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This paper aims to study the pricing problems on the two-sided market for cases of monopoly and duopoly competition, specifically investigating the impact of platform service quality on the market. Theoretical analysis and computational studies are conducted to investigate the impact of different parameters on the system outcomes.

Mathematical formulations are proposed for cases of monopoly and duopoly competition. For monopolistic market, the optimal pricing and service quality strategies are obtained using mathematical programming method. For duopolistic market, the equilibrium outcomes are derived by game theory. Sensitivity analysis and numerical studies are also adopted to investigate the impact of different parameters.

For monopolistic market, the platform will provide a low service quality when the service cost parameter is large. However, when the cost parameter is small, the platform provides a higher service quality and higher registration prices. Furthermore, the sum of the optimal prices is proportional to the service quality and inversely proportional to the user price sensitivity. For duopolistic market, the competitive equilibrium prices exist under a certain condition. The determinants of equilibrium prices are the gap between the service qualities of two platforms and the cross-group externalities.

For monopolistic market, this paper specifies the role of platform service quality in determining the platform’s pricing strategy. For duopolistic market, this paper presents a market sharing mechanism between two platforms and explores the equilibrium pricing strategies for platforms with different service quality level.

Internet + and Electronic Business in China is a comprehensive resource that provides insight and analysis into E-commerce in China and how it has revolutionized and continues to revolutionize business and society. Split into four distinct sections, the book first lays out the theoretical foundations and fundamental concepts of E-Business before moving on to look at internet+ innovation models and their applications in different industries such as agriculture, finance and commerce. The book then provides a comprehensive analysis of E-business platforms and their applications in China before finishing with four comprehensive case studies of major E-business projects, providing readers with successful examples of implementing E-Business entrepreneurship projects.

Internet + and Electronic Business in China is a comprehensive resource that provides insights and analysis into how E-commerce has revolutionized and continues to revolutionize business and society in China.

The purpose of this paper was to identify whether the two‐sided nature of markets in both online and offline channels affects the versioning strategies of multi‐channel publishers in the presence of channel substitutability.

Using analytical models, the versioning of a multi‐channel publisher is analysed, with consideration of advertising revenue and possible channel substitutability.

The paper shows that not only the two‐sided nature of the online market but also that of the offline market affects the versioning strategy online. Multiple online versions are desired when the offline advertising market shrinks and the online advertising market proliferates. In a reverse situation, providing one online version (for free) can be optimal.

Previous studies on versioning have mostly considered only the information market per se. However, studies on two‐sided markets have shown that analysis that focuses on a single side leads to analytical error due to inter‐market network externalities. In this context, it is proven that advertising revenue is a critical factor in the publisher's decision whether to provide multiple online versions.

Mobile banking (M‐banking) involves the use of a mobile phone or another mobile device to undertake financial transactions linked to a client's account. M‐banking is one of the newest approaches to the provision of financial services through information communication technology (ICT), made possible by the widespread adoption of mobile phones even in low income countries. Emerging mobile banking (m‐banking platforms) in developing markets enable two sided markets, bringing together mobile handset users with other mobile users and commercial partners. It is the argument of this paper that the emergence of m‐banking platforms has the potential for spill‐over effects, and that these spill‐over effects will require regulatory authorities to develop appropriate policy responses.

This article derives from research on the m‐banking strategies of mobile network operators (MNOs) in developing markets, and the regulatory responses to these strategies. Field visits were made to the Philippines and Kenya where m‐banking platforms are well established, and in depth interviews took place with companies that had succeeded in launching m‐banking platforms, or were considering strategic responses in markets where competitors had launched platforms. Companies were identified from the existing body of literature, observation and personal contact. Additionally, data were collected from developing case studies.

M‐banking has the potential to bring basic banking and electronic transactions services to unbanked consumers in developing markets. But in enabling two‐sided markets, m‐banking solutions also provide specific questions for telecommunications industry regulators. Regulators need to question if the elements are in place for m‐banking networks to tip towards a single platform, especially in markets with dominant operators that hold significant market share.

Because of the multi‐homing costs inherent in most existing m‐banking platforms, these platforms introduce both economic and psychological switching costs for consumers. In turn, these switching costs can have the impact of reinforcing existing network effects in markets where the incumbent already holds significant market share for voice traffic. There are a number of options available to telecommunications regulators in responding to the emergence of m‐banking platforms, and authorities should take a measured approach to achieve optimal societal and industry outcomes.

This paper fulfils an important void in the current literature related to the growth of m‐banking platforms in emerging markets. While there has been an increasing body of literature examining the potential socio‐economic impact of m‐banking in developing markets, the purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of m‐banking for competitive dynamics between competing firms, and the related issues for regulatory authorities.

This paper aimed to analyze the short- and long-term effects of the breadth and depth of seller competition on the performance of platform companies, and investigated the underlying mechanisms of customers’ two-sided marketing tactics on the structure of the competition between sellers.

A longitudinal research design was adopted by gathering daily market objective data on e-commerce platforms for 250 days, and the dynamic evolution effects was analyzed by using a vector autoregression model which compared the differences between the short- and long-term effectiveness of different customer relationship management (CRM) strategies.

The breadth of competition amongst sellers improves the performance of platforms, whilst the depth of competition among sellers has a positive effect on the short-term performance. However, it has a negative effect on the long-term performance of their platforms. In both the short and long terms, advertising tactics that attract new buyers contribute more to increases in the breadth of seller competition than those that attract existing buyers do. Subsidies for new sellers decrease the depth of seller competition more than those for old sellers.

Further research could be undertaken to investigate the validity of marketing tactics other than advertising tactics, and thus expand the time windows of the available data.

It is imperative for platform companies to implement effective control over seller competition to balance the interests of the sellers and of themselves.

The dyadic paradigm of CRM research has been extended by considering the perspective of the electronic platform company, how the tactics of exploitation and exploration of two-sided customers impact upon seller competitive structures have been delved into and why new customers have a unique value to platform companies has been identified.

This paper seeks to contribute to the debate about the regulation of termination rates in the context of Africa.

The methodology is based on analysis of secondary data and a case study of a regulatory intervention in Namibia and its impact.

Mobile call termination is a monopoly and not one side of a two‐sided market. Cost‐based termination rates increase competition between operators and lead to lower prices, more subscribers and more investment.

The case of Namibia is presented as an example of termination rate benchmarking as an alternative regulatory strategy to overcome regulatory and institutional bottlenecks in Africa.

African regulators are presented with a tool for removing market distortions.

Cost based termination rates will lead to lower retail prices and allow more people to use mobile phones.

The paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence against the waterbed effect and the two‐sided market argument.

Digital disruption offers an innovative opportunity to address housing affordability issues through the use of market design theory and two-sided matching markets. The purpose of this paper is to scope a model for how “uberisation” can revolutionise the traditional apartment delivery model in Australia, leading to improved housing affordability.

This paper uses semi-structured interviews with operators of online real estate platforms and deliberative developers to examine how the principles of “uberisation”, that is two-sided matching markets, are driving innovation in the apartment supply process.

Findings confirm that real estate internet platforms and deliberative developers innovators are informed by the benefits of aggregating demand to reduce development risk, thus enabling apartments to be provided at a substantially lower price than by traditional methods.

The number of interviews is small reflecting the limited number of market actors currently engaged in the innovations investigated.

This research is innovative as it introduces theoretical understandings gained from market design theory and applies those concepts to disrupt the apartment development process.

This paper is concerned with the current decision of the European Commission regarding Google’s comparison shopping service (Google Shopping). In 2017, the Commission has fined Google €2.42 billion for abusing its dominant position as a search engine by giving illegal advantage to Google Shopping. Consequently, Google has to stop its illegal conduct. In particular, the decision requires Google to treat rival comparison shopping services and its own service equally. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the decision from a perspective of two-sided markets. Google Shopping is an integrated service of Google Search and acts as an intermediary between companies, offerings products in the internet and people searching for products in the internet. This complies with the typical conditions of a two-sided market. From the perspective of sellers of goods and services in Europe, Google may be seen as a gatekeeper to the potential customers and thus as an essential facility. In the light of the current decision, this paper provides a possible regulation alternative. It is shown that Google Shopping represents a typical club good, so that welfare-optimising rules must be adhered to. In this context, it should be noted that in the current Google Shopping search results, artificial rivalry is created among sellers so as to ensure maximum willingness to pay for a top listing. The solution proposed in this paper entails a summary score list of all sellers of a particular product, for which a turnover-dependent contribution should be required, instead of a reduced score list, where positions are sold by auctions.

This paper uses methods of two-sided markets and public good theory.

It is shown that Google Shopping represents a typical club good, so that welfare-optimising rules must be adhered to. In this context, it should be noted that in the current Google Shopping search results, artificial rivalry is created among sellers so as to ensure maximum willingness to pay for a top listing. The solution proposed in this paper entails a summary score list of all sellers of a particular product, for which a turnover-dependent contribution should be required, instead of a reduced score list, where positions are sold by auctions.

To the best of the author’s knowledge, it is the very first paper about the decision of the European Union (06/2017) concerning Google Shopping.

The pervasive spread of digital technologies brought an incredible boost in data availability. Companies are dealing with massive amount of data that wait to be exploited. At the same time, scholars are providing different strategies and methods to help companies capture the value embedded in their data to foster innovation and improve the efficiency of existing processes. In these research studies, data are the by-product of something else, and they are a silent asset that needs to be exploited. What if data might be considered the final goal? The paper aims to discuss these issues.

The research is based on an exploratory multiple case study analysis, on the basis of three cases used as an illustration for new ideas. In particular, the gathered data are analyzed according to models previously presented in the literature review, building on and expanding them.

The research proposes a data-driven approach to innovation, offering a peculiar view of the innovation process. The trigger point is the need of data that let begin the entire development process of a complex system. In this perspective, the application that data are a by-product of the entire innovation process and not the primary output is peculiar since the vast majority of the literature consider data as the by-product of the primary product.

Future research is needed to assess the replicability of the model outside the mobile app industry and to measure its performances. Nevertheless, this paper provides insights both for scholars and managers, enlarging the discussion on digital innovation and digital business models.

The results provide a development process to foster innovation relying on the need of data as the trigger point, guiding entrepreneurs and managers in the building process of the entire digital system.

Previous research studies often considered Big Data (BD) in innovation as a way to enlarge the current product offer or to make the innovation process more effective or efficient; this paper changes the perspective by considering BD as the trigger and the enabler of the entire digital innovation process.