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This paper aims to explore Islamic finance’s resilience in times of financial crisis and considers Islamic finance’s viability as an alternative to the current financial system.

Established on a review of theoretical aspects underlying the notion of Islamic finance being proficient of reducing the harshness of financial crises and a latent solution to financial volatility, this paper assesses actual performance of Islamic and conventional banks during and in the repercussion of the current financial crisis. Interviews were also conducted with managers of Islamic banks.

The paper concludes that performance of Islamic banks during the global financial crisis is found to be supportive of their argued resilience and consistency. However, the latest financial crisis has brought to light a number of theoretical and realistic issues that challenge Islamic finance and its absorbing capacity against financial crises.

The paper is an original work which suggests about moderating risks and proposing various ways in which the Islamic finance can be made more stable and resilient.

This paper investigates the significant increase in S corporation banks converting to C corporations following the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) and the shift in motivations behind these conversions.

The paper uses bank-level panel data from Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) Call Reports to analyze the determinants of S bank conversions after the TCJA, comparing post-TCJA conversion trends with pre-TCJA trends utilizing an ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistics model.

The study finds that post-TCJA conversions are primarily driven by financially stable banks seeking improved tax conditions and relaxed shareholder restrictions as C corporations. This contrasts with pre-TCJA conversions, which were predominantly driven by financially distressed S corporation banks seeking new equity capital to maintain solvency.

The findings necessitate a comprehensive reconsideration of the Subchapter S status' sustained relevance for smaller institutions, especially in light of the comparative benefits now offered by the C corporation status post-TCJA. The results underscore the importance of ongoing academic investigation to deepen the understanding of the evolving fiscal landscape's effects on community banks, thereby contributing to the knowledge of the resilience and health of the US economy.

This research nudges policymakers and regulators to contemplate the ongoing relevance and advantages of the S corporation status. Given the substantial benefits conferred by the C corporation status in the post-TCJA environment, this study suggests that retaining the S corporation status may not offer the same appeal for smaller community banks as it once did.

This paper contributes to the broader understanding of the impact of tax policy on businesses' organizational choices, particularly in the banking industry and emphasizes the need for a comprehensive review of the S corporation status to assess its ongoing applicability in fostering small and community-focused financial institutions in light of the evolved corporate tax landscape.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the long‐term impact of the current financial and economic crisis on competition in the European Union (EU) banking sector.

The article first discusses the long term role of competition in the banking sector, commenting on policy developments prior to the crisis. Then the impact of the crisis is discussed focusing on two main areas of policy state: aids and bank regulation and supervision. The article culminates with the conclusions.

The main findings about state aids are that the efforts of the Commission to ensure that aided companies would not use the government support to distort competition seem to be working. However, given that the full impact on competition of these aids may take years to be felt, the Commission should be prepared to take action where necessary to ensure that competition will be protected. The provision of state aids could not have been avoided due to the grave systemic risks associated with bank failures. In respect of regulation and supervision, the article concluded that there is a lot of work to be done in this area to ensure that mistakes that led to the crisis will not be repeated but also that there is need for the Commission to ensure that the reforms to the regulatory and supervisory architecture do not occur at the expense of competition.

The article contains proposals about policy adjustments, thus contributing to the ongoing debate about the role of competition policy in the efforts to address the impact of the crisis.

The purpose of this paper is first, to engage in a critical examination of the broad legislative framework of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 2008, in the United States; second, to provide an in‐depth understanding the legal basis, scope and nature of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) under the Act; third, to provide a legal analysis of the oversight provisions in the new Act; fourth, to examine the powers, responsibilities, functions and roles of the various new oversight offices set up under the new Act; fifth, to assess the economic and financial impact of implementation of the programme till early 2009; and to engage in a critical discussion of the limitations and shortcomings of TARP. The central focus of the paper is largely on TARP and the issues arising from using TARP as a legislative framework to facilitate the removal of toxic assets held by the various banks and financial institutions.

The larger approach used in this paper is a financial law approach. It is to facilitate an in‐depth analysis of the broader framework of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 2008, i.e. the legislative mechanism that establishes the TARP. The central issue of the paper is to examine the provisions in TARP in the broader context of its ability to take toxic assets off the balance sheets of banks and financial institutions. The approach, therefore, aims to aid a critical examination of the related legal, financial and economic issues arising out of the implementation of TARP. It relies extensively on official publications, testimonials and reports by various oversight bodies in the public domain, academic writings and newspaper reports to assess the impact of the programme and explore the related legal, regulatory and financial implications.

The findings in the paper relate to the impact and extent of the TARP till the present. It explores the basis, nature and scope of the implementation of the programme and outlines the various shortcomings and limitations. The paper concludes that there are various issues that need to be redressed for TARP or a similar programme to be more effective and transparent.

Various oversight reports and recommendations by official bodies are still expected as regards various spending, accountability and transparency issues related to TARP in the coming months. A new stimulus package of $787 billion was just approved by the US Congress and signed into law (American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 2009) at the time this article was submitted for publication consideration. The article incorporates some issues relating to the new stimulus package as well as the Geithner plan, Public Private Investment Programme (PPIP), in the concluding section. However, substantial details are yet to emerge as to how the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 2009, establishing the stimulus package under the Obama government and the PPIP are both going to impact the future implementation of TARP and induce economic recovery at a broader level.

This paper is of immense significance to academics, jurists, consultants, legislators, policy‐makers, bankers, lawyers, auditors, consultants, researchers and anyone interested in financial and banking issues.

Toxic real estate has been used as a negative phrase to describe non‐performing assets on a firm's balance sheet. Today there is another form of “TOXIC” real estate that needs management's attention, i.e. physical workplaces that are harmful to employees on a day‐in and day‐out basis. Particularly when productivity of workforce is now central to business competitiveness, it is timely to explore the interface between physical and social environments as many of the social/psychological impacts on employees have not been recognized or calibrated. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the links between physical workplace and social behaviour.

In this conceptual paper, current literature relating to corporate real estate and environmental psychology are reviewed to investigate the links between physical workplace and social behaviour. The findings are synthesised to present a framework for understanding the cause of toxicity in the workplace and a self‐auditing preventive strategy.

This article argued that there is a link between physical workplace and the social behaviour of employees. Arising from toxic workplaces, two dysfunctional social behaviours are highlighted, i.e. bullying and destructive leadership. The paper then presents a logical plan to monitor and remediate these “TOXIC” conditions in the physical environment.

This paper is original in its angle to which social behaviour is juxtaposed against physical environment. In particular, by examining the negative interface, it informs managers of the risks to avoid and therefore identifies the baseline for which the physical workplace must be managed. It also makes a practical contribution by its development of a self‐auditing framework to avoid toxic workplaces.

This chapter analyses the causes and effects of the financial crisis that commenced in 2008, and it examines the dramatic government rescues and reforms. The outcomes of this, the most severe collapse to befall the United States and the global economy for three-quarters of a century, are still unfolding. Banks, homeowners and industries stood to benefit from government intervention, particularly the huge infusion of taxpayer funds, but their future is uncertain. Instead of extending vital credit, banks simply kept the capital to cover other firm needs (including bonuses for executives). Industry in the prevailing slack economy was not actively seeking investment opportunities and credit expansion. The property and job markets languished behind securities market recovery. It all has been disheartening and scary – rage against those in charge fuelled gloom and cynicism. Immense private debt was a precursor, but public debt is the legacy we must resolve in the future.

This chapter investigates the roles played by the Wall Street investment banks and commercial banks in triggering the worst financial crisis the markets have ever witnessed. The chapter also examines the shortcoming of the rating agencies, as well as failures of financial regulators during and after the crisis. The author proffers that the financial derivatives and other exotic financial instruments – including CDS, asset-backed securities (ABS), and collateralized debt obligation (CDO) – are not, in themselves, the financial “weapons of mass destruction” as it is being alleged. The author places the blame for the financial crises squarely and unreservedly at the doorstep of the unscrupulous and reckless institutional market practitioners, the unprofessional attitude and approach of the rating agencies as well as the regulatory failure on the part of the financial regulators and other gate keepers.