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The development of the digital age has made data and information more transparent, enhancing the strategic perspectives of both buyers (strategic waiting) and sellers (price fluctuations) in their decision-making. This research investigates the optimal dynamic pricing strategy of the content product developer in relation to their consideration of consumer fairness concerns to elucidate the impact of consumer fairness concerns on the dynamic pricing strategy of the developer.

This paper assumes that monopolistic content developers implement a dynamic pricing strategy for the content product. Through constructing a two-period dynamic pricing game model, this research investigates the optimal decisions of the content developer, contingent upon their consideration or disregard of consumer fairness concerns. In the extension section, the authors additionally account for the influence of myopic consumers on these optimal decisions.

Our findings reveal that the degree of consumer fairness concerns significantly influences the developer’s optimal dynamic pricing decision. When a developer offers content products with lower depth, there is a propensity for the developer to refrain from incorporating consumer fairness concerns into a dynamic pricing strategy. Conversely, in cases where the developer offers a high-depth content product, consumer fairness concerns benefit the developer. Furthermore, our analysis reveals a consistent benefit for the developer from the inclusion of myopic consumers.

Few studies have delved into the conjoined influence of consumer fairness concerns and strategic behavior on dynamic pricing strategy. Our findings indicate that consumer fairness concerns can enhance the efficiency of the value chain for content products under specific conditions. This paper not only enriches the existing literature on dynamic pricing by incorporating consumer fairness concerns theoretically but also offers practical insights. The outcomes of this research can guide content product developers in devising optimal dynamic pricing strategies.

This paper investigates the dynamic pricing strategy of a firm for the successive-generation products under the conditions of the limited trade-in duration and strategic customers. Further, it explores the effect of a limited trade-in duration on the choice of the myopic and strategic customers, besides the optimal dynamic pricing and trade-in strategy of the firm.

Based on the choice behavior of the myopic and strategic customers, the authors have developed a two-period game-theoretic analytical model to decide the optimal retail prices of the successive-generation products and the optimal trade-in rebate when the firm adopts a dynamic pricing strategy and then investigate three extensions of the basic model to discuss the change in the results owing to the relaxation of certain conditions.

The authors find from the results that, in terms of profit maximization, it is better to extend the limited trade-in duration, and hence, the firm should implement a dynamic pricing strategy. However, in the situation of using a static pricing strategy, the firm should extend the limited trade-in duration only if the incremental value of the new generation products is below a certain threshold. Moreover, the firm should use a dual rollover strategy instead of a single rollover one. If all customers in the market are myopic, then the firm should also extend the limited trade-in duration.

This study mainly discusses the impact of limited trade-in duration on the firm's dynamic pricing strategy when facing strategic customers, which provides several directions for future research. First, if the government offers subsidies to consumers, how will strategic consumers make purchase decisions? How would the enterprise make its pricing decision? Second, when asymmetric information exists between consumers and firms, how will it affect consumers' choice behavior and firms' pricing decisions? All these issues are worth exploring in the future.

These results offer certain managerial insights for the firm in the decision making on pricing within the trade-in program.

This is the first work to study the dynamic pricing strategy of the firm for the successive-generation products under the conditions of the limited trade-in duration and strategic customers. Further, this work discusses the changes in results owing to the relaxation of certain conditions.

The purpose of this paper is to (1) investigate the effect of freshness on consumers' willingness to pay, (2) derive static and dynamic pricing strategies and (3) compare the effect of these pricing strategies on a retailer's revenue and food waste. This investigation helps to reveal the potentials of dynamic pricing strategies for building more sustainable business models.

The authors conduct an online experiment to measure consumers' willingness to pay for fresh and three-days’ old strawberries. The impact of freshness on willingness to pay is analysed using univariate tests and regression analysis. Pricing strategies are compared using a Monte Carlo simulation.

The results of this study show that freshness largely determines consumers' willingness to pay and price sensitivity. This renders dynamic pricing a promising strategy from an economic point of view. The results of the simulation study show that food waste can be reduced by up to 53.6% with a dynamic pricing instead of a static pricing strategy in the case that there are as many consumers as strawberry packages in the inventory. Revenue can be increased by up to 10% compared to a static pricing strategy based on fresh strawberries.

This study suggests that food retailers can improve their revenue when switching from static to dynamic pricing. Furthermore, in most cases, food retailers can reduce food waste with a dynamic instead of a static-pricing strategy, which might help to improve their image through a more sustainable business model and attract additional consumers.

This study is the first to analyse the possibility of using food freshness to design a dynamic pricing strategy and to analyse the impact of such a pricing strategy on both, a retailer's revenue and a retailer's food waste.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a comprehensive analysis of dynamic pricing by Airbnb hosts.

This study uses attribute and sales information from 39,837 Airbnb listings and hotel data from 1,025 hotels across five markets to test different hypotheses which explore the extent to which Airbnb hosts use dynamic pricing and how their pricing strategies compare to those of hotels.

Airbnb is a unique and complex platform in terms of dynamic pricing where hosts make limited use of dynamic pricing strategies, especially as compared to hotels. Notwithstanding their limited use, hosts who own listings in high-demand leisure markets, manage entire places, manage more listings and have more experience vary prices the most.

This study identified a great need for Airbnb to encourage dynamic pricing among its hosts, but also warned of the potential perils of dynamic pricing in the sharing economy context. The findings also demonstrated challenges for hotel managers interested in actionable information related to Airbnb as a competitor.

This is the first Airbnb study to use a comprehensive set of data over a continuous period in multiple markets to look at a number of listing and host factors and determine their relation with dynamic pricing strategies.

In this paper, the authors study the effect of consumers' fairness preferences on dynamic pricing strategies adopted by platforms in a non-cooperative game.

This study applies fair game and repeated game theory.

This study reveals that, in a one-shot game, if consumers have fairness preferences, dynamic prices will slightly decline. In a repeated game, dynamic prices will be reduced even when consumers do not have fairness preferences. When fairness preferences and repeated game are considered simultaneously, dynamic prices are most likely to be set at fair prices. The authors also discuss the effect of platforms' discounting factors, the consumers' income and alternative choices of consumption on the dynamic prices.

The study findings illustrate the importance of incorporating behavioral elements in understanding and designing the dynamic pricing strategies for platforms and the implications on social welfare in general.

The authors developed a theoretical model to incorporate consumers' fairness preference into the decision-making process of platforms when they design the dynamic pricing strategies.

Under the carbon regulation mechanism, managing operational strategies is a challenging task. Green innovation is introduced into a hybrid system of manufacturing and remanufacturing to handle the carbon emission constraints in a dynamic market environment. This paper aims to investigate the joint dynamic green innovation policy and pricing strategies in a hybrid manufacturing and remanufacturing system.

This paper first considers a monopolistic manufacturer who offers brand-new products and remanufactured items at the same price to consumers. Subsequently, the authors extend their analyses to distinct pricing strategies for both newly manufactured products and refurnished ones in such a hybrid system. Two different cases are considered: a loose carbon emission constraint and a binding carbon emission constraint. By solving the dynamic optimization problem, the differential game and Pontryagin’s maximum principle are used to obtain the joint green innovation and pricing strategies.

The retail price first increases then declines over a single period. The green innovation diminishes in the same pricing decision model, while it first increases then declines in a distinct pricing decision model over a single planning horizon. The green innovation investment as well as the retail price are discouraged by an emission cap and recycling fraction. The distinct retail price fluctuates violently, and they are, in descending order of the highest peak price as follows: the newly manufactured product, the same pricing product and the repaired product. Carbon emission caps that are either too high or too low decrease the revenue of the manufacturer. A small emission constraint margin benefits the manufacturer. The recycling policy, as well as other parameters, affects whether the hybrid system attains the carbon emission constraint or not, which suggests that the recycling policy is complementary to the carbon emission constraint mechanism in the hybrid system.

These results offer managerial implications to the hybrid system in terms of green innovation, pricing strategies and recycling policy.

This paper is among the first papers to research the joint dynamic green innovation policy and pricing strategies with/without a carbon emission constraint in a hybrid manufacturing and remanufacturing system with a differential game. Moreover, this paper presents a potential way of investigating other common resource constraints by a differential game in a manufacturing/remanufacturing system or closed loop supply chain.

The purpose of this paper is to show how yield management and dynamic pricing, which originated in the airline industry, are now diffusing in other service industries. The aim is to demonstrate that these techniques can be profitably applied to telecommunications and similar sectors and to examine the particular conditions of their implementation, development and efficiency.

The main concepts of yield management, dynamic pricing and CRM are carefully scrutinized. Also discussed is the concept of natural demand curve that aims at reaching a better compromise between the capacity of a company and the demand in an environment where services cannot be sold in advance. In order to sustain the analysis and demonstrate its managerial implications, five case studies are presented that exemplify some aspects of yield management techniques in the telecommunication sector.

Since the telecommunications are undergoing a process of increased competition and dynamic convergence, yield management techniques can help telecom operators to optimize the benefits they can derive from a subtle management of information networks and partnerships. However, such an approach is more difficult to implement in the telecommunication industry than in the airlines sector because of the difficulty to control (and sometimes refuse) network access to customers.

Capacity and revenue management become critical differentiation factors in improving service quality, loyalty and profitability. Given the increase in competitive pressure, the main objective of operators to sell customer access database to potential partners represents a radical change in the nature of financial and information flows and leads to a “customized management of services supply”.

The purpose of this paper is to understand differences between open-book accounting (OBA) using static prices and OBA using dynamic prices. The authors identify how these differences influence various aspects of customer–supplier relationships.

This paper is based on a case study involving a builders’ merchant and a wood manufacturer in the UK. The builders’ merchant under discussion has recently outsourced part of its production to the aforementioned wood manufacturer by using OBA with dynamic prices. For this case study, the authors have conducted interviews with multiple people from both parties in the agreement. Additional illustrative cases are provided through a study of other qualitative papers on OBA.

The authors find evidence supporting that, when dynamic prices are used in OBA, risk (unpredictability) is shifted from the supplier to the customer. Also, the customer frequently focuses on the supplier’s costs, both parties often aim for a long-term relationship and the customer becomes more dependent on the supplier, causing high interdependence. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that the customer finds price less important, and the reallocation of activities between the customer and supplier is easier in OBA setups in which dynamic prices are used.

This paper provides the first study of how differences between dynamic and static prices in OBA influence the customer–supplier relationship. This paper adds to the developing literature on OBA, in particular, as well as to literature on pricing, in general.

This study aims to adopt illusion of control and lateral consumer relationship in order to investigate their effects on price fairness in online auction and group buying context. These two variables have been known to have strong influences in fairness perception on consumers' decision‐making processes and outcomes.

The authors draw their conceptual foundations from previous studies, supplement this from the electronic commerce literature, and test the model through laboratory experiments.

The study demonstrates that consumers' perception on illusion control in price determination and advantageous lateral consumer relationship significantly affect price fairness perception in both the online auction and group buying environments.

The findings are expected to provide researchers with useful insights to conduct future studies on uncovering the nomological networks associated with price fairness perception.

The findings are expected to help managers develop better pricing strategies and design effective dynamic pricing mechanisms.

The paper provides the first integrated perspective on the human decision processes in the dynamic pricing environment in electronic markets.

When the price is right, profits follow.