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Documents on Modern History of Economic Thought: Part C
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-0-76230-998-6

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Article
Publication date: 8 November 2013

Priyodorshi Banerjee

To analyse the implications of signs of reform modification, stoppage or reversal, such as price controls, that have emerged in many developing economies, it is necessary…

Abstract

Purpose

To analyse the implications of signs of reform modification, stoppage or reversal, such as price controls, that have emerged in many developing economies, it is necessary to understand their efficiency consequences. This paper aims to study the effect of price interventions in imperfectly competitive product markets, to investigate whether reforms reversals are necessarily harmful.

Design/methodology/approach

The model assumes firm set prices and face sunk costs of entry.

Findings

The paper shows that a minimum price can induce a Pareto improvement, by preventing price wars and encouraging entry. The result is supported by empirical evidence from some developed economies, holds when sunk cost vanishes, and is robust to some extensions. A fixed price may be optimal in the environment investigated.

Originality/value

The results may be of interest to theorists and policy-makers interested in imperfectly competitive markets.

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Indian Growth and Development Review, vol. 6 no. 2
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 1753-8254

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Article
Publication date: 1 May 1997

Anghel N. Rugina

The equation of unified knowledge says that S = f (A,P) which means that the practical solution to a given problem is a function of the existing, empirical, actual…

Abstract

The equation of unified knowledge says that S = f (A,P) which means that the practical solution to a given problem is a function of the existing, empirical, actual realities and the future, potential, best possible conditions of general stable equilibrium which both pure and practical reason, exhaustive in the Kantian sense, show as being within the realm of potential realities beyond any doubt. The first classical revolution in economic thinking, included in factor “P” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of a model of ideal conditions of stable equilibrium but neglected the full consideration of the existing, actual conditions. That is the main reason why, in the end, it failed. The second modern revolution, included in factor “A” of the equation, conceived the economic and financial problems in terms of the existing, actual conditions, usually in disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium (in case of stagnation) and neglected the sense of right direction expressed in factor “P” or the realization of general, stable equilibrium. That is the main reason why the modern revolution failed in the past and is failing in front of our eyes in the present. The equation of unified knowledge, perceived as a sui generis synthesis between classical and modern thinking has been applied rigorously and systematically in writing the enclosed American‐British economic, monetary, financial and social stabilization plans. In the final analysis, a new economic philosophy, based on a synthesis between classical and modern thinking, called here the new economics of unified knowledge, is applied to solve the malaise of the twentieth century which resulted from a confusion between thinking in terms of stable equilibrium on the one hand and disequilibrium or unstable equilibrium on the other.

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International Journal of Social Economics, vol. 24 no. 5
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0306-8293

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Book part
Publication date: 16 October 2007

Richard E. Just and Gordon C. Rausser

The lens used by the courts and much of the antitrust literature on predatory selling and/or buying is based on partial equilibrium methodology. We demonstrate that such…

Abstract

The lens used by the courts and much of the antitrust literature on predatory selling and/or buying is based on partial equilibrium methodology. We demonstrate that such methodology is unreliable for assessments of predatory monopoly or monopsony conduct. In contrast to the typical two-stage dynamic analysis involving a predation period followed by a recoupment period, we advance a general equilibrium analysis that demonstrates the critical role of related industries and markets. Substitutability versus complementarity of both inputs and outputs is critical. With either monopolistic or monopsonistic market power (but not both), neither predatory overselling nor predatory overbuying is profitably sustainable. Two-stage predation/recoupment is profitable only with irreversibility in production and cost functions, unlike typical estimated forms from the production economic literature. However, when the market structure admits both monopolistic and monopsonistic behavior, predatory overbuying can be profitably sustainable while overselling cannot. Useful distinctions are drawn between contract versus non-contract markets for input markets.

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Research in Law and Economics
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-84950-455-3

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Book part
Publication date: 12 November 2014

Camille Cornand and Frank Heinemann

In this article, we survey experiments that are directly related to monetary policy and central banking. We argue that experiments can also be used as a tool for central…

Abstract

In this article, we survey experiments that are directly related to monetary policy and central banking. We argue that experiments can also be used as a tool for central bankers for bench testing policy measures or rules. We distinguish experiments that analyze the reasons for non-neutrality of monetary policy, experiments in which subjects play the role of central bankers, experiments that analyze the role of central bank communication and its implications, experiments on the optimal implementation of monetary policy, and experiments relevant for monetary policy responses to financial crises. Finally, we mention open issues and raise new avenues for future research.

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Experiments in Macroeconomics
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78441-195-4

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Article
Publication date: 30 October 2018

Marjan Raoufinia, Vahid Baradaran and Reza Shahrjerdi

The purpose of this study is to analyze comparatively the properties of open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in a dynamic oligopoly model with price dynamics and reflexive…

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to analyze comparatively the properties of open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in a dynamic oligopoly model with price dynamics and reflexive behavior of market agents.

Design/methodology/approach

To consider dynamic competitive markets, the authors focus on a differential game theory in oligopolistic structures, using analytical models to illustrate how advertising effort, good differentiation and price stickiness interact simultaneously in the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibria. The comparative assessment of these equilibria obtains some significant results.

Findings

An optimization model that enriches the continuous time is presented. Under the open-loop and the closed-loop, Nash equilibrium showed an increase in the total output, advertising in price stickiness and promotional efficiency, while there was a decrease in product differentiation and advertising promotional efficiency. However, the open-loop equilibrium levels are larger than the closed-loop equilibrium. Under the closed-loop information, the long-run equilibrium was faster than the opened-loop in a dynamic oligopoly. The graphical illustration was used to present the behavior of the model parameters.

Practical implications

This study helps managers to choose an appropriate price and advertising adjustment to maximize profit. The obtained results may help firms to make the smart decision and may provide managers the valuable tool for making decisions in the competitive market environments.

Originality/value

This is a first attempt to analyze a dynamic oligopoly in the differentiated market environment. It considers a joint action of the output and advertising in shaping the closed-loop and the open-loop equilibria with N competitors in a dynamic competitive setting.

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Kybernetes, vol. 48 no. 3
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0368-492X

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Book part
Publication date: 16 January 2014

Martin Sefton and Ping Zhang

We compare allocation rules in uniform price divisible-good auctions. Theoretically, a “standard allocation rule (STANDARD)” and a “uniform allocation rule (UNIFORM)”…

Abstract

Purpose

We compare allocation rules in uniform price divisible-good auctions. Theoretically, a “standard allocation rule (STANDARD)” and a “uniform allocation rule (UNIFORM)” admit different types of low-price equilibria, which are eliminated by a “hybrid allocation rule (HYBRID).” We use a controlled laboratory experiment to compare the empirical performances of these allocation rules.

Design/methodology/approach

We conduct three-bidder uniform price divisible-good auctions varying the different allocation rules (standard, uniform, or hybrid) and whether or not explicit communication between bidders is allowed. For the case where explicit communication is allowed we also study six-bidder auctions.

Findings

We find that prices are similar across allocation rules. Under all three allocation rules, prices are competitive when bidders cannot explicitly communicate. With explicit communication, prices are collusive, and we observe collusive prices even when collusive agreements are broken. Collusive agreements are particularly fragile when the gain from a unilateral deviation is larger, and an implication of this is that collusive agreements are more robust under STANDARD.

Research limitations/implications

We do not find conclusive evidence of differences in performance among allocation rules. However, there is suggestive evidence that STANDARD may be more vulnerable to collusion.

Originality/value

Divisible-good uniform price auctions are used in financial markets, but it is not possible to use naturally occurring data to test how alternatives to the standard format would perform. Using laboratory methods we provide an initial test of alternative allocation rules.

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Experiments in Financial Economics
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78350-141-0

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Book part
Publication date: 2 June 2008

Didier Laussel and Raymond Riezman

We develop a simple two-country model of international trade that assumes that there is a fixed cost of doing international trade. We show that this leads to multiple…

Abstract

We develop a simple two-country model of international trade that assumes that there is a fixed cost of doing international trade. We show that this leads to multiple equilibria that can be Pareto-ranked. We examine the stability properties of these equilibria.

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Contemporary and Emerging Issues in Trade Theory and Policy
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-84950-541-3

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Book part
Publication date: 12 November 2014

John Duffy and Daniela Puzzello

We study a microfounded search model of exchange in the laboratory. Using a within-subjects design, we consider exchange behavior with and without an intrinsically…

Abstract

We study a microfounded search model of exchange in the laboratory. Using a within-subjects design, we consider exchange behavior with and without an intrinsically worthless token object. While these tokens have no redemption value, like fiat money they may foster greater exchange and welfare via the coordinating role of having prices of goods in terms of tokens. We find that welfare is indeed improved by the presence of tokens provided that the economy starts out with a supply of such tokens. In economies that operate for some time without tokens, the later surprise introduction of tokens does not serve to improve welfare. We also explore the impact of announced changes in the economy-wide stock of tokens (fiat money) on prices. Consistent with the quantity theory of money, we find that increases in the stock of money (tokens) have no real effects and mainly result in proportionate changes to prices. However, the same finding does not hold for decreases in the stock of money.

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Experiments in Macroeconomics
Type: Book
ISBN: 978-1-78441-195-4

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Article
Publication date: 1 January 1987

R. Rothschild

In 1933, Edward H. Chamberlin published the Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1962). The work, based upon a dissertation submitted for a PhD degree in Harvard University…

Abstract

In 1933, Edward H. Chamberlin published the Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1962). The work, based upon a dissertation submitted for a PhD degree in Harvard University in 1927 and awarded the David A. Wells prize for 1927–28, has since become a milestone in the development of economic thought. Its impact on industrial organisation theory, general equilibrium and welfare economics, international trade theory and, to a greater or lesser degree, all other branches of economic analysis, has been pervasive and enduring. The ideas set out in the book have been developed, expanded and refined in ways too numerous to be identified precisely, and the books and articles which take Chamberlin's contribution as a starting point arguably exceed in number those on any other single subject in the lexicon of economics.

Details

Journal of Economic Studies, vol. 14 no. 1
Type: Research Article
ISSN: 0144-3585

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