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This study aims to empirically examine the impact of the price structure of two-sided markets on transaction volume and market share (MS) in the context of the Korean credit card industry. The Korean credit card market differs from those in the United States (U.S.) or Europe in terms of transaction structure (i.e. a three-party system in Korea vs a four-party system in the U.S. or Europe) and government policy. In addition to the merchant discount rate and the cardholder annual membership fee rate, the authors included and analyzed exogenous variables to eliminate any endogeneity. Based on the analysis results, the authors found that credit card usage performance (i.e. transaction volume) increases with an increase in the relative price ratio (merchant discount rate ÷ cardholder membership fee rate) paid by merchants and cardholders, provided that the total price (merchant discount rate + cardholder membership fee rate) paid by merchants and cardholders remains constant. Therefore, this study is the first to confirm that the Korean credit card market operated as the theoretical mechanism of a two-sided market during the analysis period. This effect can only be observed in specific cases such as the launch of the so-called “Chief Executive Officer(CEO)-designed card.” When a new CEO takes office in a credit card company and launches a “CEO-designed card,” there is a significant increase in not only card usage performance but MS as well owing to the price structure changes caused by expanding the benefits that customers derive from card use.

This article is based on a systematic and comprehensive review of the literature on two-sided platforms, the business structure based on the concept of matchmaking groups of customers (e.g. Uber or Airbnb). The research aims to identify gaps in the existing literature while providing a structured summary of the existing knowledge in the field. Finally, we propose a conceptual framework enabling platform thinking, the ability to see hybrid multi-sided platforms as a useful resource-orchestration structure to unveil innovation opportunities.

This study adopts a bibliometric approach, combing co-citation and text mining analyses of 196 papers, also implementing a longitudinal analysis that highlights the evolution of the field since its inception till today.

The novel aspect of the paper consists in taking a purely managerial stance of a very peculiar kind of platform, merging existing knowledge in comprehensive frameworks while providing potential avenues for research.

From an academic perspective, this research highlights the double nature of two-sided platforms: as an operational choice or as a way to exploit (digital) assets and reach the economic sustainability. A research agenda is proposed, based on three pillars: a side-based standpoint, a business model perspective and an evolutionary stance to see how these businesses may evolve.

The research identifies different literature streams that may help practitioners in identifying how two-sided platforms may help them in fostering innovation.

The identification of two-sided platforms as a different way to create value (transaction platforms) or to capture value (non-transaction platform), enhancing the debate on this innovative business model. A research agenda to bring the field forward is proposed.

This paper aims to study the pricing problems on the two-sided market for cases of monopoly and duopoly competition, specifically investigating the impact of platform service quality on the market. Theoretical analysis and computational studies are conducted to investigate the impact of different parameters on the system outcomes.

Mathematical formulations are proposed for cases of monopoly and duopoly competition. For monopolistic market, the optimal pricing and service quality strategies are obtained using mathematical programming method. For duopolistic market, the equilibrium outcomes are derived by game theory. Sensitivity analysis and numerical studies are also adopted to investigate the impact of different parameters.

For monopolistic market, the platform will provide a low service quality when the service cost parameter is large. However, when the cost parameter is small, the platform provides a higher service quality and higher registration prices. Furthermore, the sum of the optimal prices is proportional to the service quality and inversely proportional to the user price sensitivity. For duopolistic market, the competitive equilibrium prices exist under a certain condition. The determinants of equilibrium prices are the gap between the service qualities of two platforms and the cross-group externalities.

For monopolistic market, this paper specifies the role of platform service quality in determining the platform’s pricing strategy. For duopolistic market, this paper presents a market sharing mechanism between two platforms and explores the equilibrium pricing strategies for platforms with different service quality level.

Internet + and Electronic Business in China is a comprehensive resource that provides insight and analysis into E-commerce in China and how it has revolutionized and continues to revolutionize business and society. Split into four distinct sections, the book first lays out the theoretical foundations and fundamental concepts of E-Business before moving on to look at internet+ innovation models and their applications in different industries such as agriculture, finance and commerce. The book then provides a comprehensive analysis of E-business platforms and their applications in China before finishing with four comprehensive case studies of major E-business projects, providing readers with successful examples of implementing E-Business entrepreneurship projects.

Internet + and Electronic Business in China is a comprehensive resource that provides insights and analysis into how E-commerce has revolutionized and continues to revolutionize business and society in China.

Two or multi-sided platforms - defined as those companies that aim to connect two or more groups of customers leveraging the opportunities provided by indirect network externalities – got massive attention from both scholars and practitioners over the last decade. Entrepreneurship scholars mainly focused on the platform's ability to enable entrepreneurial ventures for the complementors' side, exploring the network-centric view. This study aims to expand it by exploring the broader influence that sides can have on the platform provider's entrepreneurial decisions over time, during the evolution of the two-sided platform.

The study is based on a longitudinal single case study developed over five years. The research presents the born and evolution of Friendz, an Italian two-sided platform.

The research presents a four-phases evolution process that shows how the entrepreneurs may first leverage an existing platform to develop a new venture and then develop his/her own two-sided platform. In this latter phase, the findings show how the sides may actually influence the platform provider's entrepreneurial decisions, both in terms of value proposition design, but also regarding the creation of new ventures.

The study contributes to the two-sided platform literature highlighting new evolutionary paths that expand current literature and highlight the doubling platform approach. Moreover, it contributes to the entrepreneurship literature offering a novel perspective on the entrepreneurial dynamics in two-sided platforms by re-balancing the power between the platform provider and the sides within the double network-centric view.

From a practitioners' perspective, this study offers an evolutionary path and specific tactics related to the evolution of an entrepreneurial venture based on a two-sided platforms that may inspire entrepreneurs working on two-sided platforms on how to use existing platforms and on the management of sides and the value propositions used to target them.

This study takes a novel perspective at the intersection between platforms and entrepreneurship literature streams, exploring the power that sides have over the platform provider in shaping the platform's entrepreneurial evolution. In doing so, it proposes a double network view on two-sided platforms and highlights three network-related tensions that can guide the evolution of the two-sided platforms.

The purpose of this paper was to identify whether the two‐sided nature of markets in both online and offline channels affects the versioning strategies of multi‐channel publishers in the presence of channel substitutability.

Using analytical models, the versioning of a multi‐channel publisher is analysed, with consideration of advertising revenue and possible channel substitutability.

The paper shows that not only the two‐sided nature of the online market but also that of the offline market affects the versioning strategy online. Multiple online versions are desired when the offline advertising market shrinks and the online advertising market proliferates. In a reverse situation, providing one online version (for free) can be optimal.

Previous studies on versioning have mostly considered only the information market per se. However, studies on two‐sided markets have shown that analysis that focuses on a single side leads to analytical error due to inter‐market network externalities. In this context, it is proven that advertising revenue is a critical factor in the publisher's decision whether to provide multiple online versions.

Mobile banking (M‐banking) involves the use of a mobile phone or another mobile device to undertake financial transactions linked to a client's account. M‐banking is one of the newest approaches to the provision of financial services through information communication technology (ICT), made possible by the widespread adoption of mobile phones even in low income countries. Emerging mobile banking (m‐banking platforms) in developing markets enable two sided markets, bringing together mobile handset users with other mobile users and commercial partners. It is the argument of this paper that the emergence of m‐banking platforms has the potential for spill‐over effects, and that these spill‐over effects will require regulatory authorities to develop appropriate policy responses.

This article derives from research on the m‐banking strategies of mobile network operators (MNOs) in developing markets, and the regulatory responses to these strategies. Field visits were made to the Philippines and Kenya where m‐banking platforms are well established, and in depth interviews took place with companies that had succeeded in launching m‐banking platforms, or were considering strategic responses in markets where competitors had launched platforms. Companies were identified from the existing body of literature, observation and personal contact. Additionally, data were collected from developing case studies.

M‐banking has the potential to bring basic banking and electronic transactions services to unbanked consumers in developing markets. But in enabling two‐sided markets, m‐banking solutions also provide specific questions for telecommunications industry regulators. Regulators need to question if the elements are in place for m‐banking networks to tip towards a single platform, especially in markets with dominant operators that hold significant market share.

Because of the multi‐homing costs inherent in most existing m‐banking platforms, these platforms introduce both economic and psychological switching costs for consumers. In turn, these switching costs can have the impact of reinforcing existing network effects in markets where the incumbent already holds significant market share for voice traffic. There are a number of options available to telecommunications regulators in responding to the emergence of m‐banking platforms, and authorities should take a measured approach to achieve optimal societal and industry outcomes.

This paper fulfils an important void in the current literature related to the growth of m‐banking platforms in emerging markets. While there has been an increasing body of literature examining the potential socio‐economic impact of m‐banking in developing markets, the purpose of this paper is to explore the implications of m‐banking for competitive dynamics between competing firms, and the related issues for regulatory authorities.

This paper aimed to analyze the short- and long-term effects of the breadth and depth of seller competition on the performance of platform companies, and investigated the underlying mechanisms of customers’ two-sided marketing tactics on the structure of the competition between sellers.

A longitudinal research design was adopted by gathering daily market objective data on e-commerce platforms for 250 days, and the dynamic evolution effects was analyzed by using a vector autoregression model which compared the differences between the short- and long-term effectiveness of different customer relationship management (CRM) strategies.

The breadth of competition amongst sellers improves the performance of platforms, whilst the depth of competition among sellers has a positive effect on the short-term performance. However, it has a negative effect on the long-term performance of their platforms. In both the short and long terms, advertising tactics that attract new buyers contribute more to increases in the breadth of seller competition than those that attract existing buyers do. Subsidies for new sellers decrease the depth of seller competition more than those for old sellers.

Further research could be undertaken to investigate the validity of marketing tactics other than advertising tactics, and thus expand the time windows of the available data.

It is imperative for platform companies to implement effective control over seller competition to balance the interests of the sellers and of themselves.

The dyadic paradigm of CRM research has been extended by considering the perspective of the electronic platform company, how the tactics of exploitation and exploration of two-sided customers impact upon seller competitive structures have been delved into and why new customers have a unique value to platform companies has been identified.

This paper seeks to contribute to the debate about the regulation of termination rates in the context of Africa.

The methodology is based on analysis of secondary data and a case study of a regulatory intervention in Namibia and its impact.

Mobile call termination is a monopoly and not one side of a two‐sided market. Cost‐based termination rates increase competition between operators and lead to lower prices, more subscribers and more investment.

The case of Namibia is presented as an example of termination rate benchmarking as an alternative regulatory strategy to overcome regulatory and institutional bottlenecks in Africa.

African regulators are presented with a tool for removing market distortions.

Cost based termination rates will lead to lower retail prices and allow more people to use mobile phones.

The paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence against the waterbed effect and the two‐sided market argument.

Digital disruption offers an innovative opportunity to address housing affordability issues through the use of market design theory and two-sided matching markets. The purpose of this paper is to scope a model for how “uberisation” can revolutionise the traditional apartment delivery model in Australia, leading to improved housing affordability.

This paper uses semi-structured interviews with operators of online real estate platforms and deliberative developers to examine how the principles of “uberisation”, that is two-sided matching markets, are driving innovation in the apartment supply process.

Findings confirm that real estate internet platforms and deliberative developers innovators are informed by the benefits of aggregating demand to reduce development risk, thus enabling apartments to be provided at a substantially lower price than by traditional methods.

The number of interviews is small reflecting the limited number of market actors currently engaged in the innovations investigated.

This research is innovative as it introduces theoretical understandings gained from market design theory and applies those concepts to disrupt the apartment development process.