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This paper aims to investigate how user expectations affect value-added service (VAS) investment and pricing decisions of two-sided platforms. It draws on the information asymmetry theory and offers suggestions on how platform operators can manage user expectations.

According to the game theory, this study considers three user expectations (responsive, passive and wary). By framing the Hotelling duopoly model and comparing the VAS investment, price and platform profits, the optimal platform decision is analyzed and discussed.

The conclusions demonstrate that the monopolistic two-sided platform obtains more profits from the informed users with responsive expectations than uninformed users with passive or wary expectations. The marginal investment cost and cross-network externalities are two key factors that determine the platform's VAS investment and pricing strategies of passive or wary users. Furthermore, considering the expectation preferences, i.e. the uniformed users hold wary expectations with more information and hold passive expectations with less or no information, the results suggest that the proportion of wary users to all uninformed users increases the platform's VAS investment, profits and the price of informed users, and increase (decrease) the price of uninformed users when the cross-network externalities of informed users are relatively small (larger).

These results can provide insightful enlightenment into how platform operators utilize bilateral users' expectations and information level to guide their VAS investment and pricing decisions.

This paper is one of the first to explore the impact of three user expectations and the heterogeneity of preferences in informing users' passive or wary expectations, based on different levels of information on the decision-making of two-sided platforms regarding VAS.

This study focuses on the self-organized cooperative consumption of platform participants on social media platform, and reveals how the brand owner cooperates with two-sided customers to achieve value co-creation.

The authors adopted a case study approach to explore how a Chinese beauty startup developed collaborative networks from 2013 to 2022, and tracked the the changes of network structure and cooperation mechanism.

The study finds that the brand owner cooperates with two-sided customers to integrate resources and establish diverse relational trust, which enhances the evolution of a heterogeneous collaborative network for value co-creation.

The study builds upon traditional dyadic actor-to-actor interactions between providers and customers, develops a novel interaction framework of actor-to-network to explain the value co-creation by collaborative networking, reveals the self-organized mechanism of cooperative consumption on social media.

This study highlights the impact of mental accounts on a user's decision-making regarding payment schemes and aims to determine the pricing strategy for the first-enjoy-after-pay service offered by the two-sided media platforms.

This study establishes a game-theoretic model and utilizes backward induction to derive the equilibrium price by maximizing the monopolist's profit.

The findings indicate that the conditions for a two-sided media platform to offer the first-enjoy-after-pay service depend on the trade-off between pleasure attenuation and pain buffering and the effect of time discounts. Moreover, the authors found that the time discount is a critical factor in determining pricing strategies under various payment schemes offered by the platform.

This work adopts a uniform pricing strategy for users who opt for either immediate or post-payment schemes. Nevertheless, it is important to note that this approach has limitations in terms of offering discriminatory pricing for those who choose both payment schemes.

This analytical work provides valuable insights for two-sided media platforms to optimize their payment scheme strategies and pricing considering the influence of a user's mental account.

In a two-sided media platform, the authors provide applicable conditions for the platform to offer first-enjoy-after-pay service considering the effect of mental accounts. Further, the authors show the optimal pricing strategy under different payment schemes provided by the platform.

This paper aims to propose the mechanism of cross-network effect embedded, which can help cross-border e-commerce (CBEC) platforms strengthen cooperative relationships with sellers more equitably and effectively by using the network structural characteristics of the platforms themselves.

A two-stage evolutionary game model has been used to confirm the influence factors. The mathematical derivation of evolutionary game analysis is combined with the simulation method to examine the role of cross-network effect in cooperation. The evolutionary game model based on the cross-network effect is proposed to achieve better adaptability to the study of cooperation strategy from the two-sided market perspective.

The evolutionary game model captures the interactions of cross-network effect and the influence factors from a dynamic perspective. The cross-network effect has a certain substitution on the revenue-sharing rate of SMEs. CBEC platforms can enhance the connection between consumers and the website by improving the level of construction, which is a good way to attract sellers more cost-effectively and efficiently.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specificCBEC platforms.

This study provides a new method for the validation of the cross-network effect, especially when data collection is difficult. But this method is only a numerical simulation. So the conclusions still need to be further tested empirically. Besides, researchers are advised to explore the relationship between the added user scale and the cross-network effect in some specific CBEC platforms.

Investigations that study cooperation strategy from the cross-network effect perspective in CBEC are limited. The research figured out which influence factors are affected by the cross-network effect in cooperation. A two-stage evolutionary game model was proposed to explain the interaction of the factors. The evolutionary game analysis with a simulation method was combined to highlight the role of cross-network effect on cooperation strategy to give a deeper investigation into the sustainable cooperation ofCBEC.

The attempt to establish a common European framework for core platforms' duties and responsibilities toward other actors in the digital environment is at the core of the recent scholarly debate surrounding the Digital Markets Act (DMA) proposal. In particular, the everlasting juxtaposition between the “data power” – as emerging from recent cases (Section 2) – that dominant tech companies enjoy and the concept of consumer sovereignty (Section 3) lies at the core of the proposal's attempt to identify digital core platforms as market gatekeepers. Accordingly, this chapter critically investigates the divide between power imbalance and consumer sovereignty in light of the architecture designed by the DMA, with a specific focus on its effectiveness in identifying gatekeepers' power drivers (Section 4). After highlighting the main critical aspects of the pertinent rules, opportunities for fruitful developments are then identified through the reframing of some of the notions considered in the proposal, and namely the role of “lock-in” effects and “data accumulation” (Section 5). Lastly, this chapter suggests that the DMA advancements – while desirable – are bound to be fragmentary in the absence of a wider appraisal of the nature of data power imbalance dynamics in the modern digital markets (Section 6).

This paper mainly focuses on how to induce all members to represent members' true preferences for supply and demand matching of E-commerce platform in order to generate stable matching schemes with more social welfare of Multi-agent Matching Platform (MMP) and individually stable advantages than traditional methods.

An MMP is designed. Meanwhile, a true preference inducing method, Lower-Bid Ranking (LBR), is proposed to reduce the number of false preferences, which is helpful to solve the problem that too much false preferences leads to low efficiency of platform operation and supply and demand matching. Then, a systematic model of LBR-based Stable Matching (SM-LBR) is proposed.

To obtain an ideal transaction partner, the adequate preference ordering and modifying according to market environment is needed for everyone, and the platform should give full play to the platforms' information advantages and process historical transaction and cooperation data. Meanwhile, the appropriate supply and demand matching is beneficial to improve the efficiency and quality of platform operation, and the design of matching guidance mechanism is essential.

The numerical experiments show that, the proposed model (SM-LBR) can induce members to represent the model's true preferences for stable matching and generate effective matchings with more social welfare of MMP and individually stable advantages than traditional methods, which may provide necessary method and model reference for the research of stable matching and E-commerce platform operation.

Due to the cross-network effect, two-sided users communicate with each other, producing a coupling network. To study the spread of platform self-operation in two-sided users' marketing and purchasing tactics, this paper considers the differences in reputation acquired by platform-owned and third-party operating channels.

This study proposes a two-layer network with cross-network links: one layer represents the social network of consumers, while the other layer represents the competitive network of buyers. A closed system of differential equations, based on the binary dynamics of the stochastic network, is developed to study the trend and stability points of the platform self-operation dissemination. Then the overall benefits of platform are analyzed to unify the platform diffusion and pricing strategies.

The degree of difference in social influence and cross-network effects affect diffusion synergistically. Cross-network effects hinder diffusion when there is a significant difference of social influence between consumers and sellers but promote diffusion when there is little difference of social influence between consumers and sellers. Additionally, the network weights and reputation gap exhibit a nonlinear correlation with diffusion. For pricing strategy of the platform, it can achieve maximum profit when the pricing of self-operated goods and third-party-operated goods is equal.

This study considers the complex network architecture created by bilateral markets and the dynamic influence of group interactions on product. Additionally, this study takes reputation into account when considering the price and dissemination tactics of various operating channels, offering guidelines for platforms to control merchants and mediate disputes between various operating channels.

With the development of digitalization and interconnection, there is a growing need for enterprise customers to ensure the compatibility of the third-party components they are using in the manufacturing process, thus raising the integration requirements for the Industrial Internet platform and its third-party developers. Therefore, our study investigates the optimal integration decision of the Industrial Internet platform while considering its access price, the integration cost, and the net utility derived by enterprise customers from the third-party components.

We model a two-sided Industrial Internet platform that connects customers on the demand side to the developers on the supply side. We then explore the integration decision of the Industrial Internet platform and its important factors by solving the optimal profit function.

First, despite the high integration cost of third-party developers, the platform still chooses to integrate when enterprise customers derive high utility from the third-party components. Second, due to the compatibility effect, charging the enterprise customers a higher price may reduce the platform profits when these customers derive low utility from the third-party components. Third, the platform profits will increase along with the integration cost of third-party developers when it is low in the case where enterprise customers derive low utility from third-party components.

Our findings offer insightful takeaways for the Industrial Internet platform when making integration decisions.

In most economies, there are rules from the market regulators or government to sell at an equal wholesale price (EWP). But when one upstream channel is facing a negative demand disruption and another positive, EWP can create extra pressure on the disadvantageous supply chain partner, which faces negative disruption. The purpose of this study is to analyse the impact of EWP and the scope of the discriminatory wholesale price (DWP) during disruptions.

For the study, the authors used a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, online retailer (OR) and traditional brick-and-mortar (BM) retailer. Stackelberg game is used to model the interaction between the upstream and downstream channel partners, and the horizontal Nash game to analyse the interaction within downstream channel partners. For modelling asymmetric disruption, the authors took instances from the lock-down and post-lock-down periods of the COVID-19 pandemic, where consumers flow from BM retailer to OR store.

By analysing the disruption period, the authors found that this asymmetric disruption is detrimental to the BM channel, favourable to OR and has no impact on the manufacturer. But with DWP, the authors found that the profit of the BM channel and manufacturer can be increased during disruption. Though the profit of the OR decreased, it was found to be higher than in the pre-disruption period. Under DWP, the consumer surplus increased during disruption, making it favourable for the customers also. Thus, DWP can aid in creating a win-win strategy for all the supply chain partners during asymmetric disruption. Later as an extension to the study, the authors analysed the impact of the consumer transfer factor and found that it plays a crucial role in the optimal decisions of the channel partner during DWP.

Very scant literature analyses the intersection of DWP and disruptions. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study, for the first time uses DWP as a tool to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruptions. The study findings will assist the government, market regulators and manufacturers in revamping the wholesale pricing policies and strategies to help the disadvantageous supply chain partner during asymmetric disruption.

This study aims to answer the question whether investment funds managers exhibit behavioural biases in their investment decisions. Furthermore, it investigates if fund managers, as a group of institutional investors, make decisions in response to central bank’s communication as well as other information in relation to various behavioural inclinations.

A comprehensive study was conducted based on a questionnaire, which is composed of three main parts exploring: (1) general information about the funds under the management of the surveyed group of fund managers, (2) factors that influence the investment process with an emphasis on the National Bank of Poland communication and (3) behavioural inclinations of the surveyed group. Cronbach’s alpha statistic was applied for measuring the reliability of the survey questionnaire and then chi-squared test was used to investigate the relationships between the answers provided in the survey.

The central bank’s communication matters for investors, but its impact on their decisions appears to be only moderate. Interest rates were found to be the most important announcements for investment fund managers. The stock market was the most popular market segment where the investments were made. The ultra-short time horizon played no, or only small, role in the surveyed fund managers’ decisions as most of them invested in a longer horizon covering 1 to 5 years. Moreover, most respondents declared that they considered in their decisions the information about market expectations published in the media. Finally, majority of the fund managers manifested limited rationality and were subject to behavioural biases, but the decisions and behavioural inclinations were independent and, in most cases, they did not influence each other.

The results reported in this study can be used in practice to better understand and to improve the fund managers’ decision-making processes.

Apart from the commonly tested behavioural biases in the group of institutional investors in the existing literature, such as loss aversion, disposition effect or overconfidence, this paper also focuses on the less intensively analysed behavioural inclinations, i.e. framing, illusion of the control, representativeness, sunk cost effect and fast thinking. The originality of this study further lies in the way the research was conducted through interviews with fund managers, who were found to be subject to behavioural biases, although those behavioural inclinations did not influence their investment decisions. This finding indicates that professionalism and collectivism in the group of institutional investors protect them from irrationality.