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Terrorism has historically been spawned by inequitable, unjust systems with inadequate democratic options to articulate popular aspirations and ensure conflict resolution. The event of September 11, 2001 changed it all when terrorism hit the center of the increasingly globalized post-Cold War international system. The 9/11 incident has played as the role of a catalyst in initiating joint governmental policies to combat international terrorism both in India and the USA. After the incident, the former US President, George W. Bush, announced to the world community to fight against international terrorism collectively on the basis of a zero-tolerance policy. India has been the victim of cross-border terrorism promoted by Pakistan for a long time. India is the world’s largest democracy and one of its fastest-growing economics. Due to the recurrence of terrorist attacks, its security system and its socioeconomic structure have had to face tremendous pressure. Just after the 9/11 incident (attack on WTC) world’s largest (India) and oldest (USA) democracies have come closer to jointly fight against international terrorism. Both al-Qaida and the Taliban were the common enemies for Washington and New Delhi. At the governmental level, a number of policies and working groups have been organized by the two countries in order to diminish global terrorism. This chapter intends to explore the effects of joint governmental policies by India and the USA for combating international terrorism.

Terrorism has been practiced for centuries in different countries throughout the globe. The international struggle against terrorism started in the early part of the last century, and in 1937, the League of Nations concluded a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism. It is now well established in customary international law that since piracy, slavery, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are so terrible and affect the peace, tranquility, and security of all States, any State has the right to try persons for these crimes, irrespective of their nationality or where the crime was committed. This is known as universal jurisdiction. Terrorism is not quite in that category, one reason being the lack of international agreement on a comprehensive definition of terrorism. Instead, universal treaties adopted by the United Nations (UN) specializes agencies and, more recently Chapter VII measures of the UN Secretary Council, have been the means by which international law contributes to the struggle against terrorism. This aspect is discussed in a Section. Besides, today, the impact of terrorism in maintaining law and order, in assuring peace and tranquility to law-abiding citizenry and in harnessing growth and development, both at the national and international level, is quite grave, gloomy, and alarming. Global terrorism has, in fact, become an unprecedented challenge to the human civilization itself. The present chapter tries to examine the nature of terrorism at the global level with special reference to India and proposes for formation of international laws and co-ordinations to combat it.

This study aims to examine the impact of terrorism on risk perception and travel behaviour of the Dutch market towards Sri Lanka.

The research process involved an online self-administered method created with one of the leading research and web-based survey tools called Qualtrics. The questionnaire was filled in by 328 respondents.

Findings indicate that Sri Lankan is perceived to be a relatively safe destination. However, the likeliness of visiting the country is unlikely. The respondents with past travel experience (PTE) perceive Sri Lanka to be safer than those without PTE and are more likely to revisit. Male respondents have a higher safety perception of Sri Lanka than women. Most of the respondents see Sri Lanka as an attractive destination and would consider travelling there with children.

The majority of the respondents are female and aged between 18 to 29 years old. The majority of the respondents’ children were already 19 or older and not accompanying their parents on holiday. This study has managerial implications for Sri Lanka’s tourism board that could work on developing a marketing strategy that focusses on promoting Sri Lanka as a safe destination in combination with all the other unique selling points.

To the best of author’s knowledge, no analysis has been so far published with a focus on the impact of terrorism on risk perception and attitudes of the Dutch tourist towards Sri Lanka. The aim of this paper is to close the existing gap in the literature and to provide valuable knowledge on the influence of terrorism on risk perception and attitudes of the Dutch tourists’ travel behaviour towards Sri Lanka as a destination.

This article explores the ways in which hegemony and power impact on the emergence, development and conflict management function of regional organizations. It compares the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), both of which include a strong regional power. These powers have contrasting postures: South Africa is a keen regionalist, a reluctant hegemon and a pacific power, whereas India is a keen hegemon, a reluctant regionalist and a militarist power. The presence of the hegemon has stimulated regionalism in Southern Africa but retarded regionalism in South Asia. Despite these differences, SADC and SAARC have similarly failed to manage regional conflict effectively. This has been due in large measure to the conflictual relationship between the hegemon and another powerful state in each region, Zimbabwe in the case of South Africa, and Pakistan in the case of India. Some of these dynamics are well explained by neorealist theory, but other dynamics are best explained by constructivist and liberal positions. This supports the argument by Katzenstein and Okawara (2001–2002) that in the field of international relations an eclectic analytical approach is required to comprehend complex processes that combine material, ideational, international, domestic, contemporary and historical factors.

The purpose of this paper is to examine how security-related issues affect business in an integrated economic space. North America is an interesting case, as Canada and the USA have historically been highly integrated economies.

Research that focuses on the relationship between security and business is reviewed. First, the perception of security issues by business leaders is examined. Second, the North American case is discussed.

In the decade following 9-11, not all industries felt the aftermath in the same way, and business leaders from Canada and the USA did not necessarily focus on the same priorities. A thickening border is increasingly challenging for firms even though they have historically coped somewhat efficiently.

This paper has implications for integrated economies. Policymakers need to frame their response to security issues in a way that takes into account their effect on trade and firms.

Given terrorism’s impact on industries, the differences in priority ascribed to the issue by executives and the varying responses to address the problem, ensuring the ongoing gains from transborder business activity, requires creative solutions.

The effect of security on business is seldom studied. This paper provides a vivid example of the interplay between these two critical elements. This renewed understanding allows policymakers and business executives to find a common ground so that security issues are not dealt with at the expense of firms and cross-border trade.

The independence of India from the British Empire was marked by its partition into two countries, viz India and Pakistan. As a corollary to independence and partition of India, 500‐odd princely states which had direct relationship with the British Empire were required to integrate with either India or Pakistan — the successor states. The process of integration of princely states was not without its highs and lows. Some of the princely states, like Hyderabad, Junagarh and Jammu and Kashmir, posed quite a few problems at the time of integration for several reasons, namely the inclination of its rulers, the religious component of the local population and the competing interests of the two successor states, India and Pakistan. Hyderabad and Junagarh were favourably resolved in India's favour. Integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India was not a smooth affair. It was only after Pakistan‐aided forces including the Pakistan army had invaded Jammu and Kashmir that the then ruler of Jammu and Kashmir signed the instrument of accession in India's favour. With the instrument of accession, India had a locus standi to protect its territory in Jammu and Kashmir by military means. The salvage operation of throwing the Pakistan‐aided forces and Pakistan military out of Jammu and Kashmir could not be accomplished fully, because India agreed that the United Nations, to which the Kashmir dispute was to be referred, would help in the resolution of the Kashmir issue within the accepted legal framework which was in India's favour. However, India's experience with the United Nations was a great disappointment. In fact India had put so much faith in the United Nations that it even agreed to a plebiscite in Kashmir for resolving the dispute, subject to the condition that Pakistan vacated the illegally occupied areas of Jammu and Kashmir. India need not have agreed to a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir, but it did so because of its abiding faith in democratic principles, notwithstanding the legal framework on the basis of which the integration of other princely states with the successor states was carried out. To date, Pakistan has not vacated what is today called ‘Pakistan‐occupied Kashmir’. On top of that, in 1962 China gobbled up a large part of Kashmir in the north‐east, on the basis of a boundary dispute which it raised with India and which has yet to be resolved. To make matters still worse and more complicated, Pakistan ceded a part of Pakistan‐occupied territory to China. Thus the situation, as of today, is that 45.7 per cent of the 222,336 sq. km area of Jammu and Kashmir is with India, 35.1 per cent is with Pakistan and 19.2 per cent is with China. Apart from a war with China, two more full‐scale wars have been fought with Pakistan over Kashmir; the 1965 war, which was confined to the western theatre, and the 1971 war. The 1965 war was a short one and through the Soviet Union's mediation, an agreement was arrived at which was to no one's advantage and more or less restored the status quo ante. Following the 1971 war with Pakistan, India was in an advantageous position, because East Pakistan had ceded from West Pakistan and emerged as an independent country, the two‐nation theory to which Pakistan subscribed as the basis for partition of India into two successor states of India and Pakistan had been exploded; India had 90,000 Pakistan prisoners of war and it had also made large gains on the western front by occupying certain strategic positions. It was from this position of strength in 1971 that India decided that the Kashmir dispute had to be resolved bilaterally by India and Pakistan without any foreign intervention; a doctrine to which Pakistan subscribed at that point of time. In fact, India approached the bilateral talks between the two countries in a spirit of magnanimity. As a first step, India decided to return to Pakistan 90,000 prisoners of war. It agreed to a fresh demarcation of the Line of Control (including withdrawal from several strategic positions) on the unwritten understanding that this Line of Control, over a period of time, based on good neighbourly relations with Pakistan — supplemented by economic ties — would ultimately result in its becoming a de jure border from a de facto border with Pakistan; though the officially stated position continues to be that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. The 1971 agreement with Pakistan, which is also called the ‘Shimla Agreement’, thus constitutes the principal plank for the settlement of the Kashmir issue with Pakistan on a bilateral basis.