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This paper aims to provide a proper understanding of corruption in the private sector, also known as the supply-side of corruption. It also presents the causes of corrupt practices and points out the corporations’ actions to mitigate corrupt behaviour in the business environment.

This study reviews the prior literature on the phenomenon of corruption in the private sector, its causes and the preventive measures that should be implemented.

Corruption in the private sector was associated with a firm’s interaction with the public sector, and the most common corruption in the private sector is grand corruption, which is improper contribution made to high-level public officials and politicians. The causes of corruption in the private sector can be explained from several dimensions: economy, psychosocial and legal and regulation. Preventative measures encompass both internal strategies, which are endogenous to business and external strategies like exogenous legislation and restrictions enforced by the government or outside organizations.

The efficient strategies in combating corruption need active cooperation and participation from the supply-side of corruption. Thus, this study contributes to the literature on the theoretical understanding of the corruption problem from the supply-side and responsibility play by the private sector in global anti-corruption initiatives.

This study aims to explore the spillover effects of supply chain corruption practices (SCCPs) on stock returns along the supply chain and within the industry. Specifically, it investigates how SCCPs affect the stock returns of corrupt firms' bystander supply chain partners and industry peers, both of which are not involved in the SCCPs.

The authors employ the event study methodology to quantify SCCPs' spillover effects in terms of abnormal stock returns. The analysis is based on 117 SCCPs occurring in China between 2014 and 2021.

The event study results show that SCCPs have negative effects on the stock returns of corrupt firms' bystander supply chain partners. Such negative effects are more pronounced for bystander buyers than bystander suppliers. However, SCCPs do not have a significant impact on the stock returns of corrupt firms' industry peers. Additional analysis further suggests that SCCPs are more likely to affect the stock returns of domestic rather than overseas bystander supply chain partners.

This study is the first attempt to thoroughly examine the spillover effects of SCCPs along the supply chain and within the industry, advancing the understanding of the financial consequences of SCCPs and providing important implications for future research and practices related to supply chain corruption.

This study aims to offer a better understanding of supply side of bribery and corruption in an international business perspective by conceptualizing it in the narrower concept of misconduct in business (MIB) derived from the deontological perspective to business ethics.

The authors use a case study methodology of professionals working within Canadian mining multinational corporations operating in Africa. The authors conducted 2 focus groups, 25 in-depth interviews, document search and an open-ended questionnaire to 15 professionals. Further, they drew on a combination of the classic relationalist sociological framework and its recent revision, that they named the relationalism-substantialism framework to analyze the data.

The triangulated empirical data show that the reason why MIB in the form of bribery supply occurs is not exclusively tied to any given perspective, whether the individual, the organization or the wider societal context. Rather, these different layers are tightly intertwined and interact with each other for the supply of bribery to occur.

Although the three siloed perspectives of MIB have been studied in the literature, they have not been addressed in relation to one another, and even less with a relationalism-substantialism framework. Yet, this perspective contributes compellingly to the understanding of the supply side in bribery. The authors propose a net of conceptually related constructs that intervene in the process of bribery supply occurrence, namely relationality influenced by institutional dysfunctionality and conflation and substantiality through agency and culture.

This paper aims to assess the role of secrecy jurisdictions in providing supply-side stimulants for illicit financial flows from developing countries and how the tax havens structures shape the role of actors. Specifically focussing on decades of trade liberalisation and markets, and of increasingly rapid movement of people, capital and information across regions and around the globe, the paper draws on the political economy theory of globalisation to illuminate the connections between capital flight, money laundering and global offshore financial centres (OFCs).

The paper uses publicly available evidence to shed light on the role played by tax havens in facilitating money laundering, capital flight and corruption. The issues are illustrated with the aid of case studies.

The evidence shows that, in pursuit of organisational and personal interest, the tax havens create enabling structures that support illicit activities of the political and economic elites from developing countries. The paper further argues that the supply-side of corruption severely limits the possibilities of preventing corruption in developing countries.

The paper uses publicly available evidence to illuminate the role played by OFCs in facilitating elite corruption and money laundering practices.

It is impossible to quantify the volume of money laundered, but it has been estimated that money laundering may account for as much as 5% of the world economy.

The paper, therefore, suggests that unless this supply-side of corruption is tackled there is little prospect for an end to aid dependency and the creation of economically stable and democratic states in developing countries.

The paper examines predatory practices of the international financial industry in tax havens and OFCs in facilitating money laundering, corruption and capital flight and the challenges posed for the economic development of developing countries.

This chapter discusses the special case of extractive industries in relation to susceptibility to corruption, especially in states with weak institutional and governance structures. The systemic nature of this corruption is shown in a vicious cycle of extractive resource dependency and corruption which reinforce each other. The chapter then concentrates on the supply side of corruption, and the role of the private sector with domestic and foreign natural resources companies feeding into systemic corruption. Corruption is underpinned by a high demand, high prices for extractive resources scenario, and mitigated by a low demand, low prices scenario. Transparency oriented, anticorruption measures may not be effective in their own right, but a low demand, low prices scenario could provide an opening for such measures to take root, with accompanying benefits to the citizens of resource rich states and their environment. This suggests taking a contingency approach to dealing with corruption.

Corruption is a phenomenon that is ubiquitous, but the extent and the form differ across countries. According to Transparency International, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in year 2001 varied from 0.4 to 9.9 (10 is completely corruption free). The average score for the 91 countries surveyed was 4.76 (with a standard deviation of 2.39). Why is there so much cross-country difference? Why are some countries virtually corruption free, but are others fraught with corruption?

This paper aims to review the latest management developments across the globe and pinpoint practical implications from cutting-edge research and case studies.

This briefing is prepared by an independent writer who adds their own impartial comments and places the articles in context.

This viewpoint paper concentrates on unpacking the causes of and solutions to private sector, business-to-business corruption. This type of corruption is caused by any combination of economic goals and pressures, a psychology of cultural acceptance, and ineffective legislative consequences. In particular, the authors advocate internal company-wide anti-corruption measures, which can self-regulate through robust corporate governance and reporting, through company leaders taking an ethical anti-corruption stance to lead by example, and through signing up to voluntary codes of practice that their employees get trained in.

The briefing saves busy executives and researchers’ hours of reading time by selecting only the very best, most pertinent information and presenting it in a condensed and easy-to-digest format.

While corruption has long been recognized as a destructive social problem, the subject has not yet been given much attention in the literature of the management of procurement of infrastructure projects in Ghana. The purpose of this paper is to explore and discuss corruption practices inherent in public procurement of infrastructural projects in Ghana with the aim of identifying corruption related challenges that must be addressed in order to actualize the expected economic gains of infrastructural projects.

Drawing extensively on existing literature and published data, the methodology adopted for the paper consisted of multi‐stage critical review of pertinent literature; review of 2007 Annual Report of the Public Procurement Authority and review of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act 663). The study assumes value‐laden axiological philosophy, where the values and experiences of the authors provided the basis for the discussion.

Conflict of interest, bribery, embezzlement, kickbacks, tender manipulation and fraud are observed corruption practices in the Ghanaian infrastructure projects delivery system. The severity of corruption practices have intensified the search for more innovative means of delivering infrastructure projects that will achieve value for money. In the pursuit to control corruption practices, this would require constitution of a sound procurement system and pro‐social equity policies that would foster good governance, corporate social responsibility, transparency, accountability, judicious public expenditure and national progress. The Public Procurement Act 2003 (Act 663) is observed to proffer solutions for these underlying constructs but not without challenges.

The nature of the research is review and explanatory without any empirical analysis to support the discussions and thus the results cannot be generalized on a broader context of public procurement practice in Ghana.

Implementation of sound procurement performance measurements would be imperative in the bid to curb corruption practices. The paper suggested a number of business approaches to combat corrupt practices in Ghana, which are explained in terms of political, psychological, technical, operational and retaliatory measures. In this paper, it is proposed that knowledge about and debating corruption related issues is just as important to the modern public procurement as are the abilities to creatively and logically introduce monitoring systems when planning, executing and completing projects.

The work is novel providing meaningful insights into conceptual basis for a detailed empirical analysis. Being a pioneering study, further research tailored to compare the extent of corruption practices in various sectors of the economy of Ghana would be novel.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the activities of tax havens in the global financial markets and explore their role in providing a supply‐side stimulant for corrupt practices. It aims to argue that the corruption debate needs to shift to a second phase in which the role of tax havens as supply‐side stimulants features more prominently.

Based on the author's original research into the practices and activities of tax havens, the paper explores the operational features of tax havens, with particular focus on their role in providing opaque and complex offshore structures through which illicit financial flows can be routed to disguise their origins, method of transfer and true beneficial ownership. The paper explores how bankers, lawyers and accountants create complex and opaque offshore structures to facilitate economic crime and impede investigation.

Despite severe limitations imposed by the absence of rigorously researched statistical data on capital flows into and out of tax havens, the paper argues that the available data support the view that tax havens have become prominent features of the globalised capital markets, and their activities create a criminogenic environment in which illicit financial flows are easily disguised and hidden amongst legitimate commercial transactions. The paper notes that effective remedies are available to reduce financial market opacity, but political will is lacking to take effective action.

This paper tackles a new and under‐researched subject. Drawing on the author's experiences of working on a prominent tax haven for a total of 14 years, the paper brings attention to the impact of tax havens on international development.