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The purpose of this paper is first, to engage in a critical examination of the broad legislative framework of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 2008, in the United States; second, to provide an in‐depth understanding the legal basis, scope and nature of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) under the Act; third, to provide a legal analysis of the oversight provisions in the new Act; fourth, to examine the powers, responsibilities, functions and roles of the various new oversight offices set up under the new Act; fifth, to assess the economic and financial impact of implementation of the programme till early 2009; and to engage in a critical discussion of the limitations and shortcomings of TARP. The central focus of the paper is largely on TARP and the issues arising from using TARP as a legislative framework to facilitate the removal of toxic assets held by the various banks and financial institutions.

The larger approach used in this paper is a financial law approach. It is to facilitate an in‐depth analysis of the broader framework of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 2008, i.e. the legislative mechanism that establishes the TARP. The central issue of the paper is to examine the provisions in TARP in the broader context of its ability to take toxic assets off the balance sheets of banks and financial institutions. The approach, therefore, aims to aid a critical examination of the related legal, financial and economic issues arising out of the implementation of TARP. It relies extensively on official publications, testimonials and reports by various oversight bodies in the public domain, academic writings and newspaper reports to assess the impact of the programme and explore the related legal, regulatory and financial implications.

The findings in the paper relate to the impact and extent of the TARP till the present. It explores the basis, nature and scope of the implementation of the programme and outlines the various shortcomings and limitations. The paper concludes that there are various issues that need to be redressed for TARP or a similar programme to be more effective and transparent.

Various oversight reports and recommendations by official bodies are still expected as regards various spending, accountability and transparency issues related to TARP in the coming months. A new stimulus package of $787 billion was just approved by the US Congress and signed into law (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 2009) at the time this article was submitted for publication consideration. The article incorporates some issues relating to the new stimulus package as well as the Geithner plan, Public Private Investment Programme (PPIP), in the concluding section. However, substantial details are yet to emerge as to how the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 2009, establishing the stimulus package under the Obama government and the PPIP are both going to impact the future implementation of TARP and induce economic recovery at a broader level.

This paper is of immense significance to academics, jurists, consultants, legislators, policy‐makers, bankers, lawyers, auditors, consultants, researchers and anyone interested in financial and banking issues.

The purpose of this paper is to test the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the banking industry using Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) as an experimental backdrop.

The authors match banks that received TARP with CSR data on publicly available firms. Using this data set, the authors are able to perform both univariate and multivariate analyses to determine the impact of CSR on bank management behavior.

The authors find evidence that supports stakeholder theory as applied to a sample of large financial institutions. The authors show that banks increased their CSR involvement and intensity following TARP, evidence that CSR is not merely transitory in nature but structural and an important aspect of firm value. The authors also find that capital ratios increase to a greater degree in banks whose CSR ratings were stronger prior to TARP. Finally, while all banks in the sample repaid Treasury, it took strong CSR banks a longer time to repay than banks with weaker CSR. The authors show how CEO compensation played a role in this relationship.

The findings are limited to large banks.

Practically speaking, this study helps to discern the motivations and actions of large financial institutions. This is especially important from a regulator perspective, whose function is to maintain overall national financial stability.

This is the first study to link TARP and CSR literatures. Overall, there are a limited number of studies on CSR in the banking industry, and this paper adds to this burgeoning area. It is important and valuable to managers and policymakers to understand implications of CSR in the financial sector.

The purpose of this paper is to examine restrictions placed by the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) on executive compensation during the financial crisis. Since it remains unclear if TARP restored public confidence in financial institutions, the authors also analyze what effect such regulations had on investors’ confidence in the information provided by earning with respect to executive compensation during this critical period.

To test the assertions, the authors employ an Earnings Response Coefficient model, which captures the association between firms’ earnings surprise (ES) and perceived earnings informativeness. The authors implement both a long- and short-window test to obtain a better understanding of the effects of TARP on financial institutions’ earnings informativeness. The authors use the long-window approach to gather evidence about whether and how financial institutions’ ES are absorbed into security prices conditional on both their participation in TARP and their compliance with TARP’s compensation restrictions. The authors attempt to establish a stronger causal link by also using a short-window approach.

The authors find that firms paying their CEOs above the TARP threshold show higher earnings informativeness. Financial institutions that paid their CEOs above the TARP threshold achieved better performance during their participation in TARP. The authors also find that a decrease in total compensation while participating in TARP is associated with improved earnings informativeness. Lastly, separating total compensation into its cash and stock-based components, the authors find that firms improve earnings informativeness when they increase (decrease) cash (performance) compensation during TARP. However, overall earnings informativeness decreases during and after TARP relative to the pre-TARP period.

The research suggests that executive compensation incentives affect earnings informativeness and that tradeoffs are made between direct and indirect costs in retaining executives. The results have implications for policy makers, investors and researchers because the results allow policy makers and regulators to improve on how they design and implement accounting, market and finance regulations and reforms. Investors may potentially use the results when evaluating firm experiencing financial and, in some case, political distress. It also helps firms and offering optimal compensation contracts to create proper incentives for executives and ensure that managerial actions result in successful firm performance.

The study shows how firms react to changing regulations that affect executive compensation and earning informativeness. The results of the study allow regulators to potentially design more effective regulations by targeting certain aspects of firms’ operation such excessive risk-taking behavior and rent extraction opportunities.

There are very few studies that deal with how firms react to regulation that affect executive compensation. The authors provide evidence regarding what effect TARP and its compensation restrictions had on financial institutions’ earnings informativeness. The evidence in the study will further regulators’ understanding of whether TARP improved investors’ confidence in financial institutions. The paper also contributes to the understanding in how changes in executive compensation in times of high political scrutiny affect investors’ perceptions of firm performance.

This chapter analyses the causes and effects of the financial crisis that commenced in 2008, and it examines the dramatic government rescues and reforms. The outcomes of this, the most severe collapse to befall the United States and the global economy for three-quarters of a century, are still unfolding. Banks, homeowners and industries stood to benefit from government intervention, particularly the huge infusion of taxpayer funds, but their future is uncertain. Instead of extending vital credit, banks simply kept the capital to cover other firm needs (including bonuses for executives). Industry in the prevailing slack economy was not actively seeking investment opportunities and credit expansion. The property and job markets languished behind securities market recovery. It all has been disheartening and scary – rage against those in charge fuelled gloom and cynicism. Immense private debt was a precursor, but public debt is the legacy we must resolve in the future.

At the time they occurred, the savings and loan insolvencies were considered the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Contrary to what was then believed, and in sharp contrast with 2007–2009, they in fact had little macroeconomic significance. Savings and Loan (S&L) remediation cost between 2 percent and 3 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), whereas the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the conservatorships of Fannie and Freddie actually made money for the US Treasury. But the direct cost of government remediation is largely irrelevant in judging macro significance. What matters is the cumulative output loss associated with and plausibly caused by failing financial institutions. I estimate output losses for 1981–1984, 1991–1998, and 2007–2026 (the latter utilizing forecasts and projections along with actual data through 2015) and, for a final comparison, 1929–1941. The losses associated with 2007–2009 have been truly disastrous – in the same order of magnitude as the Great Depression. The S&L failures were, in contrast, inconsequential. Macroeconomists and policy makers should reserve the word crisis for financial disturbances that threaten substantial damage to the real economy, and continue efforts to identify in advance financial institutions which are systemically important (SIFI), and those which are not.

Vega et al. (2020) find that incentives in executive compensation result in higher earnings informativeness. The discussion focuses on two areas for improvement. First, the authors could look into additional measures of earnings quality. This further analysis could help us understand whether the enhanced earning informativeness stems from capital market effects or real effects. Second, the authors could consider replacing their main earnings response coefficient (ERC) model with one of the alternative ERC models in the literature. Three different ERC models are discussed.

This paper discusses capital market effects versus real effects and illustrates different ERC models.

The discussed paper could differentiate between capital market effects and real effects and use an alternative ERC model.

An accounting audience could be interested in the discussion on capital market effects versus real effects and the illustration on various ERC models.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an account of the financial crisis in Western Europe, primarily from a country‐level and banking sector perspective, from 2007 to the spring of 2009. It aims to detail measures enacted by governments and central banks to deal with impaired bank assets, recapitalize or otherwise resolve troubled banks, and inject liquidity into the banking system. It also aims to examine reform proposals aimed at creating a more secure and stable financial system.

The paper draws on factual material and analysis that is presented in central bank reports, other banking sector surveys and reports, media reports, and analysis by leading academics and practitioners sourced from published articles and books, working papers and blogs.

Recent firefighting measures to purchase impaired assets, recapitalize troubled banks, and inject liquidity have commanded widespread support, despite moral hazard concerns surrounding publicly funded bank bailouts. However, the roadmap to recovery remains uncertain. There is concern that significant volumes of impaired assets have been retained on many Western European bank balance sheets. Under the regulatory framework that is being shaped in response to the crisis, banks are expected to become leaner, more strongly capitalized and less highly leveraged, and to develop improved risk management practices.

This paper is written for a broad audience to provide a descriptive summary of the financial crisis in Western Europe, a survey of the debate concerning the implications for bank regulation and an extensive bibliography that will serve as a valuable resource for banking academics and practitioners.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a cohesive review of the major findings in the literature concerning the Global Financial Crisis.

Papers published in top-rated finance and economics journal since the crisis up to the present were reviewed. A large number of these were selected for inclusion, primarily based on the number of citations they had received adjusted for the amount of time elapsed since their publication, but also partly based on how well they fit in with the narrative.

Much has been done to investigate the causes of the Global Financial Crisis, its effects on various aspects of the financial system, and the effectiveness of regulatory measures undertaken to restore the financial system. While more remains to be done, the existing body of research paints an interesting picture of what happened and why it happened, describes the interrelationships between the mortgage markets and financial markets created by the large scale securitization of financial assets, identifies the problems created by these inter-linkages and offers possible solutions, and assesses the effectiveness of the regulatory response to the crisis.

This study summarizes a vast amount of literature using a framework that allows the reader to quickly absorb a large amount of information as well as identify specific works that they may wish to examine more closely. By providing a picture of what has been done, it may also assist the reader in identifying areas that should be the subject of future research.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the implicit subsidies received, in the form of stock market returns, from the perception that large banking organizations are too big to fail, and implications for financial regulation.

The empirical analysis focuses on the responses of stock prices of various size groups of banking organizations to announcement of government capital injections to banks (troubled assets relief program) during the 2008 financial crisis, and summarizes responses of regulatory authorities to the crisis.

The paper finds positive and statistically significant stock return reactions both for a portfolio of the large banking organizations that are part of the initial capital injection plan and a portfolio of the large banking organizations that are not part of the initial capital injection plan, implying a too‐big‐to‐fail (TBTF) effect, especially for the latter group of institutions.

The paper focuses on a short time frame of stock price reactions to specific events, for the largest US banks. Further examination of longer‐term stock price effects on US as well as foreign banks may be of interest.

The results have implications for the manner and scope of financial regulatory actions and changes in regulators' approaches to systemic risk and individual bank regulation.

The paper examines TBTF bank subsidy effects in response to a rapidly unfolding financial crisis. These have implications for longer term responses, particularly in the regulatory sphere.

The purpose of this paper is to establish the consensus about the tremendous economic success of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and explore theories of popular disapproval of TARP.

The analytical approach in this paper is a multivariate survey logit based on two Pew Research Center surveys that include questions on knowledge of and views on TARP. One survey is used to estimate a knowledge index of TARP that is applied to another survey to estimate the impact of knowledge on opinions of TARP.

The author finds that knowledge of TARP is dependent in particular on education, party affiliation, and sex. Controlling for partisan effects, views on TARP's effectiveness are distorted by limited knowledge of TARP in magnitudes that are politically significant.

Despite the severity and dramatic spillovers associated with banking crises, decisive interventions may prove difficult to defend in retrospect in light of ignorance and an inability to conceptualize the nature of the counterfactual.

This paper contributes to our understanding of the political economy of an important and controversial economic policy, in particular the roles of ideology and knowledge in accounting for public opposition to TARP. TARP is largely misunderstood. The author estimates a model of TARP knowledge based on this misconception, and shows that education, party affiliation/leaning, and sex are important predictors of TARP knowledge. By applying this model of TARP knowledge to a separate survey dataset, the author demonstrates that knowledge of TARP (along with political ideology) is an important predictor of support for TARP. By integrating two different surveys, he is able to better identify the role played by knowledge of TARP, rather than simply demographic characteristics.