to carry out the study.

The authors’ empirical analysis shows that family stake in the company and family members' presence in the executive team negatively influence the propensity to pursue cross-border M&A activities. A firm's affiliation to a business group moderates these negative relationships. On the other hand, the presence of institutional shareholders, positive past financial performance and export intensity positively influence cross-border M&A propensity.

The results establish that family businesses' attempts to preserve socioemotional wealth may come at the cost of promoting organizational diversity.

Many multinational corporations that originate from emerging economies (emerging market multinational corporations (EMNCs)) opt for acquiring a target firm in a developed market to expediently upgrade their strategic capabilities. To successfully achieve their strategic goals in the developed markets, EMNCs may use market actions and nonmarket actions to mitigate the potential risk derived from the national political differences between their home emerging economy and host developed economy. This paper aims to extend the legitimacy-based view of political risk to study the influence of political animosity – defined as misalignment of the host-home countries’ national interests – on the EMNCs’ market and nonmarket strategy in a developed market.

In this paper, we examine all EMNCs that made cross-border acquisitions of the USA targets from 2005 to 2011. The final sample consists of 252 acquisitions originating from 25 emerging markets. This paper used Tobit regression analysis to test the direct and moderating hypotheses.

Facing a high level of political animosity between their home country and the host developed economy, EMNCs use a market strategy by acquiring less ownership stake in the developed market, as well as engage in a nonmarket strategy by increasing lobbying activities. In addition, because of the heightened legitimacy concerns of developed market shareholders, cross-listed EMNCs have a greater tendency than non-cross-listed EMNCs to improve their legitimacy through their market and nonmarket strategy.

The current paper sheds light on EMNCs’ international strategy in developed markets by examining both market and nonmarket actions. EMNCs are shown to be strongly motivated to engage in acquisitions in developed markets so they can acquire invaluable strategic resources, such as brands and distribution channels, to compete with the developed market multinationals. A sophisticated ownership strategy and corporate political activities are invaluable for EMNCs to catch up with developed market multinationals.

Emerging-market multinational companies (EMNCs) utilize cross-border merger and acquisitions (M&As) to acquire strategic assets that compensate for their resource deficiencies. Therefore, developed markets have become important destinations for EMNCs. Institutional distance constitutes a major source of competitive disadvantage for foreign firms competing with indigenous firms. The purpose of this paper is to examine the ownership pattern of cross-border M&As in the USA, and determine if EMNCs respond to institutional distance differently than advanced-market multinational companies (AMNCs).

Based on the extant literature in institutional theory as well as internationalization strategy, a quantitative study was carried out. Hypotheses were proposed and tested using fixed effects panel regressions.

This paper finds that both AMNCs and EMNCs take smaller ownership positions when there is greater cognitive and normative distance. The negative association is stronger for AMNCs than for EMNCs. Further, the larger the regulative distance in the positive direction, meaning a higher level of development in the host market than in the home market, the more AMNCs and EMNCs are led to opt for a higher ownership position, with EMNCs being less influenced by regulative distance.

Though findings are robust and stable, this study is limited to observations that only have US target firms.

By integrating the literature from institutional theory and strategy, this paper offers a clearer understanding and distinction of the acquisition decisions made by EMNCs and AMNCs.

This paper aims to examine the relation between promoter ownership (PO) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) expenditure in India, the first country to legally mandate the CSR spending.

This paper applies panel regression to examine the impact of PO on actual and excess CSR expenditure because panel regression has lesser multicollinearity problems and has the benefit of controlling for individual or time heterogeneity mostly present in cross-section or time series data. The results are robust to testing the CSR expenditure decision (to engage or not to engage in CSR) by using the binary choice logit model.

Based on the agency theory, this study shows a nonlinear relation between PO and CSR expenditure, which suggests that promoters start extracting private benefits of control at the expense of outside shareholders and engage in lesser CSR expenditure only when their ownership crosses a threshold level of 52% approximately. This study further shows that the nonlinear relation between PO and CSR expenditure is more pronounced for firms that are more prone to agency problems, for business group firms than standalone firms and for firms not following the Companies Act 2013 CSR mandate.

The findings shed light at the idea of how promoters’ incentive alignment should be proposed and followed to encourage a firm’s social investment activities.

First, this study argues that the relation between PO and CSR expenditure is nonlinear in nature, by showing that the impact of PO on CSR expenditure is adverse only at higher level of PO. Second, this study’s richer data set on CSR expenditure not only allows the authors to analyze the relation for actual CSR spending by the firms but also helps to examine the excess spending made over and above the mandatory spending, as directed by the Companies Act, 2013.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, the author conducts the first detailed review on the impact of ownership variables on corporate tax avoidance, based on 69 archival studies over the two last decades.

Referring to an agency-theoretical framework, the author differentiates between six categories of ownership (institutional, state, family, foreign, managerial and cross-ownership/ownership concentration). The author also includes research on ownership proxies as moderators of other determinants of tax avoidance.

The review indicates that most research refers to institutional, state and family ownership. Moreover, except for state ownership, no clear tendencies on the impact of included ownership types can be found in line with the author’s agency-theoretical framework.

Regarding research recommendations, among others, the author stresses the urgent need for recognizing heterogeneity within and interactions between ownership proxies. Researchers should also properly address endogeneity concerns by advanced econometric models (e.g. by the difference-in-difference approach).

As international standard setters have implemented massive reform initiatives on both tax avoidance and corporate governance, this literature review underlines the huge interaction between those topics. Firms should carefully analyze their ownership structure and change their tax planning due to owners' individual tax preferences.

This analysis makes useful contributions to prior research by focusing on six categories of ownership and their impact on tax avoidance in (multinational) firms and moderating effects. The author provides a detailed overview about current archival research and likes to guide researchers to focus on ownership heterogeneity and endogeneity concerns.

The aim of this paper is to revisit the board independence–audit fees (BI–AF) relationship while taking into account the ownership structure of the firm. Two effects are unfolding along the ownership concentration spectrum: separation of ownership and control (principal–agent problems) and separation of voting and cash flow rights (principal–principal problems).

The study is conducted over a seven-year period (2002-2008) using panel regressions on a sample of Canadian publicly traded companies. The authors use a moderated regression analysis incorporating two-way interactive terms (ownership × BI) and a sub-group analysis.

The results show a positive and significant relationship between BI and AF when ownership is concentrated in the hands of a dominant/controlling shareholder. The higher the gap between voting and cash flow rights of the ultimate owner, the stronger the relationship between BI and AF. Overall, evidence supports both the demand-based perspective on AF and the expropriation effect argument.

Results support a one-size-fits-all approach to governance despite growing concerns from academics and interest groups about the appropriateness of pursuing such strategy when ownership is concentrated in the hands of a dominant/controlling shareholder.

By taking the excess voting rights into account (difference between voting rights and cash-flow rights of the ultimate owner), the authors propose a refined classification of the sample firms along the ownership concentration spectrum.

The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that the nationality of ownership affects investment through its interaction with return expectations and cash flow and to answer the question whether this is due to asymmetric information or managerial discretion problems.

Asymmetric information and managerial discretion hypothesis are being tested in a fully extended model, which provides for a variety of effects from the explanatory variables. The paper also uses firm and industry variables to account for the investment opportunities or marginal q instead of using the average Q. Using industrial variables instead of stock market data enables the possibility to extend the sample to cover a more representative sample of firms and especially a group of firms where financial constraints are expected to be more profound. Another aspect of the paper is that the ownership variable varies with the nationality of the shareholders of the firm and not with the shareholdings of the managers. This means that the paper restricts its search in two sub‐samples, those of domestic firms and of foreign (multinational) ones.

In total, 2,700 domestic and foreign (multinational) manufacturing firms located in Greece in the 1992‐1997 period were examined, providing consistent evidence supporting the asymmetric information hypothesis against the managerial discretion hypothesis. These results also support the significance of ownership effects, at least with respect to the national origin of the firm's shareholders.

This paper provides evidence that the nationality of ownership affects the investment behavior and is related with the specific information problems of the firms.