Data, Power, and Competition Law: The (Im)possible Mission of the DMA? ¹

Abstract

The attempt to establish a common European framework for core platforms' duties and responsibilities toward other actors in the digital environment is at the core of the recent scholarly debate surrounding the Digital Markets Act (DMA) proposal. In particular, the everlasting juxtaposition between the “data power” – as emerging from recent cases (Section 2) – that dominant tech companies enjoy and the concept of consumer sovereignty (Section 3) lies at the core of the proposal's attempt to identify digital core platforms as market gatekeepers. Accordingly, this chapter critically investigates the divide between power imbalance and consumer sovereignty in light of the architecture designed by the DMA, with a specific focus on its effectiveness in identifying gatekeepers' power drivers (Section 4). After highlighting the main critical aspects of the pertinent rules, opportunities for fruitful developments are then identified through the reframing of some of the notions considered in the proposal, and namely the role of “lock-in” effects and “data accumulation” (Section 5). Lastly, this chapter suggests that the DMA advancements – while desirable – are bound to be fragmentary in the absence of a wider appraisal of the nature of data power imbalance dynamics in the modern digital markets (Section 6).

Citation

Davola, A. and Malgieri, G. (2023), "Data, Power, and Competition Law: The (Im)possible Mission of the DMA? ¹ ", Fagan, F. and Langenfeld, J. (Ed.) The Economics and Regulation of Digital Markets (Research in Law and Economics, Vol. 31), Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 53-74. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-589520240000031003