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Despite scholarly effort to understand customers’ recovery evaluation, little progress is evident in deciphering how customers develop online failure/recovery perception. This paper aims to address this issue.

Social constructivism was the epistemic choice for this study. This approach is holistic and offers a comprehensive understanding of each side of the phenomena. This provided social scientific descriptions of people and their cultural bases and built on, and articulated what was implicit in interpretations of their views.

Online banking customer groups were identified as: exigent customers, solutionist customers and impulsive customers. Customers’ position in each group determined failure perception, recovery expectation and evaluation, and post-recovery behaviour. Comparisons were observed and discussed in relation to Albania and Kosovo. It was suggested that banks should expand their presence in social media platforms and offer a means to manage online customer communication and spread of online WOM.

For exigent customers, the failure/recovery responsibility is embedded within the provider. This explains their high sensitivity and criteria to define a failure.

Online banking customers’ request of a satisfactory recovery experience included: customer notifications, customer behaviour, customer determination, and the mediator of request. 10;Providers should examine customer failure/recovery experiences in cooperation with other banks which should lead to a higher order understanding of customer withdrawal and disengagement activities.

Post-recovery behaviour is linked to the decline of online banking usage, switching to new providers, and the spread of negative online and off-line word-of-mouth.

This is the first empirical study on online service failure and recovery strategy to provide information on customers’ unique preferences and expectations in the recovery process. Online customers are organised into a threefold customer typology, and explanation for the providers’ role in the online customer failure-recovery perception construct is presented.

Motivated by agency theory, this paper aims to explore the impact of bank diversification and bank independency on the likelihood of bank failure. The effects of corporate governance (ownership and board structures) are also examined.

Logistic regressions are used to explore the role of corporate governance on bank failure risk. This sample covers 608 banks from eight European countries.

The results suggest that the well-documented finding that diversification and bank independency may increase bank failure risk does not persist under strong corporate governance mechanism. Thus, to reduce the bank failure risk, diversification should be strongly monitored by the management to avoid excessive risk-taking by shareholders.

The approach used in this study differs from that used in previous studies from certain perspectives. First, unlike most previous studies that focused on the relationship between bank performance and bank diversification, the impact of income and asset diversification on bank failure is tested. Also, the impact of a combined effect of diversification and corporate governance variables on bank failure is tested. This allows the control for different ownership and board variables as factors that would potentially affect the likelihood of bank failure.

This paper aims to examine the characteristics of banks that were the target of intervention in the form of bailout or failure during the financial crisis and, of those subjected to intervention, what characteristics distinguish those that received bailout funds from those that were deemed failures.

The study estimates a series of logit regressions in an effort to identify the causes of regulatory intervention while controlling for bank-level characteristics and the economic and regulatory environment.

The empirical results indicate that many of the same characteristics associated with banks receiving bailout funds are similar to the characteristics associated with failed banks. However, non-performing loans increased the likelihood of failure, but reduced the likelihood of a bank receiving Capital Purchase Program (CPP) funds, suggesting that regulatory authorities discriminated in their use of CPP funds based on the quality of a bank’s asset portfolio. Further, those banks located in states with limits on de novo branching and those banks that are part of a multi-bank holding company structure were less likely to fail but were more likely to receive CPP funds.

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of regulatory intervention in the banking industry during the late 2000s financial crisis and the impact of different banking organizational structures, economic circumstances, and financial fragility on the likelihood of a bank failing or receiving bailout funds.

This paper aims to examine the impact of charter type (national vs state), holding company structure, and measures of bank fragility on the likelihood of bank failure during the late 2000s financial crisis.

The study estimates a series of logit regressions in an effort to identify the causes of failure and assess the role of the bank‐level characteristics while controlling for the economic and regulatory environment.

The empirical results indicate that established institutions were more likely to fail, dependent upon whether a bank received bailout funds or not, if they were relatively large, had relatively low capital ratios, had relatively low liquidity, relied more heavily on brokered deposits, held a relatively large portfolio of real estate loans, had a relatively large proportion of non performing loans, and had less income diversity. Consistent with being financially fragile, de novo banks and those banks that grew substantially prior to the crisis faced an increased likelihood of failure relative to established banks. However, capital levels were not significantly related to the likelihood of failure in de novo institutions.

This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the possible business models' impact on the likelihood of failure during the recent financial crisis. It contributes to the ongoing debate regarding appropriate regulatory reform in the banking industry by shedding light on the extent to which the business model decisions made by bank managers have an impact on the stability of the banking system.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the causes behind the failures of virtual banks. This work underscores the importance of the differing financial metrics in the virtual and brick and mortar banking channels, when analyzing bank failures.

“Probit” analysis on the failed virtual banks and the failed brick and mortar banks revealed that the interest incomes in both banks are significantly different. The non‐interest income and non‐interest expense (NIE) of the surviving banks and the failed banks are explored to examine the causes for failure.

Similar to previous research it was found that the brick and mortar banks failed due to bad asset quality, but the failure of virtual banks is mainly due to high NIEs. For virtual banks to succeed, the institutions must focus on controlling the burden.

A larger sample size would have been preferable and non‐availability of data limited the scope of the study. Continuing studies could explore the performance of Internet channels of existing brick and mortar banks.

This study accentuates the importance of the differing business models underlying the two banking channels (virtual banks and brick and mortar banks). These channel specific differences underscore the significance of the financial metrics in operational evaluation.

This is probably the first study to examine the causes of failures of virtual banks and contrast them with brick and mortar banks.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the determinants of the timing of bank failure in North Cyprus over the period of 1984‐2002 using a discrete‐time logistic survival analysis.

The empirical methodology employed in the paper allows for the determination of the factors that influence the time to bank failure. The model links the time of bank failure to a set of bank‐specific factors and macro‐environment that may have exacerbated the internal troubles of the financial institutions.

An empirical examination of the results on survival analysis reveal that the three variables, namely: low asset quality (total loan as a percentage of total assets), low liquidity (total liquid asset as a percentage of total assets), and high credit extended to the private sector (ratio of the private credit to gross domestic product) are the main factors that explain the survival time of banks in North Cyprus.

For further research this paper may better distinguish time to bank failure if it extends the time period and if it uses exchange pressure from Turkey that may have a direct effect on bank failure in North Cyprus.

Nowadays bank failure is an important problem in the world. Using time technique to investigate bank failure will help to learn the factors that determine time to bank failure, which will further help to take precautions and prevent the cost of bank failure.

The analysis would appear to be the first to provide evidence and investigate the time to bank failure in the North Cyprus banking sector.

The late 2000s Great Recession led to a surge of bank failures in the USA with nearly 300 banks failing from 2009 to 2010. Recalling the farm crises of the 1980s where the farm sector was pinpointed as one of the major precursors of such crises, this study is an attempt to validate if the agricultural sector can once again be considered as a major instigator of the current financial crises.

An early warning model is developed based on factors that may cause bank failures, with special attention given to the role of the agricultural lending portfolios of commercial banks. The model will have several time period versions that will determine the length of time prior to the actual bank bankruptcy declarations that early warning signals could be detected.

The empirical results indicate that credit exposure to the farm sector does not necessarily enhance a bank's tendency to fail or its probability of success or survival. This lends support to the reality that agricultural loan delinquency rates are consistently below the banks' overall loan delinquency rates, thus confirming that agricultural lenders are in relatively stronger financial health. This study instead finds that costly funding arrangements, increasing interest rate risk, and declining asset quality can be possible early warning signals that can be detected as far back as two or three years before eventual bank failure.

This study differentiates itself from previous studies by its special focus on the role of the agricultural finance industry in the ensuing economic crises. This study's early warning model also presents an extended version of previous empirical models as it accounts for measures of capital adequacy, asset quality, management risk, profitability, liquidity risk, loan portfolio composition and risk, funding arrangement, structural and macroeconomic variables.

This paper investigates how well regulator examinations predict bank failures and how best to incorporate examination information into an econometric model of time‐to‐failure. We estimate proportional hazard models with time‐varying covariates and find that examiner ratings help explain the failure hazard. Both the overall rating of a bank's condition and management, i.e., the composite CAMELS rating, and ratings of specific components contain information. In addition, we find that the marginal “effect” of ratings is non‐linear, in that the impact of a rating downgrade on the hazard is larger, the weaker a bank's initial rating.

Focuses on an empirical investigation of service failures and service recovery in retail banking. Different types of failures, and the recovery strategies used by Greek banks to respond to them, were identified using the critical incident technique. A survey questionnaire was then developed to measure customers’ perceptions of the magnitude of service failures and the effectiveness of service recovery strategies. A number of research hypotheses were tested relating to customers’ evaluations of particular banking failures and recovery strategies, their previous experience of failures, demographic variables, and relationships with their banks. Service failures were found to be of varying importance and different service recovery strategies more effective for particular failures; further, customers with long relationships or high deposits with their banks were more demanding with respect to service recovery.

This study aims to identify factors influencing the bank failure rate in the USA over the period from 1970 to 2014 with an emphasis on economic/financial factors on the one hand and on banking legislation on the other hand. Regarding the latter, this study empirically investigates four major banking statutes: the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977; the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991; and the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. After adopting the technique of generalized method of moments (GMM), a robustness check in the form of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) is undertaken. Overall, the estimations imply that the bank failure rate was a decreasing function of the percentage growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP) and the real interest rate yields on both three-month US Treasury bills and 30-year fixed-rate mortgages and an increasing function of the real cost of funds. In addition, there is strong evidence that the bank failure rate was increased by provisions in the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 and the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, whereas the bank failure rate was decreased as a result of provisions in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 and the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Finally, there also is evidence that higher federal budget deficits elevated the bank failure rate.

After modeling the bank failure rate as a function of financial/economic variables and banking legislation, the times series from 1970 to 2014 is estimated by GMM and then by the ARCH techniques.

The results of the GMM and ARCH estimations imply that the bank failure rate in the US was a decreasing function of the percentage growth rate of real GDP as well as the real interest rate yields on both three-month US Treasury bills and 30-year fixed-rate mortgages and an increasing function of the real cost of funds. Furthermore, there is strong empirical support indicating that the bank failure rate was elevated by various provisions in the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 and in the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, while the bank failure rate was reduced by certain provisions in the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 and the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. There also is evidence that higher federal budget deficits increased the bank failure rate.

This study is the most contemporary (1970-2014) analysis of potential causes of the bank failure rate in the USA. The study also may be the first to apply the GMM and GARCH models to the problem. Also, some interesting policy implications are provided in the Conclusion.