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The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether regulatory restriction on executive compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises is beneficial to firm performance. The authors also examine the role of monitoring mechanisms in offsetting the effect of compensation restriction.

Multivariate analysis is conducted using archival data from Chinese listed companies over the period of 2007-2014.

The findings show that the restriction on executive compensation is negatively associated with a firm’s accounting performance, and this negative effect is ameliorated in firms with good internal control and a high level of institutional shareholding. Additional analysis reveals that the negative effect of pay restriction on firm performance is more pronounced in central government-controlled listed SOEs than in those controlled by local government.

This study is the first to investigate a government’s say-on-pay policy. Specifically, the findings pinpoint the inefficacy of regulatory intervention in corporate executive compensation. The findings add to compensation literature using China’s unique institutional setting.

This paper aims to examine the impact of public scrutiny on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation at Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms.

This paper uses the unique opportunity provided by the 2008 financial crisis and, in particular, government support and legislated compensation restrictions in the US Department of the Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). It aggregates monetary and non-monetary executive compensation information from 2006 to 2012, with firm- and manager-level data. It presents univariate summary compensation results and uses multivariate regression analysis to isolate the impact of public scrutiny and legislated compensation restrictions on executive pay.

Overall, the results are consistent, with increased public scrutiny having a lasting impact on perks and temporary impact on wage and legislated compensation restrictions having a temporary impact on wage. Changes in specific perk items provide evidence on which perks firms perceive as excessive and which provide common value.

The paper contributes to the discussion of perks as excess by introducing a novel data set of perk compensation at S&P500 firms and by studying how firms choose to alter levels of specific perk items in response to increased public scrutiny and legislated compensation restrictions. The paper contributes to the literature on executive pay as there has been little inquiry into the impact of public scrutiny on compensation. Public scrutiny could be an important source of external governance if firms change behavior in response to explicit and implicit scrutiny costs.

The purpose of this paper is to examine restrictions placed by the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) on executive compensation during the financial crisis. Since it remains unclear if TARP restored public confidence in financial institutions, the authors also analyze what effect such regulations had on investors’ confidence in the information provided by earning with respect to executive compensation during this critical period.

To test the assertions, the authors employ an Earnings Response Coefficient model, which captures the association between firms’ earnings surprise (ES) and perceived earnings informativeness. The authors implement both a long- and short-window test to obtain a better understanding of the effects of TARP on financial institutions’ earnings informativeness. The authors use the long-window approach to gather evidence about whether and how financial institutions’ ES are absorbed into security prices conditional on both their participation in TARP and their compliance with TARP’s compensation restrictions. The authors attempt to establish a stronger causal link by also using a short-window approach.

The authors find that firms paying their CEOs above the TARP threshold show higher earnings informativeness. Financial institutions that paid their CEOs above the TARP threshold achieved better performance during their participation in TARP. The authors also find that a decrease in total compensation while participating in TARP is associated with improved earnings informativeness. Lastly, separating total compensation into its cash and stock-based components, the authors find that firms improve earnings informativeness when they increase (decrease) cash (performance) compensation during TARP. However, overall earnings informativeness decreases during and after TARP relative to the pre-TARP period.

The research suggests that executive compensation incentives affect earnings informativeness and that tradeoffs are made between direct and indirect costs in retaining executives. The results have implications for policy makers, investors and researchers because the results allow policy makers and regulators to improve on how they design and implement accounting, market and finance regulations and reforms. Investors may potentially use the results when evaluating firm experiencing financial and, in some case, political distress. It also helps firms and offering optimal compensation contracts to create proper incentives for executives and ensure that managerial actions result in successful firm performance.

The study shows how firms react to changing regulations that affect executive compensation and earning informativeness. The results of the study allow regulators to potentially design more effective regulations by targeting certain aspects of firms’ operation such excessive risk-taking behavior and rent extraction opportunities.

There are very few studies that deal with how firms react to regulation that affect executive compensation. The authors provide evidence regarding what effect TARP and its compensation restrictions had on financial institutions’ earnings informativeness. The evidence in the study will further regulators’ understanding of whether TARP improved investors’ confidence in financial institutions. The paper also contributes to the understanding in how changes in executive compensation in times of high political scrutiny affect investors’ perceptions of firm performance.

The authors study and compare the effects of three CEO compensation restricting policies issued by the Chinese government in 2009, 2012 and 2015. This paper aims to shed light on the conditions under which CEO compenstation can be effectively regulated without negatively affecting firm performance.

These policies targeted state-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs). Using these policies as natural experiments, the authors investigate how their effects differ on CEO compensation, firm performance and two known performance-decreasing mechanisms: perk consumption and tunneling activities.

The authors show that restricting CEO pay does not necessarily backfire in terms of deteriorating firm performance. This non-decreasing firm performance can be achieved by restricting perk consumption and tunneling activities while introducing CEO pay regulations.

The authors exploit a powerful experimental setting in the context of China. The evidence contributes to the literature on CEO pay regulations and is relevant to the managerial decisions of policy makers and boards of directors.

Following the provisions of the Planning and Compensations Act, 1991 we have a planning system under which, in principle, no compensation is paid for the refusal of planning permission. One way remains by which compensation can still be obtained – it is by way of a purchase notice under section 137 of the Town and Country Planning Act or section 32 of the Listed Building Act, 1990. Examines the legal rules governing purchase notices and then goes on to analyse the valuation and compensation implications.

The purpose of this paper is to explore why the stagnant version of amateurism that is being used by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and its member institutions to limit student–athlete compensation is creating labor law and antitrust violations, and ultimately contributing to a black market in college athletics.

The qualitative portion of the examination uses a review of historic and recent cases regarding labor law and antitrust violations and applies them to the college athletic industry. Furthermore, the quantitative portion creates a scaled revenue sharing calculation utilizing financial reports from university athletic departments and corresponding professional revenue-sharing agreements to discern an approximate value of a student–athlete’s participation.

The authors find that the current structure of the NCAA and regulatory framework perpetuate injustice for those who lack a voice in the system. Furthermore, the research shows a wage disparity of millions of dollars creating a lack of free market and black-market tensions to reach free market equilibrium.

This research creates reasoning to restructure the NCAA system to adjust for modern commercialization and profits of the industry.

This paper highlights the legal and regulatory abuses by the NCAA, and demonstrates how the compensation gap created by these legal violations is creating a strain on free market flow ultimately leading to a black-market effect in the industry.

The purpose of this paper is to test the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the banking industry using Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) as an experimental backdrop.

The authors match banks that received TARP with CSR data on publicly available firms. Using this data set, the authors are able to perform both univariate and multivariate analyses to determine the impact of CSR on bank management behavior.

The authors find evidence that supports stakeholder theory as applied to a sample of large financial institutions. The authors show that banks increased their CSR involvement and intensity following TARP, evidence that CSR is not merely transitory in nature but structural and an important aspect of firm value. The authors also find that capital ratios increase to a greater degree in banks whose CSR ratings were stronger prior to TARP. Finally, while all banks in the sample repaid Treasury, it took strong CSR banks a longer time to repay than banks with weaker CSR. The authors show how CEO compensation played a role in this relationship.

The findings are limited to large banks.

Practically speaking, this study helps to discern the motivations and actions of large financial institutions. This is especially important from a regulator perspective, whose function is to maintain overall national financial stability.

This is the first study to link TARP and CSR literatures. Overall, there are a limited number of studies on CSR in the banking industry, and this paper adds to this burgeoning area. It is important and valuable to managers and policymakers to understand implications of CSR in the financial sector.

The paper aims to determine whether the type selection and parameters determination of the compensation are most important for yielding the acceptable or optimized characteristics in design of hydrostatic bearings.

This paper utilizes the equations of flow equilibrium to determine the film thickness or displacement of worktable with respect to the recess pressure.

The stiffness due to compensation of constant‐flow pump increases monotonically as recess pressure increases. Also, the paper considers which is larger than that due to orifice compensation and capillary compensation at the same recess pressure ratio.

The findings show that the usage range of recess pressure and compensation parameters can be selected to correspond to the smallest gradient in variations of worktable displacement or film thickness.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the static stiffness of hydrostatic bearings with three constant compensations in types of constant‐flow pump, capillary and orifice, and both single‐action and double‐action variable restrictors with cylindrical‐spool, tapered‐spool, and membrane types by film gradient and recess pressure.

This paper utilizes the equations of flow equilibrium to determine the variations of film thickness or displacement of loading table with respect to the varying of recess pressure. For a hydrostatic bearing whose recess pressures are controlled by compensations, the stiffness characteristics can be presented directly by these variations.

The usage range of recess pressure and compensation parameters should be selected to correspond to a variation with smallest gradient.

This paper proposes an extensive database as a critical requirement for the selection of types and parameters of the compensation as to yield the acceptable or optimized characteristics in design of hydrostatic bearings.

This paper is the third part of a serial studies for constant and variable compensations of the closed-type hydrostatic thrust bearings which has face-to-face recesses couple. The static stiffness of closed-type hydrostatic thrust bearings can then be obtained from the differentiation of recess pressure with respect to worktable displacement. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

In this paper, the double-action restrictors of cylindrical-spool-type and tapered-spool-type are taken into consideration for variable compensation of hydrostatic bearings.

The static stiffness in thrust direction of hydrostatic bearing is determined by the flow continuity equations that are formulated by film flow and compensation flow for each recess, respectively. The type selection and parameter determination of the double-action spool-type restrictors can be obtained from finding results of this study for maximum stiffness in design of hydrostatic bearings.

This study reveals that the appropriate range of recess pressure ratio and design parameters of restrictors for the maximum stiffness can be obtained, the avoidance of negative stiffness is also provided.