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The purpose of this paper is to consider the difference in the development of the central bank in two states in transition from communism to capitalism and from being parts of the Soviet Union to being independent states.

Data and theoretical analysis were gathered from various sources in order to evaluate the approach to central banking taken by these two countries.

Substantial variations were found in the resulting monetary policies and rates of inflation which demonstrate the differences in the institutions developed and illustrate the importance of independence for the central bank.

The contrasting experience of Belarus and Estonia, both of which gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, provide examples of success and failure in this endeavor, thus providing valuable insight to those involved with transitioning economies.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the banking systems in Western, and Central and Southeastern Europe, focusing on the interactive factors of anti‐money laundering, transitional economies and the underground illicit economy.

Provides a comparative analysis of the banking systems in Western, and Central and Southeastern Europe.

The transition economies of central and Southeastern Europe face, and have been confronted for over a generation by, the interlinked problems of the transition stage post‐1989, the alternative or illegal economy, and the vulnerability of banking systems to money laundering. In contrast, by the 1990s, Western European central banks have become established as an essential government organ in macro‐economic policies.

Suggests an interesting lesson that might be gained from the experiences of central and Southeastern Europe and anti‐money laundering since the late‐1990s, where a national bank or central bank has not been essential, indeed has been comparatively unimportant, compared to the developed banking system led by the individual banks.

Purpose: This chapter discusses the need for climate change risk mitigation and why it is not the responsibility of Central Banks to mitigate climate change risk.

Methodology: This chapter uses critical discourse analysis to explain why central banks should not have the responsibility for climate change risk mitigation.

Findings: This chapter argues that the responsibility for managing climate change risk should lie with elected officials, other groups and institutions but not Central Banks. Elected officials, or politicians, should be held responsible to deal with the consequence of climate change events. Also, international organizations and everybody can take responsibility for climate change while the Central Bank can provide assistance – but Central Banks should not lead the climate policy making or mitigation agenda.

Implication: The policy implication is that the responsibility for climate change risk mitigation should be shifted to politicians who are elected officials of the people. Also, international climate change organizations or groups can take responsibility for mitigating the climate change risk of member countries. Finally, citizens in a country or region should have equal responsibility for climate change. Climate information should be provided to every citizen to help them prepare for future climatic conditions.

Originality: This chapter propagates the idea that Central Banks should take a lead role in dealing with the problems of climate change. This chapter is the first chapter to contest a Central Bank-led climate change risk mitigation agenda.

Aims to review the potential risks associated with the separation of banking regulation from the orbit of the central bank in Latin‐American and Caribbean countries (LAC).

Sets out information on the banking regulators in LAC and on the current degree of involvement of the central bank in banking regulation; the main monetary policy issues connected to the separation of banking regulation from the central bank; and the main banking regulation issues involved.

The separation of banking regulation from the central bank would not present any great danger to LAC currently. However, the need to conduct the move in accordance with best principles must be emphasized.

Given the fertile ground offered by the countries of LAC, this paper presents arguably the most comprehensive examination to date of this “hot potato”.

This paper examines the impact of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs), regulated stablecoins and tokenized traditional assets on the cryptocurrency market, following the guidelines set by the Basel Committee. This study aims to analyze the implications for secure storage, cross-border transfers and necessary investments.

The paper uses a policy analysis approach to assess the potential effects of the Basel Committee’s regulations on CBDCs, regulated stablecoins and tokenized traditional assets. It explores their impact on the cryptoasset market, strategies of central and commercial banks, payment systems and risk management.

The adoption of CBDCs, regulated stablecoins and tokenized traditional assets is expected to grow rapidly in the coming years. It raises concerns about secure storage, cross-border transfers and required investments. Central banks are likely to introduce CBDCs and authorize stablecoin issuance, aiming for efficient monetary policies and risk management. Basel III regulations may lead to asset tokenization by banks, reducing asset size and increasing fee-based income.

This paper provides insights into the potential impact of the Basel Committee's regulations on CBDCs, regulated stablecoins and tokenized traditional assets. It contributes to the understanding of the evolving cryptoasset market and the strategies of central and commercial banks in adopting these technologies. The findings offer valuable information for policymakers, regulators and market participants in navigating the changing landscape of digital assets.

This study attempts to quantify the degree of independence of Central Bank of India from both legal and behavioural contexts over the period 1990–1991 to 2018–2019, a period encompassing major developments in the operation and regulation of Reserve Bank of India (RBI).

We followed Jasmine et al. (2019) to calculate the magnitude of de jure independence of RBI and for de facto independence, “turnover rate (TOR) of CB governor” as proposed by Cukierman et al. (1992) is applied.

The results report that the legal autonomy of RBI increased specifically after the reforms and post formulation of Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). However, the actual independence of RBI remains more or less in line within the critical threshold limit of 0.2.

The study proposes effective implementation of laws and procedures designed to promote the independence of Central Bank of India imperative for an effective monetary operation along with a coordinated fiscal policy.

Targeted study of a particular central bank on its “independence” aspect in general and of the Reserve Bank of India in particular has not been attempted as on date. It is to this end that the present study contributes.

The peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/IJSE-02-2023-0098.

The Central Bank of Argentina began its activities in May 1935 surrounded by controversy. The Bank was created as a result of a mission led by the expert from the Bank of England, Sir Otto Niemeyer. The foreign involvement in the origins of the bank was not welcome to a good part of the Argentine society. Finally, the project for a central bank approved by the Argentine Congress was not the one proposed by Sir Otto Niemeyer, but a version of it that contained crucial modifications introduced by Raúl Prebisch. The aim of this work is to highlight Prebisch’s ideas on monetary and banking matters by analyzing the differences with the ideas of Sir Otto Niemeyer around monetary policy and the characteristics of the future Central Bank of Argentina. Even if there were almost no direct debates between them, there were different visions and indirect contentions that can be traced in the writings of both, which on the side of Prebisch were published in the Revista Económica del Banco de la Nación Argentina and some government documents, and on Niemeyer’s side can be traced in some writings and correspondence regarding his visit to Argentina, held in the archives of the Bank of England.

This chapter’s goal is to define the kind of seeds to be planted for moving forward in the safe and stable drive toward a leading central banking role directed at achieving a sustained Islamic banking and finance development within the global financial system. The system witnessed the input of Islamic banking with its fruitful contribution as a feasible banking structure in both implementing agreed reforms and shaping the next steps directed toward crisis prevention and crisis resolution.

The adopted approach is based upon scientific conceptual basis as well as the practical experience related to the central banking role and Islamic banking evolution. This chapter will define the strategic role of Central Banks and highlight the conceptual basis governing the leading role of central banks as well as the practical basis derived from our central banking and Islamic banking experience.

In light of the conceptual and practical basis for enabling an efficient and effective role of Central Banks as a regulatory body in shaping the future of the Islamic Financial System. Legal, institutional and managerial strategic determinants for this role have been defined.

The analytical work of this chapter crystallises in a pioneering initiative the main determining factors governing the role of central banks as the main regulatory body for Islamic banking, and how this role could be effective in affecting the future role to be played by the Islamic banks in the global financial system. Also, to this end, the integrated required role by central banks, public policies, multilateral institutions and Islamic banks are illustrated.

Energy and cooperative hard work and commitment from all players, including the regulators of Islamic banks supported by public policies, international and multilateral institutions and members of the Islamic banking family is thought to be the main determining factor for transforming the Islamic banking family into one that will make the Islamic people and all humanity – through the global financial system – live with more stability, welfare and happiness.

This chapter first reviews the current stages of retail CBDC development before examining some of the common characteristics of retail CBDC projects being proposed in various jurisdictions. This chapter then examines the possible future of retail CBDC going forward.