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The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in which the USA has sought to hold the leading banks to account for the financial crisis and to asses the validity of the methods used. This is the first of two articles which looks at the basis of the Complaints against the banks and the settlements which led to the imposition of large fines on the banks.

The paper first provides an account of the government housing policy from 1995 to 2008 and argues that the cases brought against the banks and then at the legal basis of the charges. The methodology consists of a careful examination of the documentary evidence and an analysis of the changes in the relevant laws used by the Department of Justice when bringing charges against the banks.

The paper concludes that both the basis of the cases against the banks and the purpose of large fines are open to question.

Much of the information is available. However, as the major cases against the large banks did not go the court, and the basis of the fines is a settlement between the bank and the Department of Justice, each fine is supported by a relatively brief “Statement of the Facts”. The evidence amassed by subpoenas issued by the Department of Justice is not tested in court.

Much greater consideration must be given to more effective ways of holding banks and especially senior executives to account.

The imposition of large fines does not satisfy the public desire to see that justice is done. Such fines imposed on the ban are not likely to change bank behaviour.

Its originality lies in setting out an account of government housing policy and its role in the run-up to the financial crisis. No one has carried out a careful analysis of the cases against the large banks brought by the Department of Justice and, in the second article, by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.

Risk-based clearing has been proposed by Rausser et al. (2010) for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. This paper aims to illustrate the application of risk-based margins to a case study of the mortgage-backed securities derivative portfolio of the American International Group (AIG) during the period 2005-2008. There exists sufficient publicly available information to examine AIG’s derivative portfolio and how that portfolio would depend on conjectural changes in margin requirements imposed on its OTC derivative positions. Generally, such data on OTC derivative portfolio positions are unavailable in the public domain, and thus, the AIG data provide a unique opportunity for an objective evaluation.

This paper uses modern financial methodology to evaluate risk-based margining and collateralization for the major OTC derivative portfolio of the AIG.

This analysis reveals that a risk-based margin procedure would have led to earlier margin calls of greater magnitude initially than the collateral calls actually faced by AIG Financial Products (AIGFP). The total margin ultimately required by the risk-based procedure, however, is similar in magnitude to the collateral calls faced by AIGFP by August 2008. It is likely that a risk-based clearing procedure applied to AIG’s OTC contracts would have led to the AIG undertaking significant hedging and liquidation of their OTC positions well before the losses built up to the point they had, perhaps avoiding the federal government’s orchestrated restructuring that occurred in September 2008.

There has been no published risk-based evaluations of a major OTC portfolio of derivatives for any company, let alone the AIG.

The advent of derivatives and structured products has coincided with a proliferation of fixed income models used to analyze hedging, pricing, forecasting, and estimation for the term structure of interest rates. This article evaluates five models Ho‐Lee (HL); Black‐Derman‐Toy (BDT); Vasicek; Cox‐Ingersoll‐Ross (CIR); and Heath‐Jarrow‐Morton (HJM) (see Exhibit 1) that are currently used by structured finance practitioners. We suggest which models are most appropriate for assets with different time horizons, interest rate sensitivities and cashflow properties. The authors link model selection to structured financial instruments with the singular focus on the trade‐off between model precision/complexity and calculation costs.

This paper presents the first known non‐proprietary empirical examination of the relationship between Commercial Mortgage Backed Security (CMBS) pricing. CMBS prices are examined as a function of the “moneyness” of the default option, the age of the security, the interest rate, interest rate volatility, property price volatility, amortization features and yield curve slope utilizing a proprietary data set of monthly prices on 40 CMBS securities. We find that though the senior tranche CMBS in the sample are effectively immune from default loss per se, they are not immune from early return of principal and resulting duration shift implied by increasing default probabilities. Thus, they behave very much like residential mortgage backed securities in that discount security prices are positively related to explanatory variables associated with potential shifts in duration. As a result, senior tranche CMBS prices increase with explanatoryd factors that raise the likelihood of default such as property volatility and loan to value ratio whereas CMBS prices decrease with variables that lower default probability such as amortization. These empirical results fit well with existing theoretical models of multi‐tranche CMBS pricing and models of commercial mortgage default and suggest that senior tranche CMBS may embody elements of risk that justify their seemingly rich spreads to similar duration corporate securities.

Social scientists have long been interested in how political institutions affect economic performance. Nowhere are these effects more apparent today than in the current U.S. financial meltdown. This article offers an analysis of the meltdown by showing how government regulation among other things helped cause it. Specifically, the article shows how regulatory reforms closely associated with neoliberalism created perverse incentives that contributed significantly to the increased lending in the mortgage market and increased speculation in other financial markets even as such behavior was becoming increasingly risky. The result was the failure of mortgage firms, banks, a major insurance company, and eventually the market for short-term business loans, which triggered a general liquidity crisis thereby thrusting the entire economy into a severe recession. Implications for future research are explored. The article also offers a few policy prescriptions and an assessment of their political viability going forward.

The purpose of this summary is to provide excerpts of selected Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Regulatory Notices and Disciplinary Actions issued in April, May, and June 2010.

The paper provides excerpts from FINRA Regulatory Notice 10‐18, Master Accounts and Sub‐Accounts; 10‐22, Regulation D Offerings; 10‐23, Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE); 10‐24, Trade Reporting; 10‐27, Customer Complaint Reporting; and 10‐30, Trading‐Pause Pilot Program; provides summaries of selected disciplinary actions.

(10‐18) If a firm has notice that the sub‐accounts of a master account have different beneficial ownership (but does not know the identities of the beneficial owners) or the firm is privy to facts and/or circumstances that would reasonably raise the issue as to whether the sub‐accounts, in fact, may have separate beneficial owners, then the firm must inquire further and satisfy itself as to the beneficial ownership of each such sub‐account. (10‐22) A broker‐dealer has a duty – enforceable under federal securities laws and FINRA rules – to conduct a reasonable investigation of securities that it recommends, including those sold in a Regulation D offering. (10‐23) On February 22, 2010, the SEC approved the second major proposed expansion of TRACE to include Asset‐backed Securities as TRACE‐Eligible Securities, to require the reporting of Asset‐backed Securities transactions and to establish reporting fees. (10‐27) Starting on July 1, 2010, the beginning of the third calendar quarter, firms must use revised and new product codes to report statistical information regarding written customer complaints relating to annuities and life settlement products. (10‐30) On June 10, 2010, FINRA began a pilot program in which it will halt trading otherwise than on an exchange with respect to securities included in the S&P 500® Index where the primary listing market has issued a trading pause due to extraordinary market volatility. Selected disciplinary actions: FINRA announced that it has settled charges with two additional firms relating to the sale of auction rate securities (ARS) that became illiquid when auctions froze in February 2008. FINRA announced that it has fined five broker‐dealers a total of $385,000 for the illegal sale of more than 8 billion shares of penny stock on behalf of their customers.

These are direct excerpts designed to provide a useful digest for the reader and an indication of regulatory trends. The FINRA staff is aware of this summary but has neither reviewed nor edited it. For further detail as well as other useful information, the reader should visit www.finra.org.

In August 2007 the Mainsail II SIV-Lite was frozen by its trustee as a result of the ongoing credit crisis. The state of Maine held $20 million of Mainsail commercial paper in its Cash Pool portfolio, a short-term portfolio that puts temporary, excess state revenues to work. When word of the potential loss became public, the Treasurer came under attack. The case introduces the functions of a state Treasury department, with particular emphasis on the investment objectives and guidelines for the cash pool as well as its composition. The case reviews the events leading up to and including August 2007, the month when the credit markets first began to seize and when the financial crisis effectively began. It examines securitization, structured finance, and the Mainsail SIV-Lite structure in some detail.

The recent financial crisis provides an opportunity to examine the management of local government investment pools (LGIPs). This study examines asset concentration of current LGIPs to find if investment practices of LGIPs are consistent with the objective of prudent management of public funds. Using cross-sectional data of 72 LGIP portfolios, exploratory factor analysis was conducted. Findings suggest that there are five underlying factors that describe the investment practices of current LGIP portfolios. The findings also suggest that LGIP investment managers considered return on investment when they chose investment instruments. However, LGIP managers put more focus on the safety of investment when they allocated assets in their portfolio.

The purpose of this paper is to provide selected Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) Regulatory Notices and Disciplinary Actions issued in June, July, and August 2012.

The paper provides FINRA Regulatory Notice 12‐40, SEC Approves New FINRA Rule 5123 Regarding Private Placements of Securities; Regulatory Notice 12‐44, SEC Approves Amendments to FINRA Rule 4210 (Margin Requirements); Regulatory Notice 12‐55, Guidance on FINRA's Suitability Rule; and Regulatory Notice 13‐13, Trading and Quotation Halts in OTC Equity Securities; Trade Reporting Notice of April 17, 2013: Reduction of Reporting Times for Agency Pass‐Through Mortgage‐Backed Securities Traded TBA.

Notice 12‐40: FINRA Rule 5123 is part of a multi‐pronged approach to enhance oversight and investor protection in private placements; the rule will provide FINRA with more timely and complete information about the private placement activities of firms on behalf of other issuers. Notice 12‐44: The SEC approved amendments to FINRA Rule 4210 (Margin Requirements) related to option spread strategies, maintenance margin requirements for non‐margin eligible equity securities, free‐riding, “exempt accounts” and stress testing in portfolio margin accounts. Notice 12‐55: This Notice addresses two issues discussed in Regulatory Notice 12‐25: the scope of the terms “customer” and “investment strategy.” Notice 12‐25 provided guidance in a “frequently asked questions” format in FINRA Rule 2111 (Suitability). Notice 13‐13: The SEC approved amendments to FINRA Rule 6440, which provides authority for FINRA to initiate trading and quotation halts in OTC equity securities in circumstances where it is necessary to protect investors and the public; the rule provides authority to impose foreign regulatory halts, derivative halts and extraordinary event halts. Trade Reporting Notice of April 17, 2013: FINRA reminds firms of the coming reduction in reporting periods for the timely reporting of transactions in agency pass‐through mortgage‐backed securities traded TBA (to be announced) for good delivery and products not traded for good delivery.

These FINRA notices are selected to provide a useful indication of regulatory trends.