Search results

In this paper, the authors study the effect of consumers' fairness preferences on dynamic pricing strategies adopted by platforms in a non-cooperative game.

This study applies fair game and repeated game theory.

This study reveals that, in a one-shot game, if consumers have fairness preferences, dynamic prices will slightly decline. In a repeated game, dynamic prices will be reduced even when consumers do not have fairness preferences. When fairness preferences and repeated game are considered simultaneously, dynamic prices are most likely to be set at fair prices. The authors also discuss the effect of platforms' discounting factors, the consumers' income and alternative choices of consumption on the dynamic prices.

The study findings illustrate the importance of incorporating behavioral elements in understanding and designing the dynamic pricing strategies for platforms and the implications on social welfare in general.

The authors developed a theoretical model to incorporate consumers' fairness preference into the decision-making process of platforms when they design the dynamic pricing strategies.

This paper aims to examine the behavior of “rational” residential developers, under game theory, for their pricing strategy in a competitive environment.

Results show that residential developers cooperate implicitly for long-term benefit, leading to a slow-down in sales. Developers are motivated to deviate from cooperating at the beginning and at the end of successive periods in a sub-market. Relatively high profits, earnable in the first few periods, provide an allowance to undercut prices and improve sales. For the last few periods, the punishment for any deviation from cooperating is insignificant or zero. Note that the first-mover advantage in a new market is evident. On the effect of uncertainty on the developer’s residential prices, results show that as uncertainty increases, prices decrease while price variability increases.

This study highlights the merits of a uniquely simplified experimental research design for the strategic behavioral pricing of the private residential development market using a game theoretic approach.

This study enhances the understanding of the residential development strategy of developers in the residential development market.

There is limited research on pricing strategy for the private residential development market in Asia.

The development of the digital age has made data and information more transparent, enhancing the strategic perspectives of both buyers (strategic waiting) and sellers (price fluctuations) in their decision-making. This research investigates the optimal dynamic pricing strategy of the content product developer in relation to their consideration of consumer fairness concerns to elucidate the impact of consumer fairness concerns on the dynamic pricing strategy of the developer.

This paper assumes that monopolistic content developers implement a dynamic pricing strategy for the content product. Through constructing a two-period dynamic pricing game model, this research investigates the optimal decisions of the content developer, contingent upon their consideration or disregard of consumer fairness concerns. In the extension section, the authors additionally account for the influence of myopic consumers on these optimal decisions.

Our findings reveal that the degree of consumer fairness concerns significantly influences the developer’s optimal dynamic pricing decision. When a developer offers content products with lower depth, there is a propensity for the developer to refrain from incorporating consumer fairness concerns into a dynamic pricing strategy. Conversely, in cases where the developer offers a high-depth content product, consumer fairness concerns benefit the developer. Furthermore, our analysis reveals a consistent benefit for the developer from the inclusion of myopic consumers.

Few studies have delved into the conjoined influence of consumer fairness concerns and strategic behavior on dynamic pricing strategy. Our findings indicate that consumer fairness concerns can enhance the efficiency of the value chain for content products under specific conditions. This paper not only enriches the existing literature on dynamic pricing by incorporating consumer fairness concerns theoretically but also offers practical insights. The outcomes of this research can guide content product developers in devising optimal dynamic pricing strategies.

The problem of manufacturer-customer relationships is becoming the key factor of enterprise development, and the contradiction between manufacturer’s objective and customer’s satisfaction still exists. Customers claim for product safety from manufacturers, so manufacturers should take corporate social responsibility (CSR) into their company philosophy or even enhance the degree of CSR during their production. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influences of parameters on the stability of risk-averse complementary product manufacturers.

In this study, three dynamic game models are developed: manufacturer 1 – leader Stackelberg game model, manufacturer 2 – leader Stackelberg game model and Nash game model. Using bifurcation diagrams, the largest Lyapunov exponent, 0-1 test for chaos and parameter basin plots, the influences of parameters on the complex behaviors of the three models are analyzed.

The authors demonstrate that the system exists in deterministic chaos when the parameter exceeds a certain value. The lead manufacturer will not be a beneficiary in chaotic state, and when two manufacturers have the same status the stability of the system weakens, which renders it easily chaotic.

In this paper, the authors make some assumptions, which when applied broadly could lead to some findings.

The authors find that the lead manufacturer will derive the greatest profit and will exert the least effort compared with the follower manufacturer, but that both manufacturers will exert greater effort in the Nash game. The two manufacturers should be cautious while selecting the parameter ' s value so that the stability of the system is maintained.

The research will serve as a guide for the two complementary manufacturers in their decision-making process.

The originality and value of the research rest on the use of dynamic thinking in ensuring stability in the quality of complementary products considering the firms’ market powers. The research will serve as a guide for the two complementary manufacturers in their decision-making process.

A somewhat underappreciated aspect of the burgeoning rush to regional trade agreements (RTAs) is a discrepancy between the dispute settlement procedure (DSP) embodied in the original World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and that found in the language of many RTAs. This chapter explores the issue in the context of a dynamic repeated game of trade agreements. As is well known, the institutional alternatives available in negotiating multilateral freer trade agreements – regional agreements, side agreements, trade dispute settlement punishments, and so on – can proscribe the limits and shape the nature of self-enforcing trade agreements. Here, we suggest the extent to which deviations from the WTO DSP embodied in RTAs – for example, “private interest access,” “third party procedures,” and “choice of forum” – can not only work against the interests of “weaker parties” but furthermore undermine multilateral agreements closer to free trade.

The authors characterize the conditions under which a country may eventually split and when it splits within an infinite horizon multi-stage differential game.

In contrast to the existing literature, the authors do not assume that after splitting, players will adopt Markovian strategies. Instead, the authors assume that while the splitting country plays Markovian, the remaining coalition remains committed to the collective control of pollution and plays open-loop.

Within a full linear-quadratic model, the authors characterize the optimal strategies. The authors later compare with the outcomes of the case where the splitting country and the remaining coalition play both Markovian. The authors highlight several interesting results in terms of the implications for long-term pollution levels and the duration of coalitions under heterogenous strategies as compared to Markovian behavior.

In this paper, the authors have illustrated the richness of the simplications of enlarging the set of strategies in terms of the emergence of coalitions, their duration and the implied welfare levels per player. Varying only three parameters (the technological gap, pollution damage and coalition payoff share distribution across players), the authors have been able to generate, among other findings, quite different rankings of welfare per player depending on whether the remaining coalitions after split play Markovian or stay precommited to the pre-splitting period decisions.

This study investigates the conceptual and psychometric properties of trust in organizations. Critical review of recent literature led to the conclusion that there is no single agreed upon definition of trust and that controversy exists as to its construct validity. We present empirical results based on a complex procedure for scale development, which includes a design made up of four separate stages of research. The construct of trust in employment relationships was ultimately refined to entail three dimensions: harmony, reliability, and concern (HRC). The final results of this study led to the development of a standardized 16‐item instrument that can be used to measure trust in the context of employment relationships. Evidence of the scale’s reliability, factor structure, and validity is also presented.

In this paper, the authors look back at James March’s main contributions to the evolution of organizations and their decision-making. No other author in management science has been quoted as much. Yet, his view on these issues is often far removed from the dominant academic representations. This paper aims to evaluate the trace left by March for the future. His teachings remain of the utmost importance for both practitioners and academics in charge of modeling the real functioning of the organizations.

In this paper, the authors look back at James March’s main contributions to the evolution of organizations and their decision-making.

On the basis of an in-depth analysis of his study, the authors discuss the main concepts to which he has dedicated his life as a researcher. Whether it is for innovation and the process of exploration associated with it or for the ambiguity that persists in learning cycles, March always shows us the ambivalence of the concepts. The strength of March’s study is to encourage us to remain cautious in the diagnoses for the development of the companies by not venerating too strongly the notions seen exclusively as virtuous, such as innovation or by not too quickly condemning situations perceived as harmful, such as ambiguity. It is, therefore, subjective and unpredictable, making the idea of a unified theory of management inoperative (Joullié, 2018). March’s way of thinking is deeply postmodern in the sense of Foucault (1961), who saw the world as a representation.

For this kind of paper based on a James March study’s survey, the main limitation is the variety of research methodology mobilized. Empirical confirmation sometimes is missing or is too short. The study remains essentially speculative as to its influence on future research. Some concepts, such as the concept of effectuation, which is a direct extension of March’s study, deserve to be tested empirically and theoretically in greater depth to assess their robustness.

All managerial implications are concerned with organizational change. His teachings remain of the utmost importance for both practitioners and academics in charge of modeling the real functioning of the organizations.

Providing a guideline concerning research in the management of organizations. A better understanding of the real functioning of how decisions happen in companies, how they change in the real world.

The authors show that, contrary to the great paradigms of management sciences (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) developed since Taylor’s founding study, which remains performative in essence, March’s study initiates a viscerally postmodern vision of the organization. The authors believe that his contributions are essential because they are not based on a normative attempt to propose a universal theory but provide a compass that is essential to understanding how the organization study.

Working conditions, pay rates and the rights of workers to collectively negotiate have become important points of discussions in recent years, with support for unions and union applications rising to levels long unseen in America. In many instances, though, companies have responded aggressively. This is not the first time such a dynamic has played out in American business. This study aims to take a fresh look at one of America’s most prominent historical disputes between labor and ownership – the Homestead Massacre of 1892 – to glean lessons from that conflict that remain relevant to today’s business environment.

This study adopts game theory and the principles of repeated interaction to assess how differing discount factors led to differences in time orientations between the workers and the Carnegie company. These differing time orientations affected both the strategy each side deployed in the negotiations and the payoffs received by the parties. Letters, contemporary news reports and histories of the events leading up to and immediately following the 1892 Homestead Massacre are qualitatively analyzed with a genealogical pragmatic approach.

Differences in temporal orientation between management and workers exacerbated the conflict, with the workers adopting a more cooperative stance and distal time orientation, while the Carnegie company negotiated with a proximal time orientation and played to “win” a game that, in fact, could not be fully won or lost given its infinitely repeating nature. The result was a short-term victory for the Carnegie company but with long-term negative consequences that highlight the suboptimal outcome the company achieved by playing a proximal strategy in an infinite game.

Although the incident at Homestead is a well-studied labor dispute, many of the themes that preceded the incident have resurfaced in the modern work context. This work, by adopting game theory as an analytical framework, provides new insights into management mistakes that led to the labor conflict and lessons for what present-day managers can do to avoid exacerbating labor strife.