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The aim of this study is to analyse the transformation of the Ecuadorian financial system using the regulatory dialectic approach (Kane, 1977). This research examines the initial conditions and motivating factors of the reform process, as well as the interplay between government and bankers during the period 2007-2012.

Kane’s regulatory dialectic suggests that regulation of financial institutions is a series of cyclical interactions between opposing political and economic forces. Three main stages are identified: thesis (measures and regulatory actions), antithesis (avoidance/lobby against those reforms) and synthesis (adaptive reregulation resulting from the interaction between interest groups).

Since 2007, the government focused on regulating interest rates, developing a liquidity fund for banking emergencies, increasing taxation and restricting international capital flows. These government initiatives took place against a background of conflicting interests. Private bankers opposed the majority regarding them as burdensome new rules, rather than enlightened reforms. Publicly, these reforms as intended by the government were seemingly supported. Finally through the political process, they were approved. To date, these reforms have strengthened the financial system, produced encouraging social policy results and placed the financial sector to serve the government’s development strategy.

Using Kane’s notion of regulatory dialectic, we explain the process of financial reform in Ecuador as part of a cyclical interaction between opposing forces. Drawing on this framework enabled insight into the nature of government intervention. Hence, we show how that intervention affected the growth, development and structure of the banking system.

Purpose – To discuss, from the perspective of developing countries, recent proposals for reforming international standards for bank capital requirements.

Methodology/approach – After evaluating, from the viewpoint of developing countries, the effectiveness of capital requirements reforms and progress in implementing existing regulatory accords, the chapter discusses the procyclical effects of Basel regimes, and suggests a reform proposal.

Findings – Minimum bank capital requirements proposals in developing countries should be complemented by the adoption of an incremental, size-based leverage ratio.

Originality/value of chapter – This chapter contributes to enlarge the academic and policy debate related to bank capital regulation, with a particular focus on the situation of developing countries.

This paper provides evidence that the banking sector reforms of 2004 and 2009 enhanced prudential performance of the banking industry and financial system stability in Nigeria.

This study uses regression analysis with regime shift to confirm results from tests of two means and variances model to examine the effectiveness of banking sector reforms in Nigeria.

Evidence from the regression model agrees with findings from the test of means model (not controlling for trend effects) that capital to assets ratio rose while non-performing loan ratio declined after the reforms, and that capital to earning assets ratio rose when trend effects were accounted for. Both the regression model and the tests of means model controlling for trend effects show that return on asset, return on equity and return on earning assets ratios declined after the reforms.

This paper evaluated the effectiveness of banking sector reforms in Nigeria using models that avoid weaknesses that besieged many previous studies. It however used data covering 1983–2020 period, due to data availability. A larger scope of data may improve the results, and future research may re-examine this theme as more data become available. Furthermore, banking stability issues could be examined using specialised techniques such as the generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model and related family.

These results suggest that the reforms led to improvement in the sector’s resilience (risks-absorbing capacity) and asset quality, and that profitability had not been the primary focus of the reforms.

The authors recommend that regulatory and supervisory authorities in Nigeria continue to implement and improve on banking sector reforms for a more resilient and functional banking system. As a contribution to social research, this study shows that studies on policy evaluation should be located within appropriate theoretical framework: the theory of change. It shows that an appropriate use of attribution analysis and contribution analysis within this theoretical framework engenders robust analysis and results. Otherwise, the analytical findings would be erroneous and policy advice misguided.

The statistical significance of our findings establishes that the banking sector reforms in Nigeria have been effective in promoting financial system stability in Nigeria. By deploying both the test of means with and without trend effects (an attribution analysis) and the multivariate regression analysis with regulatory shift (a contribution analysis), and relying more on the later for its superiority, this study contributes to the body of knowledge in that, it not only determined the true effects of banking sector reforms in Nigeria for appropriate policy guidance but also demonstrated that, in research, an inappropriate methodology produces results that may diverge from the more accurate ones that were derived from the correct methodology.

The purpose of this paper is to underline the (hidden) risks posed after the crisis by the exemption of non-financial operators, especially sovereigns, from the regulatory reforms of over the counter (OTC) derivatives undertaken by G20 countries in the absence of accounting data on trading.

Recent financial regulatory improvements are reported to underline that the trading of OTC derivatives by sovereigns and local administrations does not take place under the new regulatory umbrella, because of the relative size of the institution, the lack of incentives to adhere to Centralized Counterparty Systems (CCPs) and most of all, the absence of proper accounting rules. Sovereigns and local administrations have the potential to undermine global financial stability.

The limited availability of accounting data on derivatives’ use by public administrations constitutes a barrier towards a full comprehension of risks involved. Sovereigns should be compelled to adhere to the CCPs and the collateralized system of trading; the short-term costs of adhering to CCPs are worth $20bn.

The new regulatory system failed to explicitly consider the trading of sovereigns and this can reduce the effectiveness of regulation itself and can have negative impact on financial stability; in fact, omitting sovereigns from these regulations represent a significant risk oversight because they are systemically important players, although with a special political power.

Despite progress made in improving the transparency and resilience of OTC derivative markets after the subprime crisis, sovereigns and public administrations are exempted from the new regulation, posing severe risks to financial stability.

This study examines the contemporaneous changes in the reporting regime in Nigeria by investigating the effect of regulatory changes on audit fees as well as the moderating effect of overlapping directorship and financial reporting quality.

This study utilises a longitudinal sample of 409 firm-year observations, from 2008 to 2013, of nonfinancial companies listed on the Nigerian stock exchange. The study uses the general method of moments (GMM) to control for endogeneity concerns.

The results reveal that, without the moderating effect of overlapping directorship and financial reporting quality, the relationship between regulatory changes and audit fees is positive but weak, which suggests that regulatory changes drive cost. Similarly, the interaction of overlapping directorship did not reverse the positive relationship, which suggests the perceived risk associated with overlapping directorship. However, the improvement in financial reporting quality reverses the relationship, as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient on the interacted terms.

This study provides useful insights about committee membership overlap to regulatory authorities concerning the weakness of the monitoring ability of such committees.

The results of this study contribute to the growing literature on regulatory reform, audit fees and corporate governance. Specifically, the study provides empirical evidence on the effect of committee overlap on audit fees, which, to the best of the researchers' knowledge, has received no empirical attention in the Nigerian context.

In 1974, the UN General Assembly adopted a landmark resolution proclaiming the establishment of a New International Economic Order. One of the basic aims of this declaration was to enhance the voice and participation of developing countries in the international economic decision-making process based on norms of equitable governance. More than four decades have passed since its adoption. This paper aims to reflect on the past 43 years of the global financial regulatory system in light of the notion of equitable governance as envisioned by the “New International Economic Order”.

This paper surveys the global financial regulatory system from the vantage point of equitable economic governance. This discussion covers the period that comes after the 1974 UN landmark resolutions that declare the establishment of a “New International Economic Order”. The authors use qualitative and quantitative approach in this study. They use descriptive statistics and intuitive discussions of certain cases to carry the objective of the paper forward.

First, part of the development in global financial regulation manifests the establishment of informal networks that embark on global regulatory issues, while being very exclusive in their membership policies. Second, the lack of full and effective participation of developing countries in the decision-making and norm setting remains unsolved in the global financial regulatory system. Third, the shadow role of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund was of great significance in assisting the implementation of non-binding regulatory rules of international finance in developing countries despite the concerns of legitimacy and equity in the making of international standards. In sum, the global financial regulatory system that emerged in the past four decades is quite different from that aspired by the NIEO.

The declaration of NIEO coincides with the collapse of the Bretton Wood’s fixed exchange rate which in turn leads to the emergence of a new financial system and regulatory development. This period marked the proliferation of informal networks that make policy recommendations or non-binding rules with global implications. As far as the literature review goes far, this paper is the first to survey the post Bretton Wood’s period of the global financial regulatory architecture based on the tenets of the “New International Economic Order”.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the legislative process, in order to determine the likely effectiveness of financial reform efforts in the USA.

Case study of the legislative process, particularly the less visible parts such as rule making, that shaped the passage and implementation of the Dodd‐Frank Act and the failed Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) reform.

It is found that the process of financial reform legislation is structured in such a way as to thwart major reform, at least in the short run.

The passage of a particular piece of legislation may be the least important element in the process of reform. Rule making and the decisions as to how a law will be implemented, can advance or significantly defeat the quest for change.

Much of what occurs in the legislative process is invisible, or appears arcane, to the ordinary citizen but can have major impact on their lives.

The paper provides a road map to understanding the least visible parts of financial reform efforts and suggests ways of achieving reform outcomes.

The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act calls for substantially increased government regulation. Whether those regulations are, in some sense, appropriate is a function of whether the benefits of the increased regulation exceed the costs. Those costs and benefits, however, are probably impossible to measure, at least at this early stage of the implementation of the Dodd–Frank reforms. On the other hand, financial professionals who regularly deal with governmental regulations probably have a good sense of the costs and benefits based on their own experience with other similar regulations. This chapter reports the result of a survey of high-level auditors and CFOs regarding their perceptions of the costs and benefits of the main parts of the financial regulatory reform incorporated into the Dodd–Frank legislation. It concludes that there is support among these individuals for some aspects of Dodd–Frank, but no consensus.

This chapter analyses the causes and effects of the financial crisis that commenced in 2008, and it examines the dramatic government rescues and reforms. The outcomes of this, the most severe collapse to befall the United States and the global economy for three-quarters of a century, are still unfolding. Banks, homeowners and industries stood to benefit from government intervention, particularly the huge infusion of taxpayer funds, but their future is uncertain. Instead of extending vital credit, banks simply kept the capital to cover other firm needs (including bonuses for executives). Industry in the prevailing slack economy was not actively seeking investment opportunities and credit expansion. The property and job markets languished behind securities market recovery. It all has been disheartening and scary – rage against those in charge fuelled gloom and cynicism. Immense private debt was a precursor, but public debt is the legacy we must resolve in the future.

This paper aims to consider recent arguments that post-crisis regulatory reform has misunderstood the nature of banks’ activities. These arguments suggest that a bank’s role is not that of intermediation between savers and borrowers but the systemically riskier one of private money creation.

The paper assesses whether banks’ activities are best understood as private money creation rather than intermediation. It considers the argument that regulatory reform has not gone far enough to prevent a recurrence of future credit spirals ending in financial crises.

This paper analyses banks’ activities and finds that it is incorrect to consider that they engage in relatively unfettered money creation. While fractional reserve banking does create flows of money through the economy, these flows are tethered to banks’ funding requirements. Multiple use of that money, rather than representing an ill-understood risk, simply reflects the nature of maturity transformation. This has not been missed in designing the post-crisis regulatory framework. The revised framework contains many features that are not fully recognised by proponents of the money creation critique and goes significantly further than they allow. Once completed, it will address many of the concerns they raise. They are right to call for further consideration of whether the countercyclical features of the new framework are sufficiently developed.

The paper provides an early detailed response to recent criticism of the post-crisis regulatory reform programme coming from a money creation perspective of banks’ role in the economy.